An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

by David Hume

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Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Classics, Politics, Empiricism, 18th Century, Psychology

98 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1751

About the author

David Hume was a Scottish historian, philosopher, economist, diplomat and essayist known today especially for his radical philosophical empiricism and scepticism.

In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.

His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.

Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.

Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.

Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".

Reviews

[Fergus, Weaver of Autistic Webs · Rating 4 out of 5]

I run hot and cold when it comes to David Hume...

An eighteenth century philosopher who antedated postmodern deconstructionism by several centuries, with this one massive blow of his critical axe he shook the ethical foundation of inherited tradition into the first tremors of its ruin.

Ethics would never be the same again - until, some say, that Teutonic quibbler Immanuel Kant.

I am one of those who agree, for Kant re-established ethics on its firm Christian foundation.

But Hume?

Like me he was prone to novel nervous conditions, which in his case grew steadily worse and worse. My contention is you can NEVER - as is, alas, the case nowadays - graft Christian charity onto a trunk of a sceptical humanism.

It just won’t flourish. So the Void leered into his innocent face from the depths of his enthusiasm.

Just like the paucity of traditional Christians nowadays - their faith just withers in the howling wind of Nothingness and dies.

No, Christian charity needs a strong source of nutrients. And scepticism can never give that, being rootless.

If you see life holistically and in sharp focus, scepticism will drown that vision unthinkingly, as a destructive cretin might do.

You can’t “see life steadily and see it whole” if you desert traditional faith and its concomitant artistic culture.

So said Matthew Arnold a century later.

But - enter Kant to the rescue...

He says that WILLING THAT MORAL GOODNESS BECOME UNIVERSAL (by your little and ordinary good deeds) is the only firm foundation for ethical behaviour.

Read his lips: if you discard all religious behaviour out of hand, you’re lost.

And will sink.

So next time you grow weary of religious cant and hypocrisy -

Don’t throw out the Baby of sincere Moral Behaviour -

With the Bathwater of sceptical Appearances!

[Peiman E iran · Rating 4 out of 5]

‎دوستانِ گرانقدر، این کتابِ ارزشمند، از ۹ فصل تشکیل شده است و زنده یاد «دیوید هیوم» خردمند، در این کتاب، به مسائلی همچون: اصولِ کلیِ اخلاق- خیرخواهی، عدالت، جامعهٔ سیاسی- فایده رسانی- خصایل مفید برای ما و دیگران - خوددوستی و احساسِ اخلاقی، پرداخته است
‎این مردِ بزرگ و فیلسوفِ خردگرا و تجربه گرا، به هیچ عنوان اخلاقیات، کردار، گفتار و پندارِ نیک را به موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی ارتباط نداده و مسائلِ اخلاقی را همچون هر انسانِ خردگرایِ دیگر، خارج از دایرهٔ دینی و الاهیات، موردِ بررسی قرار داده است
‎در زیر، به انتخاب جملاتی از این کتاب را برایِ شما دوستانِ گرامی، مینویسم
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‎تنها حقِ ویژه و امتیازِ انحصاریِ انسان که او را بالاتر از سایرِ موجودات مینشاند، حمایت کردن از فرودستانی است که خود را در پناهِ او قرار میدهند
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‎در ستایشِ یک انسانِ خیرخواه و مردمدار، عاملی وجود دارد که به عنوانِ ستونِ اصلیِ هر تحسینِ اخلاقی، به وفور بر آن تأکید میرود، و آن شادی و رضایتی است که از برکتِ معاشرت و حسنِ رفتارِ او برایِ جامعه حاصل میشود
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‎در تمامیِ تصمیم گیری هایِ اخلاقی، معیارِ فایده مندیِ عمومی، همواره مهمترین معیارِ موردِ نظر است
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‎فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی و حقیقتِ فلسفیِ آن ، همان متانت، راستگویی، انسانیت، سودمند بودن برایِ جامعه، گشاده رویی و تفریح و شادی میباشد و دیگر خبری از آموزه هایِ موهوم و دلتنگی آورِ الهی دانان و دینداران نیست.. در بینِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی و انسانی، دیگر از پارسایی و پرهیزکاری و سخت گیری بر نفس و عذاب کشیدن و خودستیزیِ بیهوده و عبادتِ موهومات، هیچ سخنی به میان نمی آید .. انسانِ خردمندی که بر مسیرِ این اصولِ اخلاقی و انسانی حرکت میکند، در هر لحظه از زندگی، شادی و خوشبختیِ خود و تمامیِ بشریت را آرزو دارد
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‎یک دیندارِ متعصب و شوم و خرگوش مغز که وی را قدیس و مردِ خدا مینامند، شاید پس از مرگش جایی در تقویمِ دینداران و موهوم پرستان پیدا کند، ولی به ندرت در هنگامِ حیات در روابطِ صمیمی و در اجتماع پذیرفته میشود، البته به جز از سویِ کسانی که مثلِ خودش هذیان گو، موهوم پرست و بیخرد هستند
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‎انسان، با خرد و عقلِ سلیم و بدونِ پیش داوری و بدونِ جلوه و جلایِ اغواگرِ خرافات و دین و مذهب، میتواند به بزرگترین خصائلِ اخلاقی دست یابد که هم برای خویش و هم برایِ دیگران مفید باشد... دینداری، عبادت، تجرد، سخت گیری، توبه نزدِ پرودگار، ریاضت، خود انکاری، سرافکندگی، سکوت، تنهایی و دیگر رفتار و گفتاری که نزدِ دینداران و دینفروشان به عنوانِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی شناخته میشود، از سویِ هر انسانِ فهیم و خردمندی طرد میشود، چراکه چنین مسائلِ دینی، به هیچ دردِ شخص و جامعه نمیخورد.. نه جهازِ خوشبختیِ خودِ شخص را میگستراند و نه او را به عضوی مفید برای جامعه تبدیل میکند و نه او را به پذیرایی و سرگرمیِ یاران تواناتر میکند و نه نیرویِ او را برایِ حظ و سعادتِ فردی افزایش میدهد.. این اوصاف و به اصطلاح موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی که به اشتباه فضیلت خوانده میشود، بر تمامیِ مقاصد و اخلاقیاتِ مطلوب، قلم میکشد.. این مسائلِ دینی عقل و فهم را ضایع، تخیل را کور و خلق و خویِ انسان را عبوس میکند.. بنابراین ما خردگرایان، این موارد و موضوعاتِ دینی را به جایِ قرار دادن در ستونِ فضیلتها، در ستونِ رذیلتها قرار میدهیم.. هیچ نیرویِ خرافی در میانِ مردمِ جهان چندان زورآمد نیست که این احساساتِ طبیعی را به کلی تباه کند
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‎ما به فضائلِ اخلاقیِ دیگران احترام میگذاریم و آن را میستاییم، تا مطمئن شویم که فضائلِ متناظری که در خودمان وجود دارد و نهایتاً شخصیتمان، در نگاهِ دیگران قابلِ احترام و ستایش است
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‎از اعمال و اطوارِ آدمی برخی تصوراتِ عامِ اخلاقی ساخته میشود و فلان رفتار در فلان موقعیت از آنان انتظار میرود، مثلاً گفته میشود که این عملِ خاص، مطابقِ قانونِ انتزاعیِ اخلاقی ما است و آن عملِ دیگر ناقضِ آن و به یُمنِ این اصولِ عمومیِ همه گیر است که احساساتِ خاص و موردیِ حبِ نفس، کنترل و محدود میشود و میتوان گفت این چنین است که فضیلت و رذیلت شناخته میشود و اخلاقیات تشخیص داده میشوند
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‎من متقاعد شده ام که وقتی کسی خیلی به خود مطمئن و افاده باز باشد، عموماً بیشتر هم در معرضِ خطا میباشد و افسارِ خویش را بدونِ تعمق و تعلیق که تنها محافظِ او از بدخیم ترین یاوه بافی ها است، به تمایلات میسپرد
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‎امیدوارم این ریویو در جهتِ آشنایی با این کتاب، کافی و مفید بوده باشه
‎«پیروز باشید و ایرانی»

[Manny · Rating 3 out of 5]

It had been some time since I had last visited 221B Baker Street, and when I entered I found my friend engrossed in the study of a slim volume. "Watson!" he said, without lifting his eyes from the text. "Pray tell me, are you by any chance familiar with Mr. Hume's Enquiry into the Principles of Morals?"

I could not hide a smile of modest self-congratulation. "Indeed, Holmes," I said, "I know the book very well. I wrote an essay on it during my final year at Oxford, and was fortunate enough to be rewarded for my efforts by winning a minor prize."

"Excellent, excellent!" said Holmes. "Then you will no doubt have little difficulty in summarizing the content?"

"I think, even at this remove in time, that I would be equal to the task," I replied. "Mr. Hume regarded the book as his greatest and most important achievement in the field of philosophy. He endeavors to explain the origins of our moral sense, and considers three main explanations: that moral principles are due to custom, that they are due to self-interest, and that they are due to the general benefit they bring to society as a whole. Although he does not by any means discount the relevance of the first two causes, the author nonetheless maintains, throughout his book, that the third is by far the most important. This notion he argues for at length, supplying a wealth of examples in its support; though despite the fact that I generally found myself in agreement with him, and to no small extent influenced by the ideas he propounds, I am forced to admit that the prolixity of his explanations and the inordinate length of his sentences on occasion caused me to wish that he had found a more succinct manner to present his thoughts."

"It is indeed evident," said Holmes, "that Mr. Hume has had a considerably influence on you. But I must confess that, speaking for myself, there was another aspect of the work that more immediately engaged my attention."

"And what may that be?" I asked.

"Why," said Holmes, "it is perhaps of little account; but were you not struck by the curious nature of the author's remarks concerning the possibility that moral principles are divinely ordained, and follow from the precepts of Holy Scripture?"

"I am not sure I grasp your meaning," I replied. "To the best of my recollection, Mr. Hume says little or nothing about this matter."

"Quite so!" said Holmes with satisfaction. "You have put it in a nutshell. That is exactly the curious circumstance to which I was referring."

[Roy Lotz · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well, this was disappointing.

I say this because Hume’s first Enquiry was brilliant, unforgettably so. There, we see Hume as one of the most subtle, most penetrating, and most profound thinkers in Western history. Here we see him don the hat of a common moralist:

“Instance, briefly; come, instance” (As You Like It)

Hume apparently shared the English love for instances. He fills up entire chapters with example after example of moral and immoral acts. He drones away like a pontificating prefect. It’s almost embarrassing.

This would have been more excusable if he was making a sufficiently complicated point, but he is arguing that humans have a special moral sense and naturally feel pleasure when doing moral acts. If this is true, then we certainly don’t need an entire book to demonstrate it.

I would rate this book lower, but Hume can’t help letting his brilliance occasionally shine through.

[hayatem · Rating 4 out of 5]

يبحث هيوم في الكتاب عن مفهومي العدالة والاحسان ودورهما في تشكيل المبادئ الأخلاقية لدى أفراد المجتمع، بين الضرورة و الاختيار، ودورهما في سعادة البشرية ( إذ تمكّن الإنسان من التعقل والتحكم والسيطرة والأخذ والعطاء مع الآخر والأشياء في هذا العالم.)
مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار بعلاقتهما بالوعي والمشاعر وأثرهما في التعامل بين الأفراد، أو العامة، وذلك بطرح عدد من النماذج والدروس والتجارب الإنسانية المختلفة بتحليلات تفصيلية لعدد من الحالات؛ أي تشخيص الواقع وتجريده، بما يكتنه من معطيات عقلية ودلالات فكرية لمقاربة ما يعتمل بعقله بعقل الوعي الجمعي. مع اهتمامه بموضوع القوانين ودورها في ضبط السلوك الاجتماعي للأفراد، وعن الفارق بين الأخلاق والقانون . وما يثيره عامةً "مفهوم الأخلاق " من إشكاليات فلسفية ( بين فلسفة أخلاق وعلم أخلاق.) ك التناقضات والصراعات الأيديولوجية وما خلفته في السياق المفاهيمي والدلالي للأخلاق عبر التاريخ.

[Nat · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hume is the moral philosopher who is most recognizable as a fellow modern human being. In his short autobiographical "My Own Life", he says that the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is "incomparably the best" of all his writings (though he admits that he isn't the one to judge that).

Reading this for the first time, I was surprised at how little "philosophy" is in it--by that, I mean how little complicated argumentation there is. Most of the arguments are short and direct: against someone who thinks that all of morality can be constructed out of self interest, Hume says that such a view is intuitively implausible, and gives some examples of difficult cases for such a theory to handle: admiring the moral qualities of an adversary, assigning moral praise or blame to historically different acts whose relation to present self interest is not at all clear, and so on. Of course there are responses that can be made on behalf of the views that Hume criticizes, but they look needlessly complex, sophistical and increasingly implausible when compared with his straightforward approach, which is to find the traits that we find agreeable and the traits we find disagreeable and see if they have anything in common. If they do, then that's likely to be the foundation of morals. There is no search for absolute certainty.

Not to give away the ending, but the foundation of morals turns out to be shared sentiment. One worry is that it's not as universal as he makes it out to be, but overall, this is about as enjoyable a work of moral philosophy as I've ever read (it's not as much fun as the Republic, but the view is saner).

[I'm Kian · Rating 4 out of 5]

در ابتدای کار هیوم سوالی رو مطرح میکنه که خواننده حس میکنه فقط متا اثیک در این کتاب دنبال میشه و خب مسلما مباحث خشکی پیش رو داره.اما زبان ساده و بی پیراییه ی هیوم چنین مباحثی رو هم آسان میکنند.
حقیقتا آنچنان با نظریات اخلاقی هیوم بر سر مهر نیستم.حتی اون حجم قابل ملاحظه ای که هیوم در رد خودگرایی روانشناختی و خودگرایی فلسفی اختصاص داده.
این عبارات توضیحی جناب آقای مردیها هم اذیت بود. واقعا اکثرجاها زائد بود.هرچند برخی جاها واقعا مفید بود.
ترجمه هم که خیلی خوب بود.

[Mohadese · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتاب خیلی خوب بود، اما امان از مرتضی مردیها. نه این‌که ترجمه‌اش بد باشد، اما بدون اغراق یک سومِ کتاب توضیحات اضافی‌ای است که درون قلاب و وسط متن اصلی آورده است. خیلی زیاد و سطحی هستند. حسابی روی اعصاب‌اند

[John Yelverton · Rating 2 out of 5]

It would be one thing if all Hume did was ask the question, instead, he gives some quite pathetic answers that professors still cram down student's throats.

[Jibran · Rating 5 out of 5]

A contemporary reader might think his conclusions to be truisms, but the philosophical climate in Hume's lifetime ensured that his work would be consistently controversial and original.

[Illiterate · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hume argues for a naturalist view of moral sentiments against Hobbesian self-interest as well as the rationalism he rejects in the Treatise.

[Aung Sett Kyaw Min · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is no such thing as justice that resides in the soul, only justice as it resides in the community. As a public virtue, justice draws its praiseworthiness and merit-endowing powers from the services it renders for the community, the most significant of which is the maintenance of private property. As Hume's thought experiment goes, in a hypothetical post-scarcity society inhabited by supremely benevolent rational creatures, justice has no place, or if it does, it would not be glorified as a virtue. On the other extreme, in a Hobbesian state of war of all against all, justice also ceases to be a virtue. Hume, of course, is quick to acknowledge that not all behavior and actions that are praised (or blamed) are so praised because they contribute to public good or even individual self-interest. We can cite countless examples of praise bestowed on individuals for their courage, brilliance magnanimity, etc. who lived a long time ago in some faraway place and whose existence has no conceivable effect on present observers. Their actions simply excite pleasure in us, and that is why we praise them. In general, Hume is quite convinced that the passions associated with our care for others originate from that fundamental aspect of human nature we know as benevolence. In firm opposition to those who claim that benevolence is either a sham or a surface appearance assumed by narrow and abstract self-interest, Hume defends benevolence ("a particle of the dove") as a naturalistically irreducible part of the constitution of our species-being.

[Vahid Latif · Rating 4 out of 5]

هرچند هیوم را در زمرۀ فلاسفۀ اخلاق به حساب نمی‌آورند اما این کتاب از مهم‌ترین فلسفه‌ورزی‌های نظری در حوزه اخلاق است که از رویکرد طبیعت‌باورانه و تجربه‌گرایی وی نشات می‌گیرد. اصول اخلاق برای وی ریشه در نظم و مجموعه‌ای ازمصادیق خرد جمعی دارد که در پی کسب بیشترین میزان شادکامی و بهروزی و کاهش حداکثری رنج و ناکامی است. این اخلاقِ مبتنی‌بر اصالتِ «سودمندی» از دل آنچه «طبیعت در ذات بشر نهادینه کرد» شروع و به تجویز«آنچه خواستنی‌ست» منتهی می‌شود. مواضع اخلاقی هیوم با وجود تفاوت‌های جزئی با آنچه بعده‌ها توسط بنتام و استوارت‌میل بسط می‌یابد، هم‌پوشانی گسترده‌ای با آنچه امروزه بعنوان تفکر «فایده‌گرا» می‌شناسیم دارد.

[Steven · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one giant of a book, not for its length nor heaviness of subject, but the themes it touches and its argument. If Hume's first enquiry about human understanding (the book) is about the limit and nature of factual knowledge, this second enquiry is about the origin of morality.

Encountering its arguments feels like getting hit by a brick. I never thought some of these things seriously. All this time I thought morality originated in reason. All of us have some sort of innate capacity to judge whether something is right or wrong, which is based on reason. Just like mathematics and geometry, they can be deduced by reason. Being kind to others is good, and murder is wrong, surely every society agrees on that, right? The ideal morality exists regardless of differences in custom between cultures, and they can be deduced by reason. Maybe God played a role, maybe not, but there you go.

This as it turns out was more or less Kant's position. Hume had something different in mind. Here he argued that the origin of morality are feelings and utility. Throughout its history, different cultures have different experience about which actions generate the most utility for individuals and society. It is these, argued Hume, that form the basis of morality. Furthermore, our feelings reinforced this tendency, resulting in almost knee-jerk moral reaction with regards to moral judgments. For instance, there has been a taboo against incest in many societies. This is not due to some normative understanding based on reason but due to the bad consequences that such acts will result e.g. abnormality of the child. Hence, the law against incest was then codified into 'morality' where the sinfulness of the act implied something far more transcendental. Another example that Hume provided is the origin of justice. He argued that justice originates precisely in those places where there is scarcity of goods. If it weren't for scarcity, people would not need to distribute resources fairly, since they can just simply get other things without the need to divide them. This shows in the fact that ancient humans never divided virtually limitless natural resources such as oxygen and sea (that is until we got greedy). Hence, the law is codified into principles and so on.

As it turns out, Hume wasn't exactly a dogmatist about this, in fact he was rather lenient. He acknowledged that reason also played a large role in classifying and analysing moral acts, but it is clueless about right and wrong.

It was a more Darwinian approach, building morality from the bottom up. As it turns out this is a huge debate in morality, whether morality is based on feelings or reason, one that has massive consequences for many fields of study.

Hume was clear and pragmatic. He was surprised that he needed to write this book, because his approach was such a commonsensical one. If it were not for some obtuse philosophers and theologians arguing for some vague terms about the origins of morality, he wouldn't need to write this book.

The reason I read this book is mainly that I realize old books are important. Okay, new books are way easier to get through and way more entertaining, but I start to notice that certain themes keep on showing up. These books are like the foundation of the knowledge that subsequent books use to build up. And reading these books is not the same as reading book summaries! I think it was the economist writer Nassim Taleb who said that books that last older means that they pass the test of importance. He argued that you have to read books that are at least 300 years old. They age like fine wine, and they naturally select themselves. Only the best of the best remain relevant after hundreds of years. This book by Hume is no exception. Goes without saying that new books are fresher. This book is pretty tough that I have to read online summary to keep up at times.

[Xander · Rating 3 out of 5]

After A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), according to David Hume himself, "fell dead-bron from the press" he decided to lay out the two main themes of this huge work - epistemology and morality - in two new works. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume gives an overview on his epistemology, while in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) he sets out his theory of human emotions.

Hume's main thoughts on ethics are easy to summarize. He thinks human nature is the origin of morality: passions guide our behaviour, while reason cannot motivate us to act ("reason is a slave of the passions"). Therefore, we need to study mankind in order to understand (and prescribe) morality.

How does this work? Well, first of all, we have feelings of empathy for others - we feel with them. Second, when dealing with others, we notice their character traits and behaviours and these acts provoke feelings of approval or disapproval. In other words, we form (mental) associations between feelings of approval or disapproval and particular acts. This leads to our feelings of good and bad (i.e. ethics): good acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of approval; bad acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of disapproval.

This is an emotivistic theory of morality - morality is based on human emotions/passions. In approaching ethics this way, Hume breaks with the tradition of 17th and 18th cenutry contract theorists (like Hobbes and Locke), who saw mankind as a brutal animal in a state of nature, in need of hard rulers to enforce peace, safety and liberty. Hume acknowledges human beings as not only selfish, but also cooperative. Man, in the state of nature, lives in groups and cooperates regularly with his fellow beings.

Why is it necessary to live in states and coerce people to follow the laws? Well, this is because - according to Hume - there are two types of virtues. Natural virtues are the virtues that mankind already possesses in his original state; cultural virtues are virtues that only exist in states. These cultural virtues require the existence of institutions. This is the only reason for the existence of a state. This is a very important, historical lesson: human beings don't need to be forced into cooperation or into sympathy, they only need to be 'kept in check'.

But apart from being an emotivist, Hume also was a determinist. He subscribed to scientific knowledge as the only source of human knowledge - Newton's mechanics were the source of Hume's original philosophical work - but this inevitably leads to the conclusion that Nature is determined by natural laws. So where's the room for human freedom? Aren't we determined by Nature? Well, this is a thorny question (it still is) and Hume is not able to resolve it.

He decides to define freedom as 'not being shackled or in prison' (i.e. your own volition not limited by externally restrictions), but this leaves open the question of internal restrictions. What if we want to quit smoking but simply can't? And freedom might not even be a question of dichotomoty (you either have it or you don't), but be a gradual concept - something that contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett has written about at large (and has convinced me of its truth).

(I decided to write down all of my notes on Hume's approach of morality, politics and freedom, collected from his other books as well, so not all of the topics in this review are treated in the book that's being reviewed).

[Sookie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Though this was the shortest of the books I've owned of Hume, it took me longest to read it. Though the argument is debated in typical Hume's fashion, its hard to ignore Plato's dialogues echoing every few pages. Its interesting to say the least but Hume's attention is more on acts of morality than the actual principles of it.

[Antonia Faccini · Rating 4 out of 5]

La utilidad o beneficio obtenido por la sociedad como cimientos de aquello que puede ser aplaudido o censurado. Entre más útil, más loable…

Interesante la parte sobre el dogmatismo, que aunque aparece brevemente en la introducción y en las conclusiones, resulta importante: “me doy cuenta de que nada puede ser más antifilosófico que el estar seguro o ser dogmático acerca de asunto alguno”.

[Itamar Livne · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good fuck but an empiricist cuck

[Sarah Cupitt · Rating 4 out of 5]

our moral judgments arise primarily from sentiment – from feeling, rather than thinking. But if morality stems from sentiment rather than reason, what becomes of religious authority?

“Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern.”

“What comparison, I say, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, an above it in their enjoyment.”

“In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, everything still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. In our serious occupations, in our careless amusements, this principle still exerts its active energy.”

notes:
- 18th century Edinburgh, Scotland – a city so vibrant with intellectual energy it earned the nickname “Athens of the North.”
- Hume published An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, refining ideas he had first explored decades earlier in his Treatise of Human Nature. While the earlier Treatise had been largely ignored, this more accessible work – which Hume himself considered his finest – would go on to transform Western thinking about ethics.
- You might reason endlessly about facts, but facts by themselves don’t tell you what you ought to do.
- Hume noted that a great many thinkers before him routinely made precisely this unwarranted leap: they would move from describing how things are in the world, to claiming how things ought to be, all without proper justification. He saw this as a fundamental error in moral reasoning. For him, moral distinctions are not derived from some abstract, rational thought. Instead, they emerge from moral sentiments that exist naturally within all humans.
- Hume strongly believed human nature includes common sentiments that create shared moral feelings across humanity. These shared feelings make morality possible as a social phenomenon, rather than just an individual preference.
- Most thinkers before Hume assumed that virtue must be based on rational principles that transcended human feelings. Hume reversed this perspective, grounding morality both in human nature, and our human capacity for feeling.

other:
- Hume observed that humans naturally mirror the emotions they witness in others. When you see someone in pain, you feel a version of that pain yourself. Similarly, when you witness joy, you experience a similar, pleasant feeling. It’s quite remarkable that this observation was supported by research in neuroscience nearly 250 years later In 1992, when neuroscientists led by Giacomo Rizzolatti at the University of Parma discovered mirror neurons – brain cells that activate both when you perform an action, and when you observe someone else performing that very same action. This discovery provided a potential neurological basis for Hume’s earlier insight.
- the closer you are, or the more like you they seem, the easier it is to sympathize.
- Your moral feelings do not exist in isolation, but are shaped by and expressed through your interactions with others in society.
- As communities grow larger and more complex, they create systems of justice, property, and governance. These systems, in turn, help to transform natural sympathy into sustainable social cooperation

utility:
- Hume distinguished between natural virtues like benevolence, which directly produce happiness, and artificial virtues like justice, which benefit society through more indirect means. Natural virtues create immediate positive effects that anyone can appreciate through sympathy. Artificial virtues, by contrast, require social conventions and longer-term perspectives to fully recognize their utility.
- By connecting utility to sympathy, Hume created a moral theory that explains how individual moral sentiments naturally align with the common good. This approach provided a thoroughly humanistic foundation for ethics
- One of Hume's most original contributions to moral philosophy was his analysis of justice as an artificial virtue. Unlike natural virtues like benevolence or compassion, which arise spontaneously from human sentiment, Hume argued that justice emerges through social convention and agreement.
- Where resources are limited, human generosity can become restricted, and people naturally favor their own interests and those of their close associates. In a hypothetical world of unlimited abundance or perfect benevolence, strict rules of justice might be unnecessary.
- the artificial nature of justice does not make it any less important than natural virtues, however. In fact, Hume considered justice absolutely essential for any functioning society. Without the stability provided by rules of property and promise-keeping, social cooperation would collapse, and human flourishing would be all but impossible.
- Hume believed that virtues are those character traits that evoke approval from moral sentiments. These traits fall into four main categories based on their effects: traits useful to others, traits useful to the person possessing them, traits immediately agreeable to others, and traits immediately agreeable to the person possessing them. This classification shows how Hume integrated both utility and sentiment in his account of virtue.
- Unlike some virtue ethicists, Hume did not believe in a single, unified vision of human excellence. Instead, he recognized a plurality of valuable character traits that contribute to individual and social flourishing in different ways. This pluralistic approach allows for diversity in virtuous character, while maintaining that certain fundamental traits deserve universal approval.

[Sean Meagher · Rating 4 out of 5]

In his second great enquiry, Hume sets out to discuss his ideas on human morality, which in essence amount to sentimentalism, the idea that we can never make moral judgments based on reason alone. Reason deals with facts and draws conclusions from them, but, all else being equal, it could not lead us to choose one option over the other; only our sentiments can do this. I agree with many scholars who claim that Hume is merely writing a description of
human moral psychology here, rather than laying out true philosophical arguments, but I agree with most of his assessments and he writes with such joy that I will forgive him this issue. The most poignant ideas for me, come in the latter part of the text, when Hume rejects many qualities deemed by religious doctrine to be virtuous, while also signaling that qualities deemed to be bad by religion may in fact be virtuous. Hume makes important distinctions in his classifications of virtues as being either "artificial" or "natural". The key difference between these virtue classes is their origin. Artificial virtues originate from and depend on social structures such as governments or religious doctrine. This category of virtues include fidelity, justice, chastity and obedience. Natural virtues are not created but are automatically present in humans since birth. It is ideas such as these that lead Hume to be referred to as the “awful atheist Hume,” and his proddings of religious thought paved the way for legions of free thinkers to come.

[Harris Bolus · Rating 3 out of 5]

As usual, I appreciated Hume’s insights, yet it doesn’t stand up to his Treatise. I enjoyed the conclusion, appendices I and II, and the ending dialogue, but the meat of the book was tough to get through. His general method was to present a quality we generally agree is good, maybe give an example from history, and say it really is good because it’s agreeable and/or useful. Needless to say I didn’t find it very convincing. The arguments in the rest of the book were more solid.

I agree that passions are necessary for moral preferences, and that ethics can’t be derived from pure reason. I agree that self-interest is not sufficient to explain why we care about others.


I loved the daoist/epicurean sentiment at the very end: “And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct: What comparison, I say, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expence? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.”

[Devastatingwildness · Rating 3 out of 5]

Quizá hoy este libro no nos diga mucho porque estemos más de acuerdo con él en ciertos juicios que sus contemporáneos y tuviera su cierto impacto en el momento. Verdaderamente no lo sé. Empecé este libro por capricho del momento sin recabar información previamente.

Si no estás estudiando la obra de Hume, no creo que haga mucho daño a la lectura dirigirse directamente a la Conclusión y a los 4 apéndices.

[for-much-deliberation ... · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hume investigates how moral judgments are made...

[Micah · Rating 2 out of 5]

David Hume could have saved himself a lot of time if he had just admitted right away that the only true foundation for morals is GOD> any other answer is a waste of time,

[lottie pike · Rating 4 out of 5]

Yeah a solid read, cheers David 👍

[Bella · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good guy, would definitely have a beer with him

[Elijah Kitzmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Honestly thought that the 4 appendixes and conclusion were the best parts of this book.
“We may as well imagine that minute wheels and springs like those of a watch give motion to a loaded wagon as account for the origin of passion from such abstruse reflections” this sentiment stuck with me the most, care for others cannot be accounted for a simply self gratifying, and that’s comforting.

[Laurent Dv · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un livre de taille moyenne et moyennement accessible à tous. Je conseille le dialogue à la fin, c’est la présentation la plus vulgarisée de la théorie morale subjectiviste de Hume.

### Section 1 : Des principes généraux de la morale

Hume se demande ici comment on peut connaître la morale, autrement dit la façon dont on la connaît. Il y a en gros deux grosses théories : soit on y accède par la raison, soit on y accède par le sentiment. Les deux ont leurs arguments plausibles. Il récuse la méthode a priori qui consiste à déduire les propositions de la morale à partir de prémisses fondamentales à cause de notre connaissance trop limitée. Il préfère la voie expérimentable, par l’observation des faits.

### Section 2 : De la bienveillance

#### Première partie

La bienveillance est une tendre affection et un généreux souci pour nos semblables. C’est la vertu qui suscite le plus l’admiration chez les hommes.

#### Deuxième partie

Notre éloge de la bienveillance des gens et des autres vertus en général tient au moins en partie au fait qu’ils ont fait quelque chose d’utile (l’utilité). Hume donne de nombreux exemples. C’est l’utilité (ou à l’inverse l’inutilité) pour la société qui a changé notre regard positif de certaines pratiques en regard négatif : par exemple vis-à-vis de l’aumône (on pourrait dire “l’assistanat”), du tyrannicide (positif puis négatif) et du luxe (négatif puis positif).

### Section 3 : De la justice

#### Première partie

Le seul fondement et la seule cause de la justice, c’est son utilité pour la société. On le voit comme la justice n’a plus de fondement légitime en cas de prospérité généralisée (un accès à des ressources illimitées pour tout le monde, plus besoin donc de propriété privée, etc. car plus de jalousie, de convoitise, etc.) et en cas d’extrême misère (famine où chacun peut survivre par tous les moyens ou naufrage où chacun peut s’accrocher comme il le veut sur les débris ou parties du bateau qu’il veut). Plus la structure sociale (famille puis pays par exemple) est grande, plus la justice devient utile.

#### Deuxième partie

Hume poursuit sa défense de la thèse selon laquelle l’utilité est le seul fondement de la justice, et non la raison (car la justice ne diffère de la superstition que par son intérêt vital pour l’humanité contre l’inutilité de la seconde, le droit de propriété ne repose sur aucun fondement objectif et clair mais des décrets arbitraires comme la possession longue ou première) ni le sentiment en tant que faculté innée comme le goût, la vue, etc. (car c’est une hypothèse très complexe au vu de tous les avis différents des hommes). Ainsi, les lois n’ont pour fondement que leur utilité pour les hommes car sans elles, ils ne pourraient pas vivre en société à cause de leur égoïsme et de leurs partialités. Il en va de même pour les autres vertus sociales que la justice (la fidélité, la bienveillance, etc.) : tous reposent uniquement sur leur utilité.

### Section 4 : De la société politique

Ici Hume applique son principe de la primauté de l’égoïsme pour expliquer les vertus à l’échelle supranationale : même les différentes nations obéissent à des principes parce qu’ils sont dans leur intérêt.

### Section 5 : pourquoi utilité

#### Première partie

La théorie de l’intérêt rencontre une objection : elle serait incapable d’expliquer pourquoi nous trouvons vertueux les actions d’hommes d’il y a longtemps qui n’ont aucun rapport avec nous. Hume semble dire à la fin que c’est parce que leurs actions étaient utiles pour eux.

#### Deuxième partie

Les êtres humains en ont eux naturellement un sentiment d’humanité et de sympathie, à vouloir naturellement le bien des autres et de la société (en réalité surtout ce qui leur est utile) plutôt que leur mal. C’est ce qui explique qu’on s’intéresse à ce qui arrive aux autres. Mais par nos émotions, nous avons plus de partialité envers ceux qui nous sont les plus proches qu’envers les autres. La raison permet de corriger cette partialité, tout comme on corrige notre vue après des illusions d’optique.

### Section 6 : Des qualités utiles à leur possesseur

Ces qualités sont appréciées car utiles à leur possesseur : la richesse (ou haute distinction), la tempérance, la puissance, etc.

### Section 7 : Des vertus agréables à leur possesseur

Aborde la gaieté (meilleure que la mélancolie), la grandeur d’âme, la bienveillance. Ces vertus même se répandent aux autres, sont admirables pour eux, même si elle ne leur confère aucun intérêt, par leur seule convenance à leur possesseur. Par exemple le courage d’un tel ou d’un tel, sa gaieté, sa dignité même face à l’épreuve et au supplice, sa bienveillance, etc.

### Section 8 : Des vertus agréable aux autres

Ces vertus produisent du plaisir immédiatement aux autres. Elles dépendent du lieu et de la culture. Il y a le courage, la politesse, la décence, la modestie (et aussi un certaine haute image de soi), la propreté.

### Section 9 : Conclusion

#### Première partie

- Partie la plus claire du livre, le bien et le mal se définissent par le sentiment agréable ou désagréable, Hume illustre le propos avec des exemples de vertus et de vices.
- Les hommes sont mus par un la sympathie et l'intérêt de l'humanité plus que par la haine de leur prochain, cette explication est plus simple que son contraire car elle permet d'expliquer le fait que quasiment tous les êtres humains agissent ainsi.

Seconde partie :

- Hume traite de pourquoi nous ressentons l'obligation de faire ce qui est utile et agréable pour nous, en gros c'est évident, il n'y a pas grand chose à rajouter pour convaincre les opposants de la dite théorie.

### Appendice 1 : Sur le sentiment moral

- Hume revient à une discussion un peu trop métaphysique écartée au début sur l'origine de la morale : vient t-elle de la raison seule (des faits ou des relations comme en mathématiques) ou du sentiment (une création et réaction de l'homme de par sa nature, superposée à l'objet froid de ce qu'étudie la raison).
- Contre la position basée sur la raison, premièrement les faits ne peuvent pas fonder le bien et le mal car les faits sont soi neutres, il est impossible pour nous de désigner tel fait indépendamment d'un sentiment ou jugement de notre esprit comme étant moral ou non. Deuxièmement, sur les relations, le caractère moral est plutôt une propriété comme la beauté qui découle d'un jugement de l'esprit humain au lieu d'être intrinsèque à une chose extérieure a nous.
- La morale vient plutôt du sentiment.
- La raison a pour rôle de découvrir les objets tels qu'ils sont, le sentiment de superposer un jugement subjectif sur eux.

### Appendice 2 : De l'amour de soi

- Hume s'en prend à la thèse (hobbésienne ?) du réductionnisme de toutes les passions à l'égoïsme. En gros il n'y a pas réellement d'amour d'autrui, de bienveillance, d'amitié qui ne soient pas motivés au fond par un amour de soi ou son propre intérêt.
- Cette thèse va à l'encontre du sens commun, dans la vie courante on croit que ces vertus bienveillantes ou altruistes existent vraiment. On les associe même aux animaux sans les soupçonner d'être égoïstes, pourquoi donc ne pas faire de même avec les anomaux supérieurs que sont les êtres humains ? Cette thèse est très complexe.
- On suppose avant les vices égoïstes un sentiment d'attraction pour le bien, pourquoi ne pas en faire de même pour les vertus positives ?

### Appendice 3 : Considérations supplémentaires sur la justice

- Les vertus sociales de bienveillance etc visent le bien individuel, d'un individu alors que celles de justice le bien d'une société ou au moins de sa majorité.
- La justice ne vient pas d'une convention au sens de promesse car elles ne suffisent pas à garantir qu'elles seront bien accomplies mais au sens d'une tendance commune à des règles générales indifférentes (on aurait pu choisir sans grande différence d'autres règles) pour satisfaire le bien de la société de sorte à contrebalancer les maux qui en résultent
- Elles est naturelle dans le sens où tous les hommes tendent ordinairement à la vie en société autour de règles générales.

### Appendice 4 : Disputes verbales

- Hume souligne ici les limites du langage pour délimiter les vertus des vices, expressions qu'il a évitées jusqu'ici pour cette raison.
- Il est tout aussi difficile de distinguer entre les vertus : plusieurs qualités très différentes sont tout autant des vertus les unes que les autres

### Dialogue :

- Présentation la plus claire de la thèse morale de Hume sur la définition de la vertu par l'utile et l'agréable, que le principe général est universel mais son application subjective à chaque peuple et culture. Par exemple les Grecs exécraient l'adultère tandis que d'autres le considèrent comme une vertu de virilité. Hume donne plein d'exemples.
- Au début on a le récit d'un voyageur qui raconte les vertus d'un pays bizarre qui se révèlent être rien d'autre que la Grèce antique et Rome comme Brutus qui bien que vertueux a commis un parricide, celui de Jules César juste après lui avoir juré fidélité.

[Paris Sanders · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hume utilizes an empirical method to explain the basis of moral understanding, and his analysis mirrors scientific study through the observation of human traits, and the corresponding public reception of those traits. In this sense, unlike his contemporaries, Hume believes in a sort of “projectivism," in that his theory of morality does not presuppose the conditions of the world, but rather, suggests that morality exists as a product of human values, and is thus exhibited through individual preference. Hume interprets that there are two ways to view morality—motivated by either reason or by sentiment. However, despite his empirical approach when questioning the basis of morality, Hume argues that moral judgments themselves are not fundamentally rational, but are largely driven by sentiment. Whereas rationality allows individuals to have clarity, such knowledge alone is not enough to compel moral judgment, as individual action is catalyzed by impulses of the will. In conjunction, Hume proposes that individuals value certain traits or values, including those often deemed “moral,” on the basis of their utility. However, Hume does not take an egoist approach, as he does not argue that human actions are inherently self-interested, but rather, argues that actions or values are chosen based on their utility to a common good. In this sense, our sentiments are inclined to prefer traits and behaviors that satisfy the needs of humanity, and thus, those traits are ascribed as virtuous. Reflexively, traits or behaviors that contribute negatively to public interest are libeled “immoral,” or as “vice.” Hume’s preference for sentiment is noted again, as Hume argues that all actions or preferences have an ultimate end—to maximize pleasure, or to minimize suffering. Yet, Hume also contends that although some moral values are natural, others are artificial—justice a key example. Hume argues that this is once again to promote overall utility, particularly in the distribution of material goods and property.

In many ways, Hume's theory strikes a note with me--his preference for sentiment over reason lays the foundation for many modern non-cognitivist theories, particularly those expressivist or emotivist in nature. Further, Hume's long--possibly too much so--and determined argument against the principle of psychological egoism so common in utilitarian theories seemed effective, or at the least, very thought provoking. However, there appear to be several flaws within the argument, both those in connotation and those in form. First, structurally, Hume tends to beg the question, and dismiss any potential counterexamples to his theory. Notably, Hume argues that *all* individuals are motivated to promote overall social utility, but does not necessarily specify that *all* individuals have the same perception of social welfare, nor explains how the existence of individuals without sentimentality--the hypothetical sociopath as an example--would make decisions, particularly those of a "moral" nature. On that note, Hume presents the troubling notion that "moral" decisions bare no distinction from any other, leaving one to wonder why he sought to explain the foundations of moral decisions at all, if they truly were indistinguishable from other decisions. Lastly, Hume's argument that certain virtues are "artificial" seems equally troubling; For example, Hume argues that justice is only deemed virtuous due to its "usefulness," or fundamental role in distributing material goods and property.
Not only does this proposition grossly underestimate what justice seems to be, it presents the potentially harmful utilitarian notion that what is 'just' is simply what is 'useful.' Clearly, this notion has many negative implications, particularly given Hume's relatively comfortable socio-economic perspective.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ideas con los pies en la tierra y muy aclaradoras. De lo mejor que he leído sobre moral. Quizás un poco repetitivo, pero no es un libro pensado para el entretenimiento.