Two classic works of military strategy that shaped the way we think about The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Karl von Clausewitz, together in one volume
“Civilization might have been spared much of the damage suffered in the world wars . . . if the influence of Clausewitz’s On War had been blended with and balanced by a knowledge of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War .”—B. H. Liddel Hart
For two thousand years, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has been the indispensable volume of warcraft. Although his work is the first known analysis of war and warfare, Sun Tzu struck upon a thoroughly modern “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
Karl von Clausewitz, the canny military theorist who famously declared that war is a continuation of politics by other means, also claims paternity of the notion “total war.” On War is the magnum opus of the era of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.
Now these two great minds come together in a single volume that also features an introduction by esteemed military writer Ralph Peters and the Modern Library War Series introduction by Caleb Carr, New York Times bestselling author of The Alienist .
(The cover and text refer to The Art of War as The Art of Warfare, an alternate translation of the title.)
Sun Tzu (traditional Chinese: 孫子; simplified Chinese: 孙子; pinyin: Sūnzǐ) was a Chinese military general, strategist, philosopher, and writer who lived during the Eastern Zhou period (771–256 BC). Sun Tzu is traditionally credited as the author of The Art of War, an influential work of military strategy that has affected both Western and East Asian philosophy and military thought. Sun Tzu is revered in Chinese and East Asian culture as a legendary historical and military figure. His birth name was Sun Wu (traditional Chinese: 孫武; simplified Chinese: 孙武) and he was known outside of his family by his courtesy name Changqing (Chinese: 長卿). The name Sun Tzu—by which he is more popularly known—is an honorific which means "Master Sun". Sun Tzu mastered the military science of ancient China and created the military doctrine of asymmetrical warfare. According to it, an attack on the enemy should begin only after the enemy has no opportunity to either defend or counterattack. It was used in the wars in the era of the Warring States in ancient China (about 475–221 BC). It differs from the modern interpretation of asymmetric military strategy. The ancient warriors used to call it the Victorious Methods of Warfare (sheng er zhan zhi), but it has the same meaning as the modern asymmetrical military strategy. The ancient professional warriors used it in individual combats against the enemies in the wars. As a result, a variety of armed and unarmed combat combinations have been created for various combat situations as the individual battle plans. Those combat combinations had specific names, descriptions and classifications. Sun Tzu's historicity is uncertain. The Han dynasty historian Sima Qian and other traditional Chinese historians placed him as a minister to King Helü of Wu and dated his lifetime to 544–496 BC. Modern scholars accepting his historicity place the extant text of The Art of War in the later Warring States period of 475 to 221 BC, based on its style of composition and its descriptions of warfare. Traditional accounts state that the general's descendant Sun Bin wrote a treatise on military tactics, also titled The Art of War. Since both Sun Wu and Sun Bin were referred to as "Sun Tzu" in classical Chinese texts, some historians believed them identical, prior to the rediscovery of Sun Bin's treatise in 1972. Sun Tzu's work has been praised and employed throughout the arc of East Asian military history since its composition, and eventually earned global attention. During the twentieth century, The Art of War grew in popularity and saw practical use in the Western world as well. It remains influential in many contemporary competitive endeavors across the modern world beyond military strategy and warfare, including espionage, culture, governance, business, and sports.
http://nhw.livejournal.com/791254.html[return][return]A series of aphorisms from two and a half millennia ago about how to win wars: in summary, by having a better idea of what you are doing, and preparing your own troops accordingly, than your opponent. The advice is sufficiently general that I'm not surprised to see it quoted in management handbooks, and I guess also in advice to thrusting young Wall Street brokers too.[return][return]Two points slightly jumped out at me. The first was the suggestion that in the event of prolonged war, the people will object: "three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue." The US military budget of $470 billion is not quite as big, less than 20% of the total federal budget (though comfortably over 20% of income), but of course governments as a whole did a lot less in Sun Tzu's day.[return][return]The second was his interesting justification for the gathering of intelligence. I am fascinated by the flow of informations in international politics, but Sun Tzu's expression of why this is important as practically a moral imperative seemed to me unique: "to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver is the height of stupidity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his cause, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise commander to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men." I wonder who he thought he was arguing against, and what kind of thing he had in mind?
An excellent compilation of two (of three in my opinion) seminal works on warfare. I prefer this translation of Clausewitz (Jolle) vice the Paret/Howard editions. Clausewitz is hard to understand if you think in 21st Century terms/schema; however, if you consider his work through the lens of the classic (vice Hegelian) dialectic, his work is much easier to understand. The principles that KvC identifies still have merit today.
Powerful. Many a politician and/or civilian would benefit from reading and gaining an insight into how strategic warfare is devised and executed and the repercussions of both.
I cannot comment on Sun-Tzu but the Jolles translation is quite good. I've read the Howard and Paret several times and this one excels in most places. In a few places I think the H&P translation with Princeton gets the sense of Clausewitz better, most of the serious scholars of Clausewitz recommend O. J. Matthijs Jolles' translation from World War II for its accuracy. I wish Modern Library had a hard back version available, or an option to get just Sun-Tzu and Clausewitz as standalone paperbacks because the thickness of this edition is cumbersome. After one only read, there are cracks in the binding and I do think this one will last very long.
The Art of War translation was interesting. The On War translation is reputedly the most faithful to the original but was too damned wordy; I had to read sentences twice and sometimes even three times to cut through all the fat to what they were actually saying.
This edition got to be my favourite edition of Sun Tzu's Art of War (in English). You got archaeological and historical notes at the start, the text in the original Chinese (traditional characters too!) and English translation, as well as newly unearthed content in addition to the original text! A gold mine of information for those interested in military thought and strategy.