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Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War
As the driving force behind the Allied effort in World War I, France willingly shouldered the heaviest burden. In this masterful book, Robert Doughty explains how and why France assumed this role and offers new insights into French strategy and operational methods. French leaders, favoring a multi-front strategy, believed the Allies could maintain pressure on several fronts around the periphery of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires and eventually break the enemy's defenses. But France did not have sufficient resources to push the Germans back from the Western Front and attack elsewhere. The offensives they launched proved costly, and their tactical and operational methods ranged from remarkably effective to disastrously ineffective. Using extensive archival research, Doughty explains why France pursued a multi-front strategy and why it launched numerous operations as part of that strategy. He also casts new light on France's efforts to develop successful weapons and methods and the attempts to use them in operations. An unparalleled work in French or English literature on the war, Pyrrhic Victory is destined to become the standard account of the French army in the Great War.
592 pages, Hardcover
First published November 15, 2005
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224 people want to read
About the author
Robert A. Doughty
21 books9 followersBrigadier General Robert Allan Doughty, USA (Ret.), is an American military historian, educator and retired career military officer.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
February 17, 2023
In the decades following the Franco-Prussian War, the French Army set itself to one main task, which was that of reversing the ignominious defeat inflicted upon them by the Germans and reclaiming the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Their leaders were well aware that doing so would be no easy feat, as thanks to their loss France now faced an enemy that was larger, more industrialized, and well aware of France’s desire for revenge. To defeat them, France took every practical step imaginable so that when they did go to war in the summer of 1914, it was with as many advantages as possible. The challenge then became one of employing them to best effect, so as to achieve victory against a formidable and well-prepared foe.
How they did so is the focus of Robert Doughty’s book. In it he describes the nexus of French strategy, planning, and operations both before and during the First World War, detailing how they analyzed the problems they faced, the solutions they adopted to address them, and the reasons for their success or failure. It’s a masterful study, one that draws upon a range of public and privately-held French-language sources to evaluate in detail both the decision-making process and the role that politics and the often-contentious personal relationships between the leading figures played in determining outcomes.
Doughty begins with a summary of the arrangements made by the French Army prior to the war, particularly those in the years immediately preceding it. He gives considerable credit to both their development of an alliance strategy and their modernization of French arms. The first of these was vital to ensuring that France had any hope of success, for it was only with the aid of allies that France could even hope to offset Germany’s numerical advantage. Of their two major partners Russia was far more important in this regard, as the combination of Great Britain’s reluctance to make a formal commitment and their preference that any such commitment would be primarily in terms of naval power discouraged French planners from relying on them. Though British troops were welcome, the French were prepared to go it alone in the west.
The outbreak of war quickly demonstrated the limits of the army’s prewar achievements. While criticizing their planners for their prewar errors (such as their mistaken assumption that German reservists would not play as large a role in the initial operations than proved the case), Doughty credits the heroism of the soldiers in their initial battles with German forces. Yet much of this was wasted by the army’s dogged devotion to the offense, which resulted in horrendous casualties for very little gain. Among those he singles out for criticism is Joseph Joffre, who as chief of staff exerted a tight, but distant, control over army operations. Not only did he remain committed to a methodical approach involving a succession of attacks long after its wastefulness had been demonstrated, but his related neglect of defensive operations contributed to the disaster at Verdun. Here Doughty credits Philippe Pétain with salvaging the situation, arguing that he was far more innovative and flexible a commander than is traditionally held. In Doughty’s view, Pétain was exactly the general the army needed in 1916.
Only Pétain’s conservative approach was not what French leaders wanted. For all of his success in checking the Germans at Verdun, their forces still occupied substantial amounts of French territory, making it imperative politically to drive them back across the border. With Joffre discredited, the French government turned to the overconfident Robert Nivelle, who was convinced that his operational concept of continuous thrusts would prove more successful than Joffre’s more systematic methods. The bloody failure of his subsequent offensive triggered mutinies in several units, and Nivelle’s replacement by Ferdinand Foch. Though Petain’s reforms did much to restore the army’s capabilities, the growing shortage of fighting-age men left the French increasingly dependent on their British and American allies to sustain their efforts. The launch of the Germans’ long-anticipated offensive in March 1918 prompted Foch’s appointment as supreme allied commander, which gave the French a greater – albeit much contested – ability to set strategy on the entire Western Front and helped them to maintain direction of the war even as their ability to participate in it was in decline.
That the French only achieved victory with the assistance of their allies is regarded by Doughty as a vindication of their approach. As he demonstrates, throughout the war their high command pursued a coordinated multi-front strategy that only came to be realized near the end of the war. That this strategy and the operations that resulted from it were the product of reasoned debate is more contestable, as the personal disagreements and political disputes still seep through his narrative. Yet this is all for the better, as it provides a fuller demonstration of the many factors that shaped France’s decision making throughout the war. It’s easy to see why Doughty’s book has become such an important text for English-language students of the First World War, as he combines his thorough research with a perceptive analysis of the development of French strategy and operations throughout the conflict. It’s a book that is necessary reading for anyone interested in the conflict and in how France was able to redeem their previous defeat despite the long odds they faced in doing so.
How they did so is the focus of Robert Doughty’s book. In it he describes the nexus of French strategy, planning, and operations both before and during the First World War, detailing how they analyzed the problems they faced, the solutions they adopted to address them, and the reasons for their success or failure. It’s a masterful study, one that draws upon a range of public and privately-held French-language sources to evaluate in detail both the decision-making process and the role that politics and the often-contentious personal relationships between the leading figures played in determining outcomes.
Doughty begins with a summary of the arrangements made by the French Army prior to the war, particularly those in the years immediately preceding it. He gives considerable credit to both their development of an alliance strategy and their modernization of French arms. The first of these was vital to ensuring that France had any hope of success, for it was only with the aid of allies that France could even hope to offset Germany’s numerical advantage. Of their two major partners Russia was far more important in this regard, as the combination of Great Britain’s reluctance to make a formal commitment and their preference that any such commitment would be primarily in terms of naval power discouraged French planners from relying on them. Though British troops were welcome, the French were prepared to go it alone in the west.
The outbreak of war quickly demonstrated the limits of the army’s prewar achievements. While criticizing their planners for their prewar errors (such as their mistaken assumption that German reservists would not play as large a role in the initial operations than proved the case), Doughty credits the heroism of the soldiers in their initial battles with German forces. Yet much of this was wasted by the army’s dogged devotion to the offense, which resulted in horrendous casualties for very little gain. Among those he singles out for criticism is Joseph Joffre, who as chief of staff exerted a tight, but distant, control over army operations. Not only did he remain committed to a methodical approach involving a succession of attacks long after its wastefulness had been demonstrated, but his related neglect of defensive operations contributed to the disaster at Verdun. Here Doughty credits Philippe Pétain with salvaging the situation, arguing that he was far more innovative and flexible a commander than is traditionally held. In Doughty’s view, Pétain was exactly the general the army needed in 1916.
Only Pétain’s conservative approach was not what French leaders wanted. For all of his success in checking the Germans at Verdun, their forces still occupied substantial amounts of French territory, making it imperative politically to drive them back across the border. With Joffre discredited, the French government turned to the overconfident Robert Nivelle, who was convinced that his operational concept of continuous thrusts would prove more successful than Joffre’s more systematic methods. The bloody failure of his subsequent offensive triggered mutinies in several units, and Nivelle’s replacement by Ferdinand Foch. Though Petain’s reforms did much to restore the army’s capabilities, the growing shortage of fighting-age men left the French increasingly dependent on their British and American allies to sustain their efforts. The launch of the Germans’ long-anticipated offensive in March 1918 prompted Foch’s appointment as supreme allied commander, which gave the French a greater – albeit much contested – ability to set strategy on the entire Western Front and helped them to maintain direction of the war even as their ability to participate in it was in decline.
That the French only achieved victory with the assistance of their allies is regarded by Doughty as a vindication of their approach. As he demonstrates, throughout the war their high command pursued a coordinated multi-front strategy that only came to be realized near the end of the war. That this strategy and the operations that resulted from it were the product of reasoned debate is more contestable, as the personal disagreements and political disputes still seep through his narrative. Yet this is all for the better, as it provides a fuller demonstration of the many factors that shaped France’s decision making throughout the war. It’s easy to see why Doughty’s book has become such an important text for English-language students of the First World War, as he combines his thorough research with a perceptive analysis of the development of French strategy and operations throughout the conflict. It’s a book that is necessary reading for anyone interested in the conflict and in how France was able to redeem their previous defeat despite the long odds they faced in doing so.
February 25, 2008
There is little else available in English on the topic and Doughty is undoubtedly the best qualified to write it, given his previous work on the French Army between the World Wars and in 1940.
As in his other works, the strength of this volume is describing the lessons the French learned from their wartime experiences and how these were applied. While results can often be denigrated (e.g., the Nivelle Offensive in 1917), why such approaches were adopted seem eminently sensible given the personalities and perspectives of the time.
Perhaps most of all, Doughty's books read like Greek tragedies--you can't help but love the main character, despite the flaws that conspire to bring him down at the end.
As in his other works, the strength of this volume is describing the lessons the French learned from their wartime experiences and how these were applied. While results can often be denigrated (e.g., the Nivelle Offensive in 1917), why such approaches were adopted seem eminently sensible given the personalities and perspectives of the time.
Perhaps most of all, Doughty's books read like Greek tragedies--you can't help but love the main character, despite the flaws that conspire to bring him down at the end.
September 20, 2021
I gave this five stars because it is so rare to find such a well detailed look at French operations in WWI. Very well written.
The book gives a detailed description of France's conduct of the war from the political/Grand Strategic level down to individual campaigns.
The primary focus is on how the French High Command made operational decisions based on a clear understanding of the global nature of the conflict. The much maligned Joffre appears more understandable as he had to juggle operations in France with support of Russia, the British and his own government. His failing seems to be an effort to please all the people more than innate incompetence. Probably the biggest error in France's grand plan was caving in to British demands for support in the futile Salonika adventure.
Contrary to most subsequent, British centric history telling France continued to actively and substantially prosecute the war effort up to the end of the war. The never held less than 2/3rds of the front and applied constant pressure to the German Army thereby allowing the British enough leeway for their own bumbling offensives in 17 and 18.
A completely enjoyable read.
The book gives a detailed description of France's conduct of the war from the political/Grand Strategic level down to individual campaigns.
The primary focus is on how the French High Command made operational decisions based on a clear understanding of the global nature of the conflict. The much maligned Joffre appears more understandable as he had to juggle operations in France with support of Russia, the British and his own government. His failing seems to be an effort to please all the people more than innate incompetence. Probably the biggest error in France's grand plan was caving in to British demands for support in the futile Salonika adventure.
Contrary to most subsequent, British centric history telling France continued to actively and substantially prosecute the war effort up to the end of the war. The never held less than 2/3rds of the front and applied constant pressure to the German Army thereby allowing the British enough leeway for their own bumbling offensives in 17 and 18.
A completely enjoyable read.
January 10, 2019
Joffre-the French Generalissimo at least for the opening of the War- seldom visited the front and preferred instead to wage France’s struggle well behind the lines. One can certainly criticize him for doing this. But for a pertinent aside: as Robin Nielland pointed out in The Great War Generals on the Western Front that there was a peculiarity to the First World War compared to conflicts before and after which is that communication and thus command and control between the front and the generals commanding was not in any way improved by a general’s forward presence and was indeed worse. Battles took place on too large a front with many more men for a general to control. At the very least a general behind the lines was easily found if and when information came back from the battle. Plus there’s communication- or rather the lack thereof. Electronic communication meant wires had to be laid by hand and these were typically hastily run and so on the ground- or just under- and therefore easily knocked out. More reliable methods were runners-an often fatal job, pigeons- subject to the unpredictability of any animal, and semaphore- useless in fog, smoke, and darkness or basically the conditions found on a battlefield.
Another possibility for Joffre’s absence at the front is that it was a method to preserve his sanity. In 1914 the French army lost an average of 2,200 men per day. The Battle of the Frontiers which ran for about a month from 8.6.1914 to 9.5.1914 consumed 329,000 of Marianne’s sons killed, wounded, missing, and captured. It’s “easier” now over a century removed to deal with this as an abstract. At the time of course these were brother officers, classmates, neighbors, sons; stellar men and average men alike. Removing oneself may well have been the only way to deal with these sorts of catastrophic losses not only as personal losses, but these are serious casualties for any army to endure. For comparison the American Civil War (our bloodiest) took four years to consume a rough approximation of France’s losses in four months of 1914.
But this book isn’t really so much about Joffre and why he didn’t often visit the front it’s fundamentally about France and her army and ‘how’ she managed to carry on in the face of these horrendous losses.
Of course the scale of this book means that its focus is top down. So there’s a lot from Joffre, and his successors (greatly appreciated as the French effort barely figures in available books in English from any perspective), but little by the average poilou. Even still, this is a solid addition that fills a very awkward void in Great War literature available in English- one that is recommended.
Another possibility for Joffre’s absence at the front is that it was a method to preserve his sanity. In 1914 the French army lost an average of 2,200 men per day. The Battle of the Frontiers which ran for about a month from 8.6.1914 to 9.5.1914 consumed 329,000 of Marianne’s sons killed, wounded, missing, and captured. It’s “easier” now over a century removed to deal with this as an abstract. At the time of course these were brother officers, classmates, neighbors, sons; stellar men and average men alike. Removing oneself may well have been the only way to deal with these sorts of catastrophic losses not only as personal losses, but these are serious casualties for any army to endure. For comparison the American Civil War (our bloodiest) took four years to consume a rough approximation of France’s losses in four months of 1914.
But this book isn’t really so much about Joffre and why he didn’t often visit the front it’s fundamentally about France and her army and ‘how’ she managed to carry on in the face of these horrendous losses.
Of course the scale of this book means that its focus is top down. So there’s a lot from Joffre, and his successors (greatly appreciated as the French effort barely figures in available books in English from any perspective), but little by the average poilou. Even still, this is a solid addition that fills a very awkward void in Great War literature available in English- one that is recommended.
June 19, 2020
As a World War I buff that can’t read French, it’s pretty difficult finding secondary literature that places France at the center of the war. This is a great work of military history. The author finds a good balance between going into technical aspects of the weapons used and the battles with the larger narrative of French military doctrine and war strategy.
The author rightfully criticized Joffre’s stubborn refusal to abandon the ‘cult of the offensive’ without turning to polemics. He does a good job of framing this offensive preference within the context of not allowing the Germans to concentrate heavily against Russia.
There’s also a good amount of material on otherwise forgotten fronts such as the Serbian/Salonika front and the Romanian front. He shows how disunity of command within the Allies and various statesmen and commanders each had their own agendas. Highly recommend this book and will check out the sources he mentioned at the end.
The author rightfully criticized Joffre’s stubborn refusal to abandon the ‘cult of the offensive’ without turning to polemics. He does a good job of framing this offensive preference within the context of not allowing the Germans to concentrate heavily against Russia.
There’s also a good amount of material on otherwise forgotten fronts such as the Serbian/Salonika front and the Romanian front. He shows how disunity of command within the Allies and various statesmen and commanders each had their own agendas. Highly recommend this book and will check out the sources he mentioned at the end.
April 1, 2022
Cogent and clearly written and surprisingly makes me want to be a Joffre supporter. The astounding amount of adaptation to changing technical, political & strategic situations as well as tremendous quantity staff & logistic work is mind boggling. For all the “in the trenches” imagery there was a tremendous and continuous shifting of formations all over France. This is the finest general history of The Great War I have read, even if it is focused on the French effort which was undisputedly essential.
January 3, 2022
As someone who studied military history from a very UK/US/Canadian perspective, this book was really helpful on filling out the narrative the English west didn't bother to fill in for me. There are some history books which turn fact into fiction to create a story line, but for me Doughty crafted the story driven by fact and not in a boring undergrad essay manner.
November 6, 2016
A tremendous review of the French effort in World War I, certainly the best use of French sources by an American writer on the war that I've seen or heard of. Doughty provides a balanced assessment of key personalities in the French war effort like Joffre, Petain, Foch, and Nivelle, and also a sound and fair evaluation of the strategic and operational efforts they undertook.
The core thesis is that Joffre's strategy in 1914 - that of simultaneous offensives on the Triple Alliance on all fronts until Germany broke from lack of reserves - was fundamentally sound, but operational and doctrinal challenges and failures - as well as the political difficulties stemming from poor coordination among allies and the lack of a supreme commander until 1918 - made the achieving of this goal slow, painful, and difficult. Indeed, it seems the manifestation of Sun Tzu's quote that "strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory." This view explains Joffre's insistence on executing Plan XVII, with its disastrous operations in Alsace-Lorraine even as the Schlieffen Plan was being executed in Belgium; his pursuit of offensives in Artois and Champagne in 1915, and his demands for Russian and British offensives to take the pressure of the French defense of Verdun in 1916. Doughty also shows that the main differences from Joffre to Nivelle to Petain and Foch not changes to this basic strategy, but the means by which the offensives should be made successful - either through grinding down German reserves to create a "rupture" on the front (as eventually occurred in 1918) or through pursuing a "breakthrough" in individual sectors of the front and return to mobile warfare.
Finally, Doughty cautions that the fact and methods of victory in 1918 in no way sealed France's fate in 1940, though its strategic paradigm required a shift (this was something de Gaulle noted in the 1920s).
Overall, for Americans who know little about France in World War I, this is a tremendous - though of necessity high-level and somewhat dry from a personal perspective - account.
The core thesis is that Joffre's strategy in 1914 - that of simultaneous offensives on the Triple Alliance on all fronts until Germany broke from lack of reserves - was fundamentally sound, but operational and doctrinal challenges and failures - as well as the political difficulties stemming from poor coordination among allies and the lack of a supreme commander until 1918 - made the achieving of this goal slow, painful, and difficult. Indeed, it seems the manifestation of Sun Tzu's quote that "strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory." This view explains Joffre's insistence on executing Plan XVII, with its disastrous operations in Alsace-Lorraine even as the Schlieffen Plan was being executed in Belgium; his pursuit of offensives in Artois and Champagne in 1915, and his demands for Russian and British offensives to take the pressure of the French defense of Verdun in 1916. Doughty also shows that the main differences from Joffre to Nivelle to Petain and Foch not changes to this basic strategy, but the means by which the offensives should be made successful - either through grinding down German reserves to create a "rupture" on the front (as eventually occurred in 1918) or through pursuing a "breakthrough" in individual sectors of the front and return to mobile warfare.
Finally, Doughty cautions that the fact and methods of victory in 1918 in no way sealed France's fate in 1940, though its strategic paradigm required a shift (this was something de Gaulle noted in the 1920s).
Overall, for Americans who know little about France in World War I, this is a tremendous - though of necessity high-level and somewhat dry from a personal perspective - account.
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September 27, 2015Offers a solid, comprehensive account of France's military aims, strategies and achievements. Works of this sort are essential to correcting the general perception of the war, which tends to diminish or even forget the massive role the French played on the Western Front -- it wasn't just Tommy versus Fritz. Anyway, this volume gives a good overview of the "spirit of the offensive," the decisions that lay behind it, and the ways in which the French attempted to adapt to the realities of the field.
January 10, 2013
Χρησιμοποιήθηκε, μεταξύ άλλων, για τη σύνταξη του άρθρου: Μικρασιατική Εκστρατεία: Βαθύτερα Αίτια της Στρατιωτικής μας Ήττας
March 21, 2016
The detailed deconstruction of troop movements and political strategy was a bit much for someone wanting a general understanding of the French military in WWI.
March 28, 2017
While one can make jokes about the fighting prowess or political backbone of France in the last half of the 20th Century, no one who has read this book will question the French soldiers fighting prowess or the determination of the French people to fight whatever it takes to win.
To me the most telling of this excellent book on the French Army during The Great War is on the first page. The horrific statistic of 890 French soldiers dead for every day of the war from July of 1914 to November 1918. While we refer to that literary generation as the Lost Generation, the French mean it literally.
To me the most telling of this excellent book on the French Army during The Great War is on the first page. The horrific statistic of 890 French soldiers dead for every day of the war from July of 1914 to November 1918. While we refer to that literary generation as the Lost Generation, the French mean it literally.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews