On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War

Norton Essays in American History

by Thomas G. Paterson

How and why did the Cold War begin? How and why did it end? What will its end mean for international relations? Opening his new book with the drama of people struggling to survive in rubble-strewn countries after the Second World War, Thomas G. Paterson follows the long Cold War crisis though to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He examines features of the international system that guaranteed the great-power quest for order by building spheres of influence; the power, ideology, and strategic-economic needs of the United States and the Soviet Union that compelled activist, global foreign policies; and the personalities of key figures, from Truman to Bush, Stalin to Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In his exploration of the end of the Cold War, the author concludes that the two superpowers sought detente because they had been weakened by the economic costs of the Cold War, challenges from allies, and the diffusion of power in the international system after the rise of the Third World. As historical story and analysis, On Every Front provides a telling account of an era - of the making and unmaking of the Cold War.

210 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1979

About the author

Thomas Graham Paterson received his Bachelors degree from the University of New Hampshire in 1963, and his Masters and Doctoral degrees from the University of California at Berkeley in 1964 and 1968, respectively. Paterson is known primarily for his contributions to Cold War history with an emphasis on United States-Cuba relations, as well as the study of United States foreign relations in general.
A prolific author, Paterson has written and co-written numerous books and articles, and has also served as an editor for several books and scholarly journals, including Diplomatic History and the Encyclopedia of U.S. Foreign Relations (1997), for which he was a contributing editor. He has published several articles and book reviews in newspapers, magazines, and newsletters, as well as scholarly journals such as the Journal of American History, The New England Journal of History, Diplomatic History, the New England Quarterly, and the American Historical Review. He is a member of a multiple of historical and scholarly associations, including the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the New England Historical Association, and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the last of which he was president in 1987.
Paterson is the recipient of a number of fellowships and research grants. He has appeared on television and radio programs, and has delivered an impressive number of lectures throughout the United States, as well as Canada, China, Cuba, Venezuela, New Zealand, Great Britain, Colombia, and Russia. He taught both graduate and undergraduate level History courses at the University of Connecticut from 1967 through 1997. Aside from his teaching duties, Paterson was also a member of several different University and History Department committees. Paterson has been Professor Emeritus since his retirement from teaching at UConn in 1997.

Reviews

[Robert Jeens · Rating 3 out of 5]

This study of the origins of the Cold War (1945 – 1950) from the middle of the Cold War (1979) holds up remarkably well after all this time. The main narrative contends that Washington and Moscow abandoned any ideas of a community of nations in order to build competing spheres of influence. There were three intertwined reasons for this: 1, a conflict-ridden, anarchic international system; 2, conflicting fundamental needs and ideas of the major players; and 3, the diplomatic tactics of Soviet and American leaders. Ultimately, this led to more conflict than was necessary.

To start with the drawbacks of the book first, in 1979, nobody was able to research the relevant Soviet archives; therefore, fundamental questions of Stalin’s intentions could not be answered, and this had a profound impact on the analysis of the period. Many researchers who have looked at these archives now, such as Steven Kotkin, Stalin’s premier English-speaking biographer, see the Cold War as a victory that contained conflict because it led neither to hot war between the Great Powers nor surrender for the USA. John Mearsheimer, the leading realist theoretician of Great Power relations, sees conflict as inevitable and spheres of influence as desirable to lessen the chances of war.

But the reasons that Professor Bennet put this book on her reading list in my 1980s university education are many. There is a succinct description of the international system at the end of World War Two. It is narrative and particular rather than general and theoretical. There is a reasoned commentary upon the impact of the change from Roosevelt to Truman. Roosevelt was not as idealistic as many have claimed. He acquiesced to the idea of spheres of influence for the Great Powers, so there was not a change of policy but a change of style, from Roosevelt's friendly, dissembling, disarming, political approach to Truman's more brash, decisive, confrontational manner. There is an extensive discussion of foreign policy decision-making in the USA. The President could get his way but then had to bring other people along. I don’t know that much has changed in any of this analysis in almost fifty years.

The book starts with the conclusion of World War Two and ends with the Communist victory in China, the Soviets exploding their first nuclear bomb, and the Korean War. In between there is the Marshall Plan, the solidification of Soviet control of its Eastern European satellites, and spats about Germany, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and France. The period saw a devastated Europe and Asia begin to emerge from the rebuilding efforts, while for the Americans it was a golden time of prosperity.

Millions of people were imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain in Europe, but we are lucky to have had the leaders we did. They did not like the Communist system, but they knew that any attempt to fundamentally dislodge the Soviets was sure to lead to war. The Cold warriors thought that Stalin and the Soviets wanted to dominate the world, and that was true in theory, but in reality, Stalin was more cautious than that. Truman, the people around him, and the people after him contained Stalin the best they could and everyone lived to fight another day.