Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific

by Joseph H. Alexander

The Pacific War changed abruptly in November 1943 when Adm. Chester W. Nimitz unleashed his Central Pacific drive, spearheaded by U.S. Marines. The sudden American proclivity for bold amphibious assaults into the teeth of prepared defenses astonished Japanese commanders, who called them "storm landings" because they differed sharply from earlier campaigns. This is the story of seven now-epic long-range assaults executed against murderous enemy fire at Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa - and a potential eighth, Kyushu. The author describes each clash as demonstrating a growing U.S. ability to concentrate an overwhelming naval force against a distant strategic objective and literally kick down the front door. The battles were violent, thoroughly decisive, and always bloody, with the landing force never relinquishing the offensive. The cost of storming these seven fortified islands was 74,805 combat casualties for the Marines and their Navy comrades. Losses among participating Army and offshore Navy units spiked the total to 100,000 dead and wounded. Award-winning historian Joseph Alexander relates this extraordinary story with an easy narrative style bolstered by years of research in original battle accounts, new Japanese translations, and fresh interviews with survivors. Richly illustrated and abounding with human-interest anecdotes about colorful "web-footed amphibians," Storm Landings vividly portrays the sheer drama of these three-dimensional battles whose magnitude and ferocity may never again be seen in this world.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction

242 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 1997

About the author

Col. Joseph H. Alexander, USMC served in the Corps for 29 years as an assault amphibian officer. He has written six books, including Utmost Savagery and Edson’s Raiders. He was the Naval Institute Author of the Year in 1996 and Naval History Author of the Year in 2010. He was the principal historian and writer on the exhibit design team throughout the construction of the National Museum of the Marine Corps. He lived in Asheville, North Carolina.

Biography taken from http://www.usni.org/author/colonel-jo...

Reviews

[Steven Hull · Rating 4 out of 5]

Colonel Alexander’s 200-page book about the primary U.S. amphibious assaults in the Pacific theater during World War II is not exhaustive and it is not meant to be. Instead, it is a primer, an introduction to the key themes and elements of these assaults, and the evolution of the strategy and tactics on both sides from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, to the preparations for the invasion of Japan in late 1945.
The book is organized chronologically beginning with the U.S. invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942. Cynically labeled ‘Operation Shoestring’ because of the rapid and in retrospect poorly organized preparations and initial execution, this was the first of many valuable sources of lessons learned for the Army and Marines. They knew that there would be many more landings and certain organizational, training and equipping improvement had to be made. Among these were clear lines of command authority among the Navy seaborne forces and the landing forces, the establishment of continuous and defensible supply lines, protection for the ships in the landing force, and the ability to bring overwhelming, violent force to bear against the enemy at the place and time chosen. And while Guadalcanal had been a strategically defensive move, subsequent landings would be strategically offensive in nature.
Alexander served in the amphibious forces while in the Marines. His insights into the nature and difficulties of such warfare are clearly evident in how he presents and explains what occurred in the Pacific. He shows how the Americans at Guadalcanal narrowly avoided disaster when early on when several of the Navy ships protecting the landing force were defeated in sea battles off the island and the Navy had to abandon the First Marine Division. He explained the critical importance of clear lines of authority at all times between the seaborne commander and the commander of the landing force. He showed why the pre-invasion bombardment of Tarawa was woefully inadequate in scale and quality and why this cost lives.
As the amphibious war progressed, the magnitude and exactitude of these operations grew rapidly. While three LSTs (Tank Landing Ships) had been used at Tarawa in November 1943, 187 were present at Okinawa in April 1945. In June 1942 the Marines had 31 fighter squadrons; three years later they had 131. This growth was accompanied with changes in strategy and tactics. By the time Okinawa was invaded the Japanese had stopped contesting the U.S. landings at the beaches. Instead, they dug in, went underground, and became very costly to root out and defeat. Casualty ratios became more even. Iwo Jima (February 1945) was the first time the U.S. suffered more casualties than the Japanese. Okinawa was nearly as bad and on a much larger scale both on land and sea. All of this bode poorly for the eventual invasion of Japan, which Alexander address at the end of the book.
For those who know little of this slice of the Pacific war, Alexander’s book is a fine introduction. For those knowledgeable, it provides a quick refresher. For any reader, it drives home the courage of all those who fought on both sides, and again raises the question of how we avoid such wars in the first place.

[Zach Morris · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a well-written masterpiece.

I wish this would have been one of the first five books on World War II that I read when I first started reading books on the topic years ago. When it comes to books about amphibious warfare (landing from the ocean and then fighting on land) during the Second World War, this may be the best book I've ever read on the subject, next to "MacArthur's Amphibious Navy" by Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey.

This book focuses on the "storm landings" of the Central Pacific Theater. Colonel Alexander describes "storm landings" (a term used by the Japanese) as the American tactic of hurling enormous firepower against the enemy, then making organized amphibious assaults against the hostile beaches head-on. Alexander defines storm landings specifically as amphibious assaults that were highly dangerous, long-range, large-scale, self-sustaining, executed against defended positions, and all while within the protective umbrella of fast carrier task forces. This book's focus is the storm landings of Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the invasion of Kyūshū—had the Americans invaded mainland Japan. But it also discusses the the all-but-forgotten landings at Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo, which became the first significant opposed landing experienced by American forces in the Pacific War. The author does an incredible job of providing a unique overview for each battle, from an amphibious landing perspective. This is a must-read for WWII historians.

[Leonard · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very valuable book for Marine Historians and people who still, to this, day argue the use of the atomic bombs used to end the war against Japan. The value of the "bomb" plus, and any people forget, the advancing Russian army towards Japan led to the war's end. The last chapter about the Japanese preparations for the invasion of Kyushu are quite sobering, truly, no one knows just what the cost in lives would have been if the invasion would have had to go on the end the war

The book reads like a text, but his research into the records of the military units involved was quite illuminating. The book contains a lot of new information about the planning and the co-ordination between the various services.

The quote that is the last paragraph in the text by Robert Sherrod sums it all up quite succintly,"...no man who saw Tarawa, Saipan, Iwo Jima or Okinawa would agree that all the American steel was in the guns and bombs. There was a lot, also, in the hearts of the men who stormed the beaches."

[DJ Bowen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great insight into the planning, logistics and all the problems and solutions of developing the amphibious landings that were conducted across the Pacific in WW2. Not and exhaustive read and does not go into to much detail in the battles as a whole. Focusing mostly on the initial assaults its a quick read with a lot to be learned from it. The planning and development of the US strategy is often overlooked by the battles them selves but its worth knowing how extensive the war effort was beyond just the soliders, sailors and marines in direct combat.

[George Avery · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent brief history of Marine Amphibious warfare in the Second World War, and how the lessons learned led to the adaptation of doctrine and equipment, as well as the limitations in the diffusion of knowledge in the Fleet Marine Force. Working under conditions of equipment poverty due to the prioritization of operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the Marine Corps (and Army divisions attached to Central Nimitz' Pacific Command) were forced to adapt and develop novel tactics for a series of increasingly intricate and demanding operations, against a Japanese foe who also learned lessons and adapted. Alexander does an excellent job discussing each major operation in a chapter length study, including discussions of how both sides adapted to the changing environment, not neglecting to look at both the mistakes made and successes achieved in each. An excellent primer for students of the Pacific War,the history of amphibious operations, and sociologists interested in models for the diffusion of innovation.

[Steve Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

This a superbly researched and well written book about the evolution of amphibious warfare in the Pacific theater of World War Two.

I knocked off a star because I felt Colonel Alexander was too easy on some of the commanders responsible for the debacles at Tarawa and Peleliu. The Marines had been informed by a New Zealand liaison officer of the high tide at Tarawa, but ignored his warnings. This led to tremendous casualties. General Douglas MacArthur, whom Colonel Alexander uncritically assesses as "brilliant", pushed for the taking of Pelelieu...which was totally unnecessary. Colonel Alexander fails to note the logistics failure on Pelelieu that led to a lack of water for the Marines, an oversight that magnified their agony in the 110 degree heat.

That said, this is an outstanding book.

[Roger · Rating 4 out of 5]

Colonel Joe Alexander has written a superb book covering the major storm landings made by the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army in the Pacific Theater during WWII. I learned much from reading this book. It is told from the perspective of a soldier who knows what he is talking about. Recommendations on the back of the cover will give credence to my opinion of it. They include Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak, Dr. Eugene B. Sledge among others. I wish my Dad could have read this book. He would have felt that the Pacific Theater was not forgotten. From reading his papers after his death, I discovered that he felt that many people tended to pay more attention to the European Theater, (D-Day, Battle of the Bulge, etc.)

[Dave Beeman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short version of the drive in the Central Pacifc during World War 2 and the development of tactics, procedures, and the improvements made to landing craft. Nothing new for the student of amphibious operations.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Marines get to assault heavily fortified islands against an enemy who fights to the last man.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brief critical history on the evolution of amphibious war fighting in the pacific.