On the eve of the tenth anniversary of the intervention in Afghanistan, a major assessment of strategy in this most unstable of nations
In October 2001, NATO forces invaded Afghanistan. Their initial aim, to topple the Taliban regime and replace it with a more democratic government aligned to Western interests, was swiftly achieved. However, stabilizing the country in the ensuing years has proven much more difficult. Despite billions of dollars in aid and military expenditure, Afghanistan remains a nation riddled with warlords, the world's major heroin producer, and the site of a seemingly endless conflict between Islamist militants and NATO forces. In this timely and important book, Tim Bird and Alex Marshall offer a panoramic view of international involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011. Tackling the subject matter as a whole, Bird and Marshall weave together analysis of military strategy, regional context, aid policy, the Afghan government, and the many disagreements between and within the Western powers involved in the intervention. Given the complicating factors of the heroin trade, unwelcoming terrain, and precarious relations with Pakistan, the authors acknowledge the ways in which Afghanistan has presented unique challenges for its foreign invaders. Ultimately, however, they argue that the international community has failed in its self-imposed effort to solve Afghanistan's problems and that there are broader lessons to be learned from their struggle, particularly in terms of counterinsurgency and the ever-complicated work of "nation-building." The overarching feature of the intervention, they argue, has been an absence of strategic clarity and coherence.
The War in Afghanistan is now in its second decade. This book, written by two British professors, is about the first decade of our Afghan intervention. It’s a war that most Americans have stopped paying attention to and want to put far behind us. As with the war in Vietnam - our second longest war – there are lessons to be learned from our current war as well.
The authors recount the miscalculations and mistakes made by the West. The authors also make predictions:
* Afghanistan is unlikely to develop a modern government, given its history and ethnic, tribal and clan networks that are at the heart of its society. “Onto this unpromising landscape has been grafted a particularly dysfunctional Western approach to development, governance and ‘capacity building.’”
* The Karzai government will never be capable of exerting anything that resembles control in the country. In addition, a clear-cut victory over insurgents in the south and east of the country is unattainable.
* Pakistan is incapable of fully controlling the lawless tribal areas that border Afghanistan.
* Sooner or later, elements of the Taliban will be brought in to some kind of political settlement. Keeping Al Qaeda out of safe havens in Afghanistan doesn’t matter much in today’s environment where terrorists can operate from anywhere.
“Perhaps the most basic lesson of all is to think long and hard before embarking on attempting to reshape states and societies to make them conform to our whims.”
I haven't been to Afghanistan so I can hardly critique this book's accuracy, but I have no reason to believe that its assertions are untrue. There is nothing that struck me as overly outlandish about the author's claims and it is obvious that our adventure there has been fraught with hindsight.
Interesting and well researched, but as with most books on the topic, the book largely fails to give voice to the Afghan people and the human cost of the war. The book does however provide an interesting, weighty and sustained critique of Western actions in the region.