Justice Is Conflict.

by Stuart Hampshire

This book, which inaugurates the Princeton Monographs in Philosophy series, starts from Plato's analogy in the Republic between conflict in the soul and conflict in the city. Plato's solution required reason to impose agreement and harmony on the warring passions, and this search for harmony and agreement constitutes the main tradition in political philosophy up to and including contemporary liberal theory. Hampshire undermines this tradition by developing a distinction between justice in procedures, which demands that both sides in a conflict should be heard, and justice in matters of substance, which will always be disputed. Rationality in private thinking consists in adversary reasoning, and so it does in public affairs. Moral conflict is eternal, and institutionalized argument is its only universally acceptable restraint and the only alternative to tyranny.


In the chapter "Against Monotheism," Hampshire argues that monotheistic beliefs are only with difficulty made compatible with pluralism in ethics. In "Conflict and Conflict Resolution," he argues that socialism, seen as the proposal of extended political solutions for natural human ills, is still a relevant, yet strongly contested, ideal.

Genres: Philosophy

120 pages, Paperback

First published December 21, 1999

Reviews

[Tommy · Rating 3 out of 5]

There is a conception of rationality that guarantees harmony of all drives and desires that many philosophers declared as obvious truth. And, for Hampshire, this conception of rationality had pervaded into most of liberal discourse. He isn't ready to accept it and rather prefers a minimalist conception of rationality and with that as a starting point a minimalist conception of Justice. The reason for Hampshire is adversarial it mirrors the social practices of argumentation and deliberation that we engage in. Here, unlike those ideas of pure reason that starts from within and moves out, Hampshire starts out and moves inwards.

The basic condition for Justice, which is also an important part of adversarial deliberation, is that both sides should be heard. This he believes is an idea of justice that will be accepted by all of humanity. If this condition isn't foundational then the process isn't just to begin with. Hampshire believes that such a condition will avoid fanaticism and this openness is the core of liberalism for him. I have to say I share with him these believes along with the idea that Justice is Conflict and flawed because it mostly rests on compromises. If the world were black and white, all would be easy and justice would be perfect but it isn't and what we get is compromise.

But what would the other side be (audi alteram partem, is the motto after all)? someone who believes in principles of justice and isn't appeased with a procedural conception of justice. Shouldn't justice contain within it something more? That justice should serve the powerless. Hampshire points out that these most ideas of justice are conventional and customary ( he himself is a democratic socialist), these ideas of justice itself were brought forth through adversarial deliberation and conflict of ideas. But as Hampshire points out even conservatives who argue that certain conditions are natural and is not a question of politics accepts them as misfortunes. Doesn't this mean there is an idea of injustice that they accept and the question becomes who should be held accountable. After all aren't debates on Theodicy an attempt to redeem God of this accountability or sometimes condemn him with the question, what justice is this?
Could we have a conception of justice that is more than just procedural? Could the exercise of reason guarantee us harmony? I don't believe so. But my side isn't the only side.

[Sam van Driel · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interessant betoog over waarom procedurele rechtvaardigheid als hoogste substantiële rechtvaardigheid dient te worden beschouwd.

[Theo · Rating 2 out of 5]

Minus 3 stars for being a logical positivist, plus one star for at least trying to be socialist.

[Sam Andrus · Rating 4 out of 5]

thesis is roughly that there are two types of justice: procedural and substantive (i.e. both sides in a legal dispute getting to argue is procedural justice and the outcome is substantive). because people will never ever ever agree 100% on anything substantive, we need to at least agree on the procedures. and for procedures to be effective, they need to be rational and respected - respect for institutions comes from history and experience + time and tradition... sly little supreme court legitimacy propaganda at the end, wonder what old stuart would think about johnny boy roberts (J. Robby) and his thirst for perceived institutional integrity

[Joseph Langham · Rating 4 out of 5]

At last, a level headed approach to Plato, and the basis of a sound political philosophy based on the necessary and unavoidable presence of conflict- a very concise and intelligent book

[José Pereira · Rating 5 out of 5]

Textbook synthetic philosophy. What power of expression, coherence and clarity of ideas. Draws from everywhere with ease, brings insights of all types, doesn’t shy away from prescription nor real-world analysis.
Crystalizes pretty much all my inclinations – naturalism, political realism, moral anti-realism, socialism - into a moral-political worldview - appreciated.

[Timothy Butler · Rating 1 out of 5]

My dear friend should try again to explain why this work says anything worthy of note. A brief and admittedly untidy sketch of my concern:

Acknowledging reasonable pluralism is necessary. But the acknowledgment is the beginning of the required effort, not the end. When we acknowledge that rationality does not produce harmony (something like a consensus), we must then actually address how decisions are to be made--and made fairly--so that a political harmony can prevail.

Hampshire argues for a limited conception of procedural justice. His argument is within the deliberative democracy tradition, save that he does not favor democracy or any other particular form of government. I say that Hampshire's argument is within the deliberative tradition because it seems to resolve to a requirement that the institutions of government hear the arguments of the parties to a dispute. That is, he argues for deliberation as a requirement for decision-making. Beyond this, he only requests a basic and natural loyalty to the institutions of decision-making--he does not argue that these institutions should be structured in any particular way. Thus, we have deliberations heard by institutions that are admittedly the product of past power struggles---struggles that were resolved, we are told, not by any principle of justice but by the hand that held more power.

But how does this even begin to resolve conflicts in a just way? There is no requirement that the content of the deliberations be restricted to universally accessible justifications (i.e., as with John Rawls and Joshua Cohen), nor is there a requirement that decisions be made by any particular principle--collective choice of other. Indeed, I do not understand Hampshire to argue against the tyrant, so long as the tyrant rules tyrannically after hearing arguments.

[John · Rating 1 out of 5]

Hampshire's individual points were spectacular (particularly his application of omnis determinatio est negatio), but, overall, he's the world's most optimistic pessimist. He imagines that justice can be achieved by audi alteram partem or hearing both sides of the issue. This is foolish, because he assumes that his "procedural justice" will appropriately satisfy everyone. But it won't because it's a subjective justice. When asked to defend his sense of justice and morality, he evades this by saying that human Reason can make up for no real objective morality. But, in practical terms, procedural justice just becomes a way for an individual to exercise control over the conflict of political factions, and when that doesn't work, we can always just remind ourselves that Reason is only a combination of helpful genetic mutations. We can evolve out of that too.

[Sean Chick · Rating 2 out of 5]

So many words used to say so little.