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Very Short Introductions #043
Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction
Simon Critchley's Very Short Introduction shows that Continental philosophy encompasses a distinct set of philosophical traditions and practices, with a compelling range of problems all too often ignored by the analytic tradition. He discusses the ideas and approaches of philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida, and introduces key concepts such as existentialism, nihilism, and phenomenology byexplaining their place in the Continental tradition.ABOUT THE The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.
169 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2001
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About the author
Simon Critchley
112 books380 followersSimon Critchley (born 27 February 1960 in Hertfordshire) is an English philosopher currently teaching at The New School. He works in continental philosophy. Critchley argues that philosophy commences in disappointment, either religious or political. These two axes may be said largely to inform his published work: religious disappointment raises the question of meaning and has to, as he sees it, deal with the problem of nihilism; political disappointment provokes the question of justice and raises the need for a coherent ethics [...]
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August 15, 2018
حکمت در مقابل شناخت
تاریخچۀ کوتاهی از فلسفه
در آغاز راه فلسفه همه چیز خوب و خوش بود. امثال سقراط معتقد بودن با «شناخت» جهان، در حقیقت با شناختِ غاییِ جهان، می شه به «حکمت» رسید، یعنی فهمید چطوری می شه خوب و سرشار و خوشبخت زندگی کرد. شناخت یا حکمت نظری، و حکمت عملی، دو شاخۀ در هم تنیده بودن و با هم در ارتباط.
تمام مشکلات با کانت شروع شد. کانت سه کتاب داشت، که مختصراً به اسم «نقد اول و دوم و سوم» شناخته می شن. در نقد اول می خواست نشون بده که ما چه چیزهایی رو می تونیم «بشناسیم». یعنی توانایی منطقی ما برای شناخت علمی جهان چقدره. مرزهای شناختی ما چیه. و در نقد سوم، می خواست نشون بده که ما چطور باید «زندگی» کنیم. یعنی در عمل و از لحاظ اخلاقی رابطه و مناسباتمون با جهان چطور باید باشه. پس کتاب اول حکمت نظری بود، و کتاب سوم حکمت عملی.
مشکل بزرگ این بود که حکمت عملی و نظری کانت، دیگه مثل فلاسفۀ قدیم با هم ارتباط نداشتن و نقد اول و سوم با هم سازگار نبودن. کانت در نقد اول با دقت و قدرت اثبات می کرد که مفاهیمی مثل «خدا» یا «روح» یا «اختیار» از لحاظ علمی و منطقی غیرقابل اثبات هستن و خارج از مرزهای شناختی ما قرار دارن. اما توی نقد سوم می گفت: ما برای زندگی درست، مجبوریم «فرض» کنیم که خدایی هست، روح جاودانه است و اختیار به کاره، وگرنه سنگ روی سنگ بند نمی شه و تمام اخلاق فرو می پاشه. یعنی ما در عین این که اذعان داریم این مقولات غیرقابل اثبات هستن و هیچ دلیلی نفیاً و اثباتاً براشون وجود نداره، اما در زندگی مون، در روابطمون با دیگران و جهان، باید فرض کنیم که این ها وجود دارن. یعنی چیزی باید جهت زندگی ما رو مشخص کنه، که هیچ بنیان علمی و منطقی نداره.
همین جا فاجعه شروع شد، و شکاف بزرگی بین دو دسته از فیلسوف ها پدید اومد که طی سیصد سال ادامه پیدا کرد تا به ایجاد دو نحلۀ کاملاً جداگانۀ فلسفی ختم شد که اون قدر از هم فاصله دارن که حتی نمی تونن حرف همدیگه رو بفهمن: فلسفۀ تحلیلی، و فلسفۀ قارّه ای.
پیروان فلسفۀ تحلیلی، به نقد اول کانت وفادار موندن، و گفتن: ما چی کار داریم که چطور باید خوب و سرشار و خوشبخت زندگی کرد؟ کار یه فیلسوف این نیست که دنبال این چیزها باشه. کار فیلسوف یه کار جدی و دقیق و منطقیه، فیلسوف فقط باید دنبال این باشه که چطور می شه دنیا رو دقیق و درست و منطقی شناخت، و این یعنی: کار فیلسوف فقط همواره کردن راه برای علمه.
در مقابل، پیروان فلسفۀ قاره ای، روی نقد سوم تمرکز داشتن. می خواستن همچنان راه سعادت رو پیدا کنن، راه زندگی سرشار رو. و گفتن: اگه کانت ثابت کرده که نمی شه مواد مورد نیاز برای سعادت رو به صورت علمی «شناخت»، چه باک؟ مگه هر چیزی باید با روش علمی قابل شناخت باشه؟ مگه ما نمی تونیم رابطه ای غیر از رابطۀ علمی با جهان داشته باشیم؟ و جستجو به دنبال پیدا کردن راه دیگه ای برای ارتباط با جهان که بتونه به ما بگه چطور باید زندگی کنیم، شروع شد. کانت گفته بود: برای زندگی خوب، باید فرض بگیریم مفاهیم غیرقابل شناختِ «خدا» و «روح» و «اختیار» واقعاً وجود دارن. فیلسوفان قارّه ای دست از این فرض که خود کانت می گفت مبنایی نداره، برداشتن، و سعی کردن مفاهیم دیگه ای جایگزینش کنن که مسیر زندگی خوب و سعادتمند رو به ما نشون بده: نیچه «ارادۀ قدرت» رو پیشنهاد کرد، فروید «ناخودآگاه» رو، هایدگر «هستی» رو، و هر کس مفهوم مشابهی رو پیشنهاد کرد که مدعی بود می تونه زندگی ما رو سرشار کنه.
نویسندۀ کتاب، در نهایت می گه: این جا زمینی هست که می شه زمین مشترک دو گروه فیلسوفان باشه، و دو دسته فیلسوف در این زمین با هم بتونن گفتگو کنن، و اون «پدیدارشناسی»ـه. پدیدارشناسی به طور مختصر می گه: تنها رابطۀ ما با جهان، رابطۀ علمی و تئوریک نیست. ما قبل از این که جهان رو به طور تئوریک بشناسیم، با جهان رابطه داریم، روابط عملی، احساسی، زیباشناختی و... و رابطۀ علمی فقط یکی از انواع مختلف رابطۀ ما با جهانه.
اگه فیلسوفان تحلیلی این رو بپذیرن، اون وقت قبول می کنن که اگه ما بتونیم روابط دیگه ای که با جهان داریم رو درست تحلیل کنیم و بشناسیم، اون وقت شاید بتونیم توی یکی از این انواع مختلف رابطه که با جهان داریم، معنایی برای زندگی خودمون پیدا کنیم، و بر اساس همین معنا زندگی سعادتمندانه ای داشته باشیم. یعنی همون چیزی که فیلسوفان قارّه ای به دنبالشن.
کتاب
به جز فصل دوم كه نويسنده به شقاق موجود در نقد اول و سوم كانت مى پرداخت و كتاب كمى سخت شد، باقى كتاب بسيار لذت بخش و آموزنده بود. مخصوصاً كه نويسنده فقط تاريخچه عرضه نمى كرد، بلكه سعى مى كرد خط و ربط ها و طرح ها و الگوهاى تقابل تاريخى فلسفه قاره اى و تحليلى رو بيرون بكشه.
و ترجمه هم که نیازی به گفتن نداره که عالی بود. هر چند گاهی بامزه بود که مترجمی با این تبحّر، بعضی از اصطلاحات محاوره ای انگلیسی رو تحت اللفظی ترجمه کرده بود.
تاریخچۀ کوتاهی از فلسفه
در آغاز راه فلسفه همه چیز خوب و خوش بود. امثال سقراط معتقد بودن با «شناخت» جهان، در حقیقت با شناختِ غاییِ جهان، می شه به «حکمت» رسید، یعنی فهمید چطوری می شه خوب و سرشار و خوشبخت زندگی کرد. شناخت یا حکمت نظری، و حکمت عملی، دو شاخۀ در هم تنیده بودن و با هم در ارتباط.
تمام مشکلات با کانت شروع شد. کانت سه کتاب داشت، که مختصراً به اسم «نقد اول و دوم و سوم» شناخته می شن. در نقد اول می خواست نشون بده که ما چه چیزهایی رو می تونیم «بشناسیم». یعنی توانایی منطقی ما برای شناخت علمی جهان چقدره. مرزهای شناختی ما چیه. و در نقد سوم، می خواست نشون بده که ما چطور باید «زندگی» کنیم. یعنی در عمل و از لحاظ اخلاقی رابطه و مناسباتمون با جهان چطور باید باشه. پس کتاب اول حکمت نظری بود، و کتاب سوم حکمت عملی.
مشکل بزرگ این بود که حکمت عملی و نظری کانت، دیگه مثل فلاسفۀ قدیم با هم ارتباط نداشتن و نقد اول و سوم با هم سازگار نبودن. کانت در نقد اول با دقت و قدرت اثبات می کرد که مفاهیمی مثل «خدا» یا «روح» یا «اختیار» از لحاظ علمی و منطقی غیرقابل اثبات هستن و خارج از مرزهای شناختی ما قرار دارن. اما توی نقد سوم می گفت: ما برای زندگی درست، مجبوریم «فرض» کنیم که خدایی هست، روح جاودانه است و اختیار به کاره، وگرنه سنگ روی سنگ بند نمی شه و تمام اخلاق فرو می پاشه. یعنی ما در عین این که اذعان داریم این مقولات غیرقابل اثبات هستن و هیچ دلیلی نفیاً و اثباتاً براشون وجود نداره، اما در زندگی مون، در روابطمون با دیگران و جهان، باید فرض کنیم که این ها وجود دارن. یعنی چیزی باید جهت زندگی ما رو مشخص کنه، که هیچ بنیان علمی و منطقی نداره.
همین جا فاجعه شروع شد، و شکاف بزرگی بین دو دسته از فیلسوف ها پدید اومد که طی سیصد سال ادامه پیدا کرد تا به ایجاد دو نحلۀ کاملاً جداگانۀ فلسفی ختم شد که اون قدر از هم فاصله دارن که حتی نمی تونن حرف همدیگه رو بفهمن: فلسفۀ تحلیلی، و فلسفۀ قارّه ای.
پیروان فلسفۀ تحلیلی، به نقد اول کانت وفادار موندن، و گفتن: ما چی کار داریم که چطور باید خوب و سرشار و خوشبخت زندگی کرد؟ کار یه فیلسوف این نیست که دنبال این چیزها باشه. کار فیلسوف یه کار جدی و دقیق و منطقیه، فیلسوف فقط باید دنبال این باشه که چطور می شه دنیا رو دقیق و درست و منطقی شناخت، و این یعنی: کار فیلسوف فقط همواره کردن راه برای علمه.
در مقابل، پیروان فلسفۀ قاره ای، روی نقد سوم تمرکز داشتن. می خواستن همچنان راه سعادت رو پیدا کنن، راه زندگی سرشار رو. و گفتن: اگه کانت ثابت کرده که نمی شه مواد مورد نیاز برای سعادت رو به صورت علمی «شناخت»، چه باک؟ مگه هر چیزی باید با روش علمی قابل شناخت باشه؟ مگه ما نمی تونیم رابطه ای غیر از رابطۀ علمی با جهان داشته باشیم؟ و جستجو به دنبال پیدا کردن راه دیگه ای برای ارتباط با جهان که بتونه به ما بگه چطور باید زندگی کنیم، شروع شد. کانت گفته بود: برای زندگی خوب، باید فرض بگیریم مفاهیم غیرقابل شناختِ «خدا» و «روح» و «اختیار» واقعاً وجود دارن. فیلسوفان قارّه ای دست از این فرض که خود کانت می گفت مبنایی نداره، برداشتن، و سعی کردن مفاهیم دیگه ای جایگزینش کنن که مسیر زندگی خوب و سعادتمند رو به ما نشون بده: نیچه «ارادۀ قدرت» رو پیشنهاد کرد، فروید «ناخودآگاه» رو، هایدگر «هستی» رو، و هر کس مفهوم مشابهی رو پیشنهاد کرد که مدعی بود می تونه زندگی ما رو سرشار کنه.
نویسندۀ کتاب، در نهایت می گه: این جا زمینی هست که می شه زمین مشترک دو گروه فیلسوفان باشه، و دو دسته فیلسوف در این زمین با هم بتونن گفتگو کنن، و اون «پدیدارشناسی»ـه. پدیدارشناسی به طور مختصر می گه: تنها رابطۀ ما با جهان، رابطۀ علمی و تئوریک نیست. ما قبل از این که جهان رو به طور تئوریک بشناسیم، با جهان رابطه داریم، روابط عملی، احساسی، زیباشناختی و... و رابطۀ علمی فقط یکی از انواع مختلف رابطۀ ما با جهانه.
اگه فیلسوفان تحلیلی این رو بپذیرن، اون وقت قبول می کنن که اگه ما بتونیم روابط دیگه ای که با جهان داریم رو درست تحلیل کنیم و بشناسیم، اون وقت شاید بتونیم توی یکی از این انواع مختلف رابطه که با جهان داریم، معنایی برای زندگی خودمون پیدا کنیم، و بر اساس همین معنا زندگی سعادتمندانه ای داشته باشیم. یعنی همون چیزی که فیلسوفان قارّه ای به دنبالشن.
کتاب
به جز فصل دوم كه نويسنده به شقاق موجود در نقد اول و سوم كانت مى پرداخت و كتاب كمى سخت شد، باقى كتاب بسيار لذت بخش و آموزنده بود. مخصوصاً كه نويسنده فقط تاريخچه عرضه نمى كرد، بلكه سعى مى كرد خط و ربط ها و طرح ها و الگوهاى تقابل تاريخى فلسفه قاره اى و تحليلى رو بيرون بكشه.
و ترجمه هم که نیازی به گفتن نداره که عالی بود. هر چند گاهی بامزه بود که مترجمی با این تبحّر، بعضی از اصطلاحات محاوره ای انگلیسی رو تحت اللفظی ترجمه کرده بود.
August 23, 2021
As far as very short introductions are concerned, this book is crappy. Oh it's short alright, but it sure isn't introductory. To enjoy it you would require some preliminary knowledge of philosophy, because this author is prone to name-dropping not just philosophers, but also major philosophical arguments and rivalries. I suspect that anyone who doesn't already know a little about continental philosophy will get so bored that they'll likely abandon the book after two or three chapters.
Another problem is that it's supposed to be a very short introduction to continental philosophy, but really, the title should be 'analytic vs continental philosophy: a very short introduction.' Right from the beginning he talks about how the divide between the two deepened with post Kantian philosophy, and major parts or the book are Bentham vs Mill, Heidegger vs Carnap.
Once you get into it however, especially in the later chapters, it is a fun read. His main point seems to be that both analytic and continental philosophy have failed to bridge the gap between wisdom and knowledge, with extreme forms of one leading to scientism and the other leading to obscurantism. Apparently, we need some grand unification of philosophy. Not likely to happen anytime soon.
Another problem is that it's supposed to be a very short introduction to continental philosophy, but really, the title should be 'analytic vs continental philosophy: a very short introduction.' Right from the beginning he talks about how the divide between the two deepened with post Kantian philosophy, and major parts or the book are Bentham vs Mill, Heidegger vs Carnap.
Once you get into it however, especially in the later chapters, it is a fun read. His main point seems to be that both analytic and continental philosophy have failed to bridge the gap between wisdom and knowledge, with extreme forms of one leading to scientism and the other leading to obscurantism. Apparently, we need some grand unification of philosophy. Not likely to happen anytime soon.
February 2, 2023
کتابی برای شناخت وجوه تمایز فلسفۀ تحلیلی با فلسفۀ قاره ای. اما نباید امید داشت و اکتفا کرد به این که همیشه بتوانیم مرز بین این دو را راحت بسنجیم و بازشناسیم.
روایت کتاب منسجم و منطقی بود اما بخش های پایانی و مباحث مربوط به هایدگر و کارناپ و برتراند راسل برجستگی بیشتری داشت.
روایت کتاب منسجم و منطقی بود اما بخش های پایانی و مباحث مربوط به هایدگر و کارناپ و برتراند راسل برجستگی بیشتری داشت.
February 2, 2013
Just as I expected, it all starts with Kant.
Critchley faced a damned difficult task, but, as with so many of the authors of these marvelous Oxford Press A Very Short Introduction series, he has managed to turn his 127 page allotment into a reasonable exposition upon what the murkily-etched Continental Philosophy is all about. While ever at pains to point out how unsound both geographically and methodologically the allusions to a European-based system of thinking are (and as opposed to a similarly ill-configured Anglo-American Analytic competition), Critchley does manage to bifurcate this modern philosophical split into competing strains of thought derived from the Critical Philosophy of Kant and its unforseen removal of all ballasts from the foundations of meaning. Basically, there is a chain that runs something like Benthamite–>Knowledge–>Critically Destructive–>Reformist that comprises the Analytical side, and another that plays out along the lines of Coleridgean–>Meaning–>Hermaneutically Reconstructive–>Traditional that can suitably be applied to the Continental opposite. Whereas the first-named has determined to discard metaphysics completely, aligning its stars with burgeoning modern science and using logic and language as its boundary determiners, the titular branch, obsessed by the idea of nihilism that is attendant to the removal of meaningful surety and infused by an alienating technology, seeks ways of combing the traditions and methods of the past that they might be deconstructed, reconfigured, and reintroduced as potentials for stabilizing and empowering mankind in an emancipatory manner. Whether it be Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault or Derrida, each, in their own way, has that end in mind. And in the outlining and historical tracing of these connected Continental philosopher threads, Critchley has put together a suitably readable and thoughtful presentation of the Continental evolution through idealism, phenomenology, critical theory, and structuralism.
I've noticed that a few reviewers have objected to what they determine as an authorial preference for the Analytics even whilst professing an impartiality—particularly prevalent in his final chapter cautions to the two divergent sides, and in which these doubters have detected an unequal weight of seriousness. While not sufficiently knowledgeable to be able to counter these critiques, I will offer up an opinion to the effect that I found Critchley's bias to have been appreciably neutralized throughout; indeed, in the seminal chapter regarding the meeting-of-differing-minds between the Viennese Logical Positivist Carnap and the Phenomenological wunderkind Heidegger, my estimation is that the author did an exemplary job of positioning the latter's (much ridiculed) metaphysics-contra-metaphysics within the framework of the competing arguments and taking care to point out the nourishing qualities and potentiality within a thought that seeks to harness, in this case through Being, the stabilizing effect of a meaning attuned to a nature that, even then, many felt was slipping away from our understanding. YMMV, of course, but the lean towards Anglo-American modes of thinking was subtle enough that I rarely took note of it.
The author laments that philosophy has come to be so configured into these twin pillars emphasizing Knowledge via epistemology, and Meaning via hermaneutics, driven primarily by their respective doctrinal engines of logical analysis and phenomenology. That knowledge and meaning were once combined as a whole in the philosophical search for truth and man's modes of living in such upon this world, from the dimmest days of the Greeks through to the Enlightenment, is the fuel for Critchley's push for a near-future reconciliation between the estranged pathways. Finding hope in those who have been trying to reach across the aisle—Rorty, Cavell, et al—a recombinatory effort strikes him as a fruitful and desirable goal for modern philosophy to attain to: curbing the scientistic proclivities of the Analytics, and the obscurantist tendencies of the Continentals, that we might be able to realize that human life needs as much wisdom as intelligence if it is to be lived in a manner copacetic to our ofttimes unfathomable emplacement within the natural world.
Critchley faced a damned difficult task, but, as with so many of the authors of these marvelous Oxford Press A Very Short Introduction series, he has managed to turn his 127 page allotment into a reasonable exposition upon what the murkily-etched Continental Philosophy is all about. While ever at pains to point out how unsound both geographically and methodologically the allusions to a European-based system of thinking are (and as opposed to a similarly ill-configured Anglo-American Analytic competition), Critchley does manage to bifurcate this modern philosophical split into competing strains of thought derived from the Critical Philosophy of Kant and its unforseen removal of all ballasts from the foundations of meaning. Basically, there is a chain that runs something like Benthamite–>Knowledge–>Critically Destructive–>Reformist that comprises the Analytical side, and another that plays out along the lines of Coleridgean–>Meaning–>Hermaneutically Reconstructive–>Traditional that can suitably be applied to the Continental opposite. Whereas the first-named has determined to discard metaphysics completely, aligning its stars with burgeoning modern science and using logic and language as its boundary determiners, the titular branch, obsessed by the idea of nihilism that is attendant to the removal of meaningful surety and infused by an alienating technology, seeks ways of combing the traditions and methods of the past that they might be deconstructed, reconfigured, and reintroduced as potentials for stabilizing and empowering mankind in an emancipatory manner. Whether it be Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault or Derrida, each, in their own way, has that end in mind. And in the outlining and historical tracing of these connected Continental philosopher threads, Critchley has put together a suitably readable and thoughtful presentation of the Continental evolution through idealism, phenomenology, critical theory, and structuralism.
I've noticed that a few reviewers have objected to what they determine as an authorial preference for the Analytics even whilst professing an impartiality—particularly prevalent in his final chapter cautions to the two divergent sides, and in which these doubters have detected an unequal weight of seriousness. While not sufficiently knowledgeable to be able to counter these critiques, I will offer up an opinion to the effect that I found Critchley's bias to have been appreciably neutralized throughout; indeed, in the seminal chapter regarding the meeting-of-differing-minds between the Viennese Logical Positivist Carnap and the Phenomenological wunderkind Heidegger, my estimation is that the author did an exemplary job of positioning the latter's (much ridiculed) metaphysics-contra-metaphysics within the framework of the competing arguments and taking care to point out the nourishing qualities and potentiality within a thought that seeks to harness, in this case through Being, the stabilizing effect of a meaning attuned to a nature that, even then, many felt was slipping away from our understanding. YMMV, of course, but the lean towards Anglo-American modes of thinking was subtle enough that I rarely took note of it.
The author laments that philosophy has come to be so configured into these twin pillars emphasizing Knowledge via epistemology, and Meaning via hermaneutics, driven primarily by their respective doctrinal engines of logical analysis and phenomenology. That knowledge and meaning were once combined as a whole in the philosophical search for truth and man's modes of living in such upon this world, from the dimmest days of the Greeks through to the Enlightenment, is the fuel for Critchley's push for a near-future reconciliation between the estranged pathways. Finding hope in those who have been trying to reach across the aisle—Rorty, Cavell, et al—a recombinatory effort strikes him as a fruitful and desirable goal for modern philosophy to attain to: curbing the scientistic proclivities of the Analytics, and the obscurantist tendencies of the Continentals, that we might be able to realize that human life needs as much wisdom as intelligence if it is to be lived in a manner copacetic to our ofttimes unfathomable emplacement within the natural world.
September 19, 2018
I found this an extremely useful introduction to the history and major ideas within "continental" philosophy. Some ideas I found helpful:
- that continental philosophy is best seen as a network of texts in dialogue with one another, rather than addressing a set of problems directly
- the idea of revolutionary tradition, or forcing a crisis, based on re-activating a heritage which has hardened and become habitual
- that Nietzsche saw nihilism as generated by a contradiction within Christian/Platonic metaphysics, rather than an external challenge (I was reminded of Gödel)
The downside was that I found the author's attitude towards scientists almost ludicrously patronizing. If I understand his view he sees science (which he conflates with mathematics and technology) as operating under a fixed set of principles, namely the logical positivism of the early 20th century. He does not grant science, or by extension scientists, the capacity for methodological self-awareness or multiplicity of approaches that are assumed to be the exclusive domain of philosophy. This is disappointing, as I think there is an interesting discussion to be had - but the treatment here is very superficial.
Besides that irritation, it's a concise and thought-provoking survey. Overall, highly recommended.
- that continental philosophy is best seen as a network of texts in dialogue with one another, rather than addressing a set of problems directly
- the idea of revolutionary tradition, or forcing a crisis, based on re-activating a heritage which has hardened and become habitual
- that Nietzsche saw nihilism as generated by a contradiction within Christian/Platonic metaphysics, rather than an external challenge (I was reminded of Gödel)
The downside was that I found the author's attitude towards scientists almost ludicrously patronizing. If I understand his view he sees science (which he conflates with mathematics and technology) as operating under a fixed set of principles, namely the logical positivism of the early 20th century. He does not grant science, or by extension scientists, the capacity for methodological self-awareness or multiplicity of approaches that are assumed to be the exclusive domain of philosophy. This is disappointing, as I think there is an interesting discussion to be had - but the treatment here is very superficial.
Besides that irritation, it's a concise and thought-provoking survey. Overall, highly recommended.
November 15, 2022
Knowledge And Wisdom In Contemporary Philosophy
Simon Critchely's little book on "Continental Philosophy" (2001) for Oxford University Press' "Very Short Introduction" series delivers less than its title and more. From the title, I assumed that Critchley would offer a discussion of various Continental thinker, briefly explaining their ideas and exploring their similarities and differences from each other. Critchley does in fact do some of this, but it is not the focus of his study. In that sense, the book promises less than it delivers. Critchley also offers an account of different contemporary approaches to philosophy, specifically the so-called "analytic" approach practiced in Britain and the United States and the "Continental" approach associated with Europe. This rough-and-ready distinction, Critchley realizes is inadequate in many ways. Critchley gives a broad summary of the reasons for the divergent trends in contemporary philosophy, and he tries to offer a means for reconciling them. This is a long-standing, daunting task. It was part of the philosophic enterprise when I began to study philosophy 40 years ago and remains so today. Critchley is both Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex and Directeur d Programme at the College International de Philosophie, Paris.
The crux of the book is a distinction between philosophy as knowledge and philosophy as a search for wisdom. Under the former approach, philosophy serves as the hand-maiden of the sciences and explains the nature of knowledge. Under the latter approach, philosophy is concerned with meaning and the good life. The search for wisdom is a matter separate from the teachings of the sciences. A philosophy limited to knowledge, for Critchley, risks falling into skepticism and scientism under which people become beasts. Philosophies ignoring the sciences run the risk of obscurantism in which case, for Critchley, people become lunatics. The task is to find a way of incorporating the best of both these broad approaches to philosophy.
Critchley devotes substantial space to a historical study of analytic and Continental thought, pointing out where and how they diverged. His watershed philosopher is Kant. Critchley emphasizes how analytically-oriented philosophers focused on the transcendental deduction of the categories in the first critique while continental philosophers followed the path of speculative idealism to avoid the dualism of Kant's system. Philosophers of knowledge tend to be problem or issue oriented and to slight the way prior philosophers addressed issues. Philosophers seeking wisdom tend to engage in hermeneutics by studying how certain earlier philosophers framed and explored questions and by reinterpreting the answers they gave.
Critchley traces similar distinctions in the conflict that Mill saw between Bentham and Coleridge in England, in Frege and Husserl's related yet diverging approaches to formal logic, and in the distinction between "Two Cultures", scientific and literary, that C.P. Snow drew in a famous lecture.
Critchley offers an excellent discussion of Nietzsche and the question of nihilism. Nietzsche thought that traditional philosophy, with its search for transcendence and permanence led to a dead end and ultimately to nihilism. His goal was to reshape philosophy, to revalue what earlier philosophers had found important and what trivial, and to find a way of overcoming nihilism without permanence, God, or transcendence. The subsequent development of continental philosophy took Nietzsche most seriously as different thinkers offered different solutions to the problems Nietzsche identified in nihilism.
Critchley devotes a chapter to a famous dispute between the positivist philosopher Carnap and the continental philosopher Heidegger. Heidegger had delivered an address on the relationship between philosophy and the sciences in which he postured about "nothing" and about how "nothing nothings itself". Carnap subjected this difficult piece of obscurantism to scathing ridicule. Yet, for all the darkness of his expression, Heidegger was drawing distinction between science and other aspects of human life that science alone tended to deprecate. And Carnap, although justly critical, relied on unexamined metaphysical assumptions in developing his positivism that were at least as open to question as Heidegger's verbal pyrotechnics.
Critchley's solution to the divide between the two schools of thought is to adopt a phenomenological approach without obscurantism. In other words, the success of science is predicated on common life and on the activities of people in their cultures. It is the task of philosophy to explore meaning by articulating what people already know but don't always notice -- the basis of their activities and preconceptions in daily life. This is a more modest goal than pontificating about "Being" or about religion, says Critchley. But it is attainable and avoids the perils of both scientism and obscurantism. His approach, which is only sketched here, owes a great deal to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein.
Although Critchley has written a "very short introduction" this book is not simple. Philosophy is unlike the sciences in that it does not progress from simple matters to the more complex. Its questions come complete at the outset. Every person must work through these questions for themselves in what Critchley describes as "sapere audi" -- daring to think for oneself. (p. 125) Put another way, Critchley's book fulfills the purpose of philosophy that he quotes at the end of his book from the American philosopher, Stanley Cavell. (p.127) Philosophy is "the education of grown-ups."
Robin Friedman
Simon Critchely's little book on "Continental Philosophy" (2001) for Oxford University Press' "Very Short Introduction" series delivers less than its title and more. From the title, I assumed that Critchley would offer a discussion of various Continental thinker, briefly explaining their ideas and exploring their similarities and differences from each other. Critchley does in fact do some of this, but it is not the focus of his study. In that sense, the book promises less than it delivers. Critchley also offers an account of different contemporary approaches to philosophy, specifically the so-called "analytic" approach practiced in Britain and the United States and the "Continental" approach associated with Europe. This rough-and-ready distinction, Critchley realizes is inadequate in many ways. Critchley gives a broad summary of the reasons for the divergent trends in contemporary philosophy, and he tries to offer a means for reconciling them. This is a long-standing, daunting task. It was part of the philosophic enterprise when I began to study philosophy 40 years ago and remains so today. Critchley is both Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex and Directeur d Programme at the College International de Philosophie, Paris.
The crux of the book is a distinction between philosophy as knowledge and philosophy as a search for wisdom. Under the former approach, philosophy serves as the hand-maiden of the sciences and explains the nature of knowledge. Under the latter approach, philosophy is concerned with meaning and the good life. The search for wisdom is a matter separate from the teachings of the sciences. A philosophy limited to knowledge, for Critchley, risks falling into skepticism and scientism under which people become beasts. Philosophies ignoring the sciences run the risk of obscurantism in which case, for Critchley, people become lunatics. The task is to find a way of incorporating the best of both these broad approaches to philosophy.
Critchley devotes substantial space to a historical study of analytic and Continental thought, pointing out where and how they diverged. His watershed philosopher is Kant. Critchley emphasizes how analytically-oriented philosophers focused on the transcendental deduction of the categories in the first critique while continental philosophers followed the path of speculative idealism to avoid the dualism of Kant's system. Philosophers of knowledge tend to be problem or issue oriented and to slight the way prior philosophers addressed issues. Philosophers seeking wisdom tend to engage in hermeneutics by studying how certain earlier philosophers framed and explored questions and by reinterpreting the answers they gave.
Critchley traces similar distinctions in the conflict that Mill saw between Bentham and Coleridge in England, in Frege and Husserl's related yet diverging approaches to formal logic, and in the distinction between "Two Cultures", scientific and literary, that C.P. Snow drew in a famous lecture.
Critchley offers an excellent discussion of Nietzsche and the question of nihilism. Nietzsche thought that traditional philosophy, with its search for transcendence and permanence led to a dead end and ultimately to nihilism. His goal was to reshape philosophy, to revalue what earlier philosophers had found important and what trivial, and to find a way of overcoming nihilism without permanence, God, or transcendence. The subsequent development of continental philosophy took Nietzsche most seriously as different thinkers offered different solutions to the problems Nietzsche identified in nihilism.
Critchley devotes a chapter to a famous dispute between the positivist philosopher Carnap and the continental philosopher Heidegger. Heidegger had delivered an address on the relationship between philosophy and the sciences in which he postured about "nothing" and about how "nothing nothings itself". Carnap subjected this difficult piece of obscurantism to scathing ridicule. Yet, for all the darkness of his expression, Heidegger was drawing distinction between science and other aspects of human life that science alone tended to deprecate. And Carnap, although justly critical, relied on unexamined metaphysical assumptions in developing his positivism that were at least as open to question as Heidegger's verbal pyrotechnics.
Critchley's solution to the divide between the two schools of thought is to adopt a phenomenological approach without obscurantism. In other words, the success of science is predicated on common life and on the activities of people in their cultures. It is the task of philosophy to explore meaning by articulating what people already know but don't always notice -- the basis of their activities and preconceptions in daily life. This is a more modest goal than pontificating about "Being" or about religion, says Critchley. But it is attainable and avoids the perils of both scientism and obscurantism. His approach, which is only sketched here, owes a great deal to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein.
Although Critchley has written a "very short introduction" this book is not simple. Philosophy is unlike the sciences in that it does not progress from simple matters to the more complex. Its questions come complete at the outset. Every person must work through these questions for themselves in what Critchley describes as "sapere audi" -- daring to think for oneself. (p. 125) Put another way, Critchley's book fulfills the purpose of philosophy that he quotes at the end of his book from the American philosopher, Stanley Cavell. (p.127) Philosophy is "the education of grown-ups."
Robin Friedman
September 1, 2021
مدخلی است درباره مرز بین فلسفه قاره و تحلیلی در فلسفه معاصر، آغاز آن از کانت و ادامه ی آن تا امروز. هرچند در دوران نظریاتِ در نظر نویسنده افراطی، دو قسم فلسفه معاصر از لحاظ موضوع و روش کمترین شباهت را داشته اند اما در نظر او نهایتا این اختلاف سوء تفاهمی است که باید رفع شود و در ادامه روند پیشرفت نظریات عملا به هم نزدیک شده اند. از یک با این داوری او موافق نیستم هرچند در واقع هم نظر فلاسفه به یگ دیگر نزدیک شده باشند اما تاکید او بر پرهیز از علم زدگی تحلیلی و در مقابل پرهیز از وهم زدگی قاره ای تاکیدی به جا است همچنین گزارش او از تاریخ این نزاع فلسفی بسیار آموزنده است.
مجموعه در آمدی کوتاه بر ... آکسفورد هرچه خواندم یک از یک بهتر بودند. این کتاب هم مثل دیگر کتابهای مجموعه درجه یک بود. در هر زمینه ای که مایل به مطالعه هستید اگر کتابی از این مجموعه در آن باره نوشته شده بود، در خواندنش تردید نکنید. چه ترجمه و چه ترجیحا زبان اصلی
مجموعه در آمدی کوتاه بر ... آکسفورد هرچه خواندم یک از یک بهتر بودند. این کتاب هم مثل دیگر کتابهای مجموعه درجه یک بود. در هر زمینه ای که مایل به مطالعه هستید اگر کتابی از این مجموعه در آن باره نوشته شده بود، در خواندنش تردید نکنید. چه ترجمه و چه ترجیحا زبان اصلی
July 14, 2015
کتاب را به گمان من می توان کتابی سهل ممتنع دانست. در قیاس با برخی دیگر کتاب هایی که من در این زمینه ها دیده بودم، در بسیاری از موارد این کتاب این تفاوت را دارد که به روشن کردن پرسش ها و مساله ها می پردازد و نه صرفا توضیح مفاهیم و نظریه ها.. حداقل برای من اینطور بود که کتاب بسیاری از مسائل را که شاید قبلا هم به آن ها فکر کرده بودم، برایم پررنگ تر می کرد و یا سوال های جدی ای برایم ایجاد می کرد. سوال هایی که به طور کلی این روزها با آن ها درگیرم. با این حال، از آنجایی که من نمی توانم ایده اصلی کتاب در مورد شکاف میان فلسفه تحلیلی و فلسفه قاره ای را بپذیرم، بعضی از مباحث و نتیجه گیری ها و نقدها هم به تبع آن، به نظر من غیر دقیق می آمد .نویسنده، تفاوت میان فلسفه قاره ای و تحلیلی را ناشی از وجود دو فرهنگ در جهان انگلیسی زبان می داند، و خب این برای من خیلی عجیب است که مباحث فلسفه را به یک تفاوت فرهنگی تقلیل داده است! بعضی بخش ها هم به گمان من نشان می دهد که در نهایت نویسنده علیرغم اینکه در تلاش برای ایجاد پیوند میان شناخت و حکمت است، نتوانسته است دل از "درک و برداشت علمی از جهان" بکند و شاید همین، دلیل نتیجه گیری نهایی او و خیلی از نقد ها و بحث های دیگرش است. با همه این ها، به نظر من این کتاب، کتاب خوبی است برای خواندن! :)
دو تا چیز هیجان انگیز و قابل توجه دیگر کتاب برای من، یکی دست نوشته دوصفحه ای هگل جوان بود که در انتهای کتاب و به ضمیمه آمده بود و به نظر من نکات قابل توجه زیادی داشت، یکی دیگر هم بخش "برای مطالعه بیشتر" کتاب بود که نویسنده در آن کتاب های مختلفی که در موضوعات مختلف به آن ها رجوع کرده و یا ایده هایی را از آن ها گرفته را به ما معرفی می کند.
دو تا چیز هیجان انگیز و قابل توجه دیگر کتاب برای من، یکی دست نوشته دوصفحه ای هگل جوان بود که در انتهای کتاب و به ضمیمه آمده بود و به نظر من نکات قابل توجه زیادی داشت، یکی دیگر هم بخش "برای مطالعه بیشتر" کتاب بود که نویسنده در آن کتاب های مختلفی که در موضوعات مختلف به آن ها رجوع کرده و یا ایده هایی را از آن ها گرفته را به ما معرفی می کند.
September 3, 2016
نویسنده اشارات خیلی جالبی به تفاوتهای فلسفه قاره ای و فلسفه تحلیلی داره، 2 تا از اینها همیشه برای من بولد بودن. یکی اینکه در فلسفه تحلیلی به مسائل پرداخته میشه و در فلسفه قاره ای به نام های خاص!(مثلا بجای اینکه رساله ای نوشته شود با نام "مفهوم صدق" معمولا رساله ای نوشته می شود با نام "مفهوم صدق نزد هوسرل و هایدگر"). دیگری اینکه فیلسوفان قاره ای علاقه ی زیادی به تشخیص بحران و رها کردن انسان ها از اون دارن. فکر میکنم قاره ای ها به حق اشاره میکنن به مسائلی میپردازن که فلسفه تحلیلی نادیده میگیره (بصورت افراطی در پوزیتیویسم) و این مسائل دغدغه ی عموم افراد جامعه هست. اما همین نکته این سوال رو ایجاد میکنه که چرا رویکردشون مساله محور نیست و مدام به شخصیت هایی رجوع میکنن که بسیار پیچیده مینویسن و فهمشون فوق العاده دشواره. رویکرد فردگرایانه بعضی (یا شاید بیشتر) فیلسوفان قاره ای رو که به ادبیات پر پیچ و خمشون اضافه میکنم، این ظن در من تقویت میشه که اینها بیشتر بحران زایی میکنن تا بحران زدایی!
January 2, 2022
کتاب خیلی خوبی بود ولی نیاز بازخوانی دارم
از متن کتاب
از آنچه تا به حال گفتیم باید روشن شده باشد که تلاش من در جهت آسیبشناسی حداقلی صحنه فلسفی معاصر است، که منظور از آن ارائه تفسیری از -یا لگام زدن بر- بدترین افراط کاریهای هر دو فلسفه تحلیلی و قارهای است. از یک سو، برخی از فلسفههای قارهای مخاطرهی وهمزدگی را با خود دارند، که در آنها پدیدههای اجتماعی با ارجاع به نیروها موجودیتها و مستدلاتی چنان گسترده و چنان مبهم تحلیل میشوند که همه چیز را توضیح میدهند و هم در عین حال هیچ چیزی را روشن نمیکنند. مثلاً پدیدهای نظیر اینترنت (یا تلفن همراه یا خانههای متحرک) را میتوان یک گواه دیگر بر صحت این تز هایدگر درباره گشتل قلمداد کرد، یعنی نگرش چهارچوب سازی که بر جهان تکنولوژیکی غالب است و در نتیجه به فراموشی هستی مدد میرساند. در این مقام، پدیده های روزمره آشکارا با ارجاع به عوامل به ظاهر علّی توضیح داده میشوند که در واقع همان کارکردی را دارند که خدایان در اساطیر یونان باستان داشتند. هر جنبهای از زندگی شخصی و عمومی را باید گواهی دانست در قالب های از پیشساختهی قدرت، فروپاشی آن "دیگری بزرگ" و آسیب دیدگی امر واقع، شدنهای مکرر جسم بیاندام، یا چیزهایی از این قبیل. جایی که چنین گرایشهایی وجود دارند که آشکارا وهمزدگی هستند، درمان لازم را راززدایی یا اسطورهزدایی است یعنی باید نقدی بر این نوع گفتا�� وجود داشته باشد و با جستجو معلوم شود که چرا اصلاً ما درگیر این نوع وهم زدگی میشویم.
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اما در سوی دیگرِ آسیبشناسی حداقلی من، با مخاطرهی علم زدگی مزمن در برخی حوزههای فلسفهی تحلیلی روبهرو هستیم. اگر می توان رسالهای فلسفی را به تصویر درآورد که عنوانش "تجربه شخصی کیفیات و ماتریالیسم: پر کردن درهی توضیحی" باشد چرا نتوان رساله های فلسفی را به تصویر درآورد که عناوین ایشان مثلاً چنین عناوینی باشد: "بیگ بنگ و من: پر کردن درهی توضیحی" یا "گزینش طبیعی و من: پرکردن درهی توضیحی". فرض چنین نگرش هایی که مبتنی بر علم زدگی هستند این است که درهای وجود دارد که میتوان با توضیحات تجربی آن را پر کرد. در سرتاسر این کتاب من این اعتقاد را بیان کرده ام که یک درهی واقعی در اینجا وجود دارد که ما احساسش میکنیم -درهی میان شناخت و حکمت- که با هیچ پژوهش تجربی نمیتوان آن را پر کرد. یعنی مسئله معنای زندگی قابل فروکاستن به پژوهش تجربی نیست. این درهی واقعی میان شناخت و حکمت همان فضای تامل و تفکر نقادانه است. در فلسفه، ولی در ضمن کلاً در زندگی فرهنگی، ما نیازمند چیدن هر دو بال علم زدگی و وهمزدگی هستیم تا بتوانیم به این ترتیب از بدترین جنبههای هر دو فلسفه تحلیلی و قارهای پرهیز کنیم. یعنی، ما نیاز داریم از این اعتقاد خطا بپرهیزیم که میتوانیم از طریق توضیح علّی یا علّینما مسائلی را که نیازمند روشناییبخشی پدیدارشناختی هستند حل کنیم. البته، گفتن این حرف آسان است اما عمل کردن به آن دشوار است اما دست کم میشود تلاشی در این جهت به خرج داد.
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البته تمایز میان علم زدگی و وهمزدگی به همین روشنی نیست که من اینجا پیش نهادم. اولاً، وهمزدگی نمیتواند یک چیز واحد باشد در واقع و همزدگیهایی هستند که مبتنی بر ایمان به رازهای قدسی هستند، حال چه زئوس باشد، چه یهوه، چه سائق مرگ -چیزی که میتوان آن را به "وهمزدگی موهوم" نامید. اما وهمزدگیهای دیگری هم هستند که خودشان را به جامهی نوعی اثباتپذیری علمی در میآرایند: ((دکتر، نمیفهمی که بیخوابی و پرخاشگری من معلول این واقعیت است که موجودات بیگانهای تابستان گذشته که من چادر زده بودم مرا دزدیدند؟))؛ یا ((اگر فقط یک سال دیگر تحقیق کنم سرانجام ثابت خواهم کرد که ماده محصول فیضانات الاهی است.)) و البته علمزدگیهایی هم هستند که مبتنی بر ایمانند و بنابراین معادل وهمزدگی. مثلاً ممکن است من معتقد باشم که همهی حالات روحی را میتوان به استعدادهای تکاملی تقلیل داد بی آنکه بدانم چگونه یا چرا. فقط احساس میکنم که درست است. میتوانیم این را مثلاً "علمزدگی موهوم" نامید. اجازه دهید فقط بگویم که نیازی مبرم به یک رده بندی تفصیلیِ تمایز میان علمزدگی و وهمزدگی داریم.
از متن کتاب
از آنچه تا به حال گفتیم باید روشن شده باشد که تلاش من در جهت آسیبشناسی حداقلی صحنه فلسفی معاصر است، که منظور از آن ارائه تفسیری از -یا لگام زدن بر- بدترین افراط کاریهای هر دو فلسفه تحلیلی و قارهای است. از یک سو، برخی از فلسفههای قارهای مخاطرهی وهمزدگی را با خود دارند، که در آنها پدیدههای اجتماعی با ارجاع به نیروها موجودیتها و مستدلاتی چنان گسترده و چنان مبهم تحلیل میشوند که همه چیز را توضیح میدهند و هم در عین حال هیچ چیزی را روشن نمیکنند. مثلاً پدیدهای نظیر اینترنت (یا تلفن همراه یا خانههای متحرک) را میتوان یک گواه دیگر بر صحت این تز هایدگر درباره گشتل قلمداد کرد، یعنی نگرش چهارچوب سازی که بر جهان تکنولوژیکی غالب است و در نتیجه به فراموشی هستی مدد میرساند. در این مقام، پدیده های روزمره آشکارا با ارجاع به عوامل به ظاهر علّی توضیح داده میشوند که در واقع همان کارکردی را دارند که خدایان در اساطیر یونان باستان داشتند. هر جنبهای از زندگی شخصی و عمومی را باید گواهی دانست در قالب های از پیشساختهی قدرت، فروپاشی آن "دیگری بزرگ" و آسیب دیدگی امر واقع، شدنهای مکرر جسم بیاندام، یا چیزهایی از این قبیل. جایی که چنین گرایشهایی وجود دارند که آشکارا وهمزدگی هستند، درمان لازم را راززدایی یا اسطورهزدایی است یعنی باید نقدی بر این نوع گفتا�� وجود داشته باشد و با جستجو معلوم شود که چرا اصلاً ما درگیر این نوع وهم زدگی میشویم.
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اما در سوی دیگرِ آسیبشناسی حداقلی من، با مخاطرهی علم زدگی مزمن در برخی حوزههای فلسفهی تحلیلی روبهرو هستیم. اگر می توان رسالهای فلسفی را به تصویر درآورد که عنوانش "تجربه شخصی کیفیات و ماتریالیسم: پر کردن درهی توضیحی" باشد چرا نتوان رساله های فلسفی را به تصویر درآورد که عناوین ایشان مثلاً چنین عناوینی باشد: "بیگ بنگ و من: پر کردن درهی توضیحی" یا "گزینش طبیعی و من: پرکردن درهی توضیحی". فرض چنین نگرش هایی که مبتنی بر علم زدگی هستند این است که درهای وجود دارد که میتوان با توضیحات تجربی آن را پر کرد. در سرتاسر این کتاب من این اعتقاد را بیان کرده ام که یک درهی واقعی در اینجا وجود دارد که ما احساسش میکنیم -درهی میان شناخت و حکمت- که با هیچ پژوهش تجربی نمیتوان آن را پر کرد. یعنی مسئله معنای زندگی قابل فروکاستن به پژوهش تجربی نیست. این درهی واقعی میان شناخت و حکمت همان فضای تامل و تفکر نقادانه است. در فلسفه، ولی در ضمن کلاً در زندگی فرهنگی، ما نیازمند چیدن هر دو بال علم زدگی و وهمزدگی هستیم تا بتوانیم به این ترتیب از بدترین جنبههای هر دو فلسفه تحلیلی و قارهای پرهیز کنیم. یعنی، ما نیاز داریم از این اعتقاد خطا بپرهیزیم که میتوانیم از طریق توضیح علّی یا علّینما مسائلی را که نیازمند روشناییبخشی پدیدارشناختی هستند حل کنیم. البته، گفتن این حرف آسان است اما عمل کردن به آن دشوار است اما دست کم میشود تلاشی در این جهت به خرج داد.
.
البته تمایز میان علم زدگی و وهمزدگی به همین روشنی نیست که من اینجا پیش نهادم. اولاً، وهمزدگی نمیتواند یک چیز واحد باشد در واقع و همزدگیهایی هستند که مبتنی بر ایمان به رازهای قدسی هستند، حال چه زئوس باشد، چه یهوه، چه سائق مرگ -چیزی که میتوان آن را به "وهمزدگی موهوم" نامید. اما وهمزدگیهای دیگری هم هستند که خودشان را به جامهی نوعی اثباتپذیری علمی در میآرایند: ((دکتر، نمیفهمی که بیخوابی و پرخاشگری من معلول این واقعیت است که موجودات بیگانهای تابستان گذشته که من چادر زده بودم مرا دزدیدند؟))؛ یا ((اگر فقط یک سال دیگر تحقیق کنم سرانجام ثابت خواهم کرد که ماده محصول فیضانات الاهی است.)) و البته علمزدگیهایی هم هستند که مبتنی بر ایمانند و بنابراین معادل وهمزدگی. مثلاً ممکن است من معتقد باشم که همهی حالات روحی را میتوان به استعدادهای تکاملی تقلیل داد بی آنکه بدانم چگونه یا چرا. فقط احساس میکنم که درست است. میتوانیم این را مثلاً "علمزدگی موهوم" نامید. اجازه دهید فقط بگویم که نیازی مبرم به یک رده بندی تفصیلیِ تمایز میان علمزدگی و وهمزدگی داریم.
February 22, 2019
اینقدر این کتاب رو دوست داشتم و حوزه ی مورد علاقه و سوال مورد نظرم در فلسفه رو برام شفاف بیان کرد که احتملا از مهم ترین کتاب های زندگیم بشه
چیزی نمینویسم دربارش
هر چی بگم کم گفتم .
شاید وقتی که تونستم چیز شسته رفته ای در بیارم دربارش بگم
فقط یک نکته کوچولو که محور کتاب شکاف بین شناخت و حکمت عه
آیا دونستن همه چیز ته زندگیه
؟ و مبهمون معنای زندگی میده؟
اصلا معنای زندگی دونستنیه؟ و الخ ...بماند
ان شاالله یک روز بهتر :)
چیزی نمینویسم دربارش
هر چی بگم کم گفتم .
شاید وقتی که تونستم چیز شسته رفته ای در بیارم دربارش بگم
فقط یک نکته کوچولو که محور کتاب شکاف بین شناخت و حکمت عه
آیا دونستن همه چیز ته زندگیه
؟ و مبهمون معنای زندگی میده؟
اصلا معنای زندگی دونستنیه؟ و الخ ...بماند
ان شاالله یک روز بهتر :)
July 16, 2024
Modern technology, and especially artificial intelligence, has reignited fundamental debates regarding consciousness, being, nothingness, language, metaphysics, meaning - essentially every single philosophical question ever posed becomes actualized with this incredible technology.
Thus, everyone who has dabbled in any of these discourses are likely to have become more or less aware of a certain split in the approach of thinking itself. This is a classical dualism, reflected in basically every level of analysis. It may be referred to as the idealists versus the realists, the metaphysicians versus the physicists, scientism versus obscurantism, logical positivism versus metaphysics, spiritualists versus atheists and so on and so forth.
Some of these dualisms may seem false, they may seem not to be related, they may seem to regard completely different things. Critchley, in this wonderful little book, shows how there is a cultural split within philosophy - and hence within most, if not all, other sciences as well, as they all derive from philosophy. On the one side, you have people coming from natural philosophy, that is, science, who derive their understanding of the world from Descartes and Newton. On the other, you have a more textual and contextual based tradition, in which questions are interpreted and reinterpreted over and over, the modern initiator of this thread of thought might be Montaigne with his essays.
This split has grown larger over time, and possibly reached its crescendo in the 20th century, with the disagreement between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger. Carnap, a logician, essentially argues that all metaphysical speculation is not simply wrong, but rather that it is meaningless, the terms used lacks meaning, he argues, and that it does not relate to the world or anything in existence. Thus, for Carnap, Heidegger must be the ultimate charlatan, a obscurantists, who, while seemingly being deep, is actually not saying anything at all, he is simply making vibrations in the air, or dotting down meaningless signs on paper. A sad state for philosophy to be in.
You could broaden the dualism and think in terms of Apollonian and Dionysian, chaos and order, feeling versus thinking, intuition versus deduction, rational and irrational, logical and instinctual.. The dualisms are as old as time, the same archetypical idea mirrored and reflected in all levels of analysis.
Continental Philosophy is incredibly helpful here, as it allows the reader to see and become aware something that he or she really does know, everyone is aware of at least some of these dualisms, one is bound to have crashed into one of them in some seminar or in some verbal debate with classmates. And doing so, one might question the intelligence of one's sparring partner, because to either side of the dualism, the other is easily seem as naive, earthly, dumb, obscure, reductive - whatever negative label one slaps on his opponent.
Having an abyss between us does not help in solving any of the issues that we must solve, but reading this book helps you clarify precisely what the split is, and why it seems so hard to bridge. These Oxford books are called introductions, but that is probably not quite right, they are quite difficult to get through, and often presupposes knowledge of the theme at hand. This is likely the case here as well, but grasping every single detail and reference is not necessary.
Personally I tend to side with the continentalists, while ackowledgning that there are issues with that approach, issues which Critchley nicely outlines. The type of philosophy that I study at university is not what most laymen would think of as philosophy, its rather closely related to logic and linguistics instead. While the questions posed in continental philosophy is what philosophy has always been. For me it feels like the analytic thinkers have given up on the big questions, they are tired and do not believe philosophy has anything else to offer. As such, they have attempted to reduce philosophy to either science and logic, which, I think it is clear today, has failed, and had to fail. Still, the tools given to us by analytic philosophy, well, some of them, are here to stay. We should return to the questions posed by the continental philosophers though, as this is more aligned with what philosophy has always been, and, outside of academia, always will be. Even if all the professors in universities wished to reduce philosophy to logic, philosophy would simply continue in its proper form outside of that specific institution, as it has done.
Continental philosophy, while that label naturally is imperfect, tend to look at language as something to be experienced in and of itself, rather than a representation and correlation for something out there. Not every statement has, or needs, a physical correlate that it refers to, language is its own domain. It is a space where things can be said and thought that cannot be experienced elsewhere, empirical data and theory are not the same thing, but they improve upon each other. Empirical data can be aggregated, extracted, distilled, extrapolated, abstracted, speculated upon etc - techniques which are absolutely necessary. And such techniques, such modes of thinking, manifests in language and language only, wether that be written, spoken, symbolical or mathemathical.
Furthermore, and this is a correlate to thoughts of Thomas Kuhn (regarding those working with a paradigm and those who break the paradigm), philosophy proper, is not something that can be done from 8 to 16 as a "job". Philosopher is a mode of being, it is a way of life, something that you either are or you are not. The questions posed within philosophy has to grip your sould, you have to be existentially involved, and the logicians don't really seem to be. They seem to be doing something else. They seem to be saying that philosophy is commentary on science, or maybe, just maybe, the creator of new conceptualizations or framework depending largely on scientific findings. Instead, philosophy should be the poser of questions, those who challenge axiomatic assumption and those who continually seek to go under, over, beyond, deeper. A philosopher is like the artists, you cannot be trained to be a philosopher. You might learn the techniques, as a painter learns from his master how to approach the canvas, but the artistic visions cannot be learned, it is something you have or you have not. The philosophical vision is similar, either you see philosophically or you don't. If that domain is inaccessible to you, its not the fault of philosophy. You cannot disregard a whole way of thinking and reduce it to something else, simply because it is out of your reach. That is how I tend to think of Carnap and his kind. Their work is useful, no doubt, but their attacks on metaphysics are not. It should be clear, that everyone has their metaphysics, everyone has their axiomatic assumptions, every science does, and every scientists. To say that thinking about such things is not only wrong, but meaningsless, says more about the utterrer than the utterance.
The reason the continental approach is more textual, intertexual, contextual and refferential, is because the philosophical genius is just as rare as the artistic genius. There has simply been a handful of people in three thousand years that has reached the very depths. Thus, it is better to absorb their insights, than for every new generation to dabble by themselves on the surface, and never reach the necesarry depths. We refer to Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, because those people plunged to depths that the ordinary person cannot not. We are not to condemn them for their genius, but to be thankful for their existence.
And, furthermore, science works in precisely the same way. It is the extraordinary individual that moves history forward, not peer-review nor scientific journals nor the hyperspecialized worker-ants in their cubicles, working 8-16. Newton, Einstein, standing on the shoulders of giants, those are the movers of history, the great men, those with visions clearer than the rest, and who are willing to share their vision with us. Einsteins insights could not have been reduced to empiricism, it would not have been discovered with incremental progress. It was only possible with the leap-frogging insights from the revolutionary, from the breaker of paradigms, from the philosopher.
Thus, everyone who has dabbled in any of these discourses are likely to have become more or less aware of a certain split in the approach of thinking itself. This is a classical dualism, reflected in basically every level of analysis. It may be referred to as the idealists versus the realists, the metaphysicians versus the physicists, scientism versus obscurantism, logical positivism versus metaphysics, spiritualists versus atheists and so on and so forth.
Some of these dualisms may seem false, they may seem not to be related, they may seem to regard completely different things. Critchley, in this wonderful little book, shows how there is a cultural split within philosophy - and hence within most, if not all, other sciences as well, as they all derive from philosophy. On the one side, you have people coming from natural philosophy, that is, science, who derive their understanding of the world from Descartes and Newton. On the other, you have a more textual and contextual based tradition, in which questions are interpreted and reinterpreted over and over, the modern initiator of this thread of thought might be Montaigne with his essays.
This split has grown larger over time, and possibly reached its crescendo in the 20th century, with the disagreement between Rudolf Carnap and Martin Heidegger. Carnap, a logician, essentially argues that all metaphysical speculation is not simply wrong, but rather that it is meaningless, the terms used lacks meaning, he argues, and that it does not relate to the world or anything in existence. Thus, for Carnap, Heidegger must be the ultimate charlatan, a obscurantists, who, while seemingly being deep, is actually not saying anything at all, he is simply making vibrations in the air, or dotting down meaningless signs on paper. A sad state for philosophy to be in.
You could broaden the dualism and think in terms of Apollonian and Dionysian, chaos and order, feeling versus thinking, intuition versus deduction, rational and irrational, logical and instinctual.. The dualisms are as old as time, the same archetypical idea mirrored and reflected in all levels of analysis.
Continental Philosophy is incredibly helpful here, as it allows the reader to see and become aware something that he or she really does know, everyone is aware of at least some of these dualisms, one is bound to have crashed into one of them in some seminar or in some verbal debate with classmates. And doing so, one might question the intelligence of one's sparring partner, because to either side of the dualism, the other is easily seem as naive, earthly, dumb, obscure, reductive - whatever negative label one slaps on his opponent.
Having an abyss between us does not help in solving any of the issues that we must solve, but reading this book helps you clarify precisely what the split is, and why it seems so hard to bridge. These Oxford books are called introductions, but that is probably not quite right, they are quite difficult to get through, and often presupposes knowledge of the theme at hand. This is likely the case here as well, but grasping every single detail and reference is not necessary.
Personally I tend to side with the continentalists, while ackowledgning that there are issues with that approach, issues which Critchley nicely outlines. The type of philosophy that I study at university is not what most laymen would think of as philosophy, its rather closely related to logic and linguistics instead. While the questions posed in continental philosophy is what philosophy has always been. For me it feels like the analytic thinkers have given up on the big questions, they are tired and do not believe philosophy has anything else to offer. As such, they have attempted to reduce philosophy to either science and logic, which, I think it is clear today, has failed, and had to fail. Still, the tools given to us by analytic philosophy, well, some of them, are here to stay. We should return to the questions posed by the continental philosophers though, as this is more aligned with what philosophy has always been, and, outside of academia, always will be. Even if all the professors in universities wished to reduce philosophy to logic, philosophy would simply continue in its proper form outside of that specific institution, as it has done.
Continental philosophy, while that label naturally is imperfect, tend to look at language as something to be experienced in and of itself, rather than a representation and correlation for something out there. Not every statement has, or needs, a physical correlate that it refers to, language is its own domain. It is a space where things can be said and thought that cannot be experienced elsewhere, empirical data and theory are not the same thing, but they improve upon each other. Empirical data can be aggregated, extracted, distilled, extrapolated, abstracted, speculated upon etc - techniques which are absolutely necessary. And such techniques, such modes of thinking, manifests in language and language only, wether that be written, spoken, symbolical or mathemathical.
Furthermore, and this is a correlate to thoughts of Thomas Kuhn (regarding those working with a paradigm and those who break the paradigm), philosophy proper, is not something that can be done from 8 to 16 as a "job". Philosopher is a mode of being, it is a way of life, something that you either are or you are not. The questions posed within philosophy has to grip your sould, you have to be existentially involved, and the logicians don't really seem to be. They seem to be doing something else. They seem to be saying that philosophy is commentary on science, or maybe, just maybe, the creator of new conceptualizations or framework depending largely on scientific findings. Instead, philosophy should be the poser of questions, those who challenge axiomatic assumption and those who continually seek to go under, over, beyond, deeper. A philosopher is like the artists, you cannot be trained to be a philosopher. You might learn the techniques, as a painter learns from his master how to approach the canvas, but the artistic visions cannot be learned, it is something you have or you have not. The philosophical vision is similar, either you see philosophically or you don't. If that domain is inaccessible to you, its not the fault of philosophy. You cannot disregard a whole way of thinking and reduce it to something else, simply because it is out of your reach. That is how I tend to think of Carnap and his kind. Their work is useful, no doubt, but their attacks on metaphysics are not. It should be clear, that everyone has their metaphysics, everyone has their axiomatic assumptions, every science does, and every scientists. To say that thinking about such things is not only wrong, but meaningsless, says more about the utterrer than the utterance.
The reason the continental approach is more textual, intertexual, contextual and refferential, is because the philosophical genius is just as rare as the artistic genius. There has simply been a handful of people in three thousand years that has reached the very depths. Thus, it is better to absorb their insights, than for every new generation to dabble by themselves on the surface, and never reach the necesarry depths. We refer to Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, because those people plunged to depths that the ordinary person cannot not. We are not to condemn them for their genius, but to be thankful for their existence.
And, furthermore, science works in precisely the same way. It is the extraordinary individual that moves history forward, not peer-review nor scientific journals nor the hyperspecialized worker-ants in their cubicles, working 8-16. Newton, Einstein, standing on the shoulders of giants, those are the movers of history, the great men, those with visions clearer than the rest, and who are willing to share their vision with us. Einsteins insights could not have been reduced to empiricism, it would not have been discovered with incremental progress. It was only possible with the leap-frogging insights from the revolutionary, from the breaker of paradigms, from the philosopher.
September 6, 2016
A great introduction book. Actually, I can say that the book is more than an introduction. It is a helpful source to make a reading schedule thanks to Critchley's detailed and well-planned work.
In addition, the writer seperated chapters with regard to the discussions throughout the history of philosophy, not regard to the names of famous guys. So, this is a preferable way up to me 'cause it gives the idea, philosophy consists of problems not the names, to the reader.
In addition, the writer seperated chapters with regard to the discussions throughout the history of philosophy, not regard to the names of famous guys. So, this is a preferable way up to me 'cause it gives the idea, philosophy consists of problems not the names, to the reader.
January 15, 2025
Lazy. Cliched. Perhaps incompatible claims: eg. he says the continental vs analytic divide is within Anglophone culture, but unpacks the former using German & French thinkers.
May 9, 2008
There came a point last summer when after reading Thus Spoke Zarathustra I decided that I wanted to go to back to school (in search for an academic community and a Masters or a Phd). I knew that I did not want to continue studying early Christianity in a religious studies department because I do not want to be put into the theologian pigeonhole. I remembered that one of my favorite professors, Dr. Luca D'Isanto, received his MA in Continental Philosophy from UVA. Dr. D'Isanto's classes focused on mysticism and aesthetics. We read Rilke, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Florensky, Freud, Hume, Bataille, the list of really cool shit goes on. So I start looking at philosophy grad departments and notice that a majority of schools around the country aren't necessarily focused on these authors. Rather, they are looking into a more "scientific" philosophical approach, emphasizing theory of mind, and utilizing findings in the fields of cognitive science and astrophysics. I began to see a certain divide. Once having noticed this, I desired to have a better grasp on the history of philosophy in general. After a reading session at Ritual Roasters I walked over to Modern Times Books and found this appropriately titled little gem in the philosophy section. Critchley succinctly sets up the history and current situation of contemporary philosophy, illustrating the Continental/Analytical divide with flexible bold lines. I am a sucker for small books chock full of great writing and important opinions and facts. This book has caused me to question the professional distinctions between "Continental" and "Analytic" philosophy from a number of standpoints. Critchley proposes a move towards a middle ground, a problematizing of the two terms, and a call for those inclined to study philosophy to do so with a keen sense of responsibility . We should be aware that thoughts and actions are inextricably linked by history and context. Where to go to learn these things? Especially since this book is so short? A little internet search led me to The New School for Social Research where Dr. Critchley works. This is the institution where such forward and historically responsible thinking is taking place. And now, almost a year later, I have been accepted to study at this institution (and plan to begin in the Fall of 09). Basically this little book has acted as a catalyst in my life. I am sure it is not the most comprehensive study, but it doesn't claim to be. For that matter none of the Oxford Very Short Introductions claim this. In fact I highly recommend any OVSI in any field you happen to be interested. Continental Philosophy might not be your bag, in which case you don't need to read this essay, but Tudor England might be, in which case you'd be pleased to read 80-120 fascinating pages full of information with which you might not be acquainted or which you glossed over in the past.
June 26, 2020
كتاب جميل ومهم لفهم التقسيم الحاصل ما بين الفلسفة المعاصرة كفلسفة تحليلية أو قارية.
يعود الكاتب للأصل الذي انقسم فيه الجانبين فكريا، وأصل نشأة هذا التقسيم بشكل أكاديمي. مع محاولة لسد الفجوة بين التقليدين القاري والتحليلي، وهذا أمر ضروري للخروج بالفلسفة من هذا المأزج الذي سيحتم جمودها.
يعود الكاتب للأصل الذي انقسم فيه الجانبين فكريا، وأصل نشأة هذا التقسيم بشكل أكاديمي. مع محاولة لسد الفجوة بين التقليدين القاري والتحليلي، وهذا أمر ضروري للخروج بالفلسفة من هذا المأزج الذي سيحتم جمودها.
Read
May 3, 2025A fun and fairly easy breeze of a read on a not-so-easy topic. Should take you a few hours and give some decent insight into the whole movement starting from Kant, then leading to Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, and ending most recently with Foucault and Derrida. I wonder if I can get anything out of most of these thinkers without knowing German and French though.
January 24, 2023
Fun for the whole family
September 24, 2007
Finally finished-- you can see my initial review below, which probably still stands fairly well. I probably should have given it one more star, but I thought he short-changed Continental philosophy at the end with a dismissive mention of concepts such as the Real in Lacan which he apparently thinks are obscurantist causal explanations-- but then again I think this is a big part of the criticism of many of these schools of thought, so I'll withhold judgement for now. The book as a whole was a tad weird to me, as I was more in need of an intro to Analytic philosophy, so it felt a bit like an Intro to myself-- except I'm still a beginner in Continental philosophy, and a bit of the periphery as a literary-critic/philologist (if I'm allowed to use those two terms in the same sentence). I still prefer my side, but I appreciate the call for improved communication and respect between the two sides.
Decided to finally start reading this. Looks interesting so far. Being at Berkeley and in literary studies, I'm very much on the side of what is here called "continental philosophy". The book is primarily a contrast between analytic philosophy and the more phenomenological/hermeneutic (and now poststructuralist) continental trends of philosophy. The author is intent on healing the gap to some degree and creating a mutual respect between the two traditions, identifying them not just with national differences but with differences within the academic cultures of the English speaking world. On the analytic side of things there is science (and scientism), a concern with epistemology, and a focus on meaning. On the "Continental" side of things there is hermenuetics, a concern with ontology, phenomenology, and a focus on meaning. He even refers to the latter as "romantic-hermeneutics"-- a side which I fall very strongly on the side of. Unfortunately my closest friends tend to fall on the other side (or rather, on the side of science, engineering, etc), which has led to a growing cognitive dissonance in my interactions with them, even during friendly exchanges (this despite the fact that I think science and technology are pretty cool, and I think I do a good enough job at not making snide comments or assumptions about their fields). Frusterating! The "other side" always seems so cocky, hard-headed, and condescending to me-- but everynow and then I think I see that attitude coming out of an insecurity and a belief that "my side" is exactly the same way-- and alot of us are. There are some real jerks in the world of critical theory. Plus, while the "sciency" side of things is ostensibly that concerned with truth, the foundation of truth, what truth is, how we know truth, is certainly tied to a significant degree to ontology, human meaning, etc, which is the realm of the humanities (and cognitive science, psych, etc, but they straddle the border and see themselves as belonging more to the science side of things)-- so you get these "softies" from the humanities often commenting on the hard(er) sciences, using lingo refined by decades or even centuries of discussion, much of which is totally outside the experience of the "scientists", and of course this is going to sound both condescending and confused to the other party. I do think that the humanities have something particularly important to tell us in this world of the technologization, commodification, etc, of human ontology/culture, whatever, but in terms of my personal relationships I don't see this gap being bridged any time soon-- much of what there is to explain is admittedly pretty esoteric, and I'm still learning so much myself. In any case, I've strayed from the topic of two types of philosophy in opposition to two cultural trends in opposition, which I suppose is what the book is about anyway. Can you tell that this has been bugging me more and more lately?
Decided to finally start reading this. Looks interesting so far. Being at Berkeley and in literary studies, I'm very much on the side of what is here called "continental philosophy". The book is primarily a contrast between analytic philosophy and the more phenomenological/hermeneutic (and now poststructuralist) continental trends of philosophy. The author is intent on healing the gap to some degree and creating a mutual respect between the two traditions, identifying them not just with national differences but with differences within the academic cultures of the English speaking world. On the analytic side of things there is science (and scientism), a concern with epistemology, and a focus on meaning. On the "Continental" side of things there is hermenuetics, a concern with ontology, phenomenology, and a focus on meaning. He even refers to the latter as "romantic-hermeneutics"-- a side which I fall very strongly on the side of. Unfortunately my closest friends tend to fall on the other side (or rather, on the side of science, engineering, etc), which has led to a growing cognitive dissonance in my interactions with them, even during friendly exchanges (this despite the fact that I think science and technology are pretty cool, and I think I do a good enough job at not making snide comments or assumptions about their fields). Frusterating! The "other side" always seems so cocky, hard-headed, and condescending to me-- but everynow and then I think I see that attitude coming out of an insecurity and a belief that "my side" is exactly the same way-- and alot of us are. There are some real jerks in the world of critical theory. Plus, while the "sciency" side of things is ostensibly that concerned with truth, the foundation of truth, what truth is, how we know truth, is certainly tied to a significant degree to ontology, human meaning, etc, which is the realm of the humanities (and cognitive science, psych, etc, but they straddle the border and see themselves as belonging more to the science side of things)-- so you get these "softies" from the humanities often commenting on the hard(er) sciences, using lingo refined by decades or even centuries of discussion, much of which is totally outside the experience of the "scientists", and of course this is going to sound both condescending and confused to the other party. I do think that the humanities have something particularly important to tell us in this world of the technologization, commodification, etc, of human ontology/culture, whatever, but in terms of my personal relationships I don't see this gap being bridged any time soon-- much of what there is to explain is admittedly pretty esoteric, and I'm still learning so much myself. In any case, I've strayed from the topic of two types of philosophy in opposition to two cultural trends in opposition, which I suppose is what the book is about anyway. Can you tell that this has been bugging me more and more lately?
October 20, 2018
Chapter 1: The Gap between Knowledge and Wisdom
Chapter 2: Origins of Continental Philosophy: How to get from Kant to German Idealism
Chapter 3: Spectacles and Eyes to See With: Two cultures in philosophy
Chapter 4: Can Philosophy Change the World? Critique, praxis, emancipation
Chapter 5: What is to be done? How to respond to nihilism
Chapter 6: A Case Study in Misunderstanding: Heidegger and Carnap
Chapter 7: Scientism versus Obscurantism: Avoiding the traditional predicament in philosophy
Chapter 8: Sapere aude: The exhaustion of theory and the promise of philosophy
Chapter 2: Origins of Continental Philosophy: How to get from Kant to German Idealism
Chapter 3: Spectacles and Eyes to See With: Two cultures in philosophy
Chapter 4: Can Philosophy Change the World? Critique, praxis, emancipation
Chapter 5: What is to be done? How to respond to nihilism
Chapter 6: A Case Study in Misunderstanding: Heidegger and Carnap
Chapter 7: Scientism versus Obscurantism: Avoiding the traditional predicament in philosophy
Chapter 8: Sapere aude: The exhaustion of theory and the promise of philosophy
March 21, 2015
ترجمه مفردات تخصصى خشايار ديهيمى براى اهل فن ملموس و استاندارد نيست! بيش از مباحث فلسفى، مثال ها و شواهد تاريخى كه نويسنده ذكر كرده، خواننده را جذب مي كند.
March 28, 2025
The way one moves forward philosophically is by looking backward in a fresh manner.
April 8, 2019
« داستانی که سعی کردم در این کتاب بازگویم این است که چگونه این تمایز و جدایی را میتوان دوباره به یک تصویر تاریخی جالب ربط داد که در آن فلسفههای تحلیلی و قارهای را بتوان به چشم جلوههای حیاتی مشکل ‹دو فرهنگ› دید: توضیح علمی در برابر تفسیر اومانیستی، تجربی-علمی-بنتامی-کارناپی در برابر هرمنوتیکی-رمانتیک-کولریجی-هایدگری. مدعای من این است که اگر این موقعیت فرهنگی درست فهمیده نشود، با این خطر مواجه میشویم که در یک معادله بیثمر، و در واقع زیانبار، میان علمزدگی از یک سو، و وهمزدگی از سوی دیگر گیر بیوفتیم. برای فهم درست مسئلهی دو فرهنگ در فلسفه، ما باید راههای متباینی را که فلسفه پس از کانت پیمود و مسائل مختلفی را که معرف این راهها بودند درک کنیم. من سعی کردم سویهی قارهای داستان را با تمرکز بر مضمون بحران عقل پس از کانت و توصیف معضل نیهیلیسم که این بحران به آن دامن میزند به اجمال بازگویم. امید من این است که با آشکار و روشنشدن این داستان، و با آموختن راه غلبه بر فرقهگراییهای دیرپا، بتوانیم فلسفیتر پیش برویم و با مسائلی که جذابیت فکری عمیق و ماندگاری دارند، نظیر مسائل مربوط به درهی میان شناخت و حکمت، رویارو شویم.»
از کتاب.
از کتاب.
March 29, 2021
من مایلم ابتدا ایدهی مرکزی کتاب را اجمالا معرفی کنم و داوری در مورد آن را بر عهدهی مخاطبان بگذارم.
کریچلی برای مخاطب ایرانی نامآشناست. غیر از این کتاب، نشر نی سری کتابهایی را با عنوان "چگونه فلانی بخوانیم" (کیرکگور، نیچه، فروید،...) چاپ کرده که دبیر مجموعهی انگلیسیزبانشان هموست. از قضا آن کتابها هم بسیار مفیدند و به قلمهای کارآزمودهای نوشته شدهاند.
کریچلی در امر معرفی فلسفهها برای عموم پرسابقه است و کتابچهی فوقالذکر نیز با چنین هدفی نگاشته شده. با این حال کتاب به هیچوجه مروری تاریخی بر سرخط افکار فیلسوفان نیست. کریچلی ایدهای مرکزی را در این کتاب دنبال میکند. هدف اون نظر افکندن به مغاکی است که میان دو سنت بزرگ فلسفی است، با دیدی آشتیجویانه. آشتیجویی، بدین معنا که تفاوت رویکرد در دو اردوگاه را تفاوتی "فرهنگی" میداند و سپس راه سومی را پیشنهاد میدهد که از مسیر هوسرل-مرلوپونتی (و نه هوسرل-هایدگر-دریدا) میگذرد.
فارغ از داوری در باب پیشنهاد نهایی او، ادعای وی در باب "فرهنگی" بودن آن مغاک جالب توجه و بحثبرانگیز است. به زعم کریچلی، این مسئلهی فرهنگی ریشه در شکاف کانتی عقل محض دارد که برای چندین نسل موضوع تأمل متفکران اروپایی بوده است: شناخت و احساس، ضرورت و آزادی، فاهمه و زیباییشناسی-اخلاق. قول مشهور آن است که سنت انگلوساکسون فلسفه به شق اول از این دوگانهها توجه کرد و این توجه را به حلقهی وین وامدار بود، و در مقابل سنت قارهای به شق دوم این دوگانه یا به شکاف میان ایندو پرداخت. کریچلی اذعان دارد که در دهههای اخیر سنت تحلیلی به آن نیمهی دیگر نیز توجه شایان نشان داده است، ولی مغاک فرهنگی در رویکرد و رهیافت همچنان باقی است. مغاکی که در رادیکالترین شکلش دو پرتگاه را در انتهای مسیر فیلسوفان هر دو سو نمایان کرده: علمزدگی و وهمزدگی. خصوصا در مورد وهمزدگی، لیستی که کریچلی از مصادیق آن ارائه میدهد مفصل و تکاندهنده است؛ از سائق مرگ فروید تا دیفرانس دریدا.
کوشش برای ادراک این مغاک کوششی تازه نیست. کریچلی با مثالی از جان استوارت میل و کشمکش او میان دو مکتب تجربهگرای بنتام و رمانتیکِ کولریج، پاسخ اولیه به این بحران را به رسمیتشناختن هر یک از آن دو در جای خویش میداند. به قول میل: من به عینک نیاز دارم ولی به چشم هم نیاز دارم. این پاسخ جذاب است، قدری تسلای خاطر میآورد، اما به لحاظ محتوا و روش چه بسا کارآمد نباشد. تفکیک حوزههای شناخت پاسخ کانتی به این مغاک بود، انکار و بیمعنا انگاشتن یکی پاسخ کارناپی به آن، و هایدگر با بازسازیهای مفهومی و زبانی به دیگرسو حمله میبرد، ولی در هر صورت بحران در بنیان فرهنگی-فکری جهان مدرن همچنان پابرجا ماند و التفات به این بحران - به زعم کریچلی- از خدمات فلسفهی قارهای است.
کریچلی برای مخاطب ایرانی نامآشناست. غیر از این کتاب، نشر نی سری کتابهایی را با عنوان "چگونه فلانی بخوانیم" (کیرکگور، نیچه، فروید،...) چاپ کرده که دبیر مجموعهی انگلیسیزبانشان هموست. از قضا آن کتابها هم بسیار مفیدند و به قلمهای کارآزمودهای نوشته شدهاند.
کریچلی در امر معرفی فلسفهها برای عموم پرسابقه است و کتابچهی فوقالذکر نیز با چنین هدفی نگاشته شده. با این حال کتاب به هیچوجه مروری تاریخی بر سرخط افکار فیلسوفان نیست. کریچلی ایدهای مرکزی را در این کتاب دنبال میکند. هدف اون نظر افکندن به مغاکی است که میان دو سنت بزرگ فلسفی است، با دیدی آشتیجویانه. آشتیجویی، بدین معنا که تفاوت رویکرد در دو اردوگاه را تفاوتی "فرهنگی" میداند و سپس راه سومی را پیشنهاد میدهد که از مسیر هوسرل-مرلوپونتی (و نه هوسرل-هایدگر-دریدا) میگذرد.
فارغ از داوری در باب پیشنهاد نهایی او، ادعای وی در باب "فرهنگی" بودن آن مغاک جالب توجه و بحثبرانگیز است. به زعم کریچلی، این مسئلهی فرهنگی ریشه در شکاف کانتی عقل محض دارد که برای چندین نسل موضوع تأمل متفکران اروپایی بوده است: شناخت و احساس، ضرورت و آزادی، فاهمه و زیباییشناسی-اخلاق. قول مشهور آن است که سنت انگلوساکسون فلسفه به شق اول از این دوگانهها توجه کرد و این توجه را به حلقهی وین وامدار بود، و در مقابل سنت قارهای به شق دوم این دوگانه یا به شکاف میان ایندو پرداخت. کریچلی اذعان دارد که در دهههای اخیر سنت تحلیلی به آن نیمهی دیگر نیز توجه شایان نشان داده است، ولی مغاک فرهنگی در رویکرد و رهیافت همچنان باقی است. مغاکی که در رادیکالترین شکلش دو پرتگاه را در انتهای مسیر فیلسوفان هر دو سو نمایان کرده: علمزدگی و وهمزدگی. خصوصا در مورد وهمزدگی، لیستی که کریچلی از مصادیق آن ارائه میدهد مفصل و تکاندهنده است؛ از سائق مرگ فروید تا دیفرانس دریدا.
کوشش برای ادراک این مغاک کوششی تازه نیست. کریچلی با مثالی از جان استوارت میل و کشمکش او میان دو مکتب تجربهگرای بنتام و رمانتیکِ کولریج، پاسخ اولیه به این بحران را به رسمیتشناختن هر یک از آن دو در جای خویش میداند. به قول میل: من به عینک نیاز دارم ولی به چشم هم نیاز دارم. این پاسخ جذاب است، قدری تسلای خاطر میآورد، اما به لحاظ محتوا و روش چه بسا کارآمد نباشد. تفکیک حوزههای شناخت پاسخ کانتی به این مغاک بود، انکار و بیمعنا انگاشتن یکی پاسخ کارناپی به آن، و هایدگر با بازسازیهای مفهومی و زبانی به دیگرسو حمله میبرد، ولی در هر صورت بحران در بنیان فرهنگی-فکری جهان مدرن همچنان پابرجا ماند و التفات به این بحران - به زعم کریچلی- از خدمات فلسفهی قارهای است.
February 14, 2017
What is Continental Philosophy? While we all grant it is a misleading question, it is a recognizable one. It is a tradition that reflects upon the solutions and problems of post-Kantian idealism through and up to Heidegger.
Thesis: Contemporary philosophy faces the problem of the gap between wisdom and knowledge. Continental philosophy at its best tries to integrate theory and praxis. Indeed, at the heart of the book is Critchley’s argument that philosophy post-Kant worked around “praxis, critique, and emancipation.”
Continental philosophers approach problems textually and contextually (56). These texts are characterized by strong historical self-consciousness. These texts are also embedded and distanced (59).
The historicity of philosophy implies radical finitude of the human subject and contingent character of human experience (62). The createdness means that re-creation is possible, so philosophers try to emancipate themselves from situations that are not conducive to human experience. Critique is a critique of existing praxis in order to be emancipatory.
The book ends with some possible suggestions for doing Continental Philosophy in a way that doesn’t fall into the standard Conty vs. Analytic debates. Philosophers like Charles Taylor (and I would add, Alexander Dugin and Alain de Benoist) are doing Continental Philosophy but not necessarily in the same patterns.
Some Criticisms
While most of the photographs in the book were well-placed, illuminating, and contributed to the narrative, some were just vulgar, and that’s not so bad but it wasn’t clear how they contributed to the text (like Muhl).
Thesis: Contemporary philosophy faces the problem of the gap between wisdom and knowledge. Continental philosophy at its best tries to integrate theory and praxis. Indeed, at the heart of the book is Critchley’s argument that philosophy post-Kant worked around “praxis, critique, and emancipation.”
Continental philosophers approach problems textually and contextually (56). These texts are characterized by strong historical self-consciousness. These texts are also embedded and distanced (59).
The historicity of philosophy implies radical finitude of the human subject and contingent character of human experience (62). The createdness means that re-creation is possible, so philosophers try to emancipate themselves from situations that are not conducive to human experience. Critique is a critique of existing praxis in order to be emancipatory.
The book ends with some possible suggestions for doing Continental Philosophy in a way that doesn’t fall into the standard Conty vs. Analytic debates. Philosophers like Charles Taylor (and I would add, Alexander Dugin and Alain de Benoist) are doing Continental Philosophy but not necessarily in the same patterns.
Some Criticisms
While most of the photographs in the book were well-placed, illuminating, and contributed to the narrative, some were just vulgar, and that’s not so bad but it wasn’t clear how they contributed to the text (like Muhl).
December 30, 2009
The running theme of logic vs. humanity also contrasts analytic and Continental philosophy. Critchley's purpose here is to introduce us to an eclectic trend that asks what wisdom is, and which stresses the human purposes of philosophy. From Kant to the 20th century French thinkers, the book covers the major trends of the past 200 years. Included in this period are many distinct ideas:
– The difference between knowledge and wisdom
– Kant and German Idealism
– Critique, praxis, emancipation
– Nihilism and the response to it
– Heidegger and Carnap
– Scientism and obscurantism
In covering such broad areas, the author gives us a book that, page per page, packs more interesting information between its covers than most philosophy books dealing with more particular questions. One of a series, the book is suitable to general readers wanting to find out more about philosophy, but people with some knowledge in this area will also gain an excellent overview and new insights. The text reads clearly and the topics are organized lucidly. I recommend this book for its combination of readability and scope.
– The difference between knowledge and wisdom
– Kant and German Idealism
– Critique, praxis, emancipation
– Nihilism and the response to it
– Heidegger and Carnap
– Scientism and obscurantism
In covering such broad areas, the author gives us a book that, page per page, packs more interesting information between its covers than most philosophy books dealing with more particular questions. One of a series, the book is suitable to general readers wanting to find out more about philosophy, but people with some knowledge in this area will also gain an excellent overview and new insights. The text reads clearly and the topics are organized lucidly. I recommend this book for its combination of readability and scope.
June 13, 2018
-İngilizce konuşulan ülkelerde egemen olan Analitik felsefe büyük ölçüde MANTIK ve BİLGİ kuramına indirgenmiş ve felsefeyi bu anlamda sınırlandırma ve genel AHLÂKÎ ve ENTELEKTÜEL dizgelerle olan ilişkisini bir HATA olarak değerlendirme eğilimindedir (Raymond Williams).
-Bilim devrimi doğanın büyüsünü bozmuştur; doğa ise insan amaçlarına tamamen duyarsız, yalın, kişiliksiz, nesnel bir "şey"dir (Max Weber).
Analitik felsefenin izlediği BİLİMSEL gerçeğin felsefi karşılığı bilimciliktir ve bizleri HAYVANLAR haline indirger.
- Kıta (Avrupa) felsefesi ise modern dünyanın TOPLUMSAL uygulamalarını toplum ve BİREY açılarından ÖZGÜRLEŞTİRİCİ ELEŞTİRİYE tabi tutar.
İNSAN MUTLULUĞU ve ANLAM ARAYIŞI ile yakından ilgilidir.
-Benim önerim, analitik felsefenin katı bilimciliğinin hayvaniliğe kaymasından ve kıta felsefesinin bilimden uzaklaşarak gericiliğe düşmesinden uzak durmaya çalışarak, Kant'ın SAPERE AUDE (bilmeye cesaret et) ilkesine sahip çıkmaktır.
-Felsefe yetişkinlerin eğitimidir (Sokrates).
-Bilim devrimi doğanın büyüsünü bozmuştur; doğa ise insan amaçlarına tamamen duyarsız, yalın, kişiliksiz, nesnel bir "şey"dir (Max Weber).
Analitik felsefenin izlediği BİLİMSEL gerçeğin felsefi karşılığı bilimciliktir ve bizleri HAYVANLAR haline indirger.
- Kıta (Avrupa) felsefesi ise modern dünyanın TOPLUMSAL uygulamalarını toplum ve BİREY açılarından ÖZGÜRLEŞTİRİCİ ELEŞTİRİYE tabi tutar.
İNSAN MUTLULUĞU ve ANLAM ARAYIŞI ile yakından ilgilidir.
-Benim önerim, analitik felsefenin katı bilimciliğinin hayvaniliğe kaymasından ve kıta felsefesinin bilimden uzaklaşarak gericiliğe düşmesinden uzak durmaya çalışarak, Kant'ın SAPERE AUDE (bilmeye cesaret et) ilkesine sahip çıkmaktır.
-Felsefe yetişkinlerin eğitimidir (Sokrates).
August 23, 2016
It's not really an introduction because the writer will bring you in the very depth of philosophical debates. But, that is philosophy does for living. Haha...
It helped me alots, especially to understand the conflict between Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy where all of these cultures came with same root, which is Immanuel Kant in German.
And then, it evolved by dispute between Fichte, Hamman, and Jacobi. Or, Benthamites-scientism-logical positivism and Coleridgian-hermeneutic-obscurantism-nihilism. These two traditions has their own fields and methodological methods. And that should not made them distinct one another instead rather help one and another.
Simon always emphasized that the most important argumentation that should be discussed is not who wins? But, how can we bridging the gap between these two tradition, and how can we reconnect the knowledge and the wisdom?
It helped me alots, especially to understand the conflict between Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy where all of these cultures came with same root, which is Immanuel Kant in German.
And then, it evolved by dispute between Fichte, Hamman, and Jacobi. Or, Benthamites-scientism-logical positivism and Coleridgian-hermeneutic-obscurantism-nihilism. These two traditions has their own fields and methodological methods. And that should not made them distinct one another instead rather help one and another.
Simon always emphasized that the most important argumentation that should be discussed is not who wins? But, how can we bridging the gap between these two tradition, and how can we reconnect the knowledge and the wisdom?
January 3, 2017
As a literature student with a smattering of philosophical reading under my belt, I found this text enormously helpful in providing context and synthesizing trends in the philosophical literature I have read. It was interesting to note that virtually all of the philosophers I have encountered in my literary studies are Continental-this tex helped me understand some of the reasons why. Critchley's discussion of the need for a more balanced relationship between the analytic and Continental schools of philosophy is persuasive and compelling.
A side note about style - since this text is compiled from a series of talks, the writing tends toward a more conversational tone, which is not always successful. For example, the use of "or whatever" is a frequent way for Critchley to end a non-comprehensive list, but I found this phrase to be overused and incongruous with the rest of the text.
A side note about style - since this text is compiled from a series of talks, the writing tends toward a more conversational tone, which is not always successful. For example, the use of "or whatever" is a frequent way for Critchley to end a non-comprehensive list, but I found this phrase to be overused and incongruous with the rest of the text.
April 17, 2016
فلسفهی قارهای سایمن کریچلی را باید دفاعیهای از سنت فلسفی قارهی اروپا (در مقابل فلسفهی تحلیلی آنگلوامریکایی) به دست علامهای در فلسفهی معاصر دانست. هدف نویسنده ضمنا قدری پرکردن درهی بین این دو سنت هم هست؛ اشاره به نوعی مکملیت متقابل که از تلفیق شناخت و حکمت برمیخیزد. و این دومی، مدنظر فیسوفان قارهایست
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