The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783

by John Brewer

John Brewer provides a new framework for understanding Britain’s emergence in the eighteenth century as a major international power. Warfare and taxes reshaped the English economy, but at the heart of these dramatic changes lay a tension between the nation’s aspirations to be a major power and fear of the domestic the loss of liberty.

Genres: History, Politics, Economics, Nonfiction, European History, British Literature, 18th Century

312 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1989

Reviews

[Simon Wood · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE FISCAL-MILITARY STATE: BRITAIN 1688-1783

Many are the books on British history that cite John Brewers 1989 classic "The Sinews of Power" not infrequently in glowing terms, but the fact that it has been out of print since 1994, absent without leave from my local library, and hideously expensive second hand has meant that it is not until now (thanks to Oxfam) that I have been able to read this seminal work. It was definitely worth the wait.

"The Sinews of Power" charts the develpment of Britain into what he calls a "fiscal-military state" from the period of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to the loss of their American colonies in 1783. Brewer is alive to the context within which this happened, a British State that was in increasingly in the hands of the propertied classes, primarily via the House of Commons, during a period when Britain was frequently at war with France. Against these two facts the development of a "peculiary British version of the fiscal-military state, complete with large armies and navies, industrious administrators, high taxes and huge debts" are laid out in detail.

Other developments that receive Brewers attention include the formation of a distinct Financial interest (The City) that recieved a large helping hand from the "high taxes and huge debts" that became necessary for the British state during its repeated wars with France. The changes in both taxation policy and how the debt evolved are discussed in detail, as are the changes in the source of taxation. In the earliest part of the period it is direct, in particular a land tax, that form the greater proportion of tax receipts. As time passes the emphasis changes to indirect taxation on popularly consumed items that are often, or regarded as, essential. There is also an interesting chapter on Government information and Lobbyists with many examples, going back to the 1690's, of Lobbying that are immediately recognisable to the twenty-first century reader.

This is a fine book, that provides a fascinating and detailed insight into the development of Britain during the eighteenth century with close attention paid to the military and fiscal dimensions. For anyone interested in British history, in particular how Britain found itself as the leading world power in the 19th century, this book is essential.

Readers unfamiliar with the period will probably find the following books more welcoming: "English Society in the Eighteenth Century" by Roy Porter, or J.H.Plumbs "England in the Eighteenth Century" which though dated in many of the particulars still rewards the reader with a fluent general account of the era. More detailed and unapologetically academic, in the best sense, are John Rules "The Vital Century: England's Economy, 1714-1815" and "Albion's People: English Society, 1714-1815".

[Jonathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short version: Constant war with France and Spain made the British state mushroom (constant war = big military = hefty taxes and borrowing = lots of bookkeepers and tax collectors) even as the British people congratulated themselves on liberty and limited government. In fact, Brewer argues, the British "fiscal-military state" became all the more powerful for existing within a parliamentary and constitutional system. Because of this setting, the state had greater popular legitimacy and support.

But of course, some people resented the growth of the state. (Cue the provincials? We are talking about a revolt against taxes, imperial administration, and trade controls, after all.)

Although the book focuses on 18th-century Britain, it provides a lovely window into the making of modern governments in general. It should be especially useful to those interested in the growth of the national government in the United States. And it helps dispel the myth that small, responsible government has ever gone together with modern warfare.

[Troy · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good, concise history of the development of the uniquely British fiscal-military state. For context, I came across this book while searching for material on the evolution of Parliament and liberal/democratic institutions and culture in England as a consequence of the Enlightenment. This book adds a great, but very specific perspective on that era/those developments; perhaps more the commercial/mercantile and fiscal/administrative forces as opposed to the mostly political/philosophical that an Enlightenment-driven inquiry or author typically uncovers.

Filling in gap from Lipscombe’s English Civil Wars book - whereas Charles II, who returned in 1660 in “The Restoration,” was a sort of secret Catholic who was tolerated, James II - who succeeded in 1685 - was an open, devout catholic who antagonized Parliament and the aristocracy.

In 1688, James II had a son. For the Protestant establishment, this was a disaster: it signaled the start of a permanent Catholic dynasty in England.

The Glorious Revolution (1688)
The "Glorious Revolution" was essentially a bloodless coup. A group of seven English noblemen (“The Immortal Seven”) sent an "Invitation" to William of Orange, the Protestant ruler of the Netherlands and husband to James’s Protestant daughter, Mary II (who brought legitimacy through English royal (Stuart) lineage). They asked him to invade England to preserve their "religion, laws, and liberties."

William - who could use the additional resources to fight the French - landed with an army, and James II—finding himself deserted by his military and his own daughters—fled to France.

William of Orange knew he needed Parliamentary legitimacy, however, and so Parliament imposed the Declaration of Rights (later Bill of Rights 1689) and Parliamentary Sovereignty/Constitutional Monarchy/“King in Parliament” on him, paving the way for modernity.

SPOILERS BELOW

Chapter 1
- [ ] Fiscal/military state emerges through Glorious Revolution as result of centralization 10th-13th centuries, avoidance of major international war from mid 15th to late 17th centuries, and success avoiding (for most part, or at least relative to France) venal officeholders.

Pg 21 “Consider centralization. The presence of national institutions which enjoyed considerable legitimacy meant that whoever controlled them had the opportunity to exercise strong and effective governance. Of course the potentialities inherent in the state apparatus were obscured during the bitter conflicts of the seventeenth century. For more than a generation it seemed neither that the state was capable of unity, nor that its individual institutions were able to command widespread legitimacy. But, ironically, the turbulence and political experimentation of the seventeenth century revealed the durability of England’s political institutions and the potency of an ideology that urged their collaboration. The Civil War, Commonwealth and Protectorate, together with the autocratic follies of James II, showed just how difficult it was for the monarch – or any head of the executive – to dispense with parliament, for parliament to dispense with monarchy (individual monarchs, however, were more disposable), and for anybody to dispense with both.
“If the conflicts of the seventeenth century finally legitimized the potent combination of monarch and parliament, they also demonstrated the strength of a national system of provincial governance which relied for its implementation on local dignitaries. National centralized institutions were tolerable provided they were neither military nor administrative but judicial in character; they were not only acceptable but desirable if activated by the approval of the ‘natural rulers’ (i.e. landed proprietors) of the nation. Central authority in the British Isles as a whole was more circumscribed, though firmly fixed to the advantage of England’s leaders.
“We can see the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an era during which the constraints on political power at both the centre and the periphery were defined. On at least three occasions – under Henry VIII, in the 1630s and with Cromwell – and on possibly a fourth, in James II's reign – the British faced the possibility of an enduring autocratic regime. The failure of these initiatives, and the memory of their attempt, created the context within which English politics developed in the eighteenth century. After 1688 it quickly became a cardinal principle that the polity had to be ruled by king and parliament, or, to be more precise, by king in parliament. The unpalatable alternatives – a (radical Protestant) republic, military autarky or a putative (Catholic) absolutism – all lacked the legitimacy a mixed form of government commanded. Though the precise origins and nature of this legitimacy were long to remain a matter for dispute, and though there were radical differences over who was the rightful monarch and why, politicians of every stripe saw mixed government as the best form of rule. This was as true of iure divino Jacobites as it was of those whigs who endorsed a radical interpretation of the events of 1688.”

- [ ] Parliament evolved with blessing of monarchs, who opted to incorporate MP’s local authority for their own legitimacy - similar to how modern political parties subsume popular fronts into the party.

Pg 27 “The Fall of James II in 1688 inaugurated the longest period of British warfare since the middle ages. Britain was at war with France, and allies of France, in 1689–97, 1702–13, 1739–63 and 1775–83. Sometimes referred to as the ‘Second Hundred Years War’, this belligerent era culminated in the twenty-year struggle with post-Revolutionary France which ended with Wellington and Blücher’s victory at Waterloo. Though the wars in the century before 1789 were not on the scale of the titanic conflict which engulfed Europe after 1792, they marked the coming of age for the British as a major military force. Before the Glorious Revolution England had shown she was a naval power to be reckoned with, and the New Model Army had demonstrated that English troops could be as proficient and ruthless as any in Europe. But military action had been sporadic...
“After 1688 the scope of British military involvement changed radically. Britain was at war more frequently and for longer periods of time, deploying armies and navies of unprecedented size... Public spending, fuelled by military costs, rose by leaps and bounds. The civilian administration supporting the military effort burgeoned; taxes and debts increased. Britain acquired a standing army and navy. She became, like her main rivals, a fiscal–military state, one dominated by the task of waging war.”

- [ ] “Put in its simplest terms, between 1680 and 1780 the British army and navy trebled in size. During these years Britain fought five major wars: the Nine Years War, sometimes known as King William's War or the War of English Succession (1688–97), the War of Spanish Succession (1702–13), the Wars of Jenkins's Ear and Austrian Succession (1739–48), the Seven Years War (1756–63) and the American War of Independence (1775–83).” Pg 29 Ch 2

Pg 41 “According to André Corvisier, three-quarters of the wartime French army might consist of foreign troops. A similar foreign presence was to be found in the Prussian and Spanish armies. At mid-century about 38 per cent of the Prussian troops were not Prussian subjects; by the last quarter of the century the proportion had risen to over a half. In Spain in 1751 28 of the army's 133 battalions were manned by troops who were not Spanish. British armies were equally dependent upon foreign manpower. During the campaign in Ireland in 1690, two British monarchs, James II and William III, fought each other with troops from France (both Huguenot and Catholic), the United Provinces, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia. The pattern persisted throughout the century. During the American War over 32,000 Germans fought for the British against the colonists.”

- [ ] The navy was regarded much more highly by Englishmen, who viewed it as enabling trade and commercial prosperity, protection as an island nation and a legitimate arm of foreign policy. The army was viewed much more skeptically as a dangerous plaything of autocratic kings.
- [ ] A standing army and military careerism in Britain only came about after the Jacobite uprisings and Glorious Revolution. Britain’s Hanoverian kings contributed to the instantiation of careerism in the military. George I served under William III, George II distinguished himself at Oudenarde in 1708 (War of Spanish Succession) and was the last British monarch to lead troops in battle (Dettingen 1743 - War of Austrian Succession).

Chapter 4
- [ ] The perpetual public debt started in the early 1700’s under Walpole and Henry Pelham. They were able to lean on large creditors to make concessions like refinances and early retirement thanks to the existence of the East India Company, the South Sea Company, and the Bank of England.
- [ ] England’s fiscal system: more centralized thanks to being an island and relatively small geographic area. Contrast with France at the time which was much less cohesive and had porous land borders for tax evasion. England’s revenue service and public accounting evolved, as a result, to be trusted and to discourage fraud - lest aristocratic dirty laundry end up aired in the Commons. Taxpayers’ view of Parliament as legitimate and representative was important.
- [ ] Between 1697 (end of 9 Years’ War) and 1701 Act of Settlement, Parliament further constrained the monarch ability to wage war; reduced the size of the standing army; removed placemen from the commons and made privy councilors more accountable to parliament; made judges more independent
- [ ] After James II, too, whose bureaucratic innovations had been a boone to his income (duties and excise taxes), parliament sought to increase the crown’s dependence by requiring a renewal of those taxes every few years — the clear yoke of ‘the power of the purse’.
- [ ] Late in Chapter 5, Brewer takes a welcome detour into political theory and political history via discussion of “country ideology” - sometimes country persuasion or the country interest. Apparently, country ideology was a sort of spasm of limited-government republicanism in the fairly new paradigm of constitutional parliamentary preeminence. Not necessarily in opposition to the monarchy — Tories had their fair share of the country persuasion, too — but rather to centralized bureaucracy and big government. It was sometimes criticized as being a front for landowners protecting their prerogative but seems arguably to have been a step change in how Britons thought and talked about democratic republicanism post 1688. Though the Parliamentarian view that (along with religion) drove the Civil Wars was arguably the first such spasm, country ideology seems unique in the context of the coalescing and bureaucratizing fiscal-military state.

Pg 170 “In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, however, British rulers had other matters on their mind. The rise of Louis XIV’s France and the dynastic vagaries of the English succession turned policy-makers decisively towards Europe. The views of the scions of the Houses of Orange and Hanover were dominated both by a grand concern for the European balance of power and by a more parochial love of their native land, whether it were the polders of Holland or the turnip fields of Hanover. In these assumptions they were followed by Stanhope, Townshend and Carteret, the ministers who dominated foreign affairs in the first half of the century. Almost all members of the executive gave precedence to Europe before the rest of the world and placed power before profit. Trade and commerce, especially colonial trade and commerce, were of secondary importance.”

Pg 172 “By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the English achieved their three main wartime objectives: the Protestant Succession and the revolutionary settlement, if not yet secure, had nevertheless been preserved; territorial concessions in Europe restricted the powers of France (as well, incidentally, as those of Austria); and the acquisition of Gibraltar, Minorca, Hudson’s Bay, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia provided England with territories and bases that both protected her shipping and enhanced her naval power. In addition, the commercial concessions extracted from the Spanish – including the notorious contract granted to the South Sea Company to supply slaves for their Central and South American empire, the asiento – gave England what seemed an important advantage over her French and Dutch rivals in the New World.
“The Treaty of Utrecht marked England’s arrival as a major European power. But it in no way guaranteed that she would remain one. The triumph over France had only been accomplished at great cost. The subsidization of allied troops with its enormous foreign remittances; the raising of substantial English armies which drained native manpower; the quagmire of the inconclusive Iberian campaign, which swallowed men and money; and the extensive damage inflicted on the English merchant marine by enemy privateers had all taken their toll. It was by no means certain that England would make as quick a recovery as France, which had far greater resources at its disposal. The years after the peace of Utrecht were characterized by a new rivalry between the two major powers, a competition to see which could achieve the most rapid fiscal, military and diplomatic reconstruction.”

- [ ] English economic and population growth preceded the Industrial Revolution. Between 1500 and 1800, English population grew 3.5x while France failed even to double. Travelers to England commonly remarked on the “commercial society,” the lack of a peasantry, the prevalence of agriculture for the market (as opposed to subsistence farming), the extent of services, and the substantial size of the middle class.

Ch. 8
Pg 231 “'The lobby' was not an invention of the era after the Glorious Revolution. Bodies concerned to affect government policy through the skilled practice of the politics of information had existed earlier in the seventeenth century. But after 1688 they grew in number, adopted more sophisticated tactics and devoted more and more attention to parliament rather than to other parts of government.
“These developments were in large part a response to the political changes that emanated from the Glorious Revolution. After 1688 England had a standing parliament which, thanks to the strict financial settlement negotiated with the crown, met every year and not, as had previously been the case, at the whim of the monarch.
“The permanence of parliament, the greater length of its sessions, and its much increased legislative activity (by the 1760s passing as many as 200 bills a session), made it a far more important policy-making body than it had been before 1688.”

Pg 247 “Immediately after the Glorious Revolution those worried by the expansion of the state apparatus were chiefly concerned with the threat this posed to the corporate liberty of parliament. The burning question was whether or not a burgeoning executive would enable the monarch to dispense with ‘the representative of the people’. This anxiety overshadowed (though it certainly did not entirely obscure) concern for the liberties of individual subjects. But by the mid-eighteenth century it had become clear not only that parliament had been preserved but that it claimed (and sometimes enjoyed) unprecedented powers. The increased emphasis on the rights of individual subjects was a natural concomitant of the legislature’s claim to absolute authority. As the legislature came to look more and more like a part of the state apparatus and less and less like the representative of the people (a function it nevertheless succeeded in retaining), so political debate expanded into the public sphere.”

Pg 250 “The emergence of a peculiarly British version of the fiscal–military state, complete with large armies and navies, industrious administrators, high taxes and huge debts, was not the inevitable result of the nation’s entry into European war but the unintended consequence of the political crisis which racked the British state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Though not inevitable, these changes in government were enduring. The overweening power of the Treasury, a highly centralized financial system, a standing parliament, heavy taxation, an administrative class of gifted amateurs lacking training in the science of government but with a strong sense of public duty, government deficits and a thriving market in public securities: all these features of modern British politics began under the later Stuarts and Hanoverians. They had a profound effect on the subsequent history of the British state, enabling it to arbitrate the balance of power in Europe, to acquire its first empire and, when that was lost, to build another.”

[Anthony Zupancic · Rating 3 out of 5]

Really quite good history. Looks at the minutia of finance, taxes and administration to understand the growth of British power and the empire; to expose the hidden sinews that animated the British body politic: money, logistics, and administration. Breaks the book into 5 parts:

1. State prior to 1688

2. military org, money raising, and admin after Glorious Revolution

3. political crisis that gave birth to fiscal-military state

4. effects of the state on both material circumstances and attitudes of its subjects

5. assesses the nature of some of the responses to the changing nature of government

The threads Brewer follows run in and out of time periods in each part, making the read somewhat unorganized, but it seemed like a necessary result of his work. The bits he tracked emerged early and remained late. In the end, he concludes that emergence of the British fiscal-military state w/ large armies and navies, industrious administrators, high taxes and huge debts, was not inevitable, but was an unintended consequence of the political crisis after the Glorious Revolution.

Most interesting aspect is the leitmotif that runs through the book: society reacted in a contradictory way to the evolution of the fiscal-military state; on the one hand it tried desperately to limit the growth of the state and the monarch's power in an attempt to preserve liberty, on the other it embraced the growth as a National force of good and necessity as England emerged in the 18th century and aspects and individuals of society thus tried to colonize the developments to gain control of the gov't resources.

This is nuanced and interesting but perhaps not necessarily a cover to cover read. It can drag on and points are belabored (as historians are want to do).

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is probably the book on my bookshelf most cited by other books on my bookshelf.

(Well, except the Bible, obv. And excepting the law books, which are an incestuous mess of self-citation. But other than that).

[Jeff · Rating 3 out of 5]

It illuminates the development in England of the fiscal state after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and how the machinery of finance developed, was staffed, and evolved over this period. It also touches upon some of the relative advantages Britain enjoyed over the principal rival France in terms of a more centralized taxation, a gradually more professional administration, and the greater legitimacy provided by Parliament. Worth a read if you're interested in the financial underpinnings of state power, which helped propel Britain to great power status. While a drier topic, Brewer does a good job holding the reader's interest.

[David Reynolds · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not the easiest read, but a superb work of history. Brilliant, in-depth explanation of how England (then Britain after the unification) developed into a naval power, and went from a fringe nation in Early Modern Europe to a major European (and international) power. Extremely well-researched and well-written; the financial aspects are critical to understanding the underlying drivers, and he covered these in detail, making them as easy to follow as is possible without sacrificing the depth and complexity. A must-read for anyone interested in Early Modern British (and European) history.

[Chris Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

For anyone interested in how the British Empire was able to fight and finance 125 years of war while building its empire, this book is a must. True, it has economics, math, political intrigue, but Mr. Brewer's coverage and explanations make it clear what is happening. It should be a must read for any student of the British Empire. There is also much carryover to the present situation of many current countries and issues. Well done!

[Tom Buitelaar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Backlog

[Jeremy Canipe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Meh but it's because the subject bore me.

[Boone Ayala · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brewer seeks to explain an apparent paradox of 18th century Britain. At the same time that Britain became a militarily-renowned world power, it became a society famous for its love of liberty and the rights of the subject. He thus asks "why Britain was able to enjoy the fruits of military prowess without the misfortunes of a dirigiste or despotic regime" (xviii). He argues that 18th century Britain was strong in infrastructural power - the practical capability to successfully accomplish objectives within its accepted limits - but weak in despotic power, i.e., relatively limited in terms of what it had the authority to do (xx).

Brewer notes in part 1 that the English state - which after the Act of Union in 1707 effectively served as the nucleus for the British state - had 3 key advantages from the late medieval period. The first of these was "its centralization in the period between the tenth and thirteenth centuries" (3). This early centralization meant that while "regionalism was not absent... it lacked any institutional focus to challenge the authority of the central state" (5) lacking the particularism and heterogeneity of the French state apparatus (6).

The second advantage was England's escape from continental wars between the end of the 100 Years' War in the mid-15th century and the beginning of the second hundred years' war in 1688. "In a period of ferocious and continuous warfare, England was remarkable for its lack of participation in international conflict and for its many years of peace. England, in other words, was not a major participant in the so-called 'Military Revolution'" which greatly increased the scale of war in Early Modern Europe (7-8).

The third advantage was largely a consequence of the second; because England was not heavily militarized and had relatively less need of funds in the late medieval and early modern periods, the English entered the 18th century with a much smaller class of venal officeholders. "England's greatest advantage was that it was never put to the sort of grueling fiscal-military test that year after year drain the nation of its resources and the treasury of its wealth... for the proliferation and sale of offices... was the necessary price that the absolutist ruler paid for waging major wars" (21).

Part 2 details the nature of the fiscal-military state as it emerged in Britain. Britain gave a unique emphasis to its navy - an emphasis that was"singularly appropriate for a state which governed a commercial society with such a substantial commitment to overseas trade" (34). Three features were critical to the raising of vast sums necessary for fiscal-military state formation: "the existence of a powerful representative with undisputed powers of national taxation; the presence of a commercialized economy whose structure made it comparatively easy to tax; and the deployment of fiscal expertise that made borrowing against tax income an easy tax" (42). Crucially, taxation was centralized and publicized. Anglo-British warmaking in the 18th century was managed by public offices - "from the mid-17th century states began to exercise an unprecedented control over the business of war, largely because they succeeded in improving their administrative capacity" (64).

Part III contains chapter 5, "The Paradoxes of State Power." Here Brewer answers "why, in what is conventionally viewed as the most unstate-like of states, did the government manage both to cope with the pressures of war and to retain much of its integrity?" He says "first, William and his followers were the beneficiaries of the administrative reforms initiated by their predecessors. ... Secondly, the commons restrained malfeasance and secured public accountability" (139). He argues that the wars which required the expansion of the state apparatus were "fought to preserve the revolution of 1688, to avert the return of James II, whom Louis supported, and to avoid the Catholicism and executive intrusion" of his reign (140). "The Glorious Revolution was not only a Protestant but a 'country' revolution, concerned both to preserve the true faith as England's official religion and to reduce the powers of central government. But in order to protect the revolution from its enemies, the powers of the state had perforce to grow as never before" (142). Country politicians - essentially opposition politics - limited the excesses of government.

[Nic Barilar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Well-researched. Strong argument. But, if the British Empire depended upon its financial system, its tax system, etc. to fund its imperial projects that emerged after the Glorious Revolution and into the eighteenth century... where is the slave trade?

[Michael Taylor · Rating 3 out of 5]

Why did Great Britain become the financial superpower of her time? This book sought to answer that question by examining the development and growth of the modern beaucratic state. His heroes are the paper pushers of the age. In the end, Britain became great because of the statistics and reports generated by beaucrats which allowed policymakers to make informed decisions on hard data. Not a book for everyone, but if you are interested in British and American colonial history, then it is worth your time.

[Kent · Rating 4 out of 5]

While a bit of a slow read about taxes/economic policy/finance at times, Brewer is a wonderful writer and argues a strong case for how the British fiscal-military state arose after 1688 and why it worked so well compared to other European nations.

[!Tæmbuŝu]

KOBOBOOKS

[Lisa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this for a research paper about monetary and fiscal policy in Enlightenment Europe, was very helpful.

[Xinyu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Had to read this for one of my classes in school, and was rewarded with immense insights into the making of Britain's fiscal-military state. Author was detailed with his arguments, and although it is not an easy read, it is very informative for those interested in Britain's rise in the 18th and 19th centuries.