Gallipoli

by Peter Hart

One of the most famous battles in history, the WWI Gallipoli campaign began as a bold move by the British to capture Constantinople, but this definitive new history explains that from the initial landings--which ended with so much blood in the sea it could be seen from airplanes overhead--to the desperate attacks of early summer and the battle of attrition that followed, it was a tragic folly destined to fail from the start.

Gallipoli forced the young Winston Churchill from office, established Turkey's iconic founder Mustafa Kemal (better known as "Ataturk"), and marked Australia's emergence as a nation in its own right. Drawing on unpublished eyewitness accounts by individuals from all ranks--not only from Britain, Australia and New Zealand, but from Turkey and France as well--Peter Hart weaves first-hand stories into a vivid narrative of the battle and its aftermath. Hart, a historian with the Imperial War Museum and a battlefield tour guide at Gallipoli, provides a vivid, boots-on-the-ground account that brilliantly evokes the confusion of war, the horrors of combat, and the grim courage of the soldiers. He provides an astute, unflinching assessment of the leaders as well. He shows that the British invasion was doomed from the start, but he places particular blame on General Sir Ian Hamilton, whose misplaced optimism, over-complicated plans, and unwillingness to recognize the gravity of the
situation essentially turned likely failure into complete disaster.

Capturing the sheer drama and bravery of the ferocious fighting, the chivalry demonstrated by individuals on both sides amid merciless wholesale slaughter, and the futility of the cause for which ordinary men fought with extraordinary courage and endurance-- Gallipoli is a riveting account of a battle that continues to fascinate us close to a hundred years after the event.

Genres: History, World War I, Military History, Nonfiction, War, Military Fiction, Australia

544 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2011

About the author

Peter Hart is a British military historian.

He has been an oral historian at Sound Archive of Imperial War Museum in London since 1981.

He has written mainly on British participation in the First World War. His books include; The Somme, Jutland 1916, Bloody April on the air war in 1917, Passchendaele, Aces Falling (on the air war in 1918), 1918 A Very British Victory and Gallipoli.

Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 3 out of 5]

How to be Incompetent

The First World War will always be known as the war where lives were thrown away needlessly. The Gallipoli Campaign is all of the cliches and tragedies of WWI rolled into one. To study the it is to understand military incompetence at its finest and feel your heart wrench at what all sides threw away for absolutely nothing. In Gallipoli, renown military historian Peter Hart brings this story to life, drawing from a wealth of primary sources, including soldiers’ letters, diaries, and memoirs, to bring to life the human experience of the campaign, while also offering a critical analysis of the broader strategic decisions made by Allied commanders.

In Gallipoli Hart goes beyond the usual focus on the British and ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) troops, highlighting the often-overlooked roles of the French, Indian, and Ottoman forces. He provides a vivid, often harrowing account of the conditions on the ground—suffocating heat, rampant disease, and poorly planned assaults that led to devastating casualties. Through this, Hart creates an immersive and empathetic portrayal of the soldiers’ struggles, humanising both sides of the conflict.

Hart is also critical of the leadership during the campaign, particularly figures like Winston Churchill and General Sir Ian Hamilton, whose overly ambitious and poorly coordinated strategies contributed to the campaign’s failure. However, unlike some historians who tend to romanticize the Gallipoli campaign or reduce it to a disaster caused by incompetent leadership, Hart presents a more nuanced view. He acknowledges the extraordinary difficulties the Allied forces faced, including logistical challenges and the strength of the Turkish defenders, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later Atatürk), whose leadership proved decisive.

Gallipoli’s pacing might be a challenge if you for unfamiliar with the pure military history of the disastrous campaign. Hart dives deep into the operational details of battles, including troop movements, command decisions, and artillery barrages, which may overwhelm those looking for a broader overview. However, if military history is your thing or if you are looking for a ground-level perspective, then the detailed accounts in this book will be invaluable.

In conclusion, Peter Hart’s Gallipoli is a rich, authoritative, and compelling account of one of the 20th century’s most tragic military campaigns. It is a balanced narrative that neither glorifies nor dismisses the bravery of the troops involved, while also critically assessing the campaign’s leadership and strategic failings. For anyone seeking to understand Gallipoli in all its complexity, it is a good place to start. In one final note, I must say that I found Gallipoli tedious in places and it can sometimes be frustrating that a lot of the narrative is explained through the soldiers letters and diary entries rather than Harts own words. All of the books I have read by him are like this, there are pros and cons to this method. I love how the soldier’s voices come to life and it’s especially poignant to read a letter to find out they were killed shortly after. But I felt that sometimes Hart can get bogged down in this and it prevents the overall flow of the book.

[Brett C · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a well-written account of a lesser known event in World War I. I think most readers of WW1 know about the Western Front, trench warfare, Somme and Verdun, and even the Eastern Front. For me this was a learning experience. Peter Hart did a thorough job of explaining the prelude to war moving into the Ottoman Empire, the amphibious beach landing, the land campaign, and the aftermath of the conflict.

The uniqueness of this campaign was the large numbers of Australian and New Zealander Army Corps (AZNAC) soldiers who fought bravely against the Turkish army. The campaign was marked with logistical struggles, ammunition and resources shortages, disease and pestilence, relentless fighting, and the mounting casualties. The overall campaign was considered a failure but the bravery and heroism of the ANZAC soldier has become a concept of pride.

Overall this was very good on the Gallipoli campaign. It was clear with experts of personal accounts and documentation to support the narrative. I would recommend this to readers of WW1. Thanks!

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking.”

Some reviewers have complained that Hart relies too much on first hand accounts, which he uses extensively. But for me, that’s what made this such an interesting and enjoyable read. This isn’t a massively detailed military history, instead you get a very readable overview backed up by literally hundreds of first-hand accounts, including from the Turks and the French. And Hart certainly doesn’t pull his punches in criticising military and political leaders!

[Sweetwilliam · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Gallipoli campaign is one of military history’s greatest disasters. It caused Great Briton to lose prestige which some say, was the first step in the unraveling of the empire. Author Peter Hart explains that It was a scheme rather then a well planned campaign and it was doomed from the start.

In many cases, the troops were poorly led starting with the over-optimistic theater commander, Ian Hamilton on down. But even if the French troops were led by Napoleon and the British and British Commonwealth troops were led by the Duke of Wellington, there is no way this campaign would have succeeded. They hadn’t enough artillery, logistics were a disaster, objectives were not clear and movements were usually not coordinated. Oh and did I mention, the men were dropped off at the base of a cliff?

The following passage by second Lieutenant Reginald Savory of the 14th Sikhs, 29th Indian Brigade is a great example of the fog of war during this campaign. It is my favorite passage of the book because it exemplifies the mass confusion that was Gallipoli:

“I took an armed orderly with me and set out across the Aghyl Derwin in almost pitch darkness. It was about 2am. It took me an hour and a half to find MacLean, only about half a mile away, through thick scrub and dried-up river beds. I was challenged now and again, but no one could tell me where I was. I was in a fever. Here I was, with very urgent orders, and I could not find the man for whom they were intended. At half-past three I stumbled on him, fast asleep. I went through the orders with him, they were in indelible pencil on thin paper and difficult to read by the doused light of an electric torch. We were to assault Hill Q in company with the 5th Gurkhas, and with the 4th Australian Brigade on our left. Neither he nor I knew where Hill Q was. It was not marked as such on the map; nor had it been pointed out to us. All we did know was that in three-quarters of an hour or so we were to capture it. It was still dark and the men were fast asleep.”

Peter Heart tells the story of the Gallipoli campaign through the eyes of the men who fought it. Hart’s method is to organize wholly unedited eye witness accounts into chronological order using the authors commentary to make the story flow. It can be a cumbersome process at times and I found it a little challenging to read. I’m not sure if it is Hart’s style or the fact that this was such a boondoggle and such a massive waste of lives and resources that I found it depressing. Still, I’m very grateful that Peter Hart preserved these voices of the past.

[Dimitri · Rating 3 out of 5]

I attended an interview with him in Brussels in 2015 (with an interpreter who couldn't distinguish between HE and shrapnel in her French translation!) and bought this on an inspiration.

Unfortunately, Hart suffers from LynnMcDonaldism to the Nth degree, an affliction to which oral historians are suspectible: his testimonies are accompanied very sparsely by context, hard to stomach unless you have sufficient battle knowledge under your belt.

Keep Alan Moorehead at hand, or something....

[Nick Lloyd · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book, while a very thorough and informative history, was painfully frustrating to read in some places. Though the author does provide a good deal of insight into the Gallipoli campaign, he relies far too heavily on copy-pasted journal passages. To me, this is bad historiography. There is nothing wrong with using first hand accounts, and in some places it is very helpful to painting a picture of the battle scenes. However, Hart relies on this far, far too much. In some parts of the book, more than half of the text is nothing but copy-paste. An author's job is to take these accounts and weave them into a cohesive narrative that tells the story in a well thought out, accessible way, rather than the constant interruption of an inserted account. Ultimately, the good of the book outweighs the bad, but the frustration is noteworthy, and I would not generally recommend books written in this style.

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mr. Hart makes very good use of first person accounts to tell the story of the ill fated adventure in the Dardanelles. He tells both sides of the story, using diary entries from the lowest private to the leaders of both sides.

He is very scathing of the strategic thinking that led the invasion. His contention is that the invasion had absolutely 0 change of success.
He also blasts British planning and staff work through out the course fo the campaign. His contention that about the only planning they got right was the evacuation.

He does downplay the importance of the Australian/New Zealand contributions. He basically says ANZAC Cove was a side show and the important actions took place at Helles and Sulva


I think is a good slight revisionist history of the campaign.

[Dwight · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mr. Hart’s first words in the preface: “Gallipoli. It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking…” and so begins the book he never should have had to write if not for Churchill (the lunacy?), David Lloyd George (the idiocy?), Admiral Fisher (the muddled thinking?) and a cast of pushovers in England’s war cabinet who opted for an adventure in the Dardanelles.

Is he wrong? No, but the practice of collectively and specifically stating the futility of every action before describing it detracts from what is otherwise a well-written and interesting book.

Mr. Hart has a real gift for weaving the words of the participants seamlessly into a narrative that is effective and enjoyable. He ties the first person accounts together smoothly and avoids the choppiness that often accompanies quoted material in other works.

I especially appreciated his efforts to gather substantial material from the Turkish participants, and not just high-ranking officers and politicians. He utilizes dozens of accounts from front line officers and men of the Ottoman army, especially in actions around ANZAC Cove. The words of a young Colonel Mustafa Kamel are of particular interest.

British leadership at strategic and tactical levels is criticized with well-reasoned arguments. The role and voices of participants from numerous combat units are adequately covered without the common overemphasis on the Australians and New Zealanders. Dozens of heroes emerge in the small unit actions throughout the campaign on all sections of the peninsula. The narrative is well organized and coherent despite spanning several combat arenas. The maps provided are also very useful. Overall, an enjoyable read that I would consider good, but not great.

[Ross Hamilton · Rating 3 out of 5]

Here in Australia we are more used to seeing books on Gallipoli presenting a much more Anzac-centric focus on the Dardenelles campaign of 1915. It comes as a surprise to some to learn that the Australian and New Zealand troops were just one part of the multi-national Mediterranean Task Force and greatly outnumbered by British troops. Also making up the force were French, Indian and even troops from New Foundland (although the latter do not get a mention from Hart).

It is also not as well appreciated as it should be in Australia that the landing on April 25th, 1915 at Gaba Tepe, which later became known as Anzac Cove, was just one of a number of landings on the Gallipoli peninsula, both real and diversionary. Anzac Cove was also far from the worst of the landings - that dubious honour is held by the British landing further down the peninsula at V Beach.

Something that really struck me in this account was just what a great job the Turks did, particularly in the confusion of that first day. The invaders were often held up by far fewer numbers of troops who admittedly held the high ground yet were not that well equipped. The fire discipline of some of those units lead some of the attackers to believe that they were facing machine guns when the few Turkish machine guns were not brought into the line later in the day, depending on where the need was believed greatest. At one point a British advance was held up by the sight of a line of Turkish troops, laying on the ground ahead of them. If only they had realised that the Turks were out of ammunition and only had the bayonets left to fight with.

Hart is far more condemnatory of British planning and conduct of the campaign than is often the case with British researchers and authors. He also condemns aspects of the Anzac landing, while still paying the compliment of how remarkable was the grimly determined Australian and New Zealand grasp on their toehold.

It was also interesting to read some accounts by British seaman that shed some light on a significant aspect that greatly increased the confusion of the Anzac landing.

While this book does not flow or read as well as say, Les Carlyon's Gallipoli, it is far from the dry read that you might expect from a professional historian. For anyone with an interest in the larger picture of the Gallipoli campaign, this title is definitely worth a look.

[Jack · Rating 4 out of 5]

Another one down. The Gallipoli campaign is another fascinating saga of WWI. Desperate to relieve the pressure on the Russians and somehow defeat the Central Powers, the allied forces were looking for anywhere to strike. This was a Churchill idea. I found this one startlingly similar to his "strike at the soft underbelly of the Axis" which would occur one world war later. Pure Churchill. Unfortunately, this one did not work. I found the British endeavors in the Middle East belonging to romantic ideas of Arabian conquests and high adventure. Also, I noticed the method of obtaining portions of the Ottoman Empire for themselves. What would be better than to conquer Constantinople! The forcing of the Dardanelles was a naval possibility but only if done correctly. It was not. The sea campaign morphed into a land campaign. Both were muddled and cost the allies thousands of additional casualties for no gain. Yes, some Turkish troops were withdrawn from other sectors but not enough to impact any other area. The Brits expected the Turkish troops to cut and run. They did not. Trench warfare sprang forth and the landings were stopped cold. I do see a silver lining though. Much of the amphibious, operational, and intelligence lessons learned were later used by the British during WWII which saved countless lives. When we entered WWII we had to learn many of these lessons from the beginning. We never did compare with the intelligence network the British had established (even before WWII broke out). I found the author's insertion of direct passages from WWI soldiers enjoyable, however, a bit much. It seemed the majority of the book was from soldiers accounts. I hope you enjoy this one. I did.

[Frank Theising · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Gallipoli campaign in WWI is largely unheard of in the United States (anecdotally, I had multiple people mispronounce the name while asking me what the book was about). In contrast, Gallipoli has a mythical, mysterious stranglehold on the imaginations of the people of Australia. When my wife and I visited Australia in 2012 we saw countless monuments and memorials about it. The 1981 movie of the same name (one of Mel Gibson’s earliest film roles) followed two Australian men who sign up to serve during the Great War in defense of the British Empire only to be senselessly killed in the trenches. As I walk through the Pentagon, there is a hallway that prominently features the Australia & New Zealand Army Corps (ANZACs) at Gallipoli. The tragedy at Gallipoli remains a central part of Australian identity and nationhood (despite the fact that they lost significantly more men on the Western Front). So naturally, I assumed that the campaign was largely carried out by the Aussies and Kiwis. Reading this book, I was surprised to learn that the ANZACs were not even the main front in the Gallipoli Campaign though they did play an important part. (NOTE: When reading this book, I would highly recommend finding a good map of the area/battles. With a few exceptions, the maps in the book were not very good and you’ll be reading about a lot of crazy place names that won’t mean anything to you if you can’t see it on a map). Below is a synopsis of the key points in the book.

Peter Hart’s book pulls no punches stating on the very first page that the entire campaign was lunacy that was both pointless and doomed to failure (vii). The intent of the campaign was to gain control of the Dardanelles Straits and knock Turkey out of the war to relieve pressure on Russia and possibly convince the Balkan states to join the war on the side of the Allies. The campaign would prove to be a critical moment for two key figures of the 20th century: Winston Churchill, a proponent of the campaign who would spend 10 years in the political wilderness after its failure and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who would go on to become the founder of the Republic of Turkey (viii).

The slaughter in the trenches led to division in the British Government over the efficacy of committing all their strength to the Western Front. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty in particular sought potential ways the Royal Navy could be used to achieve victory. In early 1915, the Russians asked for a naval demonstration against Turks. Churchill (among others) used this opening to propose a naval campaign to the War Council. Lacking any serious opposition to Churchill’s persuasive oratory, events were set in motion for a naval campaign that seemed to gain a life of their own despite the fact that the Russians shortly thereafter effectively destroyed the Turkish IX Corps thereby limiting Turkey to a defensive role for the rest of the war (16-18).

The senior admirals of the Royal Navy questioned the initial plans and the sanity of ships attempting to conquer territory with a handful of marine battalions. Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, opened Pandora’s box by promising troops for later stages of the campaign if necessary (23). Kitchener, a soldier famous for his success in Sudan, feared that an embarrassing showing in the Dardanelles might inspire a revolt in India, Egypt or other overseas territories. After a failed naval engagement in the Straights, troops from across the Empire were quickly assembled for a campaign. These forces from England, Australian, New Zealand, and India had next to no training or military experience and were short of artillery and ammunition (arguably the key variable to success or failure of military campaigns in WWI) (55-56).

The commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was General Sir Ian Hamilton. In making his campaign plans he wanted to land his entire force in one location to achieve mass effect on his primary objective (the Kilid Bahr plateau) but decided against it fearing his men and stores could not effectively be put ashore in one cramped location. According to the author, this was a fatal decision (67). At the same time he also repeatedly conveys that it wouldn’t have mattered because even if the plateau/straights had been captured it would not have any strategic impact on the war. Instead, he landed his forces at multiple points/beaches along the peninsula (French forces would land on the Asiatic side of the straights, the British would land at V, W, X and Y beaches at Helles (the tip of the peninsula), and the ANZACs would land at Z beach on the northeastern side of the peninsula.

The ANZACs landing on 25 April was designed to push across the peninsula and cut off Turkish Communications to the forces fighting the British at Helles. Unfortunately, the ANZACs proved unable to capture the high ground surrounding their landing sight and remained stuck on their shallow bridgehead for the next eight months (118). The British landing on 25 April spanned five different beaches (V, W, X, S, and Y). The author delves into each concluding that the physical separation between these beaches coupled with the total lack of coordination meant that each was its own separate battle where success in one had little or no impact on the campaign but a failure impacted everywhere (121). The French landing at Kum Hale (on the Asiatic side of the straight) was conducted to suppress any potential Turkish batteries from firing on the main British landing force at Helles (170).
Just like the Western Front, after the initial waves of attacks the campaign stalled and devolved into trench warfare where interlocking fields of fire created a veritable No Man’s Land where anything that moved was mowed down. Fallen bodies filled the air with the stench of death. At one point, early in the campaign the ANZACs and Turks actually agreed to a brief armistice to bury all the bodies (194), something that would prove impossible later in the campaign.

At Helles, the “real fight for Gallipoli” according to the author, trench warfare proved every bit as hellish as at the Western Front. Unfortunately, the BEF had the additional challenges of being completely reliant on a 700 (from Egypt) to 2,000 (from UK) mile supply chain as well as a shortage of both artillery pieces and shells (a crisis that enveloped the entire British Empire in 1915 because of their heavy engagement on the Western Front). Advancing men toward the enemy trenches proved impossible without the support of massed firepower from artillery. Fortunately the Turks were in much the same predicament with poor artillery pieces and a shortage of ammunition (223). As No Man’s Land filled with putrefying bodies, swarms of flies inevitably followed making life all the more hellish for the living. They immediately covered any food or drink and with them came disease as they bred in the open latrines. So far from home and unable to leave the trenches without being shot, latrine discipline essentially disappeared and hygiene became nonexistent (229). Lice bred uncontrollably. Dysentery, paratyphoid, and other diseases ran wild through the trenches weakening and killing countless men.

As the campaign stalled, the War Council met on 14 May to decide what course of action to take. Kitchener was vehemently against any idea of evacuation fearing it would weaken British prestige across the Muslim world (236). During this time, the ammunition crisis and death toll on the Western Front led to the fall of Britain’s Liberal government. The First Coalition Government was formed amidst the fallout and the War Council was reorganized as the Dardanelles Committee which met on 7 June determined that something had to give (253). They decided to assign the newly formed 10th, 11th, and 13th Divisions (all freshly recruited and inexperienced) to the Gallipoli campaign in hopes of making a breakthrough. It would prove pointless, with both sides fighting for the sake of fighting, devoid of any coherent strategy (291). The futile attacks ground to a halt by 13 August when Helles was clearly locked in a stalemate and the focus shifted to an attempted breakout at Anzac.

The proposed breakout from Anzac was the centerpiece of the August Offensive and the last chance for the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 (292). The offensive was once again, overly complex with night attacks in unfamiliar terrain, multiple diversionary battles, and multiple parallel objectives to be captured by unrealistic timelines. In the end, the breakout would prove a failure with the 4 day battle costing the ANZAC corps 12,500 men (roughly 33% of their total force). In addition to the ANZAC breakout, the British IX Corps landed to the north of Anzac at Suvla Bay to establish a safe harbor and base for combined Suvla-Anzac operations. This would also prove a failure. The IX Corps was thrown into battle long before it was ready, with incompetent commanders and preposterously optimistic plans which seemed to ignore the possibility of stiff Turkish resistance (a lesson they repeatedly failed to learn over the course of the last 4 months) (367). Long after it became obvious that victory was impossible, the British pressed for one final attack out of Suvla for insignificant objectives with little chance of effecting the outcome of the campaign.

On 14 October, General Sir Ian Hamilton was dismissed and replaced by Sir Charles Monro, a hard man and veteran of the Boer War (396-397). His initial assessment of their situation on the ground was bleak. They held only a mere fringe of coastline overlooked by Turks holding the high ground and their beaches (and only source of resupply) were exposed to accurate artillery fire. The Turks had built up significant defensive fortifications that eliminated any chance of successful offensive operations (398). This news did not sit well in England and Kitchener himself took a three day tour of the Peninsula and was shocked at the conditions he saw and had no choice but to agree with Monro’s assessment (401). While everyone recognized the need to evacuate the British Cabinet prevaricated and the men in the field paid the price as brutal “General Winter” marched across Gallipoli.

In October, Bulgaria joined the Central powers which made it easier for modern heavy artillery to be brought to Gallipoli. This significantly changed the strategic situation as it eliminated any existing Allied safe areas previously inaccessible to the older Turkish artillery. Still the government continued to dither into December when the French finally stated that they could not afford to surrender the Salonika front and were prepared to evacuate Gallipoli. While the consensus now favored evacuation, it remained a dangerous proposition. Retreat on land, with room to maneuver has always been dangerous, but to retire every soldier, artillery piece, and all your stores into small craft on a beach which is under the enemy’s guns could result in a slaughter. Fortunately, the British and ANZACs executed the operations brilliantly. Long periods of quiet and reduced artillery exchanges were introduced which thoroughly confused the Turks who thought it a trap or a trick. Using this method, the Allies successfully evacuated Anzac and Suvla and then repeated the successful withdrawal at Helles.

The author concludes the book by discussing many of the popular myths that have sprung up around the campaign. He discusses the popular Australian myth that the ANZACs were at the center of the campaign (they really played a secondary role) as well as the more pernicious British myth built upon their boastful assumption of racial superiority (453). Long after the battle the British generals continued to proclaim the landings at Gallipoli as a brilliant military achievement of the highest order that was only turned back by overwhelming numbers/odds. The author then argues this was hardly the case, that the British repeatedly overestimated the size of the Turkish army and underestimated their military skill.

[Matthew Ansley · Rating 5 out of 5]

From the perspective of a casual fan of history, this was an incredible journey through the stages of a massive war effort and a very insightful perspective of both day-to-day operations from Generals and War Councils to the hard and humanity painted lives of boots on the front lines.

This is the first and only history I’ve read to date, and I found Peter Hart’s voice and sources very compelling and easy to follow. While some may criticize his use of journals and first-hand accounts, these were the most engaging aspects that kept me around.

Hart does an incredible job handling the tragedy and heroism of the people involved, while enthusiastically exposing the foolishness and dilutions of those responsible for the Gallipoli campaign at every given opportunity. The human element of war is front and centre. This book is filled with many moving and infuriating accounts.

I highly recommend this book. The perspectives I’ve walked away with are both intimate and broad; with a greater understanding of the logistics, biases, struggles, and triumphs that define this failure of a campaign and waste of lives that plague so many aspects of The Great War.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent book and well researched

[PJ · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gallipoli by Peter Hart is a raw, unflinching examination of one of the most infamous campaigns of World War I. If you’re expecting a romanticized tale of heroism, this book is not here to sugarcoat things. Hart dives deep into the harsh realities of the Gallipoli campaign, peeling back the layers of myth and propaganda to reveal the brutal truth: it was a disaster of planning, execution, and sheer human cost.

Hart’s style is incredibly detailed, with a clear focus on balancing the big-picture strategy with the personal experiences of soldiers on the ground. He doesn’t just stick to the British perspective, either—he brings in voices from the ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps), the French, and the Ottoman Turks, giving the narrative a well-rounded and deeply human feel. You’re not just reading about military maneuvers; you’re right there in the trenches, feeling the heat, the fear, and the frustration of troops caught in a seemingly unwinnable situation.

One of the standout aspects of the book is Hart’s ability to cut through the romanticism often attached to Gallipoli. He doesn’t shy away from calling out poor leadership, particularly from figures like General Sir Ian Hamilton, and he highlights just how ill-conceived the campaign was from the start. From logistical nightmares to underestimating the Ottoman resistance, Hart lays bare the catastrophic missteps that turned Gallipoli into a bloodbath. But he also gives credit where it’s due, particularly to the Ottoman forces, whose determination and strategy were key to their victory.

The pacing can be a bit dense at times, especially when Hart delves into the minutiae of military tactics and political decision-making. If you’re not a hardcore military history buff, some sections might feel like wading through molasses. But the soldier accounts—letters, diaries, and firsthand testimonies—are where this book absolutely shines. They add a deeply emotional layer that makes the horror of Gallipoli hit home.

Critiques? Well, Hart’s no-nonsense tone might come across as overly harsh to readers who are more attached to the traditional narratives of Gallipoli as a tale of bravery and sacrifice. He’s not here to glorify anyone, which might rub some the wrong way. Also, while the inclusion of multiple perspectives is a strength, the sheer amount of detail can be overwhelming at times. It’s not exactly light reading.

Gallipoli by Peter Hart is a sobering, meticulously researched account that cuts through the myths to deliver an unvarnished look at one of WWI’s most tragic campaigns. It’s not an easy read, but it’s an important one, especially if you’re looking to understand the human cost of war beyond the headlines.

[David Warner · Rating 5 out of 5]

In a book of around 500 pages, using testimony from the letters, diaries, and memoirs of participants, Peter Hart successfully supports the bold assertion made in the opening to his Preface: "Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that could never have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking." But in this history of the campaign there is no muddled thinking, instead a clear sighted and well argued case for explaining the disaster of the 1915 Gallipoli campaign as a product of serious strategic error, poor tactical leadership, and insurmountable logistic difficulties, particularly due to a insufficiency of artillery and high explosive munitions.
The defeat at Gallipoli of the British imperial and French forces, despite the tremendous courage and ingenuity of the often woefully unprepared men sent to fight it, was ultimately due to a complete failure of a political and military high command that embarked on a campaign with poor preparation and insufficient material in pursuit of a nonsensical strategic objective whose achievement, even if attained, would not have been sufficient, despite its high cost, to bring about victory against the Central Powers. The author, although primarily an historian of the eastern campaigns, is quite rightly a Westerner at heart, believing that the outcome of the Great War could only have been determined on the Western Front, and that all military objectives should have been focused on that object. Gallipoli was not just a sideshow, but by drawing resources from the Western Front it also weakened the British strategic position there and did so without degrading the capability of the enemy.
The thinking behind Gallipoli was deceptively simple. By forcing the Dardanelles, a naval force could approach Constantinople and through bombardment knock Turkey out of the war, thus relieving pressure on the Russians, so freeing up forces to attack Germany in the East, thereby forcing her to divert precious resources from the West where the British and French armies were increasing in size in preparation for coordinated attacks. It being the case, as shown at the end of 1914, that naval forces alone could not force the Dardanelles, it would be necessary to deploy land forces to overcome the Turkish land defences and deny them the capability of harassing the naval task force as it entered the narrows on its approach to Constantinople. Therefore, originally, the Gallipoli campaign was conceived in terms of military support for a naval operation, with the Gallipoli peninsula chosen as the site of land operations over the Asiatic coast for tactical and operational reasons.
However, before its very inception the primary strategic justification for the campaign had been removed after the Russians had comprehensively defeated Turkish armies to their south and secured the Caucuses, neutralising the Turkish threat to Russia. And yet, the landings on 25 April 1915 still went ahead. Why? The short answer is the imagination and determination of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, an Easterner to his bones, who with most of British naval forces tied up in the North Sea watching for a German High Seas breakout, saw an opportunity to deploy British Mediterranean naval assets, and the men of the newly formed Royal Naval Division, in a coup de main operation which would attack the Central Powers in their supposedly weaker rear and provide a short cut around the stalemate on the Western Front and the stand off in the North Sea. Unfortunately, while this was superficially attractive, it was strategic nonsense, a product of public school romanticism, and operationally impracticable.
But, Churchill did not act alone. That what was originally designed as a primarily naval campaign metastasised into a large scale military campaign with half a million men in the Allied armies was due to the failures of the politicians and military leaders to question Churchill's optimistic assumptions and to undertake the proper intelligence gathering and planning necessary, which would have revealed that operations on the Gallipoli peninsula to have any chance of success would require the allocation of resources greater than could be supplied if the position on the Western Front was to be maintained. And that is even without considering whether a forcing of the Dardanelles would bring about a Turkish surrender or whether a naval force at the top of the channel would be vulnerable to counter attack and being cut off. In this, Admiral Sir John Fisher, the normally clear sighted First Sea Lord, and Lord Kitchener, the War Secretary, were particularly deficient in allowing themselves to be diverted by Churchill from their primary objectives, respectively the bringing to battle and defeat of the German High Seas Fleet and the building up of the British Expeditionary Force in preparation for large scale offensive actions. These men should have stopped Gallipoli at its conception, rather than acquiescing in a campaign in which they had little faith and which was a diversion from their main focus, but both, along with their colleagues in the war committees, succumbed to Churchill's ebullient optimism and embarked upon a gamble whose weak premise and sketchy planning should have alerted them to its dangers.
And so, with poor planning and overly optimistic aims, Gallipoli went ahead under the leadership of Sir Ian Hamilton, whose plans for multiple landings and diversions were overly complicated and who commanded a force insufficient for the task, which included too many divisional, brigade, and staff officers who were not up to the job. Hamilton cannot be blamed for the decision to attack Gallipoli, and whatever the flaws in his plans it is unlikely any landings, even if locally successful, would have delivered the quick victory against stronger than expected and determined Turkish troops, but he is grossly at fault for continuing with his plans once it became quickly apparent that neither the British at Hellas nor the Australians and New Zealanders at Anzac would be able to achieve their initial objectives, would remain hemmed in in front of their beachheads, and would not be able to advance so as to meet up and take control of the peninsula, the ultimate tactical aim of operations. Gallipoli was bound to fail strategically, but because of its inadequate forces, poor planning and logistical weakness, the initial operations of 25 to 27 April proved that it would also be a tactical failure, and at this point Hamilton should have reassessed and withdrawn. Early on, as field officers, particularly at Anzac, reported that their initial objectives were beyond reach, Hamilton was presented with the choice as to whether to re-embark his forces before the Turks could reinforce their defences or to continue and reinforce the landings in the hope that local breakthroughs could be achieved sufficient to change the tactical balance in the British favour. Sadly, he chose the latter, more politically acceptable option, and Gallipoli descended into a gruelling stalemate where the original grand tactical objectives of securing the peninsula gave way to meaningless small scale operations which at heavy cost to both sides had no tangible effect upon the military situation.
Twice Hamilton tried through the application of additional forces, firstly in the south at Hellas in multiple offensives, and then in August at Anzac and through the new landings at Suvla to bring about breakthroughs, but, again, as in the original landings in April, through ridiculous optimism, poor staff work and incompetent local commanders little was achieved and through a lack of initiative in general officers local victories were not exploited, as cautious officers went too soon on the defensive against defences whose strength they overestimated. All Hamilton achieved was to throw more men into the slaughter and to draw more resources into theatre that could be better employed in Flanders, as he reinforced defeat in battles even less successful than the original invasion. To the last, Hamilton remained convinced that victory was possible, and yet his successor within a few days of arrival had concluded that it was not and had recommended evacuation, which was then superbly executed, as Hart excellently tells. The tragedy is that the withdrawal when it came in December was eight months too late.
Gallipoli was an unnecessary disaster. It was a strategic error and a badly executed operation that had no chance of success, and even if tactical objectives had been attained it is unlikely it would have altered the strategic situation. Turkey was not the key to unlocking the door to victory, but to romantic minds educated in a classical tradition, notions of campaigns in plains and hills not far from Troy provided an illusion attractive to politicians and military planners brought up in the nineteenth century and imbued with a spirit of gentleman amateurism that was yet through harsh experience to give way to the professionalism which would bring victory in November 1918. The meaningless of the tragedy of Gallipoli is revealed by the British defeat producing no effect upon the outcome of the War, so that in spite of their determined victory in 1915 the Turks still succumbed to total defeat in 1918, as much as anything because of the outcome on the Western Front where the Great War was actually won and lost.
In this splendid, well written popular history Peter Hart provides a fine telling of the horrors of the Gallipoli campaign and in so doing serves up a strong indictment of the old men in Whitehall who sent thousands of young men to die for little reason in pursuit of unobtainable objectives and for no practicable strategic advantage. Gallipoli, indeed, was lunacy.

[Austin Wilson · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very intriguing collection of diary entries and mountains of info regarding the Gallipoli campaign in WW1. It is a must read for whoever is interested in learning more about this theatre of the War.

[Edward Sullivan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoroughly detailed, vividly written chronicle of the disastrous World War I campaign, written by the Oral Historian with the Imperial War Museum.

[David Evans · Rating 5 out of 5]

A searing detailed history and analysis of the disaster of Gallipoli in 1915. This is illustrated by contemporaneous accounts of those involved including British, French, Australian, New Zealand, Indian, Turkish and German combatants, from those in high command to the rawest private soldiers. The whole stupidity and futility of the campaign is laid bare; the blunders that led to unimaginably high casualty rates and the hubris of planners and politicians who could not and would not see that the project was doomed from the start.
And yet the very word Gallipoli holds an immense fascination as an example as an enormity that, unfortunately, continues to be repeated. We are better men (I don’t remember any women’s experiences being recorded except in haunting letters sent to widows), better equipped and right is on our side. You are wrong and will not fight hard. Peter Hart draws his conclusions that the war against Germany could only be won on the western front by skilled professional soldiers using modern tactics which start and end with immensely powerful accurate artillery fire. This was put in jeopardy’s by this sort of “side-show”. That’s it.
I’m off to the Dardanelles to explore the battlefields this year. I expect to cry. A lot.

[Lance · Rating 4 out of 5]

Extremely comprehensive and detailed look into the doomed Gallipoli campaign. I have read Hart before and enjoy his writing style with lots of embedded I’m quotations. Hart does a great job of laying out the facts of the campaign and recognizing those who are typically forgotten. I was particularly surprised by the amount of French involvement in the campaign, and just how long and hopeless the campaign was. Gallipoli truly was a disastrous plan, and I am glad to see historical literature reflecting that after so many years of ignoring its failures. While it is a defining moment for the ANZACs and the Turks it was like many other campaigns of ww1, Poorly planned, poorly led, and poorly executed by troops with rushed training. The soldiers were brave and by the end of the war were efficient veterans, but in 1915 they were rookies being led to their doom by an overly confident high command. Gallipoli truly is a study in how not to conduct warfare.

[Adam · Rating 1 out of 5]

Unfortunately, I think this one's going to be a "did not finish" for me. I've tried, but there's just no real narrative flow to the book with how incessantly the author breaks the flow of things with first-hand quotes. I'm really interested in the stance the author has taken, and I think first-hand accounts can be really beneficial to a story such as this, but it's just so over the top and I can't keep track of anything. It's less a book by a historian and more a collection of first-hand accounts with a narrator connecting them together, and that's valid but it just doesn't work for me. I can't keep track of who's being quoted, the quotes blend together, sometimes they start at the top of a page and I'll start reading a quote and not even realize I've transitioned into one at first, etc. It's sad, but I'm putting this one down for now.

[Josiah DeGraaf · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a very thorough book, and one should not take my three star rating as a sign that it was poorly-written. Just an acknowledgement that, as a lay reader, this book was a bit overly detailed for my tastes. I did appreciate the meticulous research and primary sources quoted in this historical account, even if they contributed to the granular details that sometimes made the book feel like a slog. I also very much appreciated the conclusion that tied a lot of disparate ends together.

As a whole: probably not the best book for the lay reader, but if you want a comprehensive, in-depth look at what happened at Gallipoli, this book should be right up your alley!

Rating: 3.5 Stars (Good).

[Eleanor · Rating 2 out of 5]

Sadly a DNF for me. I wanted to finish especially as the author is scathing in his attack against the bumbling idiots that devised the campaign, so we are definitely on the same side, but the narrative is not cohesively written due to constant blocks of text which make up the first hand accounts. It was incredibly frustrating, and had to quit a couple of chapters in. There is a lot of information and if the accounts had been properly weaved into the narrative, I feel this book would be hard to put down. I am giving 2 stars simply due to the vast amount of information, but no more due to the incredibly difficult time I had getting to p.45.

[Jon B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

You know that you are a nerd, a dork, a geek, a whatever when you have a favorite historian. Peter Hart is my favorite historian. With a trained eye and an encyclopedic knowledge about WW1, not to mention the élan he brings to the written word (and his and Gary's podcast? Forget about it). He is not shy in calling out blunders made by the combatants on either side, and mixes in 1st person statements to bring in historical support when needed.

[Luke Rogers · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is incredibly detailed and provides a comprehensive analysis of the Gallipoli campaign and a worthy read for anyone interested in this topic.

My major criticism of the book is the amount of first hand accounts that are provided. I find it upsets the flow of the book and is difficult to read because of this; I often end up losing track of the different people providing accounts throughout a chapter, haveing to re-read many passages to really comprehend them.

[Stephen Mc · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was inspired to read more about this campaign when talking to my mother her father Edward Challoner was a stretcher bearer at Gallipoli.This book is a long haul but gives you all you need to know about this crazy and wasteful adventure .Initiated by Churchill.The follies of man and war in general also of the british class system are very much in evidence.

[Bill Potter · Rating 2 out of 5]

A book from the soldiers point of view. As a result it loses perspective. One can seem lost with the individual stories as you never really know where an event occurred or its importance in the overall battle

[Jordan Ghiglia · Rating 4 out of 5]

An analytical look at the complex tapestry of failures, logistical and strategic, that doomed the Gallipoli campaign from the start. Hart writes with authority from first hand accounts and weaves together a narrative of tragedy.

[Devrim Peköz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Daha çok, düşman askerlerinin anılarına yer verilerek düşman tarafında yaşanan olaylara yer verilmiş; tarafsız bir gözle yazılmış; anlatımı güzel olan bir kitap.

[Ted Haussman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid account of the Gallipoli campaign that relies extensively on memoirs of soldiers who served — on both sides. While the book has a smattering of maps, it could have benefitted with more.

[Mark Morgan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very good book covering all aspects of the Gallipoli campaign from start to finish. Exploding a few myths as well. Well written and easy to read. Highly recommended!