Poor Fritz Sauckel, the Third Reich’s conscript labor organizer. He was short, bald, uneducated and from a working class background, and he persisted in making things even worse by keeping the toothbrush moustache he wore in homage to his Fuehrer. Furthermore, he only scored 116 on his jailers’ IQ test, third-lowest of the Nuremberg 23. Worst of all, he had no real idea what a “western” trial consisted of (neither did some of the trial officials, but that is another story). In contrast, Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect and, far worse, German production czar, was handsome, polished, fluent in several languages, and knew exactly what was happening to him and had a pretty good idea what he had to do to avoid the noose. The problem here, as Persico notes (photo caption): “A key trial issue: who was guiltier, Sauckel the slave trader or Speer the slave driver?”
As you can see from the caption quoted above, Persico is refreshingly immune to Speer’s charms, and I for one find that admirable because I have just finished Speer’s “Inside the Third Reich” and “Nuremberg Diary” and I fear I might have had the same problem so many of the justices and staff did at Nuremberg in ’46, for Speer can be a very appealing figure. He was a repentant breast-beater of the most suave and sympathetic sort; he never groveled, was always dignified, articulate, and seemingly unambiguous in his willingness to assume responsibility for the horrors he did so much to perpetuate. And yet as Persico shrewdly outlines, Speer was first and foremost interested in saving his own neck and since judges and lawyers are by definition “professional” men, he knew how to push the buttons of his class. It was masterfully done. Sauckel didn’t have a chance. And yet there were some doubts:
“During the deliberations over Sauckel, Sir Norman Birkett observed that of course the man was a boor; but should one hand for lack of breeding? Speer’s fate sparked a more fierce (sic?) debate. Francis Biddle was deeply troubled by Speer. He read from an analysis that Butch Fisher had prepared: “Sauckel had never had responsibility for any major policy decisions, but was always used to execute policies which had been decided on by more powerful men such as Goring and Speer.” Furthermore, Speer acted with “complete ruthlessness and unfeeling efficiency in the application of a program which took five million into slave labor and countless numbers to their death.” Speer always got his way over Sauckel, Fisher’s analysis went on. “The violence used in recruiting was largely in response to Speer’s high labor demands.” Biddle set the paper aside. There was no doubt in his mind. Speer’s penalty must be death. Nikitchenko immediately concurred. Only one more vote was needed…” (pp. 392-393)
Speer didn’t get the vote, served 20 years in Spandau Prison, and died in 1981 in London, on his way to be on some TV show or another, in a hotel with his mistress. Postmortem photos of nasty old Fritz Sauckel right after the US Army’s botched hanging can be seen on Wikipedia, his little Hitlerian toothbrush moustache still decorating his dead upper lip. Justice was served, but to what extent?
***
There is a lot of debate over whether or not the Nuremberg Trials were valid, if they set a good or bad example for handling crimes against humanity, etc. I won’t go into that too much here - if only because I am somewhat unsure of this myself. But as for how the trial was handled in terms of basic competence, there was a lot to be desired. The chief prosecutor, US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson had spent too many years on the bench to be an effective or even competent lawyer. His cross-examinations (especially of Speer) were appalling - the Europeans (especially the British) were astonished by how incompetent he was. What Jackson was good at - at least by the standards of the day - was high-flown courtroom rhetoric. In this he was considered a success at the time, but reading the excerpts provided by Persico it is hard to see it being much more than an ambitious judge angling for a legacy using an antique Daniel Webster-Atticus Finch approach; many would’ve preferred a vivisection of Albert Speer based on evidence.
Beyond Jackson’s bloviating failures and lack of organization, the entire effort was plagued by a constant turnover based on military “points” and general string-pulling. Administratively, tons of documents and testimony had to be processed by what amounted to a bunch of temps. Some of the temps were brilliant, some not so much. As for the lawyers, lots and lots of youngsters clamored for a chance to be a part of history (and to thereby launch their careers as civilians) and their lack of experience sometimes showed painfully. Persico does a fine job pointing out this stuff, although I blipped over a lot of it, the grinding mill of justice being, well, a grind.
There were frantic little professional hithers and thithers among the psychiatrists as well. Head-shrinking a Nazi bigwig was a real career-maker and all the usual sucking-up and tiny betrayals ensued; Gus Gilbert’s naked career ambitions are particularly egregious. Some of this psychiatry seems pretty obsolete now (Freudian analysis, you know) and some of it bordered on the obstruction of (or meddling with) justice (all those in-depth bouts of the talking-cure). A study on how the shrinks influenced the weaker defendants would be interesting. I will give them credit for one thing though: they published everybody’s IQ and Speer, for all his sophistication, came off near the bottom of the list. Cruel, yes, but the creep deserved it (Wikipedia has a chart of the IQ results in their Nuremberg Trials article).
The jailer’s aspect to the Nuremberg trials makes for an interesting case in itself. The security was, by the standards of the day, tight. But three of the prisoners committed suicide, including Robert Ley (strangled himself while seated on the toilet) and, famously, Herman Goering, who poisoned himself. This is not exactly a brilliant record, despite considerable resources devoted to the preservation of the evil doers. The head jailer was Colonel Bert Andrus, a figure who somehow manages to be only occasionally ridiculous despite his best efforts to be ridiculous all the time. He is perhaps the last high-profile US Army officer to carry a riding crop, and he had his helmet liner lacquered just like General Patton’s. He was a bit of a martinet, and yet he was conscientious and rather shrewd. It is hard not to be amused by his tough-guy self-regard; here is Andrus describing Herman Goering as a fresh fish:
"When Goering came to me at Mondorf, he was a simpering slob with two suitcases full of paracodeine. I thought he was a drug salesman. But we took him off his dope and made a man of him.” (Gilbert’s Nuremberg Diary, page 11).
Unfortunately, a drug-free Goering proved to be a nightmare for the Tribunal, since he was a master of manipulation, capable of apparently overwhelming charm (I know, hard to believe) and was smarter than most of the people trying to hang him. A drug-free Goering was a lot smarter than his jailer too, since despite the elaborate precautions taken after Ley garroted himself, Goering managed to commit suicide. Apparently, Goering managed to charm Lt. Jack G. “Tex” Wheelis with flattery and corny Nazi-porn autographed souvenirs many of the US guards craved. Wheelis went soft on Goering and this is apparently how Goering retrieved his last vial of poison from his luggage (he very shrewdly hid two others that could be easily (but not too easily) found when he was first arrested). The book even features a photo of Lt. Tex with Goering and Persico examines this situation in an appendix, which doesn’t prove Wheelis’ complicity so much as it suggests his gullibility and an overall laxness in security despite Andrus’ spit-n-polish harangues. In Andrus’s defense, his guard staff suffered from the same ridiculously high level of turnover that the legal staff did; again, the Army’s “point” system at work, combined with the fact the men sent to him were sometimes the rejects from other units and the fact that everybody just wanted to go home in 1946.
Finally (and I mean finally), the last instance of Allied incompetence came during the executions. As for the “botched” US Army hanging of Fritz Sauckel noted above, it appears that Sgt. John Woods, despite claims of being an expert hangman, made a real mess of things, miscalculating drops, getting knots wrong and whatever else goes into making an inept hangman. Some of the Nazis strangled (time elapsed before death was pronounced for Ribbentrop was 17 minutes, for Keitel 18 minutes). As awful as this is, the fact the US Army did not have a competent hangman in its ranks at the end of World War II is something all Americans can be proud of, since many of the other combatants were all too good at such things.
***
The book deals with both the judicial proceedings and the personalities and crimes of the accused. It is the latter that interested me most, since legal proceedings are almost by definition characterized by long stretches of incredibly boring procedure. To Persico’s credit he keeps the judges and lawyers from putting me to sleep the way they did Rudolph Hess. Repellent as they are, the Nazi defendants were a pretty interesting bunch. Goering dominated them to various degrees, attempting to mount some sort of unified defense of Nazism. This seemed to be an exercise in warped legacy-mongering since he knew he wasn’t going to escape the noose (although he did, kind of). His constant needling of the weaker defendants was a constant problem for the jailers, who finally had to resort to segregating him from the other prisoners. Goering’s courtroom performance was sometimes masterful, since he seemed both smarter and better prepared than some of his prosecutors. He was also well aware of US-Soviet tensions and made efforts to exploit them. Horrible to behold, but rather interesting to read about.
Speer infuriated Goering with is seemingly frank admission of guilt and responsibility. Goering saw this as hypocrisy of the highest order, and an outright betrayal by a guy who perhaps more than anyone benefited from Hitler’s friendship (if that’s the word). But Speer thought there was a hope of saving his skin, so he struck out on his own. His shrewd sophistries are interesting to follow; take responsibility and admit guilt, but don’t cringe or find the Lord (the way Frank did). Don’t hide behind “duty” the way the military guys did. Only when desperate did Speer pretend he wasn’t aware of what was going on. There is considerable evidence that he visited a concentration camp, something he vigorously denied in order to maintain that he had no idea where Fritz Saukel scrounged up all those workers. My guess is that Speer, like many of the other high-ranking Nazis (including, astonishingly enough, Hitler) did not leave much of a paper trail on purpose. This proved to have been a shrewd move at Nuremberg.
The military men presented a special problem for the Tribunal. The Kreigsmarine (Navy) was being indicted, basically, for submarine warfare, a branch of service not unfamiliar to the Allies, which is why Raeder and Doenitz didn’t hang (and despite the fact Doenitz was Hitler’s hand-picked successor!). But Hitler’s two HQ guys on the ground Keitel and Jodl both got the noose. They are an interesting pair; nobody respected Keitel, who was known for nodding in agreement so much he was called “Hitler’s donkey.” Jodl played the taciturn straight-man to Keitel’s clown, but to keep his job he had to be every bit as obsequious - he was just cooler about it. There was a lot of attempts to blame the military for execution of POW’s that were pretty easy to prove (especially for Soviet POW’s) but outrageously, Stalin insisted that the Katyn Massacre of the Polish officer corps be pinned on the Nazis as well. Everybody knew the Soviets did it, and the audacity of the Soviet intransigence embarrassed virtually everybody on the bench. But there was still plenty to hang Keitel and Jodl, if only because they both knew about the Final Solution and its attendant atrocities (mass starvation of Soviet POWs, slavery, etc.). And yet many in the military had an uneasy feeling about their death sentences, if only because it does seem that being out to sea in a literal sense was also considered the same thing as being out to sea in the metaphorical sense. In one of the stranger episodes of World War II, US Admiral Chester Nimitz, fresh from his victories in the Pacific answered interrogatories about unrestricted submarine warfare that boiled down to an acknowledgement that the good guys did it too. His testimony may have been what was needed to save the necks of both Admirals Raeder and Doenitz.
Then there are the thugs, weirdos and dopes. Saukel (who was apparently for all his shortcomings, an energetic and effective procurer of slaves) was whiney, panicky and clueless in jail. The repellent Julius Streicher (Anti-Semitic agitator and pornographer) was loathed by virtually everyone on either side of the dock at Nuremberg for everything from general nuttiness to personal hygiene (he apparently used to exercise in the nude then wash his face in the toilet afterwards, to the dismay of the guard who had to stand at the door watching him). The lugubrious Hans Frank who vigorously raped Poland and lived so opulently in his stolen castle that it was shocking even by Nazi standards underwent a desperate slob’s jailhouse born-again conversion to Christianity, which delighted the chaplain but disgusted just about everybody else. These guys, especially Streicher, were shunned by the other Nazis in a fashion familiar to anybody who went to middle school. Even Goering didn’t bother much with converting them after a while.
Then there were the failed Nazis, those guys from the early days who hung on, but had lost all their power through incompetence or general befuddlement: Alfred Rosenberg the Anti-Semitic theorist, unreadable scribbler, and failed administrator. Rudolph Hess, perhaps Hitler’s only unselfish true believer whose quixotic flight to England in 1941 led to decades in prison; he feigned insanity so long it appears that it finally became real. Walther Funk (out-maneuvered by Bormann and everyone else, basically drank himself through World War II). Joachim von Ribbentrop was Hitler’s Foreign Minister, universally thought of as a shallow, pompous, yet vicious fool. Of all the defendants, the fall of Hitler and his arrest seemed to truly unhinge Ribbentrop, who spent his last days in a pigsty of a jail cell thumbing through sheaves of scattered papers frantically but incoherently trying to figure out a way to save his skin. Everyone despised Ribbentrop, including Speer, but I am happy to report he scored one IQ point higher than Speer. These guys were low on the popularity scale as well, although again, Goering, the most popular kid on the playground, tried to enlist them into his schemes.
Wilhelm Frick (Minister of the Interior), Ernst Kaltenbrunner (highest-ranking SS guy) and Arthur Seyss-Inquart (helped implement the Austrian Anschluss, then ruled over the Netherlands, which he ransacked and starved) were all to some extent the cool guys on the cell block. At least in that they didn’t engage in too may histrionics or desperate bids for innocence; they all seemed to know they were doomed. Seyss-Inquart did rediscover Catholicism, but didn’t flagellate himself in public about it. They all hanged.
There was a ragbag of other low-level or remaindered Nazis on trial mostly because the Soviets insisted on it. Handsome radio personality Hans Fritsche was on trial as a surrogate for Propaganda Czar Goebbels (and because he was one of the few ranking Nazis the Soviets captured; in 1945 everybody who was anybody in the Third Reich headed west towards the US or UK lines). Franz von Papen was an vile old political schemer who thought he could control Hitler after letting him have power; he basically didn’t have much to do with anything after about 1933. Konstantin von Neurath was Minister of Foreign Affairs before Ribbentrop, lost his job because he disagreed with Hitler back in 1938 before the war even started. Hjalmar Schacht (the economic genius who basically figured out how to fund the Nazis rise to power) also ran afoul of the Nazis (over economic not ideological matters) and was in a concentration camp at the end of the war (Ravensbrück and Dachau; something his lawyers made a lot of use of in his defense). Gustav Krupp was arrested for being son and heir to the “Guns of Krupp” armaments empire; his father was too ill to stand trial. His indictment was rejected by the judges, although he was tried later for slave labor, something pretty much all the factory owners of the Reich were involved with, I think. Your coffee maker might be a Krupp. Not that this makes it okay, but it is weird seeing all those BMWs and Volkswagens driving around sometimes. But I digress… These guys had a pretty good chance at a relatively modest jail sentence or even acquittal, so they shunned Goering and anybody else who was clearly going down. Unfortunately Persico doesn’t spend much time with these guys, which I suspect is a bit of a missed opportunity, the Banality of Evil’s middle management types being somewhat underreported.
***
This is a pretty engaging book despite being somewhat poorly written. Persico has a flinty journalist’s eye and a first class bullshit detector. Unfortunately, he writes in a kind of antique hardboiled journalist’s style left over from World War II that got so bad at one point I had to check the copyright page to make sure it wasn’t originally written in 1948. The other problem is that although he seems to have thoroughly researched everything, he indulges in interior monologues: “The “why” still gnawed at Gus Gilbert after every cell visit…” (p. 188). This sort of thing certainly gooses the narrative, but when reading I am constantly doubting the author’s omniscience: after “every” cell visit he was “gnawed” by this question? Yeah, sure he was.
Another problem is the way Persico works “the banality of evil” angle to death. Human beings, even Nazis, are all pretty much poor forked creatures once you strip off the jack boots and the villas and the stormtrooper body guard. Persico makes the annoying mistake of characterizing the defendants as being “nondescript” or worse - any group of middle-aged men of power and influence suddenly stripped of power, locked in a jail for months, wearing cast-off clothes and put under harsh lights, would look pretty sorry. General Jodl and General Eisenhower would be fairly indistinguishable in these circumstances. Even Patton would be just another pathetic old guy in the Nuremberg dock. By jeering at their appearance, Persico runs the risk of making them pitiable. They weren't.