The story of how a pandemic, driven in part by climate change, destroyed an empire and left Europe an appreciably worse place for centuries. I've had this book for 13 years, but ever since the Event obliged me to work in the room where it sits, it's been glaring at me. I dodged it in 2020 by tacking a different account of late antiquity instead, one which devoted less space to these millions of deaths than it did to the decor in a single church in Ravenna. But as we entered a second year of this shit, I couldn't really leave it any longer, and so here we are. First problem: it's not nearly as much about the plague as the title suggests. It's there in the opening...and then drops out of sight for half the book, in favour of an account of Justinian's reign. Rosen takes the line on Rome which I've always found most congenial, that whatever its undoubted flaws it was better than an awful lot of what followed, and in some respects we're still playing catch-up – though unlike me, he doesn't see the rot setting in as soon as Christianity was adopted. Accordingly, he has a lot of time for Justinian, making much of his being the last Roman emperor known as 'the Great'. And he points out that this was not someone born to the purple; he began as a Balkan peasant, and was married to a former teen courtesan – a level of social and geographical mobility far greater than one would generally expect in world leaders even when this book came out, let alone now. I was also taken with Justinian's pre-Justinian name, Petrus Sabbatius – wouldn't Peter Sabbath be a great name for an occult detective? As well as this big picture stuff, Rosen's also excellent at the snippets of gossip which bring the story alive, like what a dickhead neighbour one of the architects of Hagia Sophia could be, or exactly what sort of thing Empress Theodora was rumoured to get up to in her scandalous younger days (I was particularly taken by the bit about the goose – chastity was never an option). Here too is Galimer, the Vandal king, holed up in his last redoubt, "composing an ode bemoaning his lack of a sponge". And in all those frankly excessive descriptions of Ravenna's ecclesiastical art in that other late antiquity book, I don't remember anything half so eyecatching as the bit here about "the pictorial Jesus – nude, in water up to his waist, but with his procreative equipment quite visible".
While Rosen has more sense than to force cheesy contemporary parallels, he's not afraid of drawing a broader point when one legitimately applies. So, regarding the successes of Justinian's great general Belisarius, we get "Virtually the entire library of tactics, as set down in classics from Sun Tzu to Liddell Hart, consists of ornate descriptions of the best way to apply force - clubs, arrows, or .50 machine-gun bullets - from your front to your enemies' flank." Which, yes, sums it up pretty well. Equally, when he points out that Belisarius' preferred army, armoured men on armoured horses, is the beginning of the knight in European warfare - even if the stirrup was not yet a thing, meaning lances held otherwise, and considerably less useful, than would later be the case. And if that seems like a weird presentiment of the mediaeval in the ancient world, another of the generals, the eunuch Narses, is eight centuries ahead of his time at the battle of Taginae, where he annihilates heavy cavalry with dismounted pikemen supported by missile artillery. Although he had a slight advantage in that his adversary, Totila, told his Ostrogoth cavalry to use only lances, no swords or bows, for reasons which remain unclear but probably involve a heavy dose of macho bullshit. Other, less glorious representatives of the Roman military sound like they'd be more at home in a sitcom version. Chilbudius just for the name, which makes him sounds like an affable stoner from Asterix. John the Sanguinary for the name too, but also for the way he's forever getting distracted from missions by trying to marry people, to the extent that at one point he ends up with his former fiancee as his mother-in-law. And lest it all sound too much like a sausage party, aside from Theodora there's her good friend, Belisarius' wife Antonina - who "disdained the merit of conjugal fidelity" but was recognised as an all-round smart person and good commander in her own right. Again demonstrating the social mobility of the time, she was the daughter of a charioteer and a prostitute, and she gets into a quite spectacularly fruity liaison with her stepson which leads to shenanigans and dismemberment. Granted, Rosen expresses scepticism about whether Procopius can be trusted on this, but surely if recent years have taught us anything, it's that the most batshit accounts of what the ruling classes are up to are exactly the ones to believe.
In other words, this has an awful lot of the stuff I enjoy in a history book, stuff you want to pass on to people. Even the gratifying bit where a pro will admit that yes, sometimes history can be ridiculously confusing, as when Constantine names his three sons Constantine, Constantius and Constans (something which does absolutely nothing to improve my opinion of the emperor whose conversion basically ruined Rome and the civilisations which would follow it). Equally, Rosen can offer a way in to material which can easily alienate, such as the era's interminable theological debates and how seriously they were taken. He offers the illuminating analogy to early twentieth century Bolshevism – and is good in general on how faith really mattered to them, including the tiny niceties which even the other monotheisms aren't fussed about in the same way, abstractions regarding the nature of the divine essence or whatever – which Rosen suggests stems from Christianity's central paradox, "reconciling the suffering death of an omnipotent god". Set against which, despite the purges, the orthodoxy, turning synagogues into churches, even theologians would still invoke Deplhic oracles or Dame Fortune without anyone batting an eyelid, much less building a pyre. Building on that, Rosen can show the ways in which the whole intellectual climate was different: "Justinian was an innovator and reformer who would have been mortally insulted had anyone ever referred to him as such, a man only able to modernise 'by convincing himself and others that he was restorying the past...the idea of innovation, as a sixth-century Christian, was virtually heretical'". Equally, when it comes to the law code which has been one of Justinian's lasting legacies, Rosen explains how the text would frequently quote past jurists still considered authorities - while changing what they said to fit the current requirements. Which is about what you can expect when it's largely the work of Tribonian, a man somehow accused in subsequent centuries of being a pagan despite his personal responsibility for the ruling that Christian oaths must precede all court cases. He was, as you would expect from that, forever changing rulings and generally reckoned to be corrupt as hell. This is not a line Rosen draws himself, alas, though he does note that the Code was the basis for civil, as against common, law, and as such much more vulnerable to subversion by autocrats, which was very much a feature rather than a bug in the mind of Justinian, and of the monarchs who would later rediscover and build on it. It all leaves one wondering how much worse things in the US might have gone over the past few years if they had civil rather than common law as a foundation.
This is what keeps coming through, the way that things from then feed into the world we now inhabit. Sometimes it's micro – I don't think I'd ever twigged that Dietrich is the modern form of Theodoric, and I certainly didn't know that Andalusia was originally Vandalusia, and wouldn't that sound even better in Debaser? Equally, Rosen reminds us when the means by which we think about the past threaten to mislead, as with a certain byword for savagery: "Attila was a patient negotiator, 'temperate in all things', who achieved as much by diplomacy as by his military prowess." Or how the terms 'Ostrogoth' and 'Visigoth' wouldn't have been recognised at the time. Speaking of Goths, I was amused at Belisarius offering the Goths Britain, which was intended as a pisstake, but seems like one of those moments in history where some passing djinn heard and determined that, centuries hence, this would indeed come to pass, only it would involve a lot more hairspray.
You will notice that this is already a lot of review with very little mention of plague. This is representative. In some ways, the title and angle would make more sense if the book were being released now, trying to ride the obvious hook, than it does for something which came out back in the carefree noughties. If Rosen had wanted to write about Justinian, a figure who obviously fascinates him – "Justinian was neither a great orator nor a skilled warrior, nor even a brilliant theologian (the last would probably have been his choice of preofession). He was not physically brave or personally charismatic. He was, however, one of the greatest statesmen who ever lived, combining a grand vision for the empire he ruled with the ability of seeing a dozen moves ahead of his opponents'' – and the publishers had insisted he get the sales up by wedging the plague in. I'm really not sure about those claims, by the way. Purely from Rosen's own account, you can see Justinian repeatedly shooting himself in the foot, not least in his under-resourcing of his generals, his distrust of Belisarius in particular, and the penny wise, pound foolish approach to pacifying territories once conquered. But I digress. Which, again, is representative, because so does Rosen. What makes this both forgivable and frustrating is that he clearly does know his stuff about the plague too. He can do the proper big picture history which easily impressed people think Adam Curtis does, while also giving what at least seems to a non-specialist like a solid account of, for instance, bacterial evolution and its particular promiscuity. He seems as at home with Yops as with the Byzantine (in both sense) details of theology; he even explains the Krebs cycle in a way that I understood it for, ooh, maybe six hours afterwards? Which is at least four times the previous record. Finally, we're on to the promised theme, and the book's revving its engine... And then we're on to another chapter, introducing Justinian's opposite number Khusro, which requires a potted history of the Persian empire as a whole, and once again the suspicion creeps to the fore that this is simply too much material for one book aimed at the general reader. The line editing seems to lapse a little from this point onwards – I definitely noticed more repetition and typos, though whether they were fixed in the final copies, who knows. Which bolsters a sense that maybe the structural editing needed another pass too, because while everything here is something the writer grasps, and gets across well, it's hard to argue that he's properly corralled it all.
Still, when you do follow the thread of the plague through all the other material with which it's tangled here, it's staggering. Bear in mind, this was a proper pandemic – 70% mortality, Rosen estimates, rather than 1.3%; 25 million dead at a time when the population was a fraction what it is now, and life expectancy about half that in the West today, such that the average person who dies of COVID would already have been dead half their lives, as it were. Even if the device of referring to the disease as a demon is slightly overdone, you can see where he's coming from. He's careful to offer the caveat that, with so many moving parts in history, drawing direct consequences is next to impossible – I enjoyed his term for this, 'The Three-Thousand Body Problem'. But equally, some approximations are more useful than others, and I think his comparison is fair: trying to talk about the transition from antiquity to mediaeval Europe without accounting for the plague, as so many historians still do, is like a Saturn mission not taking Jupiter's gravitational perturbation into account. So you get the suggestion that while silkworms being smuggled out of China was definitely a factor in making Arabia less strategically interesting to Rome and Persia, the fact that both empires were far more ravaged by the plague than the Arabs may have been a key factor in enabling the early successes of the Islamic conquests. Rome itself, the former capital, suffers militarily too, but those wars are themselves tilted by the epidemic, and so the plague is a key reason that the city's civilian population is at one point reduced to a feeble 500. It's at this point that the suggestion is made that "the Rome that Belisarius delivered was still the Rome of the Caesars; the Rome that Narses entered sixteen years later was already the Rome of the Popes." This sort of thing is why, unlike some historically minded friends, I do not find the subject much consolation right now. We get an extended comparison between China and Rome – two empires of roughly the same size, which had more contact than one tends to remember, but of which one survived as a recognisable superstate to the present day, while the other fragmented into the patchwork that is Europe. We even get a nod to the birth of the tensions between Islam and China which, Rosen notes, are still an issue among the Uighurs of his present day – and this, lest we forget, in a book published a decade before the world at large started paying (very slight) attention to the atrocities underway in Xinjiang.
At the highest level of all – and this is largely in a footnote, and part of me would have liked much more – there's the following very plausible chain of events. Justinian's plague, like its 14th century successor (and despite Justinian's attempt at a wage freeze), made the poor richer and the rich poorer by reducing the labour supply. This fed into Europe's agricultural revolution*, and thus the felling of forests, and thus a major population increase. These last two, of course, being responsible for the global warming now threatening us. Meaning sixth century global cooling (necessary for a plague pandemic, which are surprisingly fussy about temperature) begets modern global warming, and their depopulation by one pandemic creates our overpopulation that births another. And of course, all these grand cycles are of no interest whatsoever to the plague itself, which even in so far as it can metaphorically be said to 'care' about anything, is only interested in rats; the millions of human deaths are, in Rosen's entirely apt and utterly devastating choice of words, "a sideshow".
*Also, of course, the real reason European slavery ended, in so far as it did though this is a rare tangent Rosen neglects to bring up.