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The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) is recognised as a classic of modern political philosophy. Along with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), it is widely credited with breathing new life into the discipline in the second half of the twentieth century. This Companion presents a balanced and comprehensive assessment of Nozick's contribution to political philosophy. In engaging and accessible chapters, the contributors analyse Nozick's ideas from a variety of perspectives and explore neglected areas of the work such as his discussion of anarchism and his theory of utopia. Their detailed and illuminating picture of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, its impact and its enduring influence will be invaluable to students and scholars in both political philosophy and political theory.
- GenresPhilosophyPolitics
332 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2011
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Background:
American political philosopher Robert Nozick wrote “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” in 1974. This book won the 1975 US National Book Award in Philosophy and Religion, was translated into 11 languages, and was named one of the “100 most influential books since the war” (1945–1995) by the UK Times Literary Supplement.
In contrast to John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971), Nozick advocates for a minimal state that is “limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and enforcement of contracts.” Nozick argues that when a state takes on more responsibilities, it violates people’s rights. To support the idea of a minimal state, Nozick presents an argument demonstrating how the minimalist state arises naturally from a Lockean state of nature. He also states that any expansion of state power beyond the minimalist threshold is unjustified.
Abstract:
The book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” features Nozick’s entitlement theory, which considers humans as valuable entities and permits the redistribution of goods only with their consent. This theory is influenced by the ideas of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Hayek. Additionally, the book defends the concept of minarchist libertarianism and argues against extreme views like anarcho-capitalism. Nozick claims that anarcho-capitalism would eventually lead to a dominant private defense and judicial agency that would function as a de facto “state.” As a result, the concept of anarcho-capitalism would only exist for a limited period before a minimalist state emerged.
Politics of Nozick
In the preface of “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” Nozick discusses the standard approach to presenting philosophical work as the final word. However, he believes philosophers are more aware of their work’s weaknesses and should acknowledge them. He criticizes the tendency to force ideas into a predetermined shape and hide any inconsistencies. Nozick’s work stands apart from this approach because he believes in doubts and beliefs without hiding any discrepancies.
Theory of State of Nature
Nozick’s objective is to demonstrate the importance of examining a Lockean state of nature to determine whether a state is necessary. He argues that if an anarchic society is proven to be worse than one with a state, the latter should be chosen as the better alternative. One should adopt a balanced view of a non-state situation to compare the two scenarios effectively. Instead, the focus should be on a state-of-nature situation where people generally adhere to moral constraints and act as they ought. Investigating the nature and flaws of this situation is crucial in deciding whether a state or anarchy should prevail. Nozick plans to describe the permissible and impermissible actions in a non-political society and how violations of these constraints could lead to the emergence of a state. He acknowledges the limitations of his “invisible hand” explanation of the minimal state but believes it is fundamental in explaining the political realm in terms of the non-political. However, his later “genealogical” ambition aims to explain both the political and moral by tracing beneficial cooperative practices back to our hunter-gatherer ancestors and beyond, explaining the fundamental status of individual rights.
The State of Nature
Nozick explains the features of the Lockean state of nature, including the right of an individual to seek compensation for rights violations and the acceptability of punishment for offenders. However, this raises some problems, which Nozick believes can be solved by establishing mutual-protection associations. These associations may lead to entrepreneurs selling protective services, resulting in the dominant association and, ultimately, a minimal state. Nozick prefers the idea of invisible-hand explanations, which suggest that voluntary agreements between individuals can create patterns that look like they were designed but were not. However, protective agencies still need to be a state, as they do not offer everyone the same degree of protection and lack a monopoly on using force. Therefore, Nozick believes that a necessary condition for the existence of a state is the announcement of punishment for anyone who uses power without permission.
Moral Constraints and the State
Nozick arrives at the night-watchman state of classical liberalism theory by showing that there are non-redistributive reasons for the redistributive procedure of making its clients pay for the protection of others. He defines an ultraminimal state, which would not have this seemingly redistributive feature but would be the only one allowed to enforce rights. 26 Proponents of this ultraminimal state do not defend it on the grounds of trying to minimize the total of (weighted) violations of rights (what he calls utilitarianism of rights. 30 ) That idea would mean, for example, that someone could punish another person they know to be innocent to calm down a mob that would otherwise violate even more rights. 29 This is not the philosophy behind the ultraminimal state. 27–28 Instead, its proponents hold its members’ rights are a side constraint on what can be done to them. This side-constraint view reflects the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, so the rights of one individual cannot be violated to avoid violations of the rights of other people. 30–31 Which principle should we choose, then? Nozick will not try to prove which one is better. Instead, he gives reasons to prefer the Kantian view and later points to problems with classic utilitarianism.
The first reason he gives in favour of the Kantian principle is that the analogy between the individual case (in which we choose to sacrifice now for a more significant benefit later: 32 ) and the social case (in which we offer the interests of one individual for the greater social good) is incorrect:
There are only individual people, different individual people with their personal lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?). To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take into account the fact that he is a separate person, that he is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice.
— Robert Nozick, Anarchy, “State and Utopia,” Reprint Edition, 2013, p. 33
A second reason focuses on the non-aggression principle. Are we prepared to dismiss this principle? That is, can we accept that some individuals may harm some innocent in some instances? 34 (This non-aggression principle does not include, of course, self-defenses and perhaps some other exceptional cases he points out. 34–35 )
He then goes on to expose some problems with utilitarianism by discussing whether animals should be taken into account in the practical calculation of happiness, if that depends on the kind of animal, if killing them painlessly would be acceptable, and so on. 35–42 He believes that utilitarianism is not appropriate even with animals.
But Nozick’s most famous argument for the side-constraint view against classical utilitarianism and the idea that only felt experience matters is his Experience Machine thought experiment. 42 It induces whatever illusory experience one might wish, but it prevents the subject from doing anything or making contact with anything. There is only pre-programmed neural stimulation sufficient for the illusion. Nozick pumps the intuition that we have a reason to avoid plugging into the Experience Machine forever. 43 This is not to say that “plugging in” might not be the best all-things-considered choice for some who are terminally ill and in great pain. The point of the thought experiment is to articulate a weighty reason not to plug in, a reason that should not be there if all that matters is felt experience.
Prohibition, Compensation, and Risk
To achieve a night-watchman state, a procedure includes compensating non-members who cannot enforce their rights. The association deems its enforcement mechanism less risky than that of non-members. Compensation is given to address any disadvantages non-members face due to their inability to enforce their rights. Assuming that non-members take reasonable precautions and adjust their activities based on the association’s prohibition, the association must elevate the non-member’s status by equal to the difference between their position on an indifference curve and their original position.
Nozick introduces the Compensation Principle, which is vital for understanding how an ultraminimal state can transition to a minimal state without violating anyone’s rights. The discussion centers around whether it is justifiable for some individuals to pay for the protection of others or be compelled to do so, and this is explored through a natural rights perspective. Therefore, he focuses on the development of a theory of compensation.
The discussion begins with what happens if someone goes beyond a limit, like causing physical harm. If the person affected has consented, there is no issue. Unlike Locke, Nozick does not hold a paternalistic view and thinks that an individual can allow others to do things to them or do something to themselves. However, if person B crosses person A’s boundaries without their consent, is it acceptable if they receive compensation?
According to Nozick, compensation means anything that restores someone’s sense of fairness after wrongdoing, as long as that person took reasonable steps to prevent the situation. He believes compensation alone is insufficient, as some individuals may violate others’ rights without revealing their identity. Therefore, those who violate others’ rights should face additional consequences as a deterrent. For simplicity, further discussion on deterrence is provided in another section of this article.
The topic of punishment and justice is discussed by Nozick, who favours a retributive theory. However, he concludes that not all rights violations can be deterred under this theory. He then proposes the idea of compensation, suggesting that anyone can do anything if they provide total compensation afterwards. However, there are issues with this view. Firstly, if someone gains by violating another’s rights and compensates the victim up to the point of indifference, the violator benefits. The violator should provide additional compensation, but determining a fair price is difficult. Nozick believes negotiations should take place whenever possible, but in cases where negotiation is not possible, it is unclear whether all acts should be accepted if compensation is paid. Secondly, allowing anything if compensation is paid creates fear among people. Nozick argues that even if someone knows they will be compensated for their rights being violated, they will still be afraid. These issues raise important questions about justice and compensation.
Financial compensation alone cannot fully address the harm caused by assault. Fear experienced by the victim cannot be compensated for, as it is not solely the responsibility of the assaulter.
If compensation for fear were the only solution, non-victims would be left uncompensated for their worries. Moreover, it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of anxiety after the fact, as we tend to downplay its significance. Instead, Nozick suggests calculating “Market Compensation,” which represents the compensation that would have been agreed upon if negotiations had occurred before the incident. However, this approach is only sometimes feasible, according to Nozick.
It can be concluded that anything that causes general fear can be prohibited. This includes using people as a means, which goes against Kantian principles. However, banning all boundary crossings without prior consent would be too restrictive, as accidents and unintentional acts can occur. Additionally, obtaining consent may be costly, especially if the victim is in a remote location. The most efficient policy would allow unfeared actions without prior agreement as long as the transaction costs of obtaining prior consent are higher than the costs of posterior compensation.
It is essential to understand that a single action may not instill fear if it’s unlikely to cause harm. However, considering all risky activities together increases the probability of injury significantly. This creates a dilemma, as banning these activities would be overly restrictive. One proposed solution is to establish a threshold value (V) that indicates a violation of rights if the probability of harm (p) multiplied by the potential amount of liability (H) exceeds this value. However, this approach may need to align with a natural-rights perspective. As one philosopher put it:
According to Robert Nozick’s book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” some traditions believe stealing violates a person’s rights, even if it is just a penny or a pin. These traditions do not set a minimum threshold for harm, even if injury is guaranteed to occur.
Nozick does discuss insurance solutions for these situations, but what about those who cannot afford insurance or compensate others for the risks they pose? Should they be prohibited from taking specific actions?
Prohibiting risky actions, whether because they are financially uncovered or too dangerous, goes against the idea of a free society that values liberty and allows individuals to act freely as long as they do not harm others. Limiting an individual’s freedom to act based on potential risks, even if they pose no cost to anyone else, is not in line with this idea.
In his book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Robert Nozick discusses the Principle of Compensation, which states that dangerous actions that are commonly done should be prohibited. Still, the especially disadvantaged individual should be compensated for the prohibition. For example, people with epilepsy can be forbidden from driving, but only if they are reimbursed for the costs of being unable to move, such as chauffeurs or taxis. This compensation will only happen if the benefits of increased security outweigh these costs. Nozick compares this to blackmail and considers such transactions unproductive. Similarly, a person with epilepsy should not negotiate payment for not doing something risky to others. Nozick’s conclusion is to balance safety with fairness for all individuals.
Nozick raises concerns regarding the compensation principle. His first point is that the action must be generally accepted, as eccentric and dangerous activities should not be rewarded. For instance, someone who enjoys playing Russian roulette with others’ lives without their consent should be prohibited without exception. However, the definition of a generally accepted action is subjective and can be manipulated. For example, Russian roulette could be considered fun and thus eligible for compensation.
Secondly, if the peculiar and hazardous action is the only way a person can achieve something important to them, such as having fun or supporting themselves, it may warrant compensation.
Thirdly, Nozick acknowledges that he does not have an explicit theory of disadvantage, making it challenging to determine what qualifies as a “special disadvantage.”
The concept needs more development as no governing body defines terms in a state of nature. A similar issue is discussed on page 89. It is not necessary to state the principle precisely, only to assert the correctness of certain principles, like the principle of compensation, which requires those who prohibit risky activities from being forbidden from those same activities. However, I hesitate to present and use a code that has yet to be fully fleshed out. It is acceptable to start with an unclear principle as long as it serves its purpose. This is discussed in Robert Nozick’s book, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Reprint Edition, 2013, on page 87.
State
If an individual seeks to uphold justice through a method that is either unknown or poses a risk, it may be prevented. However, even if the method used by an individual does not pose a significant threat, if many others use similar techniques, it may result in a real risk that exceeds acceptable limits. In such a situation, it can be challenging to determine who should stop it since nobody is held personally responsible. Although independents may collaborate to find a solution, everyone may choose to be a free-rider and continue their risky activities. Nozick has refused to accept the “principle of fairness” proposed by H.L.A. Hart to deal with free riders, arguing that one cannot charge for benefits without prior agreement.
When the principle of fairness fails, how do we determine what is right? The natural law tradition only guides our procedural rights. Nozick believes we have the right to know if an appropriate and reliable method is used to determine guilt. We have the right to resist if this information isn’t publicly available. After reviewing the data, We may only participate if we find the procedure fair and reliable. Protective agencies can enforce these rights by publishing a list of accepted methods and punishing anyone who violates it. While other companies may enter the business, only the dominant protective agency can ensure clients that unaccepted procedures won’t be used on them. Every individual has this right.
However, there is a significant distinction to consider. The protective agency may put specific independent individuals at a disadvantage. This specifically pertains to those who use a prohibited method, can only afford the agency’s services with significant effort, or are too impoverished to pay. Consequently, these individuals may end up bearing the costs of the agency’s paying clients.
Addressing the notion of compensating those who face disadvantages. This compensation should only cover the extra cost incurred by the disadvantaged beyond what they would typically pay for the risky or unknown procedure they want to undergo. However, if the needy person cannot pay for a protection policy even after receiving compensation, the compensation should cover the policy’s total cost. (Reference: pages 111-112)
The protective services only cover paying clients because they are the ones who were initially defenseless in this situation. This means that non-paying clients may receive different protection.
Will this compensation mechanism lead to a free-riding problem? According to Nozick, it should be fine since the compensation is only equal to the cost of a basic policy plus the cost of self-protection and
Background:
American political philosopher Robert Nozick wrote “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” in 1974. This book won the 1975 US National Book Award in Philosophy and Religion, was translated into 11 languages, and was named one of the “100 most influential books since the war” (1945–1995) by the UK Times Literary Supplement.
In contrast to John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” (1971), Nozick advocates for a minimal state that is “limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, and enforcement of contracts.” Nozick argues that when a state takes on more responsibilities, it violates people’s rights. To support the idea of a minimal state, Nozick presents an argument demonstrating how the minimalist state arises naturally from a Lockean state of nature. He also states that any expansion of state power beyond the minimalist threshold is unjustified.
Abstract:
The book “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” features Nozick’s entitlement theory, which considers humans as valuable entities and permits the redistribution of goods only with their consent. This theory is influenced by the ideas of John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Hayek. Additionally, the book defends the concept of minarchist libertarianism and argues against extreme views like anarcho-capitalism. Nozick claims that anarcho-capitalism would eventually lead to a dominant private defense and judicial agency that would function as a de facto “state.” As a result, the concept of anarcho-capitalism would only exist for a limited period before a minimalist state emerged.
Politics of Nozick
In the preface of “Anarchy, State, and Utopia,” Nozick discusses the standard approach to presenting philosophical work as the final word. However, he believes philosophers are more aware of their work’s weaknesses and should acknowledge them. He criticizes the tendency to force ideas into a predetermined shape and hide any inconsistencies. Nozick’s work stands apart from this approach because he believes in doubts and beliefs without hiding any discrepancies.
Theory of State of Nature
Nozick’s objective is to demonstrate the importance of examining a Lockean state of nature to determine whether a state is necessary. He argues that if an anarchic society is proven to be worse than one with a state, the latter should be chosen as the better alternative. One should adopt a balanced view of a non-state situation to compare the two scenarios effectively. Instead, the focus should be on a state-of-nature situation where people generally adhere to moral constraints and act as they ought. Investigating the nature and flaws of this situation is crucial in deciding whether a state or anarchy should prevail. Nozick plans to describe the permissible and impermissible actions in a non-political society and how violations of these constraints could lead to the emergence of a state. He acknowledges the limitations of his “invisible hand” explanation of the minimal state but believes it is fundamental in explaining the political realm in terms of the non-political. However, his later “genealogical” ambition aims to explain both the political and moral by tracing beneficial cooperative practices back to our hunter-gatherer ancestors and beyond, explaining the fundamental status of individual rights.
The State of Nature
Nozick explains the features of the Lockean state of nature, including the right of an individual to seek compensation for rights violations and the acceptability of punishment for offenders. However, this raises some problems, which Nozick believes can be solved by establishing mutual-protection associations. These associations may lead to entrepreneurs selling protective services, resulting in the dominant association and, ultimately, a minimal state. Nozick prefers the idea of invisible-hand explanations, which suggest that voluntary agreements between individuals can create patterns that look like they were designed but were not. However, protective agencies still need to be a state, as they do not offer everyone the same degree of protection and lack a monopoly on using force. Therefore, Nozick believes that a necessary condition for the existence of a state is the announcement of punishment for anyone who uses power without permission.
Moral Constraints and the State
Nozick arrives at the night-watchman state of classical liberalism theory by showing that there are non-redistributive reasons for the redistributive procedure of making its clients pay for the protection of others. He defines an ultraminimal state, which would not have this seemingly redistributive feature but would be the only one allowed to enforce rights. 26 Proponents of this ultraminimal state do not defend it on the grounds of trying to minimize the total of (weighted) violations of rights (what he calls utilitarianism of rights. 30 ) That idea would mean, for example, that someone could punish another person they know to be innocent to calm down a mob that would otherwise violate even more rights. 29 This is not the philosophy behind the ultraminimal state. 27–28 Instead, its proponents hold its members’ rights are a side constraint on what can be done to them. This side-constraint view reflects the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, so the rights of one individual cannot be violated to avoid violations of the rights of other people. 30–31 Which principle should we choose, then? Nozick will not try to prove which one is better. Instead, he gives reasons to prefer the Kantian view and later points to problems with classic utilitarianism.
The first reason he gives in favour of the Kantian principle is that the analogy between the individual case (in which we choose to sacrifice now for a more significant benefit later: 32 ) and the social case (in which we offer the interests of one individual for the greater social good) is incorrect:
There are only individual people, different individual people with their personal lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?). To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take into account the fact that he is a separate person, that he is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice.
— Robert Nozick, Anarchy, “State and Utopia,” Reprint Edition, 2013, p. 33
A second reason focuses on the non-aggression principle. Are we prepared to dismiss this principle? That is, can we accept that some individuals may harm some innocent in some instances? 34 (This non-aggression principle does not include, of course, self-defenses and perhaps some other exceptional cases he points out. 34–35 )
He then goes on to expose some problems with utilitarianism by discussing whether animals should be taken into account in the practical calculation of happiness, if that depends on the kind of animal, if killing them painlessly would be acceptable, and so on. 35–42 He believes that utilitarianism is not appropriate even with animals.
But Nozick’s most famous argument for the side-constraint view against classical utilitarianism and the idea that only felt experience matters is his Experience Machine thought experiment. 42 It induces whatever illusory experience one might wish, but it prevents the subject from doing anything or making contact with anything. There is only pre-programmed neural stimulation sufficient for the illusion. Nozick pumps the intuition that we have a reason to avoid plugging into the Experience Machine forever. 43 This is not to say that “plugging in” might not be the best all-things-considered choice for some who are terminally ill and in great pain. The point of the thought experiment is to articulate a weighty reason not to plug in, a reason that should not be there if all that matters is felt experience.
Prohibition, Compensation, and Risk
To achieve a night-watchman state, a procedure includes compensating non-members who cannot enforce their rights. The association deems its enforcement mechanism less risky than that of non-members. Compensation is given to address any disadvantages non-members face due to their inability to enforce their rights. Assuming that non-members take reasonable precautions and adjust their activities based on the association’s prohibition, the association must elevate the non-member’s status by equal to the difference between their position on an indifference curve and their original position.
Nozick introduces the Compensation Principle, which is vital for understanding how an ultraminimal state can transition to a minimal state without violating anyone’s rights. The discussion centers around whether it is justifiable for some individuals to pay for the protection of others or be compelled to do so, and this is explored through a natural rights perspective. Therefore, he focuses on the development of a theory of compensation.
The discussion begins with what happens if someone goes beyond a limit, like causing physical harm. If the person affected has consented, there is no issue. Unlike Locke, Nozick does not hold a paternalistic view and thinks that an individual can allow others to do things to them or do something to themselves. However, if person B crosses person A’s boundaries without their consent, is it acceptable if they receive compensation?
According to Nozick, compensation means anything that restores someone’s sense of fairness after wrongdoing, as long as that person took reasonable steps to prevent the situation. He believes compensation alone is insufficient, as some individuals may violate others’ rights without revealing their identity. Therefore, those who violate others’ rights should face additional consequences as a deterrent. For simplicity, further discussion on deterrence is provided in another section of this article.
The topic of punishment and justice is discussed by Nozick, who favours a retributive theory. However, he concludes that not all rights violations can be deterred under this theory. He then proposes the idea of compensation, suggesting that anyone can do anything if they provide total compensation afterwards. However, there are issues with this view. Firstly, if someone gains by violating another’s rights and compensates the victim up to the point of indifference, the violator benefits. The violator should provide additional compensation, but determining a fair price is difficult. Nozick believes negotiations should take place whenever possible, but in cases where negotiation is not possible, it is unclear whether all acts should be accepted if compensation is paid. Secondly, allowing anything if compensation is paid creates fear among people. Nozick argues that even if someone knows they will be compensated for their rights being violated, they will still be afraid. These issues raise important questions about justice and compensation.
Financial compensation alone cannot fully address the harm caused by assault. Fear experienced by the victim cannot be compensated for, as it is not solely the responsibility of the assaulter.
If compensation for fear were the only solution, non-victims would be left uncompensated for their worries. Moreover, it is difficult to accurately measure the impact of anxiety after the fact, as we tend to downplay its significance. Instead, Nozick suggests calculating “Market Compensation,” which represents the compensation that would have been agreed upon if negotiations had occurred before the incident. However, this approach is only sometimes feasible, according to Nozick.
It can be concluded that anything that causes general fear can be prohibited. This includes using people as a means, which goes against Kantian principles. However, banning all boundary crossings without prior consent would be too restrictive, as accidents and unintentional acts can occur. Additionally, obtaining consent may be costly, especially if the victim is in a remote location. The most efficient policy would allow unfeared actions without prior agreement as long as the transaction costs of obtaining prior consent are higher than the costs of posterior compensation.
It is essential to understand that a single action may not instill fear if it’s unlikely to cause harm. However, considering all risky activities together increases the probability of injury significantly. This creates a dilemma, as banning these activities would be overly restrictive. One proposed solution is to establish a threshold value (V) that indicates a violation of rights if the probability of harm (p) multiplied by the potential amount of liability (H) exceeds this value. However, this approach may need to align with a natural-rights perspective. As one philosopher put it:
According to Robert Nozick’s book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” some traditions believe stealing violates a person’s rights, even if it is just a penny or a pin. These traditions do not set a minimum threshold for harm, even if injury is guaranteed to occur.
Nozick does discuss insurance solutions for these situations, but what about those who cannot afford insurance or compensate others for the risks they pose? Should they be prohibited from taking specific actions?
Prohibiting risky actions, whether because they are financially uncovered or too dangerous, goes against the idea of a free society that values liberty and allows individuals to act freely as long as they do not harm others. Limiting an individual’s freedom to act based on potential risks, even if they pose no cost to anyone else, is not in line with this idea.
In his book “Anarchy, State and Utopia,” Robert Nozick discusses the Principle of Compensation, which states that dangerous actions that are commonly done should be prohibited. Still, the especially disadvantaged individual should be compensated for the prohibition. For example, people with epilepsy can be forbidden from driving, but only if they are reimbursed for the costs of being unable to move, such as chauffeurs or taxis. This compensation will only happen if the benefits of increased security outweigh these costs. Nozick compares this to blackmail and considers such transactions unproductive. Similarly, a person with epilepsy should not negotiate payment for not doing something risky to others. Nozick’s conclusion is to balance safety with fairness for all individuals.
Nozick raises concerns regarding the compensation principle. His first point is that the action must be generally accepted, as eccentric and dangerous activities should not be rewarded. For instance, someone who enjoys playing Russian roulette with others’ lives without their consent should be prohibited without exception. However, the definition of a generally accepted action is subjective and can be manipulated. For example, Russian roulette could be considered fun and thus eligible for compensation.
Secondly, if the peculiar and hazardous action is the only way a person can achieve something important to them, such as having fun or supporting themselves, it may warrant compensation.
Thirdly, Nozick acknowledges that he does not have an explicit theory of disadvantage, making it challenging to determine what qualifies as a “special disadvantage.”
The concept needs more development as no governing body defines terms in a state of nature. A similar issue is discussed on page 89. It is not necessary to state the principle precisely, only to assert the correctness of certain principles, like the principle of compensation, which requires those who prohibit risky activities from being forbidden from those same activities. However, I hesitate to present and use a code that has yet to be fully fleshed out. It is acceptable to start with an unclear principle as long as it serves its purpose. This is discussed in Robert Nozick’s book, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Reprint Edition, 2013, on page 87.
State
If an individual seeks to uphold justice through a method that is either unknown or poses a risk, it may be prevented. However, even if the method used by an individual does not pose a significant threat, if many others use similar techniques, it may result in a real risk that exceeds acceptable limits. In such a situation, it can be challenging to determine who should stop it since nobody is held personally responsible. Although independents may collaborate to find a solution, everyone may choose to be a free-rider and continue their risky activities. Nozick has refused to accept the “principle of fairness” proposed by H.L.A. Hart to deal with free riders, arguing that one cannot charge for benefits without prior agreement.
When the principle of fairness fails, how do we determine what is right? The natural law tradition only guides our procedural rights. Nozick believes we have the right to know if an appropriate and reliable method is used to determine guilt. We have the right to resist if this information isn’t publicly available. After reviewing the data, We may only participate if we find the procedure fair and reliable. Protective agencies can enforce these rights by publishing a list of accepted methods and punishing anyone who violates it. While other companies may enter the business, only the dominant protective agency can ensure clients that unaccepted procedures won’t be used on them. Every individual has this right.
However, there is a significant distinction to consider. The protective agency may put specific independent individuals at a disadvantage. This specifically pertains to those who use a prohibited method, can only afford the agency’s services with significant effort, or are too impoverished to pay. Consequently, these individuals may end up bearing the costs of the agency’s paying clients.
Addressing the notion of compensating those who face disadvantages. This compensation should only cover the extra cost incurred by the disadvantaged beyond what they would typically pay for the risky or unknown procedure they want to undergo. However, if the needy person cannot pay for a protection policy even after receiving compensation, the compensation should cover the policy’s total cost. (Reference: pages 111-112)
The protective services only cover paying clients because they are the ones who were initially defenseless in this situation. This means that non-paying clients may receive different protection.
Will this compensation mechanism lead to a free-riding problem? According to Nozick, it should be fine since the compensation is only equal to the cost of a basic policy plus the cost of self-protection and
January 8, 2017
This contains a few very insightful essays, notably on Nozick versus Rawls, Nozick's solution to the contested Lockean Proviso regarding the acquisition of private property, and Nozick's experience machine.
October 22, 2023
This is an edited volume intended as a companion to Nozick's seminal text. I didn't read every single essay but most of them. Overall, I would say it's an indispensible work to understand the essence of Nozick's libertarian thought and its critiques.
June 29, 2016
The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a pretty good critical collection of essays on Robert Nozick's famous book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (ASU). I stress the word critical to describe this collection.
The target of the collection, ASU, is considered a landmark book in libertarianism. In ASU, Nozick argues that the only legitimate political institution is what he calls the minimal state, a government that protects people from harm and violence and enforces contracts among its citizens--and nothing more. He thinks any version of the State will have to be defended against anarchy. And he thinks that his version of the State serves as a model for future utopias.
This Cambridge Companion critically evaluates Nozick's claims about anarchy, State, and utopia and calls into question his ideas about morality and justice, among other matters. Several of the essays find holes in Nozick's project. Take the last essay in the book, for instance. Because I just read it, it's still fresh on my mind. It's titled "E pluribus plurum, or, How to fail to get to utopia in spite of really trying" by Chanran Kukathas. Kukathas argues that the kind of State that Nozick advocates couldn't really help us think about the ideal society because it's never existed. Furthermore, even if the kind of State he advocates could have emerged, it didn't emerge, and so it doesn't make sense to think that a State is necessary for utopia as opposed to a stateless society.
This book makes a great reference and really makes me want to finish reading Nozick's book.
The target of the collection, ASU, is considered a landmark book in libertarianism. In ASU, Nozick argues that the only legitimate political institution is what he calls the minimal state, a government that protects people from harm and violence and enforces contracts among its citizens--and nothing more. He thinks any version of the State will have to be defended against anarchy. And he thinks that his version of the State serves as a model for future utopias.
This Cambridge Companion critically evaluates Nozick's claims about anarchy, State, and utopia and calls into question his ideas about morality and justice, among other matters. Several of the essays find holes in Nozick's project. Take the last essay in the book, for instance. Because I just read it, it's still fresh on my mind. It's titled "E pluribus plurum, or, How to fail to get to utopia in spite of really trying" by Chanran Kukathas. Kukathas argues that the kind of State that Nozick advocates couldn't really help us think about the ideal society because it's never existed. Furthermore, even if the kind of State he advocates could have emerged, it didn't emerge, and so it doesn't make sense to think that a State is necessary for utopia as opposed to a stateless society.
This book makes a great reference and really makes me want to finish reading Nozick's book.
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