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The Third Reich and the Palestine Question
In order to ensure its racial, ideological, and strategic interests, the Hitler regime actively supported the status quo in Palestine and the Middle East during the interwar period. This included the perpetuation of British imperial power in Palestine, the Jewish National Home (not an independent Jewish state) promised by the Balfour Declaration, and the rejection of Arab self-determination and independence. The Third Reich and the Palestine Question is the first comprehensive study of German Palestine policy during the 1930s. Francis R. Nicosia places that policy within the context of historical German interests and aims in Palestine, the Middle East, and Europe from the Wilhelminian era through the Weimar period and the Third Reich. He also provides insight into the broader foreign policy aims and calculations of the Nazi regime throughout the Arab Middle East before World War II. In a new introduction, Nicosia places his ground-breaking research in its proper historical perspective. He reviews some of the recent literature on the history of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. He also discusses some of the archival materials that have recently become available in the former German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union.
343 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
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About the author
Francis R. Nicosia
15 books4 followersFrancis R. Nicosia was an American historian at the University of Vermont with a focus on modern history and Holocaust research. Prior to taking up his position at the University of Vermont, he taught at Saint Michael's College from 1979 to 2008, and research stays in 1992 as a Fulbright scholarship holder at the Technical University of Berlin and in 2006 at the Humboldt University of Berlin.
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June 3, 2024
When the Nazi Party attained power in Germany in January 1933, among their main priorities was the persecution of the Jewish population in Germany. In the six years that followed, laws and decrees were introduced that barred Jews from the civil service, restricted their participation in various professions, and gradually segregated them from the rest of society. In response, thousands of Jews sought to emigrate from Germany, a solution complicated by the challenge of identifying a destination to which they could escape. For while many countries expressed their sympathy for the plight of Jews, few were willing to increase their quotas and allow more of them to immigrate to their countries.
For many Jewish refugees, the most desirable destination was Palestine. Historically associated with the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judaea, by the early twentieth century the British-controlled territory had become the focus of the aspirations of the Zionist movement for the creation of a Jewish state. This received a boost from German officials, who proved more than willing to facilitate emigration to the region. The irony of this is a central, if unstated, feature of Francis Nicosia’s book. In it, he parses the complicated and at times contradictory agenda of German officials to detail their evolving policies towards Jewish emigration to Palestine and the question of a Jewish state. As he demonstrates effectively, their development was often dictated by the shifting priorities of the Nazi regime, as they sought to reconcile incompatible goals in their pursuit of their ideologically-driven agenda.
An additional complicating factor in this was the broader context of their policies. As Nicosia demonstrates, the Third Reich’s relationship with Palestine was not new, but one that was inherited from its predecessors. German interests in Palestine dated back to the imperial era, when the region was part of the Ottoman Empire and the interest in advancing German influence in the Middle East dictated a policy of “sympathetic aloofness” to the Zionist movement. The desire to rebuild Germany’s economic position in the region after the First World War prompted the Weimar Republic to pursue its agenda through the movement, an effort that was opposed primarily by those German Jews who worried that Zionism undermined their identification with the German nation and their efforts to assimilate with it.
The assimilationists found their position undermined fatally by the Nazis’ rise to power. While Nicosia notes the compatibility of the Zionists’ exclusionary goals with those of German nationalists and anti-Semites, Nazi ideology expressly rejected the creation of a Jewish state. Not only would it contradict their claims that Jews were incapable of constructing one, but such a state, they believed, would become a power base from which Jews could pursue their agenda against Germany. What the Nazis sought instead, according to Nicosia, amounted to an expanded Jewish minority in a territory that would remain under British domination, a goal that would make it possible to use Palestine as an outlet for Jewish emigration while ensuring that a Jewish threat did not emerge from it.
Yet anti-Semitism was just one of several factors shaping German policy towards Palestine during this period. Economic recovery and Hitler’s ambitious geopolitical goals also played important roles in German planning, and Nicosia devotes considerable attention to their influence. Foremost among them was the effort to respond to the economic crisis of the Great Depression, a problem exacerbated by the international anti-German boycott that began shortly after Hitler’s assumption of power. With the need for foreign currency paramount for both recovery and rearmament, German officials reached an agreement in August 1933 with representatives of Zionist groups – the Haavara Transfer Agreement – that allowed Jews emigrating to Palestine to transfer some of their property through the sale of German goods in the region. Though the overall economic impact of this was small, it nonetheless helped to expand German trade while simultaneously driving a wedge between Jewish groups over the boycott effort.
The Haavara Agreement also had the effect of making Palestine the preferred destination of Nazi emigration policy. This led to tensions with the British, which grew increasingly concerned over the growing tensions between Arabs and Jews in the mandate created by the influx of Jewish immigrants from Germany. Nicosia is adamant that Hitler had no desire to use Jewish emigration to disrupt Britain’s hold on the mandate, which when coupled with his desire for an accommodation with Great Britain initially mitigated against actions that might antagonize the British. By 1937, however Britain’s reaction to Germany’s increasingly aggressive assertion of its interests in Europe led Hitler to abandon hopes for any sort of understanding between the two nations. While the Peel Commission’s proposal to partition Palestine between Arabs and Jews led some to doubt the wisdom of continuing to permit Jews to emigrate there, by 1938 the stepped-up campaign to drive Jews out of Germany brushed aside any such concerns, as the preparations for war became the Germans’ foremost priority.
That Germany’s policies towards Palestine were always determined by their racial agenda and their interests in Europe was the one constant throughout the period Nicosia examines. This is demonstrated effectively in an analysis that draws upon archives in four countries to describe the evolution of those policies and the factors determining them. The result is something of a patchwork, as the chapters read more like a collection of overlapping articles than a single, coherent study. Though limited in scope, its coverage of German diplomacy within Palestine is a particular strength of the book, especially for its insight into how policy conceived in Berlin was carried out in the region. Taken together, these elements make it a highly useful study of the development of decisions that, though of secondary concern to the men who made them, proved to have an enduring impact on Palestine, the Middle East, and the world in general.
For many Jewish refugees, the most desirable destination was Palestine. Historically associated with the ancient kingdoms of Israel and Judaea, by the early twentieth century the British-controlled territory had become the focus of the aspirations of the Zionist movement for the creation of a Jewish state. This received a boost from German officials, who proved more than willing to facilitate emigration to the region. The irony of this is a central, if unstated, feature of Francis Nicosia’s book. In it, he parses the complicated and at times contradictory agenda of German officials to detail their evolving policies towards Jewish emigration to Palestine and the question of a Jewish state. As he demonstrates effectively, their development was often dictated by the shifting priorities of the Nazi regime, as they sought to reconcile incompatible goals in their pursuit of their ideologically-driven agenda.
An additional complicating factor in this was the broader context of their policies. As Nicosia demonstrates, the Third Reich’s relationship with Palestine was not new, but one that was inherited from its predecessors. German interests in Palestine dated back to the imperial era, when the region was part of the Ottoman Empire and the interest in advancing German influence in the Middle East dictated a policy of “sympathetic aloofness” to the Zionist movement. The desire to rebuild Germany’s economic position in the region after the First World War prompted the Weimar Republic to pursue its agenda through the movement, an effort that was opposed primarily by those German Jews who worried that Zionism undermined their identification with the German nation and their efforts to assimilate with it.
The assimilationists found their position undermined fatally by the Nazis’ rise to power. While Nicosia notes the compatibility of the Zionists’ exclusionary goals with those of German nationalists and anti-Semites, Nazi ideology expressly rejected the creation of a Jewish state. Not only would it contradict their claims that Jews were incapable of constructing one, but such a state, they believed, would become a power base from which Jews could pursue their agenda against Germany. What the Nazis sought instead, according to Nicosia, amounted to an expanded Jewish minority in a territory that would remain under British domination, a goal that would make it possible to use Palestine as an outlet for Jewish emigration while ensuring that a Jewish threat did not emerge from it.
Yet anti-Semitism was just one of several factors shaping German policy towards Palestine during this period. Economic recovery and Hitler’s ambitious geopolitical goals also played important roles in German planning, and Nicosia devotes considerable attention to their influence. Foremost among them was the effort to respond to the economic crisis of the Great Depression, a problem exacerbated by the international anti-German boycott that began shortly after Hitler’s assumption of power. With the need for foreign currency paramount for both recovery and rearmament, German officials reached an agreement in August 1933 with representatives of Zionist groups – the Haavara Transfer Agreement – that allowed Jews emigrating to Palestine to transfer some of their property through the sale of German goods in the region. Though the overall economic impact of this was small, it nonetheless helped to expand German trade while simultaneously driving a wedge between Jewish groups over the boycott effort.
The Haavara Agreement also had the effect of making Palestine the preferred destination of Nazi emigration policy. This led to tensions with the British, which grew increasingly concerned over the growing tensions between Arabs and Jews in the mandate created by the influx of Jewish immigrants from Germany. Nicosia is adamant that Hitler had no desire to use Jewish emigration to disrupt Britain’s hold on the mandate, which when coupled with his desire for an accommodation with Great Britain initially mitigated against actions that might antagonize the British. By 1937, however Britain’s reaction to Germany’s increasingly aggressive assertion of its interests in Europe led Hitler to abandon hopes for any sort of understanding between the two nations. While the Peel Commission’s proposal to partition Palestine between Arabs and Jews led some to doubt the wisdom of continuing to permit Jews to emigrate there, by 1938 the stepped-up campaign to drive Jews out of Germany brushed aside any such concerns, as the preparations for war became the Germans’ foremost priority.
That Germany’s policies towards Palestine were always determined by their racial agenda and their interests in Europe was the one constant throughout the period Nicosia examines. This is demonstrated effectively in an analysis that draws upon archives in four countries to describe the evolution of those policies and the factors determining them. The result is something of a patchwork, as the chapters read more like a collection of overlapping articles than a single, coherent study. Though limited in scope, its coverage of German diplomacy within Palestine is a particular strength of the book, especially for its insight into how policy conceived in Berlin was carried out in the region. Taken together, these elements make it a highly useful study of the development of decisions that, though of secondary concern to the men who made them, proved to have an enduring impact on Palestine, the Middle East, and the world in general.
July 30, 2019
Hitler vs Zion
An excellent parsing of German and Nazi policy up to the start of WW II. The Haavara (Transfer) Agreement between Germany and the Zionist movement was initiated before Hitler's rise to power in 1932 by the Jewish Palestinian firm Hanotaiah Ltd which sought an exemption to the 1931 ban on exporting German capital abroad, a measure undertaken by the Brüning government to mitigate the effects of the depression. This was approved by the Nazis in August 1933 who saw this as a way to encourage Jewish immigration not just out of Germany but Europe. While believing in a world wide Zionist conspiracy, Hitler paradoxically maintained since 1920 that there was no danger that Jews might create a functioning nation as they were racially incapable of Aryan characteristics such as “love of work, racial purity, cultural creativity and the capacity to build states.” (pp26) As such Nazi policy was designed to marginalize and disperse potential Jewish power encouraging Jews to leave for Palestine, South America and other distant destinations where they would, in their estimation, do the least harm.
Another aspect of Hitler's policy was that he honestly believed that England and Germany could form an alliance. As such, he worked at not disturbing the British Empire in the hope that England would return some of Germany's colonial possessions. In 1933 when approached with an offer from King ibn Saud of large supplies of oil in return for development capital, which Germany did not have, Hitler turned him down reasoning that in the event of war such holdings would be too difficult to defend, preferring instead to rely on Romania, the Soviet Union and German synthetics. (3) In 1935, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, according to Albert Speer, he said “I really don't know what I should do. It is a terribly difficult decision. I would by far prefer to join the English.” (pp75) He was relieved the British lack of reaction that he did not have to choose. By and large German policy was to remain neutral on Palestine, in part to protect German expatriates but also because Hitler regarded the Mediterranean as Italy's sphere of influence. Even in 1941 with the war in progress, aside from the vigorous agitprop of his Iraqi ambassador Fritz Grobba, little to no material help was given to the pro-Nazi coup of Rashid al-Galiani. And while the 1937 Peel Commission in Palestine momentarily raised Nazi fears that a Jewish State might indeed be established, which went away when that aspect was shelved, however the British reduced immigration limits into Palestine for Jews which reduced flow out of Germany, as did restrictions world wide.
Though Hitler seized power in 1933 he still needed the help from elements of the old guard Weimar elite to manage the country which applied the same Keynesian tools of government works used in other countries to stimulate the economy out of the depression. Anti-Semitic to the core he began with the notion of cleansing German soil of all Jewish social, cultural and economic involvement, which became more intricate over time due to the influence of NSDAP theoretician Alfred Rosenberg.
So what finally changed Hitler's mind? Mostly World War II and the lead up to it. In late 1937 key ministers in Hitler's government, von Neurath (Foreign Office), Hjalmar Schacht (Economics), Field Marshal von Blomberg (War) , all right wing holdovers from the Wiemar Republic, were replaced by von Ribbentrop, Goering and Hitler himself. “Within a space of three months Hitler had effectively neutralized the army, Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economics as impediments to his plans for war.” (pp146). When Germany expanded its frontiers it found itself in a situation where the Reich contained millions of Jews but, as of early 1938 less than half of Germany's 1933 population of 561,000 Jews had left. Something had to be done to pick up the pace. After the Anschluss in Austria, unencumbered by the established bureaucracy of the Altreich in Germany itself, Eichamann and the SD took up the gauntlet and began to round up Austrian Jews, confiscate their assets and deport them.
The Haavara agreement effectively ended in 1939 after Britain declared war which closed the gates to dealing with Germany. At no point did it significantly add to Germany's revenues. According to Appendix 8, from 1933-39 a total of 105.7 million RM was transferred to Palestine and we could assume that all of it went back to Germany to purchase goods. Between 1929 and 1932, the only years Nicosia gives figures for, German GDP had dropped from 26.9 billion RM to a low of 10.4 billion RM. At best in any given year it would have accounted for less than a fifth to 3/10ths of 1% of GDP, the highest year being 1937 with a transfer of 31.4 million RM. In contrast, following the events of Kristalnacht in 1938, Nicosea reports that the Reich was so needy for capital to finance military expansion that it fined the Jewish community 1 billion RM for damages that occurred in Kristalnacht, the Nazi provoked attack on Jewish shops and neighbourhoods, and confiscated the insurance monies to be paid.
It's a compelling, revealing and different analysis that ends in 1939, at which point all previous bets are removed from the table.
An excellent parsing of German and Nazi policy up to the start of WW II. The Haavara (Transfer) Agreement between Germany and the Zionist movement was initiated before Hitler's rise to power in 1932 by the Jewish Palestinian firm Hanotaiah Ltd which sought an exemption to the 1931 ban on exporting German capital abroad, a measure undertaken by the Brüning government to mitigate the effects of the depression. This was approved by the Nazis in August 1933 who saw this as a way to encourage Jewish immigration not just out of Germany but Europe. While believing in a world wide Zionist conspiracy, Hitler paradoxically maintained since 1920 that there was no danger that Jews might create a functioning nation as they were racially incapable of Aryan characteristics such as “love of work, racial purity, cultural creativity and the capacity to build states.” (pp26) As such Nazi policy was designed to marginalize and disperse potential Jewish power encouraging Jews to leave for Palestine, South America and other distant destinations where they would, in their estimation, do the least harm.
Another aspect of Hitler's policy was that he honestly believed that England and Germany could form an alliance. As such, he worked at not disturbing the British Empire in the hope that England would return some of Germany's colonial possessions. In 1933 when approached with an offer from King ibn Saud of large supplies of oil in return for development capital, which Germany did not have, Hitler turned him down reasoning that in the event of war such holdings would be too difficult to defend, preferring instead to rely on Romania, the Soviet Union and German synthetics. (3) In 1935, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, according to Albert Speer, he said “I really don't know what I should do. It is a terribly difficult decision. I would by far prefer to join the English.” (pp75) He was relieved the British lack of reaction that he did not have to choose. By and large German policy was to remain neutral on Palestine, in part to protect German expatriates but also because Hitler regarded the Mediterranean as Italy's sphere of influence. Even in 1941 with the war in progress, aside from the vigorous agitprop of his Iraqi ambassador Fritz Grobba, little to no material help was given to the pro-Nazi coup of Rashid al-Galiani. And while the 1937 Peel Commission in Palestine momentarily raised Nazi fears that a Jewish State might indeed be established, which went away when that aspect was shelved, however the British reduced immigration limits into Palestine for Jews which reduced flow out of Germany, as did restrictions world wide.
Though Hitler seized power in 1933 he still needed the help from elements of the old guard Weimar elite to manage the country which applied the same Keynesian tools of government works used in other countries to stimulate the economy out of the depression. Anti-Semitic to the core he began with the notion of cleansing German soil of all Jewish social, cultural and economic involvement, which became more intricate over time due to the influence of NSDAP theoretician Alfred Rosenberg.
So what finally changed Hitler's mind? Mostly World War II and the lead up to it. In late 1937 key ministers in Hitler's government, von Neurath (Foreign Office), Hjalmar Schacht (Economics), Field Marshal von Blomberg (War) , all right wing holdovers from the Wiemar Republic, were replaced by von Ribbentrop, Goering and Hitler himself. “Within a space of three months Hitler had effectively neutralized the army, Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economics as impediments to his plans for war.” (pp146). When Germany expanded its frontiers it found itself in a situation where the Reich contained millions of Jews but, as of early 1938 less than half of Germany's 1933 population of 561,000 Jews had left. Something had to be done to pick up the pace. After the Anschluss in Austria, unencumbered by the established bureaucracy of the Altreich in Germany itself, Eichamann and the SD took up the gauntlet and began to round up Austrian Jews, confiscate their assets and deport them.
The Haavara agreement effectively ended in 1939 after Britain declared war which closed the gates to dealing with Germany. At no point did it significantly add to Germany's revenues. According to Appendix 8, from 1933-39 a total of 105.7 million RM was transferred to Palestine and we could assume that all of it went back to Germany to purchase goods. Between 1929 and 1932, the only years Nicosia gives figures for, German GDP had dropped from 26.9 billion RM to a low of 10.4 billion RM. At best in any given year it would have accounted for less than a fifth to 3/10ths of 1% of GDP, the highest year being 1937 with a transfer of 31.4 million RM. In contrast, following the events of Kristalnacht in 1938, Nicosea reports that the Reich was so needy for capital to finance military expansion that it fined the Jewish community 1 billion RM for damages that occurred in Kristalnacht, the Nazi provoked attack on Jewish shops and neighbourhoods, and confiscated the insurance monies to be paid.
It's a compelling, revealing and different analysis that ends in 1939, at which point all previous bets are removed from the table.
February 23, 2026
A fascinating analysis of Nazi German’s policy towards Palestine and, more generally, the United Kingdom and Italy. Hitler was determined to reach an understanding with the UK, which contributed to Berlin’s refusal to support Palestinians and other Arabs in their struggle for self-determination. Moreover, the determination to rid Germany of its Jewish population meant that it was in Germany’s interest to prevent Palestine from becoming an unattractive destination of Jewish immigrants, which reinforced the decision not to supply weapons or even diplomatic support to Palestinians.
Also very interesting is the description of how the Nazis were less repressive of German Zionists than of other Jews. Since Zionists reinforced the idea that Jews were of a different, unassimilable race, and encouraged them to leave Europe entirely, the Nazis could make use of the movement. Their organizations remained legal when other Jewish associations were banned; even after Kristallnacht the authorities ordered Zionist leader released from prison so as to continue their work. Under the Nuremberg laws, Jews were forbidden from flying the German flag but could fly the Zionist (now Israeli) flag with no objection
Nicosia concludes that Hitler simply didn’t care much about the Middle East or about Arabs, despite significant sympathy for his government during its early years. He wanted to cultivate good ties with Britain (to the point of insisting that Mussolini avoid encroaching on British interests in the Mediterranean), wanted German Jews to continue emigrating, wanted the economic benefits of the Haavara agreement under which German Jews could leave for Palestine in exchange for buying German goods, and wanted Jews concentrated in a single place after their departure (to avoid them spreading anti-German hatred throughout the world). As a result, he mostly ignored the region and its Arab peoples.
Also very interesting is the description of how the Nazis were less repressive of German Zionists than of other Jews. Since Zionists reinforced the idea that Jews were of a different, unassimilable race, and encouraged them to leave Europe entirely, the Nazis could make use of the movement. Their organizations remained legal when other Jewish associations were banned; even after Kristallnacht the authorities ordered Zionist leader released from prison so as to continue their work. Under the Nuremberg laws, Jews were forbidden from flying the German flag but could fly the Zionist (now Israeli) flag with no objection
Nicosia concludes that Hitler simply didn’t care much about the Middle East or about Arabs, despite significant sympathy for his government during its early years. He wanted to cultivate good ties with Britain (to the point of insisting that Mussolini avoid encroaching on British interests in the Mediterranean), wanted German Jews to continue emigrating, wanted the economic benefits of the Haavara agreement under which German Jews could leave for Palestine in exchange for buying German goods, and wanted Jews concentrated in a single place after their departure (to avoid them spreading anti-German hatred throughout the world). As a result, he mostly ignored the region and its Arab peoples.
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April 9, 2024nothing to say other than I learned so much -- great great place to start on the relationship between Germany, Zionism, and Palestinian national aspirations
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