CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION:
Has modernization sparked a decline in religious beliefs, behaviors, and belongings? If so, how (in a descriptive sense) and why (in an explanatory sense)?
THESIS or THESES:
There is enough empirical evidence to claim that modernization causes a decrease in religious beliefs, behaviors, and belonging.
METHODS:
Statistical analysis of cross-national survey data, ethnography, structural-functionalist quantitative and qualitative sociology, and theory.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S):
Beyond Doubt begins with the authors’ appreciative criticism of anti-secularization theories, especially as depicted in Rodney Stark’s corpus. In demonstrating the influence and breath of anti-secularization process theories, the authors then claim that “religiosity can—and often does—diminish significantly in society.” And that “far from being a falsified myth, the secularization of many societies is readily observable by numerous objective measures” (7). In other words, religious belief, practice, and identities have remarkably declined.
However, before developing the theses of the book, the authors define religion as “the amalgamation of ideas, rituals, practices, symbols, identities, and institutions that humans collectively construct based upon their shared belief in the supernatural” (9). On the other hand, the authors, after quickly surveying literature on secularism, define secularization, at least on a microlevel, as a “a social process in which fewer people, over time, believe in supernatural claims, fewer people engage in religious behaviors, and fewer people belong to or identify with a religion” (12). After presenting data that demonstrates the decline of religious beliefs, behaviors, and belongings (13-15), the authors clarify their theses and address trivial points that scholars may highlight by way of disagreement; one such clarification is that the authors do not take religious forms and expressions to have only changed, but to have changed and declined.
At the beginning of the first chapter, the authors survey literature on secularism and subsequently provide a formal and testable theory of secularization. In surveying the literature, the authors summarize secularization theory as “modernization creates problems for religion” (22). However, the authors are careful not to equate differentiation with secularization, as they see differentiation as indicator of an increased likelihood of secularization. Nevertheless, the authors theoretically insist that differentiation, rationalization, and specialization increase the likelihood of secularization (23-29). After theoretically developing their concept of secularization, the authors then trace classic secularization theories. From Max Weber’s contention that rationalization leads to disenchantment and Durkheim’s theory of differentiation to Berger’s concept of the sacred canopy and Inglehart’s notion of existential security, the authors show how principal figures in sociology have theorized secularism (30-35). Doing so allows the authors to address various critiques of secularization theory: namely, the religious economies model and the change not decline argument (37-45). While disagreeing with these two critiques, the authors note that they do not think secularization is inevitable, that secularization can, in rare cases, be reversed, and that the book does not offer a macro structural-functionalist theory, but a mid-theory narrowly focused on religion (46-51).
Given the authors surveyed literature and developed their theories, they then turn to empirical data. Beginning with a story on the demise of Christianity in Scotland, the authors illustrate how religious behaviors (understood as participation in religious services), belonging (construed as identification with a religion), and belief in god(s), have, in near unanimity, declined throughout the world (53-66). One notable exception includes a rise in religious participation in post-Soviet Union countries (59). The authors then briefly demonstrate that low development in a region increases the likelihood of religiosity in that region—and vice versa.
Building on the work of the second chapter, the authors closely inspect secularization in Norway, Chile, South Korea, and the United States. However, the authors now expand their data to account for beliefs in heaven, hell, miracles, spirituality, and life after death. First, the authors show how the disestablishment of the Church of Norway caused people to become less religious (72-77). Then, turning to Catholicism in Chile, the authors acknowledge that though most Chileans believe in God, life after death, heaven, and religious miracles, they nonetheless insist, via analysis of survey data, that the secularization process is not limited to the highly developed West (78-82). The authors then focus on South Korea and—against Stark & Co. who have cited South Korean evangelical Christianity as evidence against secularization—illustrate how modernization since 2005 has decreased religiosity and, perhaps, is increasing skepticism towards the Americanization of South Korea (83-88). To conclude the chapter, the authors refute the idea that the United States is an exception to secularization (89-96).
Changing methodologies, chapter four is where the authors address the idea that religion is innate and secularism is unnatural. The chapter reveals that nonreligious people have existed throughout history, many people today are not religious, a growing number of societies are increasingly secular, and people raised without religion tend to say areligious (98). To refute the idea that religion is normal/healthy/given, the authors delineate between those who understand all human activity, including religion, as ‘natural’ and those who view religion as ‘normal’ or ‘healthy.’ In other words, they call this thesis “religion as correctly natural and secularity as problematically unnatural” (99). After debunking the presumed naturality of religion, the authors trace a long durée of atheist people/groups in human history (101-103). This tracing leads the authors to a discussion on the millions of secular people in the contemporary world; such evidence demonstrates the illogical nature of claims which presume religion to be natural and innate. After speculation on the origins of religion, the authors state that religion continues to persist because of socialization; by this they mean that people adopted the behaviors and norms of those in their social spheres (108-113).
Once again shifting methodologies and goals, the fifth chapter is driven by the authors’ aim to portray what secular life looks like in highly secularized contexts. From religious indifference as an indicator of late stage secularism and ethical values as determinative of social life to various forms of community engagement and life-cycle rituals, secular people are a far cry from the immoral and meaningless heathens that many conservative religious people construe them as (116-128). While also addressing how secular people understand and appreciate raising children, ageing, and dealing with crises, the authors demonstrate that secular people do not inevitability ‘give up’ on secularity and turn to religion at a turning point in life (129-138).
The final chapter of the book analyses possible exceptions to the secularization process. The three supposed exceptions to the secularization process that the authors address are cultural defense, government restrictions, and forced secularization. The authors understand these supposed exceptions, relatively, as “religiosity is used to generate solidarity among the citizens in defense of an external threat, countries that restrict people’s ability to leave religion, and countries that try to force secularization all have low levels of differentiation” (159). However, in focusing on specific countries that are usually referenced as exceptions to this process, the authors conclude that the often-cited countries do not have both high levels of differentiated and rationalization. In other words, the countries in the study are not exceptions.
SCHOLARS THE AUTHOR IS IN CONVERSATION WITH:
Rodney Stark, Auguste Comte, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Peter Burger, and Christian Smith.
CRITICISM:
• The depiction of secularization and modernization in this work are largely passive. The authors pay little attention to who causes modernization and why; if they were to further inspect this non-passive development of modernization, it would lead them to critically assess, in concert with theorists and historians of slavery, colonialism, and capitalism, their categories of modernization, secularization, and rationalization.
• If rationalization (understood as technological efficiency, empirical/scientific evidence, etc.) is a contributing factor to secularization, as the authors repeatedly claim, then I would take it that a brief study on the deep irrationality of modernity, such as the creation of humanity’s extinction, may complicate this notion of rationalization and secularism. Modern societies do not seem, on a macro, meso, and micro level, to be characterized by rationalization; as such, I would press these authors to critically reformulate the relationship between secularism and rationalization.
• Though the authors note that secularization can in rare insistences be reversed (47), I would think that Israel must be an exception to this theory of secularization? I know that the de-secularization of Israel has to do with starkly different birth-rates between orthodox and non-orthodox Jews; however, I would think the authors should address how the increasing rationalization and modernization of Israel has simultaneously provided grounds for a massive increase in religious activity. (Note: I later found an interview with the authors in which they state that they should have written a chapter on Israel.)
• I understand why the authors are hesitant to claim that this project is a macro-structuralist theory, as they take religion to not be a determining factor of all life; however, part of me wanted them to own it and say with their chest that “macro-structuralist theories are f*cking back.” This is a transhistorical argument that accounts for the absence or presence of belief, practice, and institutional affiliation—just claim that this is a macro-theory and prove it!
• The authors use GDP data as if it were an empirical metric of modernization. This is an issue because GDP data is not empirical. It is a set of made-up numbers imagined to indicate economic growth or degrowth. Thus, the authors would need to rely on other data to define and indicate modernization. Otherwise, the author’s demonstration of modernization is commendable.
PRAISE:
Stylistically, the authors do a nice job of balancing a plethora of empirical data with an engaging and fluid writing style. Though similar in content to Casanova, this book was a more enjoyable and appealing read.
I appreciate how much attention the authors gave to the vast amount of literature on secularism, secularization, and secularity. Similarly, they did as much while not needlessly addressing every theoretical controversy that has preoccupied other scholars of secularism.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND PATHS FORWARD:
Can anyone empirically say what the density of religious beliefs, practice, and institutions was in the early United States? I was under the impression that it was a low density of religion; however, these authors insist that (e.g., 25) it was certainly more religious than the contemporary United States.
AUTHOR’S UNDERSTANDING OF “Secular, Secularism, Secularization, or Secularity”:
In short, the authors’ understanding of secularization is “a social process in which fewer people, over time, believe in supernatural claims, fewer people engage in religious behaviors, and fewer people belong to or identify with a religion” (12). As far as secularism is concerned, the authors insist in chapter five that secularism is a set of non-religious patterns, ethics, norms, and values that allow secular people to live meaningful and purposeful lives in such a way that does not rely on religious beliefs, practices, and institutions.