One of the least known stories of World War II, Operation Mars was a military disaster on an epic scale. Designed to dislodge the German Army from its position west of Moscow, Mars cost the Soviets an estimated 335,000 dead, missing, and wounded men and over 1,600 tanks. But in Russian history books, it was a battle that never happened. It became instead another victim of Stalin's postwar censorship. David Glantz now offers the first definitive account of this forgotten catastrophe, revealing the key players and detailing the major events of Operation Mars. Using neglected sources in both German and Russian archives, he reconstructs the historical context of Mars and reviews the entire operation from High Command to platoon level. Orchestrated and led by Marshal Georgy Kostantinovich Zhukov, one of the Soviet Union's great military heroes, the twin operations Mars and Uranus formed the centerpiece of Soviet strategic efforts in the fall of 1942. Launched in tandem with Operation Uranus, the successful counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Mars proved a monumental setback. Fought in bad weather and on impossible terrain, the ambitious offensive faltered (despite spectacular initial success in some sectors). Zhukov kept sending in more troops and tanks only to see them decimated by the entrenched Germans. Illuminating the painful progress of Operation Mars with vivid battle scenes and numerous maps and illustrations, Glantz presents Mars as a major failure of Zhukov's renowned command. Yet, both during and after the war, that failure was masked from public view by the successful Stalingrad operation, thus eliminating any stain from Zhukov's public image as a hero of the Great PatrioticWar. For three grueling weeks, Operation Mars was one of the most tragic and agonizing episodes in Soviet military history. Glantz's reconstruction of that failed offensive fills a major gap in our knowledge of World War II, even as it raises important questions about the reputations of national military heroes.
David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
This is so far in English the most comprehensive account of a forgotten German victory of World War II, overshadowed by events at Stalingrad and conveniently forgotten by the Soviets, as it did not show Zhukov and Konev at their best. That said, this is clearly a book for the expert and is very detail oriented. The dramatic flourishes, where encountered, seem at odds with the mostly dry prose. Either way, this is first rate research even if not the best read.
A detailed study of Operation Mars, a Soviet offensive against the Rzhev Salient to the west of Moscow in late November 1942. The narrative is a very detailed and well researched study of operations and strategy, with little attention to air combat or logistics, and should be familiar to anyone who has read his other works. His argument, that Mars was intended to be an equal or even larger counterpart to Operation Uranus - the Soviet offensive to encircle Stalingrad - is well crafted but has received significant criticism from other military historians. It is by no means the final word on the topic. According to Glantz the rather grandiose title was chosen by the publisher, not he, so don't let it dissuade you. Despite some faults, it's an excellent work about a little known operation of the war and should definitely be read.
Great and detailed analysis of one of WW2 less known operations. David Glantz shows himself again as the top western expert on the Eastern front. However, I think he goes a little too far in telling what were the thoughts and feelings and many commanders in each moment, since there is no actual data to support those. Nonetheless - an excellent book by a great scholar.
A straight military history about one of the worst military campaigns executed by arguable the USSR’s greatest general. Poor planning for logistics, weather and stronger than expected military resistance from the Germans turned this into a costly setback operationally for the Soviets, especially in lost equipment and men. Yet, Mars was executed concurrently with Saturn and Uranus, which focused on the Southern front and the back-breaking loss for the Nazis at Stalingrad. Thus, this campaign got buried in military history.
Overall, a jam-packed book full of military actions and accounts. Credit that it used the source material that it did, but it could get very into the weeds on military terminology. Worth a read for the military history student, but not much beyond that.
An in depth and pioneering work on a difficult subject. It was much better than his book on Leningrad. This is not a book for beginners, but rather only those well read on the Soviets" war. It also differs from Beevor's work in that there is little human content.
The book should definitely help the Western reader better appreciate the Soviet fight against Germany.
A really good book overall about one of WWIIs largest and most forgotten battles. Glantz states that Mars was not a "diversion " as later Soviet history would say, but was ver much a serious a and ambitious offensive designed to crush German Army Group Center. Glantz did an excellent job of researching the Soviet archives to come up with the evidence.
I have discovered that in all history, someone makes a statement about an event, and then it's repeated as fact for decades without any critical thinking or discussion. Operation Mars is a great example of this. For over 50 years, the official Soviet version has been cited by numerous historians without questioning it. Until now. Glantz said his real purpose was to honor the dead and wounded men of this operation that have been forgotten for too long. Amen to that.
A well laid out presentation of an epic offensive that has been left out of the lime light. The Soviet Operation Mars was to be equal, if not larger than it's more famous sibling, Operation Uranus-The Stalingrad offensive. Unfortunately for the Soviets it failed spectacularly. The German 9th Army under Walter Model was able to hold off 4 Soviet Armies and prevent them from crushing the Rhzev salient in November/December 1942. David Glantz explains the preparation for and the commanders who were involved in this enormous catastrophe. Aided by appropriate maps he explains how each Soviet Army fared as well as what the Germans did to stave off their own annihilation. A must read for anyone interested in the Eastern Front in World War 2.
I hate giving up on a great book, but this is unreadable. I have read other reviews, and I absolutely agree with the 5-star ratings and their reviews. What amazes me is how they read this book WITHOUT maps. I have tried the National Geographic Atlas, Google Earth, Google Maps, WWII atlases, and other atlases that might have a hint of coverage, but without success. How Mr. Glantz and his editors came up with the idea for black lettering on dark grey background is beyond me. They then jam 15 Soviet Union units in white into three square inches. They are unreadable and unusable. If they had given the attention to the maps that they did on the appendices, I would be sailing through. Even a Glantz Atlas for all his books at $40-60 would be a bargain. I hope someone has a solution.
This is a very detailed book on a part of the war that was highly unknown. The author's writing style is dry and it can be a chore to get through certain parts of it. Although the book has several maps, they are almost unreadable with their dark gray background.