A brisk, deeply reported answer to a familiar question: why do good people (cops, here) turn bad?
The answer is complicated (of course it is). The RCMP Security Service, in Sawatsky’s telling, was hampered by a number of factors: the force’s traditions and structure; oversight that oscillated between “Don’t tell us anything” and “Document everything”; and the gulf between the Mounties’ expertise (policing) and their mission (spying).
These problems with the Security Service are outlined in rigorous detail, which fits Sawatsky’s status as a demigod in Canadian media. It’s an impressive work of history that shows the value of beat reporters — it’s hard to imagine a metro daily’s Ottawa reporter having the time and resources to pursue this kind of investigation. (For that matter, few dailies even have Ottawa reporters today.)
Still, by blaming institutional issues for institutional failures, he can forget the individuals responsible. The chapter devoted to two Mounties who were blackballed by the Force’s leadership goes into way more detail than it merits, and while the criticism is valid, it reads more like a grievance from McCleery and Brunet rather than a piece of reporting.
At the same time, the Quebec section’s crimes are, with a few exceptions, summarized in a hurry. This probably doesn’t reflect malice so much as the banal reality that anglophone Canadian institutions don’t put much effort into understanding Quebec. (Sawtasky mentions this same problem when discussing the RCMP’s failures in the October Crisis.) This incomplete picture is unfortunate, because the pivot from anti-Soviet activity to anti-Quebec activity is a useful case study in how quickly the enemy du jour can change. Maybe the October Crisis and its consequences were old news to readers in 1980.
It’s odd to read a contemporaneous book about the Cold War, because it reflects in the attitudes of the time: paranoia around Soviet intrusion, frustration with domestic sympathizers, belief in the west’s inherent virtue. Forty years later, this conventional wisdom looks dated and silly. The fall of the Soviet Union and the passage of time are not Sawatsky’s fault, but he doesn’t go out of his way to question leaders’ attitudes. This is especially striking when he discusses the pursuit and suicide of Herbert Norman, which is a haunting story that I’m shocked I hadn’t heard before.
To his credit, Sawatsky does (sort of) explore the causes of criminality. It’s a bit of a soapbox moment in chapter 19, but he makes his point forcefully: of course cops broke the law. We practically asked them to. Maybe he would have produced a different answer if he had more non-police sources.