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Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War
How the Grand Alliance of World War II succeeded ― and then collapsed ― because of personal politics
In the spring of 1945, as the Allied victory in Europe was approaching, the shape of the postwar world hinged on the personal politics and flawed personalities of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Roosevelt's Lost Alliances captures this moment and shows how FDR crafted a winning coalition by overcoming the different habits, upbringings, sympathies, and past experiences of the three leaders. In particular, Roosevelt trained his famous charm on Stalin, lavishing respect on him, salving his insecurities, and rendering him more amenable to compromise on some matters.
Yet, even as he pursued a lasting peace, FDR was alienating his own intimate circle of advisers and becoming dangerously isolated. After his death, postwar cooperation depended on Harry Truman, who, with very different sensibilities, heeded the embittered "Soviet experts" his predecessor had kept distant. A Grand Alliance was painstakingly built and carelessly lost. The Cold War was by no means inevitable.
This landmark study brings to light key overlooked documents, such as the Yalta diary of Roosevelt's daughter Anna; the intimate letters of Roosevelt's de facto chief of staff, Missy LeHand; and the wiretap transcripts of estranged adviser Harry Hopkins. With a gripping narrative and subtle analysis, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances lays out a new approach to foreign relations history. Frank Costigliola highlights the interplay between national political interests and more contingent factors, such as the personalities of leaders and the culturally conditioned emotions forming their perceptions and driving their actions. Foreign relations flowed from personal politics―a lesson pertinent to historians, diplomats, and citizens alike.
In the spring of 1945, as the Allied victory in Europe was approaching, the shape of the postwar world hinged on the personal politics and flawed personalities of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Roosevelt's Lost Alliances captures this moment and shows how FDR crafted a winning coalition by overcoming the different habits, upbringings, sympathies, and past experiences of the three leaders. In particular, Roosevelt trained his famous charm on Stalin, lavishing respect on him, salving his insecurities, and rendering him more amenable to compromise on some matters.
Yet, even as he pursued a lasting peace, FDR was alienating his own intimate circle of advisers and becoming dangerously isolated. After his death, postwar cooperation depended on Harry Truman, who, with very different sensibilities, heeded the embittered "Soviet experts" his predecessor had kept distant. A Grand Alliance was painstakingly built and carelessly lost. The Cold War was by no means inevitable.
This landmark study brings to light key overlooked documents, such as the Yalta diary of Roosevelt's daughter Anna; the intimate letters of Roosevelt's de facto chief of staff, Missy LeHand; and the wiretap transcripts of estranged adviser Harry Hopkins. With a gripping narrative and subtle analysis, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances lays out a new approach to foreign relations history. Frank Costigliola highlights the interplay between national political interests and more contingent factors, such as the personalities of leaders and the culturally conditioned emotions forming their perceptions and driving their actions. Foreign relations flowed from personal politics―a lesson pertinent to historians, diplomats, and citizens alike.
544 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
March 8, 2023
This is one of the very best books, history or otherwise, I've read in a long time. Americans believe in myths about American exceptionalism. Fighting the Cold War is one, another is the area bombing in World War 2. This book breaks new ground, at least for me, and sets the record straight regarding the causes of the Cold War. Bottom line, if FDR had lived at least a few years longer, the resources and lives of a generation or two of Americans wouldn't have been wasted fighting proxy wars with the Russians. Unfortunately, Truman surrounded himself with the persons who most hated them, considering the Russians barbaric, inferior, and would always back down to force, which never worked. Now, in 2023, we're doing it again. Has anyone asked why we are fighting a proxy war with the Russians now? I call it national suicide by the Ukrainians. Professor Costigliola is nothing short of brilliant!!!
June 1, 2023
After I had finished Professor Costigliola's recent superb biography of George Kennan (Kennan: A Life between Worlds), I was curious about what other books this able historian might have written. And my investigation led me to this 2012 work.
I found it to be an enjoyable, fascinating experience, just as I had felt about his book on Kennan. Even more importantly, however, I cannot overpraise it for effectively putting to rest (at least for me) some of the uglier distortions about Roosevelt, his relational and negotiating skills, and the magnitude of what he actually did accomplish that have circulated on the Right for well over half a century.
It has long since become an article of faith for many of these more extreme conservatives that Roosevelt “betrayed the West” by foolishly trusting Stalin and, thereby, “giving Stalin” too much territory in the closing months of the Second World War. A whole industry has sprung up to discredit Roosevelt and the Yalta Conference, for instance.
Equally corrosive has been the assertion by these same folks that it was Truman – not Roosevelt and his advisors – who correctly perceived that the Soviets were never to be trusted and that the only thing they ever understood was overwhelming military force and the willingness to use it.
There is an interesting thread in this argument, as it echoes what became the perceived “wisdom” about Wilson and his hope for a functioning League of Nations – that is, that any such effort not only wrongly places limits about the sacred sovereignty of the United States, but that the necessary consequent involvement with so many other nations will only serve to “tie us down” and “interfere with the unique American experiment.” Another threat is that the Right always needs an “enemy” to rail against!
What I think Costigliola demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt was that Roosevelt had forged a working relationship with Stalin and, moreover, had than endured after the war – as both Roosevelt and Stalin intended – what we know of as the “Cold War” probably never would have happened!
So, then, since the Cold war did happen, how can we explain this?
Like the best historians of which he is certainly a member, while Costigliola clearly admires Roosevelt as a person and believes that had he lived the post-war events that so quickly went sour would likely not have occurred, he does not downplay or shy away from portraying Roosevelt’s weaknesses, either. In reading of the key figures of the past 200 years, I am reminded repeatedly of the reality of hubris which played such a pivotal role in so many of the ancient Greek plays.
Hubris is having such excessive pride (or what we would call self-confidence) that persons are effectively blind to what they do not know – or that they overestimate the scope of their knowledge and understanding – that inevitably leads them to nemesis, the Greek term for the inescapable cause of one’s downfall.
FDR had an incredible ability to charm those with whom he came in contact in such a way that they felt themselves both taken into his confidence as well as valued for their ideas and proposals, even though throughout Roosevelt managed to remain somewhat aloof and dispassionate. He was able to convey the idea of familiarity without committing himself to it. This was one of the reasons that throughout his life so many people of significant talent were attracted to him.
Roosevelt was not false or insincere, however. He genuinely loved being with other people and drank in all of their uniqueness. In this respect, he was very different from Woodrow Wilson who really preferred solitude to being with others, especially crowds. Thus, while Wilson was susceptible to being strongly influenced by someone whom he allowed to get close – say, a key advisor such as Colonel House – Roosevelt was able to pick and choose, to sort wisdom and wise tactics from less worthy ideas or advice.
Even before the US entry into the war, FDR recognized that its outcome would have a direct impact upon the United States and, therefore, from the first was determined to do all that he could to ensure that Great Britain – which stood alone after the Nazi’s lightening invasion and conquest of the Low Countries and France – would remain free from Hitler’s control. Thus he early intentionally developed a close working relationship with England’s Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.
But this was by no means easy, since the vast majority of American citizens in the late 30s and early 40s felt just as their ancestors had during the First World War – that is, we want no part of it! We must stay out of this fight! Roosevelt was in a situation much like damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Later critics have occasionally faulted him for not doing more to prepare America for war. Well, this is very hard to do when citizens are against such preparation and where Congress was very reluctant to approve any such funding.
Nonetheless, FDR steadily worked to both supply England with the resources she so badly needed and worked to convince the Congress and the American people that this was a contest we could not avoid. Of course, all debate about that ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 and when, after only the passage of just a few days, Germany declared war on the United States.
Immediately Great Britain began pressing the US even more urgently for more supplies: boats, planes, vehicles! The difficulty we then faced was the challenge of rapidly gearing up to supply not only Britain but ourselves; especially after the near-total destruction of the Pacific fleet, we were unable to do much in the first few months after our entry into the war to defer the Japanese, let alone the Germans.
With the Russians now bearing the brunt of the Nazi army’s attacks, Stalin – who had lost a foolish bet that Hitler would honor the treaty hastily concluded between them only a short time before – also began pressuring both England and the US for starting a “second front” in the West in order to help weaken the German invasion of his country. Such a front actually didn’t begin until 1944, although the allies did attack Italy and sent forces to counter Germany in Africa.
Roosevelt quickly went to work to establish a close association with Josef Stalin similar to that which he had established with Churchill, and there is every indication that the two men indeed did establish a remarkable level of trust in one another.
Costigliola shows that Roosevelt and Stalin came to a mutual understanding on several important points:
First, that it was vital that after the war’s conclusion the victorious powers – especially the US, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain – continue to cooperate and work closely to allow for the successful suppression of Germany and the much-needed reconstruction in those countries that had borne the brunt of the war. Since Great Britain had been badly wounded in this war, Stalin believed that his alliance with the US was of vital importance.
Second, Roosevelt understood Stalin’s desire to have “friendly” states along his western border, since it had been through this border that Russia had been attacked three times in the previous 150 years. Now “friendly” did not necessarily mean communist states, but it certainly required nations controlled by forces who would work closely with Russia. This is important, because the Right has since argued that just as the US under Truman “lost China to the Reds” in 1949, so also had FDR effectively “surrendered much of central and eastern Europe to the Communist Soviet Union at Yalta.” In fact, the territorial understandings reached at Yalta by Stalin and Roosevelt simply recognized the fact that those nations were already occupied by Soviet troops. FDR “gave away” nothing since “we” did not control the situation on the ground.
Most tragically, however, and it was what Costigliola recognizes as his fatal flaw, was that Roosevelt did not keep many of his advisors – let alone his vice-president Harry Truman – aware of his plans and intentions during the crucial final months of the war. It was not just that he did not share with them his plans for the future, but also – and, arguably, even more important – they whys and hows behind his reasoning. He really believed that Stalin would honor their understanding precisely because it was to Stalin’s – and Russia’s – best interest to do so. Stalin needed a partnership with the US to preserve the hard-won peace and, as Costigliola points out, so that Stalin could engage in the necessary reconstruction of his ravaged country.
However, with Roosevelt’s tragic death the postwar agreements he believed he had reached with Stalin quickly fell apart in major part because he had not shared his plans or reasoning, but also because Truman – and those upon whom he came to lean for advice – did not share (or understand) Roosevelt’s conviction that the Soviets could be trusted to keep their agreements.
In a piece-by-piece dissection of events after Roosevelt’s death, Costigliola shows how the US’ new truculence caused a not surprising reaction in a fairly short time by Stalin. It didn’t take long for both sides’ statements and actions to cause those most suspicious of each other in both countries to conclude that they had been right all along.
I was so moved by this powerful book and the remarkable professionalism of its author that I sent an email to Professor Costigliola briefly stating my reactions. Surprisingly, he responded within hours, thanking me for sharing my thoughts, and adding that he really believed that things would have turned out differently and for the better had Roosevelt managed to survive into the postwar world.
Somethings, however, are apparently just not meant to be.
I found it to be an enjoyable, fascinating experience, just as I had felt about his book on Kennan. Even more importantly, however, I cannot overpraise it for effectively putting to rest (at least for me) some of the uglier distortions about Roosevelt, his relational and negotiating skills, and the magnitude of what he actually did accomplish that have circulated on the Right for well over half a century.
It has long since become an article of faith for many of these more extreme conservatives that Roosevelt “betrayed the West” by foolishly trusting Stalin and, thereby, “giving Stalin” too much territory in the closing months of the Second World War. A whole industry has sprung up to discredit Roosevelt and the Yalta Conference, for instance.
Equally corrosive has been the assertion by these same folks that it was Truman – not Roosevelt and his advisors – who correctly perceived that the Soviets were never to be trusted and that the only thing they ever understood was overwhelming military force and the willingness to use it.
There is an interesting thread in this argument, as it echoes what became the perceived “wisdom” about Wilson and his hope for a functioning League of Nations – that is, that any such effort not only wrongly places limits about the sacred sovereignty of the United States, but that the necessary consequent involvement with so many other nations will only serve to “tie us down” and “interfere with the unique American experiment.” Another threat is that the Right always needs an “enemy” to rail against!
What I think Costigliola demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt was that Roosevelt had forged a working relationship with Stalin and, moreover, had than endured after the war – as both Roosevelt and Stalin intended – what we know of as the “Cold War” probably never would have happened!
So, then, since the Cold war did happen, how can we explain this?
Like the best historians of which he is certainly a member, while Costigliola clearly admires Roosevelt as a person and believes that had he lived the post-war events that so quickly went sour would likely not have occurred, he does not downplay or shy away from portraying Roosevelt’s weaknesses, either. In reading of the key figures of the past 200 years, I am reminded repeatedly of the reality of hubris which played such a pivotal role in so many of the ancient Greek plays.
Hubris is having such excessive pride (or what we would call self-confidence) that persons are effectively blind to what they do not know – or that they overestimate the scope of their knowledge and understanding – that inevitably leads them to nemesis, the Greek term for the inescapable cause of one’s downfall.
FDR had an incredible ability to charm those with whom he came in contact in such a way that they felt themselves both taken into his confidence as well as valued for their ideas and proposals, even though throughout Roosevelt managed to remain somewhat aloof and dispassionate. He was able to convey the idea of familiarity without committing himself to it. This was one of the reasons that throughout his life so many people of significant talent were attracted to him.
Roosevelt was not false or insincere, however. He genuinely loved being with other people and drank in all of their uniqueness. In this respect, he was very different from Woodrow Wilson who really preferred solitude to being with others, especially crowds. Thus, while Wilson was susceptible to being strongly influenced by someone whom he allowed to get close – say, a key advisor such as Colonel House – Roosevelt was able to pick and choose, to sort wisdom and wise tactics from less worthy ideas or advice.
Even before the US entry into the war, FDR recognized that its outcome would have a direct impact upon the United States and, therefore, from the first was determined to do all that he could to ensure that Great Britain – which stood alone after the Nazi’s lightening invasion and conquest of the Low Countries and France – would remain free from Hitler’s control. Thus he early intentionally developed a close working relationship with England’s Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.
But this was by no means easy, since the vast majority of American citizens in the late 30s and early 40s felt just as their ancestors had during the First World War – that is, we want no part of it! We must stay out of this fight! Roosevelt was in a situation much like damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Later critics have occasionally faulted him for not doing more to prepare America for war. Well, this is very hard to do when citizens are against such preparation and where Congress was very reluctant to approve any such funding.
Nonetheless, FDR steadily worked to both supply England with the resources she so badly needed and worked to convince the Congress and the American people that this was a contest we could not avoid. Of course, all debate about that ended with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 and when, after only the passage of just a few days, Germany declared war on the United States.
Immediately Great Britain began pressing the US even more urgently for more supplies: boats, planes, vehicles! The difficulty we then faced was the challenge of rapidly gearing up to supply not only Britain but ourselves; especially after the near-total destruction of the Pacific fleet, we were unable to do much in the first few months after our entry into the war to defer the Japanese, let alone the Germans.
With the Russians now bearing the brunt of the Nazi army’s attacks, Stalin – who had lost a foolish bet that Hitler would honor the treaty hastily concluded between them only a short time before – also began pressuring both England and the US for starting a “second front” in the West in order to help weaken the German invasion of his country. Such a front actually didn’t begin until 1944, although the allies did attack Italy and sent forces to counter Germany in Africa.
Roosevelt quickly went to work to establish a close association with Josef Stalin similar to that which he had established with Churchill, and there is every indication that the two men indeed did establish a remarkable level of trust in one another.
Costigliola shows that Roosevelt and Stalin came to a mutual understanding on several important points:
First, that it was vital that after the war’s conclusion the victorious powers – especially the US, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain – continue to cooperate and work closely to allow for the successful suppression of Germany and the much-needed reconstruction in those countries that had borne the brunt of the war. Since Great Britain had been badly wounded in this war, Stalin believed that his alliance with the US was of vital importance.
Second, Roosevelt understood Stalin’s desire to have “friendly” states along his western border, since it had been through this border that Russia had been attacked three times in the previous 150 years. Now “friendly” did not necessarily mean communist states, but it certainly required nations controlled by forces who would work closely with Russia. This is important, because the Right has since argued that just as the US under Truman “lost China to the Reds” in 1949, so also had FDR effectively “surrendered much of central and eastern Europe to the Communist Soviet Union at Yalta.” In fact, the territorial understandings reached at Yalta by Stalin and Roosevelt simply recognized the fact that those nations were already occupied by Soviet troops. FDR “gave away” nothing since “we” did not control the situation on the ground.
Most tragically, however, and it was what Costigliola recognizes as his fatal flaw, was that Roosevelt did not keep many of his advisors – let alone his vice-president Harry Truman – aware of his plans and intentions during the crucial final months of the war. It was not just that he did not share with them his plans for the future, but also – and, arguably, even more important – they whys and hows behind his reasoning. He really believed that Stalin would honor their understanding precisely because it was to Stalin’s – and Russia’s – best interest to do so. Stalin needed a partnership with the US to preserve the hard-won peace and, as Costigliola points out, so that Stalin could engage in the necessary reconstruction of his ravaged country.
However, with Roosevelt’s tragic death the postwar agreements he believed he had reached with Stalin quickly fell apart in major part because he had not shared his plans or reasoning, but also because Truman – and those upon whom he came to lean for advice – did not share (or understand) Roosevelt’s conviction that the Soviets could be trusted to keep their agreements.
In a piece-by-piece dissection of events after Roosevelt’s death, Costigliola shows how the US’ new truculence caused a not surprising reaction in a fairly short time by Stalin. It didn’t take long for both sides’ statements and actions to cause those most suspicious of each other in both countries to conclude that they had been right all along.
I was so moved by this powerful book and the remarkable professionalism of its author that I sent an email to Professor Costigliola briefly stating my reactions. Surprisingly, he responded within hours, thanking me for sharing my thoughts, and adding that he really believed that things would have turned out differently and for the better had Roosevelt managed to survive into the postwar world.
Somethings, however, are apparently just not meant to be.
September 26, 2014
Read this for a grad class.
I enjoyed reading this book, but I also very much understand the criticisms. The very fact that it's super readable and entertaining comes from the not-so-reliable or convincing evidence Costigliola utilizes. The effect of personal politics is very intriguing, but the speculation and rather liberal interpretation are concerning.
But let's be honest, my chief complaint is that I now have a way too clear of an image of naked Churchill in my head. Mer.
I enjoyed reading this book, but I also very much understand the criticisms. The very fact that it's super readable and entertaining comes from the not-so-reliable or convincing evidence Costigliola utilizes. The effect of personal politics is very intriguing, but the speculation and rather liberal interpretation are concerning.
But let's be honest, my chief complaint is that I now have a way too clear of an image of naked Churchill in my head. Mer.
October 30, 2019
The thesis of this book is that during WW II Franklin Roosevelt built relationships with Churchill and Stalin so that after the war a United Nations policed by the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR and maybe China would enforce a peace amongst the nations. This framework was dismantled by disgruntled State Department and British Foreign Office personnel, people who hated the insularity of the USSR towards foreigners. Their venomous attitudes shaped American policy. The Soviets responded first with confusion and disappointment, then with stubborn refusal to submit to the dictates of the US and Britain. The result was the Cold War and our dysfunctional United Nations .
I found the evidence presented convincing and the documentation impressive. The narrative was well organized and readable.
I found the evidence presented convincing and the documentation impressive. The narrative was well organized and readable.
May 28, 2021
A thoroughly interesting study. Whether one ultimately finds the author's main claims to be convincing or not, the book is full of thought-provoking and detailed insights, and is therefore well worth reading.
August 1, 2025
DNF at 258. I tried. I did. But I don’t care enough about the subject matter, nor did I think the book was well-written. I have no idea who recommended this book, but it was not for me.
June 3, 2013
This book reminds of the importance of leaders in critical points in history. It provides good insights into what might have happened had FDR lived and the postwar world may have looked very different than what evolved.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews