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Reaching for the Stars: A New History of Bomber Command in World War II
The role of Bomber Command in World War II is still shrouded in mystery. This book provides a new and revisionary narrative of the campaign, serving as both a military history and an investigation into how modern perceptions of Bomber Command have come about. It shows why Bomber Command - in one of the largest and bloodiest campaigns of the war with 55,000 aircrew lost - has received so much attention yet remains a "lost sheep" among British wartime glories, and is still dogged by controversy.
280 pages, Hardcover
First published May 4, 2001
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January 10, 2025
Great apologetic for Bomber Command and Harris written in an accessible and entertaining way. Constrasts 'post-war recrimination' (Overy) to the widespread support of Bomber Command during the war. Similar to Adrian Gregory (but WWII not WWI) in seeking to disentagle contemporary attitudes from jugements made in hindsight.
Area bombing intended to weaken enemy morale by targeting civilian not conceived by Harris in 1942. Advocated by Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the RAF from 1918-29: "moral effect of bombing stands to the material effect in proportion of 20 to 1". Not to say it wasn't controversial; the 1937 Western Air Plans prescribed the precision bombing military-industrial targets rather than housing or morale (e.g. Kiel Canal, German navy, Ruhr etc.).
Precision bombing attempted in early years of the war, but too inaccurate to be a viable strategy. Utilisation of 'you started it' argument to gradually broaden campaign: first raid on German soil on 19/3/1940 only after German bombing of Scapa Flow. However, did not always rely on reprisal justification - Charles Portal argued for area bombing and attacking morale before the Blitz.
Move to area bombing with 9/7/1941 directive for Bomber Command to destroy "the morale of the civil population as a whole". However, key moment was Harris's appointment which accelerated the bombing campaign: Lubeck, Rostock, Cologne, formation of Pathfinders, Battle of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and then Berlin.
Evidence for popular support in the 1940s largely derived from newspapers and propaganda films, which, as could be expected, exaggerated Bomber Command's accuracy and effectiveness. The media justified bombing by emphasising either its precision against military targets, or its nature as just revenge for Nazi brutality against civilians. Doesn't ignore the contemporary criticisms levelled against area bombing by the Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing and Bishop George Bell
Convincing argument that the hiding from the public of the policy of intentionally bombing civilians (as well as the inaccuracy exposed by the Butt Report) aided this positive reception. Bolder claim that the public would have been receptive in any case, as they were in a fight for national survival. Works for 1940 to 1942, but more difficult proposition for 1944, and particularly 1945, when the tide was turning.
Aircrews themselves isolated from broader debates, focussed on completing missions and decompressing in-between (Bomber Command highest rates of VD in the RAF...).
Evidence of post-war disapproval. Harris himself distancing himself from civilian deaths, denying in his memoirs that he wanted to weaken German morale. Protests at the erection of the statue for Arthur Harris on the Strand in 1992. Distate directed towards Harris in particular, rather than the government, overestimating his control over policy. Argument that the spread of disapproval concerning area bombing was a top-down process initiated by the government seeking to distance itself from wartime atrocities: Harris used as a scapegoat. However, hotly contested: Sunday Telegraph and Daily Mail criticising 1992 protestors.
Interesting comparison of 'The Dam Busters' and 'Appointment in London', only 2 films about Bomber Command in 1950s era of nationalistic war films: idealistic image of precision bombing campaign by a plucky, stoic few (epistomised by characterisation of Guy Gibson) v. failure to hit the target & aircrew mentally unravelling.
Spirit of debunking in the 1960s in the wake of Alan Clark's 'The Donkeys. The Donkeys' chiming with the Official History, 'The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945', which dispelled wartime narratives about the skill and power of Bomber Command.
Focus shifted away from high-level strategy to the experiences of aircrews in the 1970s (social history...) with Martin Middlebrook's first book on Bomber Command published in 1973.
Area bombing intended to weaken enemy morale by targeting civilian not conceived by Harris in 1942. Advocated by Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the RAF from 1918-29: "moral effect of bombing stands to the material effect in proportion of 20 to 1". Not to say it wasn't controversial; the 1937 Western Air Plans prescribed the precision bombing military-industrial targets rather than housing or morale (e.g. Kiel Canal, German navy, Ruhr etc.).
Precision bombing attempted in early years of the war, but too inaccurate to be a viable strategy. Utilisation of 'you started it' argument to gradually broaden campaign: first raid on German soil on 19/3/1940 only after German bombing of Scapa Flow. However, did not always rely on reprisal justification - Charles Portal argued for area bombing and attacking morale before the Blitz.
Move to area bombing with 9/7/1941 directive for Bomber Command to destroy "the morale of the civil population as a whole". However, key moment was Harris's appointment which accelerated the bombing campaign: Lubeck, Rostock, Cologne, formation of Pathfinders, Battle of the Ruhr, Hamburg, and then Berlin.
Evidence for popular support in the 1940s largely derived from newspapers and propaganda films, which, as could be expected, exaggerated Bomber Command's accuracy and effectiveness. The media justified bombing by emphasising either its precision against military targets, or its nature as just revenge for Nazi brutality against civilians. Doesn't ignore the contemporary criticisms levelled against area bombing by the Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing and Bishop George Bell
Convincing argument that the hiding from the public of the policy of intentionally bombing civilians (as well as the inaccuracy exposed by the Butt Report) aided this positive reception. Bolder claim that the public would have been receptive in any case, as they were in a fight for national survival. Works for 1940 to 1942, but more difficult proposition for 1944, and particularly 1945, when the tide was turning.
Aircrews themselves isolated from broader debates, focussed on completing missions and decompressing in-between (Bomber Command highest rates of VD in the RAF...).
Evidence of post-war disapproval. Harris himself distancing himself from civilian deaths, denying in his memoirs that he wanted to weaken German morale. Protests at the erection of the statue for Arthur Harris on the Strand in 1992. Distate directed towards Harris in particular, rather than the government, overestimating his control over policy. Argument that the spread of disapproval concerning area bombing was a top-down process initiated by the government seeking to distance itself from wartime atrocities: Harris used as a scapegoat. However, hotly contested: Sunday Telegraph and Daily Mail criticising 1992 protestors.
Interesting comparison of 'The Dam Busters' and 'Appointment in London', only 2 films about Bomber Command in 1950s era of nationalistic war films: idealistic image of precision bombing campaign by a plucky, stoic few (epistomised by characterisation of Guy Gibson) v. failure to hit the target & aircrew mentally unravelling.
Spirit of debunking in the 1960s in the wake of Alan Clark's 'The Donkeys. The Donkeys' chiming with the Official History, 'The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945', which dispelled wartime narratives about the skill and power of Bomber Command.
Focus shifted away from high-level strategy to the experiences of aircrews in the 1970s (social history...) with Martin Middlebrook's first book on Bomber Command published in 1973.
Displaying 1 of 1 review