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Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis--Suez and the Brink of War
A gripping tale of international intrigue and betray-al, Eisenhower 1956 is the white-knuckle story of how President Dwight D. Eisenhower guided the United States through the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. The crisis climaxed in a tumultuous nine-day period fraught with peril just prior to the 1956 presidential election, with Great Britain, France, and Israel invading Egypt while the Soviet Union ruthlessly crushed rebellion in Hungary. David A. Nichols, a leading expert on Eisenhower’s presidency, draws on hundreds of documents declassified in the last thirty years, enabling the reader to look over Ike’s shoulder and follow him day by day, sometimes hour by hour as he grappled with the greatest international crisis of his presidency. The author uses formerly top secret minutes of National Security Council and Oval Office meetings to illuminate a crisis that threatened to escalate into global conflict. Nichols shows how two life-threatening illnesses—Eisenhower’s heart attack in September 1955 and his abdominal surgery in June 1956—took the president out of action at critical moments and contributed to missteps by his administration. In 1956, more than two thirds of Western Europe’s oil supplies transited the Suez Canal, which was run by a company controlled by the British and French, Egypt’s former colonial masters. When the United States withdrew its offer to finance the Aswan Dam in July of that year, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the canal. Without Eisenhower’s knowledge, Britain and France secretly plotted with Israel to invade Egypt and topple Nasser. On October 29—nine days before the U.S. presidential election—Israel invaded Egypt, setting the stage for a “perfect storm.” British and French forces soon began bombing Egyptian ports and airfields and landing troops who quickly routed the Egyptian army. Eisenhower condemned the attacks and pressed for a cease-fire at the United Nations. Within days, in Hungary, Soviet troops and tanks were killing thousands to suppress that nation’s bid for freedom. When Moscow openly threatened to intervene in the Middle East, Eisenhower placed American military forces—including some with nuclear weapons—on alert and sternly warned the Soviet Union against intervention. On November 6, Election Day, after voting at his home in Gettysburg, Ike rushed back to the White House to review disturbing intelligence from Moscow with his military advisors. That same day, he learned that the United Nations had negotiated a cease-fire in the Suez war—a result, in no small measure, of Eisenhower’s steadfast opposition to the war and his refusal to aid the allies. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, the United States effectively replaced Great Britain as the guarantor of stability in the Middle East. More than a half century later, that commitment remains the underlying premise for American policy in the region. Historians have long treated the Suez Crisis as a minor episode in the dissolution of colonial rule after World War II. As David Nichols makes clear in Eisenhower 1956, it was much more than that.
373 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 8, 2011
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June 23, 2025
Eisenhower And The Suez Crisis
In 1978, historian David Nichols published his first book "Lincoln and the Indians", which remains a rare study of a frequently overlooked aspect of Lincoln's presidency. I read and reviewed the book early in my days as an Amazon reviewer. Following his retirement from academic life, Nichols, who resides near the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, effectively began a second career as a historian of the Eisenhower administration. "Eisenhower 1956" tells the story of Eisenhower's greatest foreign policy test: the Suez crisis of 1956, Eisenhower's handling of this crisis remains controversial. I wanted to read this book because of my own interest in and admiration for Eisenhower. I also remembered Nichols' first book on Lincoln and was inspired to see an author branch out in a new direction upon retirement. (Between 1978 and his two recent books on Eisenhower, Nichols apparently had not published a book.)
Nichols tells a complex, detailed history clearly and well. Although he is critical of some aspects of Eisenhower's handling of the Suez crisis, he praises Eisenhower's broad approach and what Nichols sees as his principled leadership. Some critics of Eisenhower's presidency tended to see him as disengaged and as deferential to his subordinates, in particular to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Critics of Eisenhower in the Middle East have also claimed that his administration showed too much sympathy for the Arab position and underestimated the threats that Israel faced. Nichols belongs with a group of scholars who, beginning in the 1980's, have reassessed Eisenhower's leadership style and gradually and substantially raised the stature of his presidency. In his book, Nichols portrays Eisenhower as an active, knowledgeable leader in the area of foreign affairs who managed top-down with the public interest rather than politics at heart. Eisenhower gave direction to his administration as opposed to responding passively to his staff.
Nichols shows that the Suez crisis had a long history during which Eisenhower's participation was mixed. The crisis coincided with Eisenhower's first heart attack and with a subsequent serious intestinal illness. During these periods, Eisenhower's active operation in government was necessarily limited. American policy thus tended to lack firm control, and it vacillated. During this time, the Soviet Union had begun massive arms sales to Egypt. The Israelis became concerned and the United States had to determine the extent to which it would support the sale of additional arms to Israel without precipitating an arms race and encouraging conflict. In addition, the United States and Egypt had discussed American assistance in the construction of the large Aswan Dam to stimulate Egypt's economy and reduce the flooding which over the ages had plagued the country. The Egyptian leader, Nasser, tried to play off the United States and the Soviet Union as providers of the aid. American policy on Aswan aid vacillated during Eisenhower's illness and led to the Suez crisis. During the period of Eisenhower's ill-health, he was also preoccupied with deciding whether he was physically in a condition to run for the presidency for a second term. Although Eisenhower was a Cold Warrior, his major preoccupation during his presidency was avoiding nuclear war which, the president understood, would have catastrophic, irrevocable consequences.
The Suez crisis began when Dulles rather peremptorily informed Egypt that it could not provide assistance for Aswan. A good part of this decision was a result of Congressional opposition. Nasser then nationalized the Suez canal in retaliation for the United States refusal of the aid, and Britain and France prepared for military action. Eisenhower opposed precipitate military action chiefly because of his fear that it would lead to broad war. He was committed to a negotiated resolution. Eisenhower believed that Egypt was within its legal rights to nationalize the canal as long as the canal remained open and was operated fairly. Britain, France, and Israel had reason to be worried.
For months, under Eisenhower's leadership, the allies sought a negotiated solution. Without Eisenhower's knowledge, Britain, France and Israel surreptitiously planned and camoflagued an invasion of Egypt, leading Eisenhower to claim, with great justification, that the allies had "double-crossed" him. Although his actions were and remain severely criticized, Eisenhower worked through the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire. The Soviet Union, which had invaded Hungary, had threatened to intervene on Egypt's behalf. The world may have been close to WW III, which Eisenhower was determined to avoid. The crisis came to an end and the threatened rupture with America's allies was tenuously restored.
Although the United States had effectively blundered into the crisis and showed a marked failure of intelligence operations in not detecting the British-French-Israeli plan before its implementation, Nichols gives Eisenhower high marks for leadership and principle in resolving the Suez crisis after it was thrust upon him. On the whole, and although even today Eisenhower is severely criticized over the Suez crisis, I think the praise is deserved.
As with subsequent administrations, Eisenhower tried to be friends with all parties in the Middle East and to encourage a negotiated solution to the problems which plagued the region at the time and continue to do so. Eisenhower's broad efforts proved no more successful than those of subsequent administrations. But in his cool, even-handed handling of the Suez crisis, Eisenhower may have averted a world war. He showed principled political leadership under substantial pressure. I am looking forward to reading Nichols' other book on the Eisenhower presidency: "A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution".
Robin Friedman
In 1978, historian David Nichols published his first book "Lincoln and the Indians", which remains a rare study of a frequently overlooked aspect of Lincoln's presidency. I read and reviewed the book early in my days as an Amazon reviewer. Following his retirement from academic life, Nichols, who resides near the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, effectively began a second career as a historian of the Eisenhower administration. "Eisenhower 1956" tells the story of Eisenhower's greatest foreign policy test: the Suez crisis of 1956, Eisenhower's handling of this crisis remains controversial. I wanted to read this book because of my own interest in and admiration for Eisenhower. I also remembered Nichols' first book on Lincoln and was inspired to see an author branch out in a new direction upon retirement. (Between 1978 and his two recent books on Eisenhower, Nichols apparently had not published a book.)
Nichols tells a complex, detailed history clearly and well. Although he is critical of some aspects of Eisenhower's handling of the Suez crisis, he praises Eisenhower's broad approach and what Nichols sees as his principled leadership. Some critics of Eisenhower's presidency tended to see him as disengaged and as deferential to his subordinates, in particular to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Critics of Eisenhower in the Middle East have also claimed that his administration showed too much sympathy for the Arab position and underestimated the threats that Israel faced. Nichols belongs with a group of scholars who, beginning in the 1980's, have reassessed Eisenhower's leadership style and gradually and substantially raised the stature of his presidency. In his book, Nichols portrays Eisenhower as an active, knowledgeable leader in the area of foreign affairs who managed top-down with the public interest rather than politics at heart. Eisenhower gave direction to his administration as opposed to responding passively to his staff.
Nichols shows that the Suez crisis had a long history during which Eisenhower's participation was mixed. The crisis coincided with Eisenhower's first heart attack and with a subsequent serious intestinal illness. During these periods, Eisenhower's active operation in government was necessarily limited. American policy thus tended to lack firm control, and it vacillated. During this time, the Soviet Union had begun massive arms sales to Egypt. The Israelis became concerned and the United States had to determine the extent to which it would support the sale of additional arms to Israel without precipitating an arms race and encouraging conflict. In addition, the United States and Egypt had discussed American assistance in the construction of the large Aswan Dam to stimulate Egypt's economy and reduce the flooding which over the ages had plagued the country. The Egyptian leader, Nasser, tried to play off the United States and the Soviet Union as providers of the aid. American policy on Aswan aid vacillated during Eisenhower's illness and led to the Suez crisis. During the period of Eisenhower's ill-health, he was also preoccupied with deciding whether he was physically in a condition to run for the presidency for a second term. Although Eisenhower was a Cold Warrior, his major preoccupation during his presidency was avoiding nuclear war which, the president understood, would have catastrophic, irrevocable consequences.
The Suez crisis began when Dulles rather peremptorily informed Egypt that it could not provide assistance for Aswan. A good part of this decision was a result of Congressional opposition. Nasser then nationalized the Suez canal in retaliation for the United States refusal of the aid, and Britain and France prepared for military action. Eisenhower opposed precipitate military action chiefly because of his fear that it would lead to broad war. He was committed to a negotiated resolution. Eisenhower believed that Egypt was within its legal rights to nationalize the canal as long as the canal remained open and was operated fairly. Britain, France, and Israel had reason to be worried.
For months, under Eisenhower's leadership, the allies sought a negotiated solution. Without Eisenhower's knowledge, Britain, France and Israel surreptitiously planned and camoflagued an invasion of Egypt, leading Eisenhower to claim, with great justification, that the allies had "double-crossed" him. Although his actions were and remain severely criticized, Eisenhower worked through the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire. The Soviet Union, which had invaded Hungary, had threatened to intervene on Egypt's behalf. The world may have been close to WW III, which Eisenhower was determined to avoid. The crisis came to an end and the threatened rupture with America's allies was tenuously restored.
Although the United States had effectively blundered into the crisis and showed a marked failure of intelligence operations in not detecting the British-French-Israeli plan before its implementation, Nichols gives Eisenhower high marks for leadership and principle in resolving the Suez crisis after it was thrust upon him. On the whole, and although even today Eisenhower is severely criticized over the Suez crisis, I think the praise is deserved.
As with subsequent administrations, Eisenhower tried to be friends with all parties in the Middle East and to encourage a negotiated solution to the problems which plagued the region at the time and continue to do so. Eisenhower's broad efforts proved no more successful than those of subsequent administrations. But in his cool, even-handed handling of the Suez crisis, Eisenhower may have averted a world war. He showed principled political leadership under substantial pressure. I am looking forward to reading Nichols' other book on the Eisenhower presidency: "A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution".
Robin Friedman
January 24, 2012
When I read non-fiction, which isn't often enough, I tend to favor biographies or histories. I picked up Nichols' detailed microscopic compilation of a critical year in the life of President Eisenhower based on a review my uncle wrote. Being born and raised and still living in Kansas, I have an understandable preoccupation with one of our most famous and respected residents.
The extent of Nichols' meticulous research impressed me. His delivery of the facts and circumstances and thoughts of key players (gleaned from personal notes and diaries) brought me to the center of the conflicts and the crises. I queried many older friends and family on what they remembered of 1956 (since I wasn't born until eight years later), most of whom were too young at the time to really remember the Suez Canal crisis.
That didn't stop me from feeling an echo of the anxiety and the beginning of our national belief in 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD - a very apropos acronym, don't you think?). Eisenhower's early understanding of the true horrors of thermonuclear warfare paved the way for his campaign of waging peace, even at the expense of some short-sighted WWII Allies. (For a great glimpse into an early (and now classic) apocalyptic novel, please see Alas, Babylon by Pat Frank, originally published in 1959 - click here for my review).
While reading this book, I visited the website for the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum. I learned the current exhibit entitled 'Eisenhower: Agent of Change' ran until the end of January and the Library celebrates fifty years in 2012. As soon as I finished the book, I convinced my husband we needed to visit Abilene, since I could barely remember the last/first time I visited the Eisenhower Center (probably forty years ago or more). We spent a pleasant Saturday exploring the Museum, Library, boyhood home (intact and preserved on the grounds), the grounds and the final resting place of Dwight, Mamie and their son Doud (who died at the age of 3 in 1921).
The extent of Nichols' meticulous research impressed me. His delivery of the facts and circumstances and thoughts of key players (gleaned from personal notes and diaries) brought me to the center of the conflicts and the crises. I queried many older friends and family on what they remembered of 1956 (since I wasn't born until eight years later), most of whom were too young at the time to really remember the Suez Canal crisis.
That didn't stop me from feeling an echo of the anxiety and the beginning of our national belief in 'mutually assured destruction' (MAD - a very apropos acronym, don't you think?). Eisenhower's early understanding of the true horrors of thermonuclear warfare paved the way for his campaign of waging peace, even at the expense of some short-sighted WWII Allies. (For a great glimpse into an early (and now classic) apocalyptic novel, please see Alas, Babylon by Pat Frank, originally published in 1959 - click here for my review).
While reading this book, I visited the website for the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum. I learned the current exhibit entitled 'Eisenhower: Agent of Change' ran until the end of January and the Library celebrates fifty years in 2012. As soon as I finished the book, I convinced my husband we needed to visit Abilene, since I could barely remember the last/first time I visited the Eisenhower Center (probably forty years ago or more). We spent a pleasant Saturday exploring the Museum, Library, boyhood home (intact and preserved on the grounds), the grounds and the final resting place of Dwight, Mamie and their son Doud (who died at the age of 3 in 1921).
October 31, 2011
History as it should be written: thorough, detailed, documented and straight. (By that latter I mean grinding no ideological axes or "Monday morning quarterbacking" from 55 years later.) It's good history. While by no means good literature, Eisenhower 1956 draws the reader into the mind of his principal character and lets us see the world as Ike saw it, as well as seeing where Ike missed clues (and why) and, more tragically, was mislead by those he trusted.
The Suez crisis marked England's end as a major player in the Middle East. Eisenhower 1956 tells why they deserved to lose their place in the world. Because the British (and French and Israelis) were lying to Eisenhower (and the world) over Suez, a major war almost happened and no effective western response was possible to the simultaneous Soviet invasion of Hungary. Even though World War Three was averted, the Cold War was certainly lengthened and the divisions between the Western and Arab worlds deepened as a result of our "friends" duplicity.
Required reading of anyone hoping to understand how we got into this mess. Yes, there were other factors and players, but the fall of 1956 was a watershed in American international relations, even though most Americans don't know it. (Most Americans probably can't even locate the Suez Canal or know why anyone cares about it.)
Well researched, well-written. If Nichols took a few courses in writing fiction, his prose would be more readable, but—hey—it's history.
A few maps would be nice. Maybe a timeline.
The Suez crisis marked England's end as a major player in the Middle East. Eisenhower 1956 tells why they deserved to lose their place in the world. Because the British (and French and Israelis) were lying to Eisenhower (and the world) over Suez, a major war almost happened and no effective western response was possible to the simultaneous Soviet invasion of Hungary. Even though World War Three was averted, the Cold War was certainly lengthened and the divisions between the Western and Arab worlds deepened as a result of our "friends" duplicity.
Required reading of anyone hoping to understand how we got into this mess. Yes, there were other factors and players, but the fall of 1956 was a watershed in American international relations, even though most Americans don't know it. (Most Americans probably can't even locate the Suez Canal or know why anyone cares about it.)
Well researched, well-written. If Nichols took a few courses in writing fiction, his prose would be more readable, but—hey—it's history.
A few maps would be nice. Maybe a timeline.
March 1, 2021
A fascinating account of a tense year (1956) for Eisenhower with crises in the Mid-East, Soviet crackdown against the revolt in Hungary, amidst two health emergencies (a serious heart attack and surgery for an intestinal blockage) and his re-election bid. The author is an unabashed Eisenhower fan and until the epilogue (“conclusion”) there is no mention that Ike personally approved CIA regime change (including assassinations) covert activities in Iran, Guatemala, Congo, Cuba and Vietnam. The centerpiece is Ike’s leadership through the Suez crisis when in response to Nasser nationalizing the canal, the British, French and Israelis “double crossed” Ike by invading Egypt and taking control of the Canal Zone and lying to him about their plans. A day by day (and sometimes hour by hour) account of the 14 months from September 1955 to November 1956.
October 18, 2012
Decent book about Eisenhower's handling of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. His efforts were hampered somewhat by his re-election bid that year, and much more so by his heart attack in September 1955 and then subsequent abdominal surgery in July 1956. Ike truly was double-crossed by Anthony Eden of Britain, Guy Mollet of France, and David Ben-Gurion of Israel as they went behind his back to attack Egypt over Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Canal. Nichols portrays Eisenhower as a very cautious leader in the sense that his overriding fear was that something small would trigger WWIII, so he did everything he could to keep that from happening.
My only issue with Nichols is that he seems to be an Eisenhower admirer (which is fine - there is much to admire in the man), but he basically does not criticize him for anything that he did or failed to do. And, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is left looking more like a sometimes-dithering, sometimes-blustering, inconsistent blowhard who caused Ike problems with his frequent provocative rhetoric. While Dulles did tend to be effusive sometimes with his "brinksmanship" philosophy, he was also an energetic Secretary who deftly handled crises as well.
My only issue with Nichols is that he seems to be an Eisenhower admirer (which is fine - there is much to admire in the man), but he basically does not criticize him for anything that he did or failed to do. And, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is left looking more like a sometimes-dithering, sometimes-blustering, inconsistent blowhard who caused Ike problems with his frequent provocative rhetoric. While Dulles did tend to be effusive sometimes with his "brinksmanship" philosophy, he was also an energetic Secretary who deftly handled crises as well.
April 9, 2011
While we are consumed today with the ongoing global and foreign policy crisis', it is quite fascinating to look back at 1956. As David Nichols reminds us in this well researched and highly readable book is that President Dwight Eisenhower was forced to battle with the British and French for control of the Suez Canal - military moves by them that almost sparked a massive war in the region and perhaps elsewhere in the world - but it was also the year that Eisenhower suffered a massive heart attack while on vacation. You have to wonder how the people of the United States would react today with constant screaming CNN updates if the current President suffered such a dangerous health challenge while dealing with a similiar foreign policy crisis.
What I particularly liked about this book is Nichols focus on Eisenhower's management style -- how he ran the White House, how he managed his staff, etc. -- much of which was honed by years in the military and brought to a razors edge of precision during World War II. All in all, an excellent history of a critical year in US history with many lessons to be learned for today.
What I particularly liked about this book is Nichols focus on Eisenhower's management style -- how he ran the White House, how he managed his staff, etc. -- much of which was honed by years in the military and brought to a razors edge of precision during World War II. All in all, an excellent history of a critical year in US history with many lessons to be learned for today.
August 21, 2018
Waging Peace
A dramatic and compelling behind the scenes portrait of events leading up to the Suez crisis.
Everyone remembers the phrase "I Like Ike", his warning against feeding the Military Industrial Complex and one can sense the appeal of having a wise and capable father/grandfather figure in the White House. Yet 1956 was a year of two major crises - the short lived Hungarian Spring and Nasser's bold play to nationalize the Suez canal. Domestically it was also an election year ... and Eisenhower has a heart attack on June 8th which puts him on the sidelines just when he needs to be front and centre. So it is left to high ranking subordinates such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to steer the ship and maintain the Eisenhower Doctrine for a nuclear age. This meant avoiding the escalation of conflict while containing the Soviet Union. However, if as Nichols suggests (pp53) that the localized US policy was to influence the Egyptians towards a peace agreement using the financing of of Aswan as an incentive, then the US pullout from such a deal, which was a financially sound decision, was a political disaster.
Eisenhower's critics charged that Ike was really out of the game as he recovered from the attack. Nichols claims that he wasn't, that he read key reports and gave short judgements, much like the spin that was given to the press. In his view Eisenhower deferred the process of crisis resolution to the UN on principle, and Adlai Stevenson's accusation that Ike's health problems made him unaware and distant until the middle of November. However from reading Nichol's account my conclusion was that for a significant time the country was on autopilot.
The slow build to crisis is covered in detail. In addition to Aswan the US hoped to use America's cotton industry and the Baghdad pact as bargaining chips with the Egyptians. To the Israelis Dulles turned down their appeal for the US to balance Soviet and American arms sales to Egypt, saying that the Israel's best hope was to rely on the UN for protection (pp71). Though not adverse to indirect arms sales through France and Britain, on May 10th the administration blocked the sale of 21 army surplus half tracks. (pp104) Yet Dulles was not happy with the pro-Egyptian attitude of America's US Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade who wanted to "break the back of Zionism as a political force", bypassed by the administration through Ike's friend and diplomatic envoy Robert Anderson. At the same time Nasser had extended recognition to communist China - crossing another American red line of the time. And on June 26th the Americans discover that Russia has trumped the US by offering to finance Aswan with a 60 yr. loan of $400m, cancelling the debt on previous arms sales, and offers to buy Egypt's cotton crop and aid its industrialization by building a steel mill. (pp116).
What gets presented is a somewhat insular and very American outlook. For example, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his bold solution to the Suez crisis (establishing UNEF) is not even mentioned - all we get is a one line throwaway about a Canadian proposal to the UN with no details as to what it entails. Or the aftermath. And while we get a sense that Britain saw Suez as a way to hold on to what was left of its economic power, Nichols never details the reasons behind French involvement - the coverage of Eden's antipathy towards Nasser, his sinking popularity over the handling of the crisis and British economic vulnerability is much better. Through the discussion on Egypt's solicitation of financing for Aswan we see how Nasser attempt to play the US against the Soviets. The US said no, the Soviets yes, and the rational was both reasonable and revealing. But missing was Nasser's efforts to elevate Egypt to the centre of the Arab world, Missing too was that Israel sensed a gradualized aggression from Egypt, a sliced salami approach, premised on Nasser's rhetorical bluster, attacks by fedayeen, the cutting off of oil supplies via Suez, and the acquisition of large amount of armaments acquired from the Soviets that would have put her in a far worse position by the summer of '57. The fact that Nasser's moves on the canal antagonized the French and the British added to the sense that striking now rather than later was more desirable. And what of Hungary? One suspects that the Soviets pushed the focus of the UN towards the Suez Crisis to emphasize the then current diplomatic view of spheres of influence in order reassert their control over their satellite nation and extend their influence into the middle east, a diplomatic success that would persist for another generation. A look at complementary view points would have, IMV, improved the book.
That being said, the writing is clear and the material is presented in an interesting way that succeeds in bringing the era to life Probably this would resonate very well with readers who lived through the era and for me, as a Canadian, it rendered a great deal of insight into the era.
Recommended supplementary reading:
Pearson's Prize: Canada and the Suez Crisis
Between Arab And Israeli
Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67
A dramatic and compelling behind the scenes portrait of events leading up to the Suez crisis.
Everyone remembers the phrase "I Like Ike", his warning against feeding the Military Industrial Complex and one can sense the appeal of having a wise and capable father/grandfather figure in the White House. Yet 1956 was a year of two major crises - the short lived Hungarian Spring and Nasser's bold play to nationalize the Suez canal. Domestically it was also an election year ... and Eisenhower has a heart attack on June 8th which puts him on the sidelines just when he needs to be front and centre. So it is left to high ranking subordinates such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to steer the ship and maintain the Eisenhower Doctrine for a nuclear age. This meant avoiding the escalation of conflict while containing the Soviet Union. However, if as Nichols suggests (pp53) that the localized US policy was to influence the Egyptians towards a peace agreement using the financing of of Aswan as an incentive, then the US pullout from such a deal, which was a financially sound decision, was a political disaster.
Eisenhower's critics charged that Ike was really out of the game as he recovered from the attack. Nichols claims that he wasn't, that he read key reports and gave short judgements, much like the spin that was given to the press. In his view Eisenhower deferred the process of crisis resolution to the UN on principle, and Adlai Stevenson's accusation that Ike's health problems made him unaware and distant until the middle of November. However from reading Nichol's account my conclusion was that for a significant time the country was on autopilot.
The slow build to crisis is covered in detail. In addition to Aswan the US hoped to use America's cotton industry and the Baghdad pact as bargaining chips with the Egyptians. To the Israelis Dulles turned down their appeal for the US to balance Soviet and American arms sales to Egypt, saying that the Israel's best hope was to rely on the UN for protection (pp71). Though not adverse to indirect arms sales through France and Britain, on May 10th the administration blocked the sale of 21 army surplus half tracks. (pp104) Yet Dulles was not happy with the pro-Egyptian attitude of America's US Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade who wanted to "break the back of Zionism as a political force", bypassed by the administration through Ike's friend and diplomatic envoy Robert Anderson. At the same time Nasser had extended recognition to communist China - crossing another American red line of the time. And on June 26th the Americans discover that Russia has trumped the US by offering to finance Aswan with a 60 yr. loan of $400m, cancelling the debt on previous arms sales, and offers to buy Egypt's cotton crop and aid its industrialization by building a steel mill. (pp116).
What gets presented is a somewhat insular and very American outlook. For example, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his bold solution to the Suez crisis (establishing UNEF) is not even mentioned - all we get is a one line throwaway about a Canadian proposal to the UN with no details as to what it entails. Or the aftermath. And while we get a sense that Britain saw Suez as a way to hold on to what was left of its economic power, Nichols never details the reasons behind French involvement - the coverage of Eden's antipathy towards Nasser, his sinking popularity over the handling of the crisis and British economic vulnerability is much better. Through the discussion on Egypt's solicitation of financing for Aswan we see how Nasser attempt to play the US against the Soviets. The US said no, the Soviets yes, and the rational was both reasonable and revealing. But missing was Nasser's efforts to elevate Egypt to the centre of the Arab world, Missing too was that Israel sensed a gradualized aggression from Egypt, a sliced salami approach, premised on Nasser's rhetorical bluster, attacks by fedayeen, the cutting off of oil supplies via Suez, and the acquisition of large amount of armaments acquired from the Soviets that would have put her in a far worse position by the summer of '57. The fact that Nasser's moves on the canal antagonized the French and the British added to the sense that striking now rather than later was more desirable. And what of Hungary? One suspects that the Soviets pushed the focus of the UN towards the Suez Crisis to emphasize the then current diplomatic view of spheres of influence in order reassert their control over their satellite nation and extend their influence into the middle east, a diplomatic success that would persist for another generation. A look at complementary view points would have, IMV, improved the book.
That being said, the writing is clear and the material is presented in an interesting way that succeeds in bringing the era to life Probably this would resonate very well with readers who lived through the era and for me, as a Canadian, it rendered a great deal of insight into the era.
Recommended supplementary reading:
Pearson's Prize: Canada and the Suez Crisis
Between Arab And Israeli
Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67
September 10, 2019
Did I miss something or was this book a bit of a grind? The wealth of information, thanks to meticulously declassified documents, family and associate contributions made this a very personal and detailed account of a point of history that could have well become World War III. It's never an enviable job for a historian to engage readers, and Eisenhower is an interesting fellow, having set political forces in motion that have consequences we deal with even now.
So why was this such a drag? David's active quoting style was a useful vehicle for creating a uniform text with so many sources of information to track, and the dramatics of the time were certainly fascinating. Unfortunately it's likely the current social climate, with people losing interest in every day activities, without a purpose to motivate them.
That's what is most compelling about Eisenhower, and David touches on some of those things, but I would like to have seen more examples of this. I would like to have understood more of what made the man, and this slice of history excludes valuable references that would contextualize the actions Eisenhower took during the Suez crisis.
While the editor may have positioned the book for broad appeal, I believe they forgot to take into account that a reader could well be a fresh entrant into the realm of history. Is history only for historians? I daresay not, and all demographics must be considered. This is a historical volume in plain text, though effectively written, falls somewhat flat in spite of its highly dramatic subject.
This is the perilous question all authors must ask themselves: For whom am I writing? In this case I got the clear impression that this was written for historians and enthusiasts, but not for newcomers. A good textbook this would not make, though it could serve as the basis for a cinematic retelling.
The most engaging moments in this account were the human moments, where reactions communicated the situational clime, and how mistakes were made and command exerted. Though competition for resources comprises a large portion of human history, the politics of those activities can be dull. This is a good book, just be aware what you're getting into.
So why was this such a drag? David's active quoting style was a useful vehicle for creating a uniform text with so many sources of information to track, and the dramatics of the time were certainly fascinating. Unfortunately it's likely the current social climate, with people losing interest in every day activities, without a purpose to motivate them.
That's what is most compelling about Eisenhower, and David touches on some of those things, but I would like to have seen more examples of this. I would like to have understood more of what made the man, and this slice of history excludes valuable references that would contextualize the actions Eisenhower took during the Suez crisis.
While the editor may have positioned the book for broad appeal, I believe they forgot to take into account that a reader could well be a fresh entrant into the realm of history. Is history only for historians? I daresay not, and all demographics must be considered. This is a historical volume in plain text, though effectively written, falls somewhat flat in spite of its highly dramatic subject.
This is the perilous question all authors must ask themselves: For whom am I writing? In this case I got the clear impression that this was written for historians and enthusiasts, but not for newcomers. A good textbook this would not make, though it could serve as the basis for a cinematic retelling.
The most engaging moments in this account were the human moments, where reactions communicated the situational clime, and how mistakes were made and command exerted. Though competition for resources comprises a large portion of human history, the politics of those activities can be dull. This is a good book, just be aware what you're getting into.
September 30, 2021
1956 was "The President's year of crisis" That's the author's sub title and 1956 certainly was a year of crisis across the world.
The crisis he is writing about is what we call the Suez crisis. That's when Egypt took over the Canal and Britain, France and Israel attempted to seize it from them. Basically, this amounted to re-establishing colonialism. While Britain and France were primarily focused on recovering control of the canal, Israel was expanding its territory and power in the Middle East.
Eisenhower had to walk carefully, since (a) these were America's closest allies from WWII, (b) the thought that this was an attack on Israel was popular and Israel was a special topic in the U.S. and (c) Egypt had just been a problem with the Aswan Dam projects.
There was also the problem that Eisenhower was still recovering from a serious heart attack (or two). It was important that he appear to be recovered and strong.
Of course, this is the height of the Cold War, so Russia's support of Egypt was always a fear.
Nichols mentions the Hungarian Revolution, but mostly as a distraction for Russia.
All in all, this is a good review of what was happening in 1956 and what we've learned, as material becomes available. It's not entirely what we knew back in 1956 or 1958 or 1966.
The crisis he is writing about is what we call the Suez crisis. That's when Egypt took over the Canal and Britain, France and Israel attempted to seize it from them. Basically, this amounted to re-establishing colonialism. While Britain and France were primarily focused on recovering control of the canal, Israel was expanding its territory and power in the Middle East.
Eisenhower had to walk carefully, since (a) these were America's closest allies from WWII, (b) the thought that this was an attack on Israel was popular and Israel was a special topic in the U.S. and (c) Egypt had just been a problem with the Aswan Dam projects.
There was also the problem that Eisenhower was still recovering from a serious heart attack (or two). It was important that he appear to be recovered and strong.
Of course, this is the height of the Cold War, so Russia's support of Egypt was always a fear.
Nichols mentions the Hungarian Revolution, but mostly as a distraction for Russia.
All in all, this is a good review of what was happening in 1956 and what we've learned, as material becomes available. It's not entirely what we knew back in 1956 or 1958 or 1966.
November 4, 2022
On the eve of the 1956 presidential election, the world came dangerously close to world war 3 as Israel, France and Great Britain invaded Egypt to secure access to the Suez canal. They did so without a heads up to the United States. At the same time Soviet Union which was crushing a popular movement in Hungary, threatened to send troops into Egypt. If this had occurred Eisenhower had committed to send troops as well into Egypt which would have assuredly led to a third world war in quite possibly the use of nuclear weapons.
President Eisenhower though was astutely aware of the high price of such a war and worked diligently to avoid escalation of the crisis, much to the point that he alienated his World War II allies, France and Great Britain.
This book is a fine insight into the thinking of Eisenhower as he battled health issues, an uncertain Soviet Union, the electorate in a presidential year they're being betrayed by traditional global allies.
President Eisenhower though was astutely aware of the high price of such a war and worked diligently to avoid escalation of the crisis, much to the point that he alienated his World War II allies, France and Great Britain.
This book is a fine insight into the thinking of Eisenhower as he battled health issues, an uncertain Soviet Union, the electorate in a presidential year they're being betrayed by traditional global allies.
July 31, 2017
PROS:
Reads like a well-written West Wing episode. It moves quickly and relies on great research of primary sources from the Eisenhower Administration to tell this story. Also offers a fair minded analysis of Nasser's philosophy and motivations.
CONS:
Undermined somewhat by its highly pro-Eisenhower bias. Hews closely to a narrative that Eisenhower was highly opposed to war and thought almost exclusively in those terms. This narrative is a somewhat accurate one, but it's undercut by more recent research that suggests that Eisenhower was perfectly fine with smaller scale wars (see: his support of the CIA), and was also quite interested in maintaining US hegemony over not just the Soviets but also other world powers. So Nichols tells a fascinating story, albeit an incomplete one.
Reads like a well-written West Wing episode. It moves quickly and relies on great research of primary sources from the Eisenhower Administration to tell this story. Also offers a fair minded analysis of Nasser's philosophy and motivations.
CONS:
Undermined somewhat by its highly pro-Eisenhower bias. Hews closely to a narrative that Eisenhower was highly opposed to war and thought almost exclusively in those terms. This narrative is a somewhat accurate one, but it's undercut by more recent research that suggests that Eisenhower was perfectly fine with smaller scale wars (see: his support of the CIA), and was also quite interested in maintaining US hegemony over not just the Soviets but also other world powers. So Nichols tells a fascinating story, albeit an incomplete one.
February 9, 2022
This book is not (as the title makes clear) a full-life biography. It is a snapshot of a very critical year in the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. It is very thorough within that very limited scope, and reasonably readable. It may, possibly, be overly adulatory towards its subject, but that is a flaw in many biographies; it's rare that someone takes the time and spends the effort to write a biography unless they either truly admire or totally detest the subject.
August 27, 2022
is an ok book. Took a while to get to the point.
April 7, 2013
This book provides insight into a period of history and events about which I previously did not know much. For that reason, I am glad that I read this book, and I would encourage others to read about the Suez Crisis in the mid-1950s and Eisenhower's approach to foreign policy. Despite the interesting nature of the topics, I nonetheless give this book a low rating, because I think the author could have done a much better job writing about the subject. My criticisms of the book fall primarily into two categories:
1. The decision to tell the story in straight chronological orders makes it seem like a series of (not necessarily related) newspaper articles. The story could have been told much more effectively by arranging events by theme or my laying out an analytical structure at the beginning of the book, so that the reader could place events in a larger context. By presenting the facts strictly as they occurred, the story frequently loses coherence. Further, the author's decision to focus in great detail on some aspects and give cursory coverage to others that seemed more important exacerbated the problem. For example, the author validly makes the point that Eisenhower's health issues shaped the course of events. But by telling the story chronologically, the author was almost forced to go into great and repetitive details about Eisenhower's personal feelings of his recovery, because there was not much else relevant going on at the time. (If the author cited one more letter to a friend in which Eisenhower complained about his slow recuperation, I thought I might scream.)
2. The author presents the materials in a very U.S.-centric fashion. By omitting many foreign sources and portraying almost everything through the lens on one of the American participants, the picture loses detail and a richer context that would have made Eisenhower's contributions, in my mind, much stronger. Without some of that additional context, Eisenhower frequently comes across as an indecisive, petulant child, and Secretary of State Dulles fares much worse. By more accurately capturing the complex world in which the decisions were being made and adding more details about the views of non-U.S. participants, the book could have been a much stronger historical contribution.
1. The decision to tell the story in straight chronological orders makes it seem like a series of (not necessarily related) newspaper articles. The story could have been told much more effectively by arranging events by theme or my laying out an analytical structure at the beginning of the book, so that the reader could place events in a larger context. By presenting the facts strictly as they occurred, the story frequently loses coherence. Further, the author's decision to focus in great detail on some aspects and give cursory coverage to others that seemed more important exacerbated the problem. For example, the author validly makes the point that Eisenhower's health issues shaped the course of events. But by telling the story chronologically, the author was almost forced to go into great and repetitive details about Eisenhower's personal feelings of his recovery, because there was not much else relevant going on at the time. (If the author cited one more letter to a friend in which Eisenhower complained about his slow recuperation, I thought I might scream.)
2. The author presents the materials in a very U.S.-centric fashion. By omitting many foreign sources and portraying almost everything through the lens on one of the American participants, the picture loses detail and a richer context that would have made Eisenhower's contributions, in my mind, much stronger. Without some of that additional context, Eisenhower frequently comes across as an indecisive, petulant child, and Secretary of State Dulles fares much worse. By more accurately capturing the complex world in which the decisions were being made and adding more details about the views of non-U.S. participants, the book could have been a much stronger historical contribution.
March 13, 2013
Before reading this book I didn't know much about Eisenhower's presidency. What I knew about him was about his military career and particularly World War II. After reading the book, I am much more impressed with Eisenhower the President. Focusing on 1956 (really starting in October 1955 when the President suffered a heart attack), David Nichols shows how the President skillfully handled his life threatening illness, a campaign for a second term, and the Suez crisis. Having played a major role in WWII and knowing the awesome power of the atomic bomb (and the country's unpreparedness to deal with nuclear war) the President's biggest fear was another world conflict with nuclear weapons. Then, two of our closest allies Britain and France, entered into what the President considered an unncessary military foray into Egypt.
Providing a massive amount of historical materials on the day to day activities of the President and his senior advisors, Nichols paints a picture of a President who was in control of all the intricacies of geopolitical maneuvering on the international front and of the political situation in a Presidential campaign where his health and the international crisis were major issues.
For me, the thing that kept this from being a great book was the focus on the details of day to day activities to the detriment of more detailed anaylsis. It is clear that Nichols wanted to *show* Eisenhower in control through his actions. Maybe I am a lazy reader, but I would have preferred more analysis from the author to provide context. This is a book where I wish I had read the last chapter (the wrap up chapter) first.
Providing a massive amount of historical materials on the day to day activities of the President and his senior advisors, Nichols paints a picture of a President who was in control of all the intricacies of geopolitical maneuvering on the international front and of the political situation in a Presidential campaign where his health and the international crisis were major issues.
For me, the thing that kept this from being a great book was the focus on the details of day to day activities to the detriment of more detailed anaylsis. It is clear that Nichols wanted to *show* Eisenhower in control through his actions. Maybe I am a lazy reader, but I would have preferred more analysis from the author to provide context. This is a book where I wish I had read the last chapter (the wrap up chapter) first.
August 4, 2011
I like Ike.
Since I'm bringing students to the Embassy of Egypt this year and teaching students the history of Egypt since 1945, I figured I'd learn a little more about the Suez Crisis of 1956. First of all, I can't believe England, France and Israel would team for a such a stupid and transparently ham-handed attempt to
a) take control of the Suez Canal after Nasser nationalized it, the canal being completely in Egypt of course and
b) Israel's land grab of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula.
The plan these 3 hatched while keeping their ally, the U.S. in the dark was for Israel to invade Egypt. Under the pretext of "keeping the combatants apart" and "protecting Suez Canal" England and France would send troops in to take control of the canal.
Ike, who had just had a heart attack and intestinal surgery and who was dealing with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, oh and in the last month of the '56 presidential election stood up to England, France and Israel and supported Egypt. We gave our WW II allies no assistance and quietly stopped oil shipments to England and monkeyed with their currency causing severe economic problems in England. The result was England and France agreed to a cease-fire and all 3 nations removed their troops...and Egypt remained in control of THEIR canal.
While the narrative got bogged down at time, David Nichols did a fine job telling this story.
Since I'm bringing students to the Embassy of Egypt this year and teaching students the history of Egypt since 1945, I figured I'd learn a little more about the Suez Crisis of 1956. First of all, I can't believe England, France and Israel would team for a such a stupid and transparently ham-handed attempt to
a) take control of the Suez Canal after Nasser nationalized it, the canal being completely in Egypt of course and
b) Israel's land grab of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula.
The plan these 3 hatched while keeping their ally, the U.S. in the dark was for Israel to invade Egypt. Under the pretext of "keeping the combatants apart" and "protecting Suez Canal" England and France would send troops in to take control of the canal.
Ike, who had just had a heart attack and intestinal surgery and who was dealing with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, oh and in the last month of the '56 presidential election stood up to England, France and Israel and supported Egypt. We gave our WW II allies no assistance and quietly stopped oil shipments to England and monkeyed with their currency causing severe economic problems in England. The result was England and France agreed to a cease-fire and all 3 nations removed their troops...and Egypt remained in control of THEIR canal.
While the narrative got bogged down at time, David Nichols did a fine job telling this story.
August 30, 2011
Over the past couple of decades there have been attempts by certain historians to attempt to dispel the myth of Eisenhower as a president who spent most of his time and energy on the golf course. Stephen Ambrose, for example, wrote extensively about Ike's "hidden hand" style of leadership, attempting to point out the many actions Eisenhower took behind the scenes that prove he was in fact a dynamic, active leader. Unfortunately, the examples Mr. Ambrose cited were so subtle that the hand remained hidden. Mr. Nichols does a much more creditable job of illustrating Eisenhower as an active player leading the government and makes the case that except for the periods where he suffered from health issues, he was clearly in charge of foreign policy and his naturally strategic mind grasped complex possibilities long before any of his subordinates. While I still find his leadership on civil rights wanting, my admiration for his leadership in foreign policy has risen significantly. The drama of the book lies in the juxtaposition of three events: the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the 1956 election. The drama would have been more intense had the Democrats nominated a credible candidate, but the book still works as an excellent study of crisis leadership. Well-structured and well-written, Mr. Nichols is to be commended for his efforts.
May 30, 2013
Picture this: You're the president of The United States in 1956 and two crisis break out at roughly the same time in the form of The Soviet invasion of Hungary and your closest Western Allies Britain and France joining with Israel to attack Egypt in a dispute over the Suez Canal. Adding to the calamity, you suffer a heart attack and several other ailments, oh and did I mention that 1956 is an election year and your health concerns have led people to question your fitness to serve a second term. This was the world that Dwight Eisenhower confronted in 1956 and 1956 was perhaps the defining year of his presidency.
David Nichols has written a readable, just the facts, history that one doesn't typically see given the modern desire towards something that reads more like a novel. Yet, with a powerful sense of detail he's able to offer the reader illuminating sketches of the big players Eisenhower, The Dulles Brothers, and various other advisors. The thing that separates this book from others is that the reader feels as though he's transported directly into Ike's mind as he tries to figure out whether to join his WW2 allies in war or let them hang alone. The consequences of this decision still make up the bedrock of Middle East policy today.
Recommended way to kill off a rainy day.
David Nichols has written a readable, just the facts, history that one doesn't typically see given the modern desire towards something that reads more like a novel. Yet, with a powerful sense of detail he's able to offer the reader illuminating sketches of the big players Eisenhower, The Dulles Brothers, and various other advisors. The thing that separates this book from others is that the reader feels as though he's transported directly into Ike's mind as he tries to figure out whether to join his WW2 allies in war or let them hang alone. The consequences of this decision still make up the bedrock of Middle East policy today.
Recommended way to kill off a rainy day.
June 29, 2012
A very good examination of the Suez crisis. From all indications we were closer to nuclear war than at any other time, except the Cuban missile crisis.
I have been reading several biographies of Eisenhower lately and initially had great admiration for him as a General but not so much as a President. This could have been because of my general tendency toward the Democratic Party and my father's great admiration for Adlai Stevenson. Having read this book and the others, however, I have flipped. I now greatly admire his diplomatic skills and his ability to see two and even three moves ahead, but am not as impressed with him as a Military Tactician. Still, I greatly admire his skill as a diplomatic General. That, alone, makes him one of the greats.
Because he generally had an opposition Congress his ability to work with all political persuasions and make decisions while generally keeping politics out of the equation are admirable. Of course, he had to get elected, so he was capable of playing politics, but it appears he put country first.
I have been reading several biographies of Eisenhower lately and initially had great admiration for him as a General but not so much as a President. This could have been because of my general tendency toward the Democratic Party and my father's great admiration for Adlai Stevenson. Having read this book and the others, however, I have flipped. I now greatly admire his diplomatic skills and his ability to see two and even three moves ahead, but am not as impressed with him as a Military Tactician. Still, I greatly admire his skill as a diplomatic General. That, alone, makes him one of the greats.
Because he generally had an opposition Congress his ability to work with all political persuasions and make decisions while generally keeping politics out of the equation are admirable. Of course, he had to get elected, so he was capable of playing politics, but it appears he put country first.
October 20, 2014
Very interesting coverage of the Suez Canal Crisis and the role that Ike played in ending it. Much of what is covered is known at some level by most, but much more was revealed. Much more might not be known-Ike had a heart attack and was out of commission. The chain of power had not been created by the Constitutional Amendment and the White House wanted to make sure that there was not a repeat of the Wilson Administration. After he recovered, he then found out he had colon cancer. So while he dealt with that, he also had the elections and campaigning to deal with. There was talk about WWIII, but Ike was able to pressure The Soviets to back down, the Chinese to stay away and the French and English to leave. Not the best written book, but filled with analysis and info to make up for the repetitive writing style.
April 20, 2011
I was like nine when all this happened and have vague memories of the events but I remember that the Suez was a hot item at the time. I didn't realize then how close things were to just blowing into a war. This is my second book about Eisenhower, he seems somewhat forgotten by todays world, but he ahndled various crisis from behind closed doors and had an ability to delegate power to people who weren't always afraid to just step up and get it done. Don't get me started.
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January 15, 2012Eisenhower 1956 reads almost like an adventure novel with the president as the chief protagonist. But that quality may be its biggest shortcoming. It contains more detail (at what time did Ike arise, how did he sleep, what did he eat) than I found interesting in a book even about very important historical events. On the other hand, Nichols’s analysis is keen, albeit sparse.
Note: An excellent map is included, as well a number of photographs of the key players.
Note: An excellent map is included, as well a number of photographs of the key players.
January 6, 2013
This is a fine addition to the recent effort to rehabilitate the historical view of Eisenhower's presidency. It is a very detailed account of the crises of 1956 as they are exacerbated by Ike's health concerns. I like Ike's determination to avoid war and find myself wishing that his successors might have shared that passion. On the other hand, his health limited him to such an extent that he probably should not have run for a second term
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February 25, 2016I was not aware how close US was to armed conflict with Russia during the Suez Canal Crisis. Foolishness and betrayal on the part of Isreal, France and GB. Ike showed amazing leadership, especially while in middle of election campaign.
August 2, 2011
A quick read. Must marvel at his endurance and foresightedness.
August 10, 2012
My review in AND Magazine: http://www.andmagazine.com/content/ph...
December 6, 2012
Great history. Get a better appreciation for Eisenhower.
January 6, 2014
Very well written and well researched look at probably the most critical foreign policy issue the Eisenhower administration faced.
April 30, 2015
Gives a clear, concise history of a somewhat forgotten event in time.
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