What do you think?
Rate this book
Testimony: A Philosophical Study
Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions in the areas of history, law, mathematics, and psychology.
- GenresPhilosophy
326 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 1992
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 11, 2014
The book should get 5 stars if it weren't for the very dry and complex writing style of Mr. Coady.
The book tackles the neglected topic of testimony and its significance in epistemology.
There is a general tendency towards defining knowledge only terms of what is "perceived" (i.e. using your 5 senses), this mode of thinking extends towards negating any value of knowledge stemming from testimony and/or logic.
I believe the book does a very good job in presenting a solid argument on the inter-dependencies on these three tools of acquiring knowledge .
The book first starts out by defining what knowledge is. Then Coady moves on to illustrate the vast areas of human life where testimony is used to acquire knowledge. Areas range from history, law, psychology, medical studies to the latter end of physics, orientation information and oblique testimony.
He then moves on to distinguish between Formal testimony (mainly used in Law) and Natural testimony which spans to a wider range of applications.
The chapters following critiques the different philosophical stances pertaining to Hearsay,and this is where the book becomes really confusing. Coady lists different arguments and then debunks them, but never seems to at the end provide a resolution or a clear proven approach to how Hearsay is important.
Nevertheless, the debates are fruitful and provides a lot of insights. I found myself in many instances saying to myself: 'huh, this is interesting, never thought of it that way'
I would go down to details and list the different points he makes throughout the book. (I have about 10 pages worth of notes)... but I'll pass!
I'm tempted to emailing Mr. Coady in hopes of nailing down a few loose ends... Let's see what happens!
The book tackles the neglected topic of testimony and its significance in epistemology.
There is a general tendency towards defining knowledge only terms of what is "perceived" (i.e. using your 5 senses), this mode of thinking extends towards negating any value of knowledge stemming from testimony and/or logic.
I believe the book does a very good job in presenting a solid argument on the inter-dependencies on these three tools of acquiring knowledge .
The book first starts out by defining what knowledge is. Then Coady moves on to illustrate the vast areas of human life where testimony is used to acquire knowledge. Areas range from history, law, psychology, medical studies to the latter end of physics, orientation information and oblique testimony.
He then moves on to distinguish between Formal testimony (mainly used in Law) and Natural testimony which spans to a wider range of applications.
The chapters following critiques the different philosophical stances pertaining to Hearsay,and this is where the book becomes really confusing. Coady lists different arguments and then debunks them, but never seems to at the end provide a resolution or a clear proven approach to how Hearsay is important.
Nevertheless, the debates are fruitful and provides a lot of insights. I found myself in many instances saying to myself: 'huh, this is interesting, never thought of it that way'
I would go down to details and list the different points he makes throughout the book. (I have about 10 pages worth of notes)... but I'll pass!
I'm tempted to emailing Mr. Coady in hopes of nailing down a few loose ends... Let's see what happens!
May 9, 2022
Published around thirty years ago, this is ‘old’ for an academic book, but it retains much of its significance as posing a serious challenge to traditional accounts of testimony.
The author suggests that historical figures like Locke and Hume proposed their accounts of Testimony with a purpose to rule out certain types of testimony. Hume famously wants to rule out religious miracles (Kindle 54%), but his prejudice against ‘bare-arsed’ highlanders also meant he wanted to rule out Ossian Epic Poems (57%)
Unsurprisingly, negative accounts of testimony like this, lack a positive account of what it is that actually does justify trusting testimony. The author suggests that Reductive accounts like Hume’s, end up being prejudiced or circular, as he wants to justify testimony on the basis of some other factor. So, either a person must judge the generality of testimony from a prejudicially small sample of personal experiences, or a person must rely on others’ testimony to know whether to trust testimony (28%).
This means that the authority, and the justification for accepting testimony (in general) cannot rest upon some other inferential or analogical argument. With significant refinements, the author inclines towards an approach championed by Thomas Reid, which treats Testimony as directly justified, in the same way that perception or memory is (40%).
In presenting this argument, the author gives a good survey of some historical writers on the issue of testimony, dipping into figures from the fourth century St Augustine to the twentieth century with Betrand Russell.
The presentation of ideas is clear and well argued, although there is the occasional acerbic commentary. For example, ‘Cultural Relativism’ is described as ‘possibly the silliest and most confused account of the nature of morality…’ (91%). There is also the occasional tendency to appeal to a general knowledge of a philosophical issue. Thus we hear that the broad outline of Donald Davidson’s truth-conditional theory of meaning does not need to be detailed in the text, as it ‘will be familiar to most philosophpers’ (47%). This is unfortunate for the readers who do not have such information in their memories, but it is a relatively minor issue and does not impact upon an ability to appreciate the book.
The overall thrust of the book is philosophical, so it will be of most interest to readers who like to explore the philosophical aspects of issues. However the language and presentation does mean that the book should also be accessible to general readers.
The author suggests that historical figures like Locke and Hume proposed their accounts of Testimony with a purpose to rule out certain types of testimony. Hume famously wants to rule out religious miracles (Kindle 54%), but his prejudice against ‘bare-arsed’ highlanders also meant he wanted to rule out Ossian Epic Poems (57%)
Unsurprisingly, negative accounts of testimony like this, lack a positive account of what it is that actually does justify trusting testimony. The author suggests that Reductive accounts like Hume’s, end up being prejudiced or circular, as he wants to justify testimony on the basis of some other factor. So, either a person must judge the generality of testimony from a prejudicially small sample of personal experiences, or a person must rely on others’ testimony to know whether to trust testimony (28%).
This means that the authority, and the justification for accepting testimony (in general) cannot rest upon some other inferential or analogical argument. With significant refinements, the author inclines towards an approach championed by Thomas Reid, which treats Testimony as directly justified, in the same way that perception or memory is (40%).
In presenting this argument, the author gives a good survey of some historical writers on the issue of testimony, dipping into figures from the fourth century St Augustine to the twentieth century with Betrand Russell.
The presentation of ideas is clear and well argued, although there is the occasional acerbic commentary. For example, ‘Cultural Relativism’ is described as ‘possibly the silliest and most confused account of the nature of morality…’ (91%). There is also the occasional tendency to appeal to a general knowledge of a philosophical issue. Thus we hear that the broad outline of Donald Davidson’s truth-conditional theory of meaning does not need to be detailed in the text, as it ‘will be familiar to most philosophpers’ (47%). This is unfortunate for the readers who do not have such information in their memories, but it is a relatively minor issue and does not impact upon an ability to appreciate the book.
The overall thrust of the book is philosophical, so it will be of most interest to readers who like to explore the philosophical aspects of issues. However the language and presentation does mean that the book should also be accessible to general readers.
March 4, 2023
Solid--
Clearly& compellingly argued, this book presents a case for testimony as a fundamental source of human knowledge, on a par with perception, memory, inference, and others. In doing so, Coady soundingly refutes any individualistic and reductive attempts at justification of testimony (an attempt represented by no less an authority than David Hume). The book is technical but on the whole not difficult to follow with patience, though some parts are quite difficult to understand without former familiarity with certain philosophical thoughts—like that crucial chapter on "Language and Mind" where knowledge of Donald Davidson's idea of radical interpretation would greatly aid understanding, as the author criticizes arguments made by a critic of Davidson's argument (so I had to first understand Davidson's argument in order to understand the critic's arguments, which in turn was obviously necessary for understanding Coady's criticism).
The first half or so of this book was focused and compelling. Starting in the second half, the chapters become a little diffuse and haphazard, as if the author threw in related but disparate papers he'd written (e.g., "Drestke's Drinker," though dealing with testimony, presents too specific and technical a problem that I didn't find it engaging at all).
On the whole, though, the book as advertised, delivers what it promises: a solid philosophical study of an important and ubiquitous phenomenon that had been neglected for far too long.
Clearly& compellingly argued, this book presents a case for testimony as a fundamental source of human knowledge, on a par with perception, memory, inference, and others. In doing so, Coady soundingly refutes any individualistic and reductive attempts at justification of testimony (an attempt represented by no less an authority than David Hume). The book is technical but on the whole not difficult to follow with patience, though some parts are quite difficult to understand without former familiarity with certain philosophical thoughts—like that crucial chapter on "Language and Mind" where knowledge of Donald Davidson's idea of radical interpretation would greatly aid understanding, as the author criticizes arguments made by a critic of Davidson's argument (so I had to first understand Davidson's argument in order to understand the critic's arguments, which in turn was obviously necessary for understanding Coady's criticism).
The first half or so of this book was focused and compelling. Starting in the second half, the chapters become a little diffuse and haphazard, as if the author threw in related but disparate papers he'd written (e.g., "Drestke's Drinker," though dealing with testimony, presents too specific and technical a problem that I didn't find it engaging at all).
On the whole, though, the book as advertised, delivers what it promises: a solid philosophical study of an important and ubiquitous phenomenon that had been neglected for far too long.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews