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Thinking In Time: The Uses Of History For Decision Makers
“A convincing case that careful analysis of the history, issues, individuals, and institutions can lead to better decisions—in business as well as in government” (BusinessWeek).Two noted professors offer easily remembered rules for using history effectively in day-to-day management of governmental and corporate affairs to avoid costly blunders. “An illuminating guide to the use and abuse of history in affairs of state” (Arthur Schlesinger).
352 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 31, 1986
154 people are currently reading
2205 people want to read
About the author
Richard E. Neustadt
22 books18 followersRichard Elliott Neustadt (June 26, 1919 – October 31, 2003) was an American political scientist specializing in the United States presidency. He also served as adviser to several presidents.
Neustadt was born in Philadelphia of a family of Swiss origin. Neustadt received a BA in History from the University of California, Berkeley in 1939, followed by an M.A. degree from Harvard University in 1941. After a short stint as an economist in the Office of Price Administration, he joined the U.S. Navy in 1942, where he was a supply officer in the Aleutian Islands, Oakland, California, and Washington. He then went into the Bureau of Budget (now known as the Office of Management and Budget) while working on his Harvard Ph.D., which he received in 1951.
Neustadt died in London after complications from a fall. In addition to Shirley Williams, Neustadt left a daughter, Elizabeth, and a granddaughter. His son, Richard, predeceased him in 1995.
Neustadt was born in Philadelphia of a family of Swiss origin. Neustadt received a BA in History from the University of California, Berkeley in 1939, followed by an M.A. degree from Harvard University in 1941. After a short stint as an economist in the Office of Price Administration, he joined the U.S. Navy in 1942, where he was a supply officer in the Aleutian Islands, Oakland, California, and Washington. He then went into the Bureau of Budget (now known as the Office of Management and Budget) while working on his Harvard Ph.D., which he received in 1951.
Neustadt died in London after complications from a fall. In addition to Shirley Williams, Neustadt left a daughter, Elizabeth, and a granddaughter. His son, Richard, predeceased him in 1995.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 52 reviews
February 6, 2022
I have been reading historical works for over three years, and if I have to characterize the past as it is seen through the lens of history, I will say that it is a long string of mistakes committed, or, to quote a childhood fairy tale, "calamities with consequences." I have lost count of the times I, and no doubt many others, have exclaimed about this president or that policy-maker, "Ah, but why did he not learn from history? The same mistakes have already been made before!" Knowledge conveys wisdom; ignorance courts trouble. History has proven two things so far: first, that studying history is an absolute necessity if one wishes to spare himself many headaches in life and second, that no one, or at least almost no one, has ever learned from history.
Why do we never learn history's lessons? The most common explanation is that we humans are allegedly all too stubborn to learn from someone else's mistakes and always prefer to make our own. While this must be so for many people in many situations, it is nevertheless a narrow answer, which cannot be applied to all cases. There are so many instances in life when we rely on the bitter experience of others to determine whether we should do something or not. For instance, the majority of teenagers, thankfully, avoid doing drugs after they hear stories of other teens' lives gone down the drain because of drug addiction. There are, of course, also those who think they can do drugs and avoid the tragic outcome despite being aware that deaths from overdosing are frequent among drug addicts. But the majority still knows better. That is why I believe that inherent human stubbornness is just one aspect of the problem.
Neustadt and May's book led me to the conclusion that maybe we all have not learned how to learn from history. In Russian popular history writer Edward Radzinskiy's words, history is not a teacher; it is a cruel taskmaster. To paraphrase with my words and understanding, history will not be so kind as to guide you until you have learned the necessary lessons; she will let you figure them out on your own, and if you don't, she will punish you. Having heard the saying about history being a teacher a hundred times, many expect her to just offer them all the answers. But by reading a history book or two, or ten will not be enough for them to gain the wisdom they need. History is not How to NOT Repeat My Predecessors' Mistakes 101. Learning from history is an art in itself, it is a special approach that has to be mastered.
In their book, Neustadt and May outline this approach with explanations and examples. To start learning history's lessons, one has to develop historical thinking first and foremost. Historical thinking in this context is the ability to adapt one's knowledge of history to the particular case one has to deal with, and at the same time to disregard the traditional notion that familiarity with history will be the automatic solution to the problem. A good example the authors offer draws a parallel between Thucydides's history of the Peloponnesian Wars and Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate the Vietnam War. Athenian ignorance about Sicilian history, psychology, and capabilities was a strong warning for Johnson when he contemplated warfare at long distance with the North Vietnamese, of whom he and his aides knew next to nothing. Why did not Secretary of State Dean Rusk or McGeorge Bundy warn him? Considering their learning, there was no way they had not read Thucydides. Nevertheless, the idea of them invoking his book to President Johnson seems unthinkable. The enormous technological capability of America, and especially American exceptionalism, alienated them from the experience of Athens immeasurably much. The story of some ancients, armed with spears, propelled by oars, maintained by slaves, deprived of electronics, and knowing nothing of air power, could convey nothing to men managing a modern war. It would have not even occurred them to draw on the past and see all the similarities: the blinding, self-imposed sense of superiority, the rash or over-cautious tendencies of generals, the fickleness of the public, the faithlessness or self-interest of allies, and the uncertainty of luck.
Furthermore, had they seen those patterns, Johnson would have still stumbled into the disastrous Vietnamese conflict. Because although most of us believe that to know history is to know what the decision to make, such knowledge is usually not enough to save us from a calamity. There is the issue of feasibility, as the authors call it. We usually do not choose the circumstances we find ourselves in. We may have learned from history which option is the good on, but what if this option is not available to us at all? By the time Johnson had become President, Vietnam was already a tragedy. He did not have much choice.
Nevertheless, history can be useful and applicable. History is a powerful placement tool. Placement means evaluating stereotypes and making sense of people and organizations – an absolutely essential ability in our society. For instance, the fact that Ronald Reagan voted four times for Franklin Delano Roosevelt can tell us volumes about Reagan's concept of the presidency and the federal government. When he campaigned for President, it must have been clear to all Americans who knew history that he would expand the federal government like FDR had done in the 1930s. Therefore, through placement history can help us predict the future to a certain extent, which also means that it can help us correctly evaluate the options that are available to us and choose the better one. Historical thinking would mean exactly that: analyzing the present situation, finding parallels with a similar case in the past, enumerating and evaluating the options available back then, deciding which one is better, or the best, and possibly applying it to the current situation.
THINKING IN TIME is written primarily for the use of decision-makers, who undoubtedly need to know how to properly utilize history. That is why Neustadt and May put such an emphasis on options and decisions. However, while decision-makers are charged with greater responsibility than most of us, each one of us is responsible for the decision-making in his or her own life. We all have had to make important decisions after evaluating several options. That is why I believe that every person will benefit immensely from reading this book. The authors also made use of the advice of a few notable decision-makers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Bundy brothers, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Selrensen among them. I highly recommend it.
Why do we never learn history's lessons? The most common explanation is that we humans are allegedly all too stubborn to learn from someone else's mistakes and always prefer to make our own. While this must be so for many people in many situations, it is nevertheless a narrow answer, which cannot be applied to all cases. There are so many instances in life when we rely on the bitter experience of others to determine whether we should do something or not. For instance, the majority of teenagers, thankfully, avoid doing drugs after they hear stories of other teens' lives gone down the drain because of drug addiction. There are, of course, also those who think they can do drugs and avoid the tragic outcome despite being aware that deaths from overdosing are frequent among drug addicts. But the majority still knows better. That is why I believe that inherent human stubbornness is just one aspect of the problem.
Neustadt and May's book led me to the conclusion that maybe we all have not learned how to learn from history. In Russian popular history writer Edward Radzinskiy's words, history is not a teacher; it is a cruel taskmaster. To paraphrase with my words and understanding, history will not be so kind as to guide you until you have learned the necessary lessons; she will let you figure them out on your own, and if you don't, she will punish you. Having heard the saying about history being a teacher a hundred times, many expect her to just offer them all the answers. But by reading a history book or two, or ten will not be enough for them to gain the wisdom they need. History is not How to NOT Repeat My Predecessors' Mistakes 101. Learning from history is an art in itself, it is a special approach that has to be mastered.
In their book, Neustadt and May outline this approach with explanations and examples. To start learning history's lessons, one has to develop historical thinking first and foremost. Historical thinking in this context is the ability to adapt one's knowledge of history to the particular case one has to deal with, and at the same time to disregard the traditional notion that familiarity with history will be the automatic solution to the problem. A good example the authors offer draws a parallel between Thucydides's history of the Peloponnesian Wars and Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate the Vietnam War. Athenian ignorance about Sicilian history, psychology, and capabilities was a strong warning for Johnson when he contemplated warfare at long distance with the North Vietnamese, of whom he and his aides knew next to nothing. Why did not Secretary of State Dean Rusk or McGeorge Bundy warn him? Considering their learning, there was no way they had not read Thucydides. Nevertheless, the idea of them invoking his book to President Johnson seems unthinkable. The enormous technological capability of America, and especially American exceptionalism, alienated them from the experience of Athens immeasurably much. The story of some ancients, armed with spears, propelled by oars, maintained by slaves, deprived of electronics, and knowing nothing of air power, could convey nothing to men managing a modern war. It would have not even occurred them to draw on the past and see all the similarities: the blinding, self-imposed sense of superiority, the rash or over-cautious tendencies of generals, the fickleness of the public, the faithlessness or self-interest of allies, and the uncertainty of luck.
Furthermore, had they seen those patterns, Johnson would have still stumbled into the disastrous Vietnamese conflict. Because although most of us believe that to know history is to know what the decision to make, such knowledge is usually not enough to save us from a calamity. There is the issue of feasibility, as the authors call it. We usually do not choose the circumstances we find ourselves in. We may have learned from history which option is the good on, but what if this option is not available to us at all? By the time Johnson had become President, Vietnam was already a tragedy. He did not have much choice.
Nevertheless, history can be useful and applicable. History is a powerful placement tool. Placement means evaluating stereotypes and making sense of people and organizations – an absolutely essential ability in our society. For instance, the fact that Ronald Reagan voted four times for Franklin Delano Roosevelt can tell us volumes about Reagan's concept of the presidency and the federal government. When he campaigned for President, it must have been clear to all Americans who knew history that he would expand the federal government like FDR had done in the 1930s. Therefore, through placement history can help us predict the future to a certain extent, which also means that it can help us correctly evaluate the options that are available to us and choose the better one. Historical thinking would mean exactly that: analyzing the present situation, finding parallels with a similar case in the past, enumerating and evaluating the options available back then, deciding which one is better, or the best, and possibly applying it to the current situation.
THINKING IN TIME is written primarily for the use of decision-makers, who undoubtedly need to know how to properly utilize history. That is why Neustadt and May put such an emphasis on options and decisions. However, while decision-makers are charged with greater responsibility than most of us, each one of us is responsible for the decision-making in his or her own life. We all have had to make important decisions after evaluating several options. That is why I believe that every person will benefit immensely from reading this book. The authors also made use of the advice of a few notable decision-makers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Bundy brothers, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Selrensen among them. I highly recommend it.
March 12, 2014
Read this book for a grad class.
In my life I have literally thrown a book across the room maybe two or three times. I threw this one across the room. What a couple of infuriatingly condescending pricks. To think that no amount of intelligent thought goes into decision making at the highest level is ridiculous. Yes there were some pretty significant moments where what someone thought was a small decision turned out to be a huge disastrous one... but this book fixes 0% of that. Your solution is to further bureaucratize the decision making process and rely on people's memories of events to shape current policy? Don't include historians because they'll give you too much information and you'll run the risk of having said historian possibly think of themselves as an "advisor"? God. Go to hell. I am so pissed at having to suffer through this crap that I cannot construct any actual scholarly response. In their attempt to press home the idea that history should be consulted in the decision making of today was completely destroyed by their utter disregard for the fact that there are various interpretations of history that might just be spelled out for you in those pesky history books that "possibly" might help you out if you find that kind of reading "fun." Surprise, turns out not every autobiography is 100% truthful. Utilize the people who are professionally trained to present various interpretations of historical events and not only will you not have to read those tedious books, you might get another, well educated, less invested perspective.
Douche bag.
In my life I have literally thrown a book across the room maybe two or three times. I threw this one across the room. What a couple of infuriatingly condescending pricks. To think that no amount of intelligent thought goes into decision making at the highest level is ridiculous. Yes there were some pretty significant moments where what someone thought was a small decision turned out to be a huge disastrous one... but this book fixes 0% of that. Your solution is to further bureaucratize the decision making process and rely on people's memories of events to shape current policy? Don't include historians because they'll give you too much information and you'll run the risk of having said historian possibly think of themselves as an "advisor"? God. Go to hell. I am so pissed at having to suffer through this crap that I cannot construct any actual scholarly response. In their attempt to press home the idea that history should be consulted in the decision making of today was completely destroyed by their utter disregard for the fact that there are various interpretations of history that might just be spelled out for you in those pesky history books that "possibly" might help you out if you find that kind of reading "fun." Surprise, turns out not every autobiography is 100% truthful. Utilize the people who are professionally trained to present various interpretations of historical events and not only will you not have to read those tedious books, you might get another, well educated, less invested perspective.
Douche bag.
May 4, 2016
The authors state up front that this is not a book about history but about the uses of history. The book reviews a number of (mostly) disastrous Presidential decisions (Bay of Pigs, Americanization of Vietnam War, multiple blunders by President Carter) and asks the question “if routine staff work had brought into view historical evidence overlooked or not sought, might ‘that’ not have occurred?” (pg xiii). Before diving into these though the author begins with a look at two successes (JFK’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Reagan’s Social Security Reform of 1983). In both instances, the leaders (and their staffs) used history to frame sharper questions and probe the undersides of their initial presumptions. It should be noted that the authors are not arguing for a prescriptive approach that guarantees perfect decisions but merely that “marginal” (and theoretically cumulative) improvements in decision making can be made by a closer look at history. Their primary goal is to get people to avoid the “usual” practice of plunging into action with an overdependence on fuzzy analogies. By stopping to think a second time, decision makers and their staffs are able to question their presumptions and stereotypes and evaluate their potential choices in light of the issue’s own history and possible future outcomes and come to better decisions (33).
A common theme in the book is that analogies are powerful tools that all too easily substitute for critical thought when a crisis arises. Facing a new crisis and the natural drive to do something now, analogies offer a readymade roadmap of actions taken in the past. Unfortunately, few stop to analyze the current situation and its similarity to the offered analogy. They suggest the first step of listing out the KNOWN, UNCLEAR, and PRESUMED points in the current situation. All too often, points are treated as known when in fact they are either unclear or presumed. Second, we should compare the analogy to the present situation, breaking out the likenesses and differences. All too often, our brains are quick to latch on to superficial similarities while ignoring the significant differences (for example the analogy of Korea during Vietnam). Conversely, we are too quick to dismiss valid analogies because of their apparent differences. The primary example given for dodging a bothersome analogy is the French defeat in Vietnam. This analogy was brought up during LBJ’s administration but in such a way as to easily dismiss it. They compared the differences and similarities between France in 1954 (domestic political unrest, fighting for colonialism, etc) and the US in 1965 (US would be fighting against communism, the administration had popular support). Unfortunately, this was a faulty report meant more for advocacy than critical analysis. To do the analysis justice they should have compared the US to France in 1950 BEFORE they had sent a million men into war and began suffering terrible casualties. Such a comparison would have had a lot more similarities than the differences and would have been much harder to disregard out of hand.
The authors provide a few other practical “mini-methods” to help flush out the history of an issue before making a decision to act: Mapping out the historical timeline of a particular issue with key milestones and players involved. Ask “What’s the story?” instead of “what’s the problem?” (this leads you to question what the problem really is instead of jumping to conclusions). And asking the questions a Journalist would ask: 5W’s and How to help flush out the details that might be missing from a superficial analysis. Had JFK done this, many of his presumptions for the Pay of Pigs invasion would have quickly been shown to be false (that it was plausibly deniable, that the CIA had the correct capabilities to pull it off, that the Cuban’s would rise up and overthrow Castro, etc). In contrast, FDR’s enactment of Social Security is hailed as brilliant for his ability to recognize the historical cycle of alternating between the election of liberal and conservative administrations and crafting his legislation to address those challenges.
Another mini-method is to consider the different perspectives of the history at hand (how its viewed by different generations, races, cultures, etc). All too often we act based off of stereotypes that may be largely false. Stereotypes can serve a purpose but by “sophisticating” them (adding different perspectives and filling in some of the blanks) will lead to better decision making. People naturally used the Korean War as an analogy when going into Vietnam but people from different generations viewed it differently. General Maxwell Taylor (former CJCS) remembered the terrible ordeal in Korea and was a staunch member of the “Never Again Club.” General William Westmoreland, a junior officer in Korea, was more enthusiastic to test his mettle as the senior commander in a war thought to be similar to one he had fought already. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in 1965 had underestimated the Chinese during the Korean War and consequently overestimated them thereafter, exaggerating their menace as expansionists in Vietnam.
The author make a point of the fact that the people we may seek to help or influence all carry their own memories (direct or vicarious) of past events and hold their own beliefs about persistent or recurring patterns. George Ball, whose October Memorandum would very accurately predict what the US experience in Vietnam would be like, was doomed to fail in his attempts at advocacy because he didn’t analyze his audience. His approach “challenged McNamara’s abilities, Rusk’s confidence, Bundy’s honor and Johnson’s pride.”
Overall, the book makes several good points on critical thinking skills that can be applied to staff work and for that its worth a skim. The examples given in this book do help to articulate how to apply their methods but I will warn you that it does tend to get tedious for large portions of the book.
A common theme in the book is that analogies are powerful tools that all too easily substitute for critical thought when a crisis arises. Facing a new crisis and the natural drive to do something now, analogies offer a readymade roadmap of actions taken in the past. Unfortunately, few stop to analyze the current situation and its similarity to the offered analogy. They suggest the first step of listing out the KNOWN, UNCLEAR, and PRESUMED points in the current situation. All too often, points are treated as known when in fact they are either unclear or presumed. Second, we should compare the analogy to the present situation, breaking out the likenesses and differences. All too often, our brains are quick to latch on to superficial similarities while ignoring the significant differences (for example the analogy of Korea during Vietnam). Conversely, we are too quick to dismiss valid analogies because of their apparent differences. The primary example given for dodging a bothersome analogy is the French defeat in Vietnam. This analogy was brought up during LBJ’s administration but in such a way as to easily dismiss it. They compared the differences and similarities between France in 1954 (domestic political unrest, fighting for colonialism, etc) and the US in 1965 (US would be fighting against communism, the administration had popular support). Unfortunately, this was a faulty report meant more for advocacy than critical analysis. To do the analysis justice they should have compared the US to France in 1950 BEFORE they had sent a million men into war and began suffering terrible casualties. Such a comparison would have had a lot more similarities than the differences and would have been much harder to disregard out of hand.
The authors provide a few other practical “mini-methods” to help flush out the history of an issue before making a decision to act: Mapping out the historical timeline of a particular issue with key milestones and players involved. Ask “What’s the story?” instead of “what’s the problem?” (this leads you to question what the problem really is instead of jumping to conclusions). And asking the questions a Journalist would ask: 5W’s and How to help flush out the details that might be missing from a superficial analysis. Had JFK done this, many of his presumptions for the Pay of Pigs invasion would have quickly been shown to be false (that it was plausibly deniable, that the CIA had the correct capabilities to pull it off, that the Cuban’s would rise up and overthrow Castro, etc). In contrast, FDR’s enactment of Social Security is hailed as brilliant for his ability to recognize the historical cycle of alternating between the election of liberal and conservative administrations and crafting his legislation to address those challenges.
Another mini-method is to consider the different perspectives of the history at hand (how its viewed by different generations, races, cultures, etc). All too often we act based off of stereotypes that may be largely false. Stereotypes can serve a purpose but by “sophisticating” them (adding different perspectives and filling in some of the blanks) will lead to better decision making. People naturally used the Korean War as an analogy when going into Vietnam but people from different generations viewed it differently. General Maxwell Taylor (former CJCS) remembered the terrible ordeal in Korea and was a staunch member of the “Never Again Club.” General William Westmoreland, a junior officer in Korea, was more enthusiastic to test his mettle as the senior commander in a war thought to be similar to one he had fought already. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State in 1965 had underestimated the Chinese during the Korean War and consequently overestimated them thereafter, exaggerating their menace as expansionists in Vietnam.
The author make a point of the fact that the people we may seek to help or influence all carry their own memories (direct or vicarious) of past events and hold their own beliefs about persistent or recurring patterns. George Ball, whose October Memorandum would very accurately predict what the US experience in Vietnam would be like, was doomed to fail in his attempts at advocacy because he didn’t analyze his audience. His approach “challenged McNamara’s abilities, Rusk’s confidence, Bundy’s honor and Johnson’s pride.”
Overall, the book makes several good points on critical thinking skills that can be applied to staff work and for that its worth a skim. The examples given in this book do help to articulate how to apply their methods but I will warn you that it does tend to get tedious for large portions of the book.
August 21, 2018
Reflections in History's Mirror
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
Reflections in History's Mirror, September 4, 2012
This review is from: Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (Paperback)
Created for their single semester Harvard course for training political decision makers, authors Neustadt and May's historiography focuses on a several recent American turning points and examines how historical precedent either did or could have persuaded those involved. The book intrigues on multiple levels, first as a comparison between similar events, second as a profile of the personalities involved such as Kennedy, LBJ, Reagan and Carter, third as a set of methods for outlining perspectives and finally, even though the book is 26 years old and predates the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subjects discussed such as health care, social entitlements and military confrontation are still relevant today, even more so today in light of the 2012 election cycle.
Any methodology has the benefit of crystallizing the issues. N&M's approach advises the guarded use of analogy. Having selected one of more exemplars they suggest outlining the similarities and differences between them and the current situation. Since our knowledge of events are incomplete, categorize features as "Known", "Unknown" and "Presumed". Instead of describing the problem, an approach that might bias the conclusion, tell the story and tell it from the perspective of different actors. In addition to asked the 5W's, ask "Alexander's Question" - what new information might challenge the "Presumed" items and lead to a different course of action. Additionally they recommend "Placement" - creating a timeline of events in the lives of key players in order to understand their motivation. The technique is nicely summarized at the end of the book.
The case studies are marvelous and include LBJ's intense use of placement as a political tool (allegedly saying: I never feel really comfortable with a man unless I have his pecker in my pocket), the wide range of historic parallels used by Kennedy's emergency cabinet during the Cuban missile crisis, Truman's extensive knowledge of and ability to ability to apply history without which he is easily misread, and the key insight into Reagan that he was influenced positively by the New Deal and had a deep and genuine admiration for FDR's approach to leadership. Another good case was the debate and planning for the 1977 Swine Flu (more recent examples would be the preventative regime implemented to combat SARS or the awareness campaign and infrastructure created in reaction to AIDS) which was strongly linked to the pandemic of 1918 which killed a half million Americans and had more victims by the end of WWI than the war itself! N&M also unkinde to problems of the Carter presidency which they viewed as technically motivated and, beyond the imagery of the 100 day post-election "honeymoon" which resulted in an overly ambitious program that failed to pass, did not employ historic analogy. With his tendency to sermonize they likened Carter to a Baptist preacher, surrounded by like mannered people, who tended to assume the moral high ground rather than constructively engage with others, an example being his treatment of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Like FDR he engaged in fireside chats with the nation, but whereas FDR was uplifting, Carter's broadcasts were more downbeat and depressing. N&M also focus on the failure of the SALT II disarmament talks and Carter's fractious relationship with leading Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, but surprisingly neglect what was, at least on first inspection, his major success, the Camp David Accords.
I was especially intrigued by the rivalry between Francis Perkins, US Secretary of Labour during the Depression and WW II and Mary Anderson, Director of the Woman's bureau and subordinate to her. The two came from different backgrounds but had similar feminist ideals - yet Anderson made the tactical mistake of alienating Perkins by accusing her of betraying ideals, which she was not rather than working within the framework of finding common goals. The result allowed Anderson to keep her position, but damaged her advancement.
The last chapter is a paean to reading history and makes a number of excellent though ambitious recommendations. The authors tend to favour accounts written by individuals close in time to events, especially autobiographies, ie Ulysses S. Grant , or wielding influence such as Churchill , rather than recent historians who run the risk of layering too much hindsight based on outcomes. The book informs, entertains and elevates the level of discussion leading one to seek out similar approaches to historic interpretation.
A great read and highly recommended.
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful
Reflections in History's Mirror, September 4, 2012
This review is from: Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (Paperback)
Created for their single semester Harvard course for training political decision makers, authors Neustadt and May's historiography focuses on a several recent American turning points and examines how historical precedent either did or could have persuaded those involved. The book intrigues on multiple levels, first as a comparison between similar events, second as a profile of the personalities involved such as Kennedy, LBJ, Reagan and Carter, third as a set of methods for outlining perspectives and finally, even though the book is 26 years old and predates the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subjects discussed such as health care, social entitlements and military confrontation are still relevant today, even more so today in light of the 2012 election cycle.
Any methodology has the benefit of crystallizing the issues. N&M's approach advises the guarded use of analogy. Having selected one of more exemplars they suggest outlining the similarities and differences between them and the current situation. Since our knowledge of events are incomplete, categorize features as "Known", "Unknown" and "Presumed". Instead of describing the problem, an approach that might bias the conclusion, tell the story and tell it from the perspective of different actors. In addition to asked the 5W's, ask "Alexander's Question" - what new information might challenge the "Presumed" items and lead to a different course of action. Additionally they recommend "Placement" - creating a timeline of events in the lives of key players in order to understand their motivation. The technique is nicely summarized at the end of the book.
The case studies are marvelous and include LBJ's intense use of placement as a political tool (allegedly saying: I never feel really comfortable with a man unless I have his pecker in my pocket), the wide range of historic parallels used by Kennedy's emergency cabinet during the Cuban missile crisis, Truman's extensive knowledge of and ability to ability to apply history without which he is easily misread, and the key insight into Reagan that he was influenced positively by the New Deal and had a deep and genuine admiration for FDR's approach to leadership. Another good case was the debate and planning for the 1977 Swine Flu (more recent examples would be the preventative regime implemented to combat SARS or the awareness campaign and infrastructure created in reaction to AIDS) which was strongly linked to the pandemic of 1918 which killed a half million Americans and had more victims by the end of WWI than the war itself! N&M also unkinde to problems of the Carter presidency which they viewed as technically motivated and, beyond the imagery of the 100 day post-election "honeymoon" which resulted in an overly ambitious program that failed to pass, did not employ historic analogy. With his tendency to sermonize they likened Carter to a Baptist preacher, surrounded by like mannered people, who tended to assume the moral high ground rather than constructively engage with others, an example being his treatment of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Like FDR he engaged in fireside chats with the nation, but whereas FDR was uplifting, Carter's broadcasts were more downbeat and depressing. N&M also focus on the failure of the SALT II disarmament talks and Carter's fractious relationship with leading Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, but surprisingly neglect what was, at least on first inspection, his major success, the Camp David Accords.
I was especially intrigued by the rivalry between Francis Perkins, US Secretary of Labour during the Depression and WW II and Mary Anderson, Director of the Woman's bureau and subordinate to her. The two came from different backgrounds but had similar feminist ideals - yet Anderson made the tactical mistake of alienating Perkins by accusing her of betraying ideals, which she was not rather than working within the framework of finding common goals. The result allowed Anderson to keep her position, but damaged her advancement.
The last chapter is a paean to reading history and makes a number of excellent though ambitious recommendations. The authors tend to favour accounts written by individuals close in time to events, especially autobiographies, ie Ulysses S. Grant , or wielding influence such as Churchill , rather than recent historians who run the risk of layering too much hindsight based on outcomes. The book informs, entertains and elevates the level of discussion leading one to seek out similar approaches to historic interpretation.
A great read and highly recommended.
December 23, 2015
Drybut the lessons can be used in many decision making areas.
February 1, 2026
I just finished reading - Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers by Ernest R. May and Richard Neustadt. This is a very in-depth, academic read about how to use history and information to make decisions. I really benefited from this read and hope to read it again in the future. While the book is for decision-makers, it's also helpful for staff to identify and focus on the relevant information and illustrations. This book helped provide me with a new paradigm for thinking through developing situations. I recently used Known, Unclear, and Presumed methods at work to great effect. I read this book while also reading a biography of Marshall, whom the authors saw as someone who visualized time as a stream. My only criticism was the sole focus on presidential and political issues. I believe their argument would have been fuller had they provided business, military, or community issues. Highly recommend it to anyone who wants to make better decisions or help their organization do the same.
“It is about how to use experience, remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect for tomorrow.”
“Success owed something to the fact that the decisive actors saw their choices as part of a series starting long ago and continuing for years to come.”
“Better decision-making involves drawing on history to frame sharper questions and doing so systematically, routinely.
“the significant items Known, Unclear, and Presumed are those which make the situation different now from what it was before, when it did not require attention.”
“Seductive analogies should be examined and reexamined for those reasons and one more: to gain protection against supposing that a problem is what I used to be when, in reality, conditions have changed.”
“Analogies also helped preserve consensus.”
“When a manager comes to me, I don’t ask, ' What's the problem?' I say, ' Tell me the story.” That way, I find out what the problem really is.”
“Remember that its only purpose is to produce a better working guess, a more sophisticated conjecture; the result is still a guess, a hypothesis, and it may be wrong.”
“ask what new evidence might change a current presumption.”
“Plainly, the more history one carries in one’s head about more centuries or countries - or institutions, issues, individuals, whatever - the less, one has to scramble in these ways when need arises.”
“visualizing issues in time streams.”
“books are a storehouse of vicarious experience, the ready source of reference points for inventory and context.”
“It is about how to use experience, remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect for tomorrow.”
“Success owed something to the fact that the decisive actors saw their choices as part of a series starting long ago and continuing for years to come.”
“Better decision-making involves drawing on history to frame sharper questions and doing so systematically, routinely.
“the significant items Known, Unclear, and Presumed are those which make the situation different now from what it was before, when it did not require attention.”
“Seductive analogies should be examined and reexamined for those reasons and one more: to gain protection against supposing that a problem is what I used to be when, in reality, conditions have changed.”
“Analogies also helped preserve consensus.”
“When a manager comes to me, I don’t ask, ' What's the problem?' I say, ' Tell me the story.” That way, I find out what the problem really is.”
“Remember that its only purpose is to produce a better working guess, a more sophisticated conjecture; the result is still a guess, a hypothesis, and it may be wrong.”
“ask what new evidence might change a current presumption.”
“Plainly, the more history one carries in one’s head about more centuries or countries - or institutions, issues, individuals, whatever - the less, one has to scramble in these ways when need arises.”
“visualizing issues in time streams.”
“books are a storehouse of vicarious experience, the ready source of reference points for inventory and context.”
July 29, 2022
A fascinating book, not just as a tool for decision makers (not me) and their staffs (there I am!) to make good use of history, but also as history itself.
On the first point (it being a tool for how to use history) the writers, both political and policy veterans in US service, propose a way of facing a given situation by understanding its history, the history of key players involved, and the differences between prior situations and the current one. What's more, they offer what they call "mini-methods" which are basically questions to ask and thought exercises to perform when faced with a situation.
On the second point (it being history itself), it offers a fascinating window into some more forgotten details of the Ford and Carter administrations, in many cases informed by the authors' discussions and questions of the decision makers themselves. I found particularly fascinating the discussion of the 1976 Swine Flu Epidemic that wasn't. I'd never heard it mentioned before, even while working at the federal interagency level in DC during the COVID pandemic! (Which, by the way, goes a long way to proving the point the authors make about a shameful lack of institutional knowledge and history among US citizenry and institutions.) What was especially striking and infuriating was that the book's exploration of what went wrong at the CDC during the 1976 incident felt like it could have been written last year, some forty-five years later.
I can think of no more powerful (or damning) endorsement of Thinking in Time than that--given the chance not to repeat a mistake from the past, the lack of understanding of history and failure to ask the right questions of our own past that the book warns against meant we were condemned to repeat it.
Failure, it seems, is evergreen.
On the first point (it being a tool for how to use history) the writers, both political and policy veterans in US service, propose a way of facing a given situation by understanding its history, the history of key players involved, and the differences between prior situations and the current one. What's more, they offer what they call "mini-methods" which are basically questions to ask and thought exercises to perform when faced with a situation.
On the second point (it being history itself), it offers a fascinating window into some more forgotten details of the Ford and Carter administrations, in many cases informed by the authors' discussions and questions of the decision makers themselves. I found particularly fascinating the discussion of the 1976 Swine Flu Epidemic that wasn't. I'd never heard it mentioned before, even while working at the federal interagency level in DC during the COVID pandemic! (Which, by the way, goes a long way to proving the point the authors make about a shameful lack of institutional knowledge and history among US citizenry and institutions.) What was especially striking and infuriating was that the book's exploration of what went wrong at the CDC during the 1976 incident felt like it could have been written last year, some forty-five years later.
I can think of no more powerful (or damning) endorsement of Thinking in Time than that--given the chance not to repeat a mistake from the past, the lack of understanding of history and failure to ask the right questions of our own past that the book warns against meant we were condemned to repeat it.
Failure, it seems, is evergreen.
November 19, 2025
Delightfully arrogant, befitting high culture historians. They assume historical thinking is unavoidable and give useful advice for clearing the thicket. Also whet the appetite for history with animated examples.
Summary of practical advice for thinking in time, in short form carried over from appendix a:
1. Define the decision maker’s situation by listing relevant details and separating known, unclear, and presumed.
2. Consider analogies, review the likenesses and differences.
3. Don’t ask ‘what’s the problem,’ ask ‘what’s the story,’
4. Create a time line for the issue from now to the story’s start. Plot trends and significant changes.
5. Ask the journalist's question to place details on the time line: when, what, where, who, how, and why.
6. Ask what odds you give that the presumption proves correct or how much of your own money would you wager on it.
7. Ask ‘what fresh facts, if at hand, by when, would cause you to changer your presumptions.’
8. Practice placement for both individuals and organizations. Consider both the private history (a person’s life details, an organization's major events) as well as public history (national and global affairs during a person’s life, relevant public affairs during an organization’s life). This gives you a better operating assumption about the person or organization, but be ready to update that assumption as time passes.
The most important and helpful advice is their chief metaphor, think of time in streams. I editorialize: do not look at decisions as a point of crisis that demands attention and resolution. Instead pay attention to where the issue is coming from, where it is now going, and where/how you can redirect it. A critical insight is that time flows forward inevitably, and no soul can remake it, but a creative person can set it along in a new and previously unimagined path.
Summary of practical advice for thinking in time, in short form carried over from appendix a:
1. Define the decision maker’s situation by listing relevant details and separating known, unclear, and presumed.
2. Consider analogies, review the likenesses and differences.
3. Don’t ask ‘what’s the problem,’ ask ‘what’s the story,’
4. Create a time line for the issue from now to the story’s start. Plot trends and significant changes.
5. Ask the journalist's question to place details on the time line: when, what, where, who, how, and why.
6. Ask what odds you give that the presumption proves correct or how much of your own money would you wager on it.
7. Ask ‘what fresh facts, if at hand, by when, would cause you to changer your presumptions.’
8. Practice placement for both individuals and organizations. Consider both the private history (a person’s life details, an organization's major events) as well as public history (national and global affairs during a person’s life, relevant public affairs during an organization’s life). This gives you a better operating assumption about the person or organization, but be ready to update that assumption as time passes.
The most important and helpful advice is their chief metaphor, think of time in streams. I editorialize: do not look at decisions as a point of crisis that demands attention and resolution. Instead pay attention to where the issue is coming from, where it is now going, and where/how you can redirect it. A critical insight is that time flows forward inevitably, and no soul can remake it, but a creative person can set it along in a new and previously unimagined path.
January 22, 2009
http://kellylowenstein.wordpress.com/...
Now, the work begins.
After a memorable day in which he weathered Chief Justice John Roberts’ fumbling of the presidential oath, danced with his wife Michelle to the Etta James tune “At Last” crooned by Grammy Award-winning singer Beyonce, and attended all 10 inaugural balls, Barack Obama wakes up today as America’s first black president.
Yesterday inauguration was drenched in historical symbol and substance.
Obama referred repeatedly to the past in his inaugural address and placed his hand on the same bible that Abraham Lincoln had used close to 150 years earlier.
At different points, Obama invoked immigrants’ journeys to America from distant shores, the hardships of slavery, military sacrifice in Concord, Gettysburg and Khe Sanh.
He cited the strength of previous generations in meeting daunting challenges like fascism and communism.
“We are the keepers of this legacy,” Obama proclaimed.
Today, he begins, with other elected officials and the public, to work to maintain and advance that noble legacy.
But, while doing so, Obama would do well to consider previous presidents’ uses of history to positive and negative effect.
The late Harvard professor Richard Neustadt and his colleague Ernest May tackle this subject in an illuminating book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers.
Published in the mid 80s, the book arose out of the professors’ classes at the Kennedy School of Government.
During their courses Neustadt and May would examine prior presidents’ decisions with an eye toward evaluating how they thought of, and used, the past to guide their weighty decisions.
It is a decidedly mixed record.
The book begins with the success of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the saving of Social Security during the 1980s, but also covers a wide range of fiascos from the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to the false call in 1976 of an impending flu epidemic to a series of missteps during the Carter Administration.
In many cases, the authors argue, a more thoughtful use of history based in a combination of analysis, close examination of analogies used to understand the present situation, the leaders’ placing themselves in the other person or organization’s position, and officials’ thinking about themselves as part of a time stream, a bridge between the past and present, could have made a difference.
Neustadt and May explain their method in concrete and unfolding details that are continually amplified by concrete examples. The authors suggest that leaders identify what is known, unknown and presumed, then explore the likenesses and differences between previous events and the current moment.
An examination of the presumptions driving the action should be next so as to uncover possibly inaccurate assessments of the situation and likely outcomes should follow. From there, leaders should try to understand other individuals involved in the situation in part by mapping their life experiencs as well as those of the organizations to which they belong-in essence, heading the Native American injunction not to judge a man until one has walked a mile in his moccasins.
Finally, and perhaps most important, leaders should think about their actions in the present as part of an historical stream in which the present bridges from the past to the future.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had this quality on domestic issues, the authors say, but less so on foreign concerns. Lynon Baines Johnson had this sensibility on race issues because of his childhood experiences in segregated Texas, but lacked it in the War in Vietnam.
Neustadt and May admit that this method is neither a panacea nor a recipe for transformation-at one point they compare someone who applies it to a baseball player who may raise his average from .250 to .265-but they do believe it can make a positive difference and help decision makers avoid “the Kennedy complaint at the moment of disaster in the Bay of Pigs: “How could I have been so stupid!”
Now, it is Obama’s turn to lead us during a seemingly endless and worsening series of challenges.
History will judge his actions, and the closing of his inaugural addressed suggested that he, at least yesterday, thought in Neustadt and May’s time stream.
In this excerpt Obama links his family’s journey to the nation’s creed and diversity before connecting George Washington’s words to a huddled band of soldiers in a desparate hour to what we may someday say to our grandchildren:
“This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed — why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.
So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:
‘Let it be told to the future world … that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive…that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet (it).’
America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.”
Delivered before a throng of 1 million people more at the Washington Mall, these lofty words will now need to be matched by Obama’s individual and our collective action to be given life and meaning.
The work begins today.
Now, the work begins.
After a memorable day in which he weathered Chief Justice John Roberts’ fumbling of the presidential oath, danced with his wife Michelle to the Etta James tune “At Last” crooned by Grammy Award-winning singer Beyonce, and attended all 10 inaugural balls, Barack Obama wakes up today as America’s first black president.
Yesterday inauguration was drenched in historical symbol and substance.
Obama referred repeatedly to the past in his inaugural address and placed his hand on the same bible that Abraham Lincoln had used close to 150 years earlier.
At different points, Obama invoked immigrants’ journeys to America from distant shores, the hardships of slavery, military sacrifice in Concord, Gettysburg and Khe Sanh.
He cited the strength of previous generations in meeting daunting challenges like fascism and communism.
“We are the keepers of this legacy,” Obama proclaimed.
Today, he begins, with other elected officials and the public, to work to maintain and advance that noble legacy.
But, while doing so, Obama would do well to consider previous presidents’ uses of history to positive and negative effect.
The late Harvard professor Richard Neustadt and his colleague Ernest May tackle this subject in an illuminating book, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers.
Published in the mid 80s, the book arose out of the professors’ classes at the Kennedy School of Government.
During their courses Neustadt and May would examine prior presidents’ decisions with an eye toward evaluating how they thought of, and used, the past to guide their weighty decisions.
It is a decidedly mixed record.
The book begins with the success of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the saving of Social Security during the 1980s, but also covers a wide range of fiascos from the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to the false call in 1976 of an impending flu epidemic to a series of missteps during the Carter Administration.
In many cases, the authors argue, a more thoughtful use of history based in a combination of analysis, close examination of analogies used to understand the present situation, the leaders’ placing themselves in the other person or organization’s position, and officials’ thinking about themselves as part of a time stream, a bridge between the past and present, could have made a difference.
Neustadt and May explain their method in concrete and unfolding details that are continually amplified by concrete examples. The authors suggest that leaders identify what is known, unknown and presumed, then explore the likenesses and differences between previous events and the current moment.
An examination of the presumptions driving the action should be next so as to uncover possibly inaccurate assessments of the situation and likely outcomes should follow. From there, leaders should try to understand other individuals involved in the situation in part by mapping their life experiencs as well as those of the organizations to which they belong-in essence, heading the Native American injunction not to judge a man until one has walked a mile in his moccasins.
Finally, and perhaps most important, leaders should think about their actions in the present as part of an historical stream in which the present bridges from the past to the future.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt had this quality on domestic issues, the authors say, but less so on foreign concerns. Lynon Baines Johnson had this sensibility on race issues because of his childhood experiences in segregated Texas, but lacked it in the War in Vietnam.
Neustadt and May admit that this method is neither a panacea nor a recipe for transformation-at one point they compare someone who applies it to a baseball player who may raise his average from .250 to .265-but they do believe it can make a positive difference and help decision makers avoid “the Kennedy complaint at the moment of disaster in the Bay of Pigs: “How could I have been so stupid!”
Now, it is Obama’s turn to lead us during a seemingly endless and worsening series of challenges.
History will judge his actions, and the closing of his inaugural addressed suggested that he, at least yesterday, thought in Neustadt and May’s time stream.
In this excerpt Obama links his family’s journey to the nation’s creed and diversity before connecting George Washington’s words to a huddled band of soldiers in a desparate hour to what we may someday say to our grandchildren:
“This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed — why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent Mall, and why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.
So let us mark this day with remembrance, of who we are and how far we have traveled. In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:
‘Let it be told to the future world … that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive…that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet (it).’
America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.”
Delivered before a throng of 1 million people more at the Washington Mall, these lofty words will now need to be matched by Obama’s individual and our collective action to be given life and meaning.
The work begins today.
April 22, 2021
This is a book about how government decision-makers should use history to make decisions. It stems from the “Uses of History” course in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. The book uses numerous case studies both good and bad, from the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Administration through the Jimmy Carter Administration. The authors breakdown how decisions were made or should have been made and come up with seven critical steps in making good decisions. There is one potential danger to this approach. If current decisions are based on historical decisions that were flawed due to inaccurate information or presumptions, then current leaders simply might perpetuate bad decisions. Nevertheless, the methods presented (there are seven steps to this process) are necessary for good decision making. So bottom line, the book is not a history book but about “how to use experiences in the process of deciding what to do today about the prospect for tomorrow.” An interesting read.
Read
March 18, 2025#Read for class!
An exploration of how foreign policy makers/presidents have used history to make good and bad decisions. The authors propose the Known-Unclear-Presumed to Likeness-Difference test for people to compare analogies and see when historical events do and don't line up. I like this framework and think it would be helpful in my studies. However, I don't think this book was super engaging, and the authors lack humility in talking about their framework, which bugs me from a political science perspective. There is not always a simple solution for every issue, and the authors acknowledge this point, but it should be taken with some caution. Regardless, current policy makers today clearly don't use this advice, so I'm walking away a little more depressed than anything else. Imagine if people in power fought against their biases in favor of an analytical approach based in history and fact.
An exploration of how foreign policy makers/presidents have used history to make good and bad decisions. The authors propose the Known-Unclear-Presumed to Likeness-Difference test for people to compare analogies and see when historical events do and don't line up. I like this framework and think it would be helpful in my studies. However, I don't think this book was super engaging, and the authors lack humility in talking about their framework, which bugs me from a political science perspective. There is not always a simple solution for every issue, and the authors acknowledge this point, but it should be taken with some caution. Regardless, current policy makers today clearly don't use this advice, so I'm walking away a little more depressed than anything else. Imagine if people in power fought against their biases in favor of an analytical approach based in history and fact.
May 2, 2020
Sometimes the hardest thing is to ask the sorts of questions that will help define the problem that ultimately must be solved. Thinking In Time is not a new book but should remain close at hand for decision makers and their staffs. I have seen firsthand the rush to develop alternatives for action in operational and policy settings, which is not unusual in strong ego organizations with a bias for action. That leaves an important job for well read staffers or leaders, who can see an issue relative to the stream of time, to perhaps temper the rush to action or help tease out the hidden risks that threaten to trip up the organization. Solid work by the authors, given I have been reading this in the time of Coronavirus, I was particularly appreciative of the swine flu case study and the damage sustained by the Ford administration in their haste to vaccinate the country.
December 19, 2021
A book about the perils of analogical reasoning and history in decision-making, primarily from the viewpoint of statesmen. The majority of the examples involve decision making in the foreign policy arena.
The authors argue that the usual way of decision making involves reaching for the nearest fuzzy analogy with surface similarities and a plunge towards action. They use historical examples such as Carter’s first 100 days in office to demonstrate how the use of inadequate analogies and a failure to think about key presumptions, known and unclear, the likenesses and differences between their chosen analogy and the situation at hand as well as consider the histories if issues, persons and organizations can lead to inadequate and sometime disastrous results.
Overall the book was helpful in identifying the problems analogical reasoning but short on empirically-solid solutions.
The authors argue that the usual way of decision making involves reaching for the nearest fuzzy analogy with surface similarities and a plunge towards action. They use historical examples such as Carter’s first 100 days in office to demonstrate how the use of inadequate analogies and a failure to think about key presumptions, known and unclear, the likenesses and differences between their chosen analogy and the situation at hand as well as consider the histories if issues, persons and organizations can lead to inadequate and sometime disastrous results.
Overall the book was helpful in identifying the problems analogical reasoning but short on empirically-solid solutions.
October 22, 2017
Neustadt and May argue that thinking of history as a time stream allows leaders to analyze situations, issues, individuals, and institutions and come up with better answers to the question "What should I do?" Using case studies from history they show how asking questions and establishing, Knowns, Uncertains, Presumptions would lead to better presidential and governmental decisions.
Why I started this book: This book is repeatedly placed on military professional reading lists. And while the cover is dated and so are the examples, the thought process and questions deserve to be pondered, answered and applied.
Why I finished it: Hard book to get thru... because of dated examples (Kennedy-Reagan) but worth it in the end.
Why I started this book: This book is repeatedly placed on military professional reading lists. And while the cover is dated and so are the examples, the thought process and questions deserve to be pondered, answered and applied.
Why I finished it: Hard book to get thru... because of dated examples (Kennedy-Reagan) but worth it in the end.
December 1, 2023
This contains some incredibly in-depth reviews of various 20th century policy decision points, usually with significant firsthand information from the participants. I learned about several events that were not covered at all by school history books. In addition, much of the advice afforded is absolutely spot on, if somewhat obvious at times, with the best advice really being to take a moment and step away from urgent reactions. On the negative side, this was written in the 80s and it really needs to be updated, especially for the problems of 21st century politics, and I also wonder if Carter would benefit a bit from less proximity bias.
January 4, 2024
Tough but informative read. Clearly write BY academics FOR prospective policymakers but some good lessons to take away from their ideas. Main point they are trying to get across is the importance of contextualizing history during decision-making: history doesn't explicitly repeat itself but you can use it to inform your thought process for problem solving, etc. Very honed-in on 20th century US Presidents which was informative for me but a broader approach may have proven beneficial. Also taught me that I need some more history lessons. Written for a specific audience but I have several useful conclusions coming away from it.
January 12, 2020
I thought this book had some good insights that fit well with what we teach in CAP; in particular, thinking about Knowns, Unknowns, and Presumptions when dealing with issues. Also thinking abut timelines of events--should consider thinking about extending timelines further in the past than we usually do. The concept of "placing" was interesting - considering the background of people you're serving--policymakers--to get a better sense of how they're processing information. I found the book was a little slow in some sections.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Read
November 3, 2024This was recommended to me years ago by a professor in grad school. I bought a copy of it years ago and it sat on my shelf. Finally got around to reading it. Talk about underwhelming. Written by a couple of Harvard pinheads. Dull and tendentious. This was purely Kennedy School of Government argle bargle.
The only lasting thing I got out of this book was a glorious quote -
"Avoid trivia"
General George C. Marshall
The only lasting thing I got out of this book was a glorious quote -
"Avoid trivia"
General George C. Marshall
May 19, 2018
“Thinking In Time,” by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May is a must read for field-grade officers and practitioners of operational design methodology found in the operational level of war planning. It is also a great read for millennials entering government service because it uses interesting historical situations from the 1950s through the 1980s to illustrate all major points.
The authors set up a cognitive framework called “mini-methods,” useful to staff members and decision-makers who are to solve ill-defined problems. Don’t confuse this with operational design method, rather the authors offer a way to enhance the first step in operational design: define the current operational environment.
Although the authors built a very strong academic approach to problem-solving, they risk jumping to inferences too soon. It might be better to pause before drawing inferences and establish a clear vision for the future state. The authors didn’t fully consider this risk. Following the operational design method, the next step would be to define the problem, clearly. Then, create an assortment of operational approaches toward that desired future situation.
Overall, the “mini-methods” described in the book are easy to learn and apply to one’s daily/routine staff work. In particular, field-officers are expected to bring value and depth to problem-solving and conversations with decision-makers. Applying the “mini-methods“ will absolutely help field-grade officers meet this expectation.
The authors set up a cognitive framework called “mini-methods,” useful to staff members and decision-makers who are to solve ill-defined problems. Don’t confuse this with operational design method, rather the authors offer a way to enhance the first step in operational design: define the current operational environment.
Although the authors built a very strong academic approach to problem-solving, they risk jumping to inferences too soon. It might be better to pause before drawing inferences and establish a clear vision for the future state. The authors didn’t fully consider this risk. Following the operational design method, the next step would be to define the problem, clearly. Then, create an assortment of operational approaches toward that desired future situation.
Overall, the “mini-methods” described in the book are easy to learn and apply to one’s daily/routine staff work. In particular, field-officers are expected to bring value and depth to problem-solving and conversations with decision-makers. Applying the “mini-methods“ will absolutely help field-grade officers meet this expectation.
June 7, 2018
Neustadt & May are arguing a model for effective decision making. They place their model amoung multiple historical case studies as examples both good and bad decision making. This isn't clear at first. However, once you understand the model and their logic, the application process in the text is enlightening.
December 6, 2025
I didn’t like this book because it never delivered a coherent analytical method. I wanted a framework converting vague qualitative questions into convincing quantitative answers, but found none. Instead, the chapters drift through fluff and fillers. Worse, the book overpromises to students and policymakers, without delivering on those promises.
May 22, 2019
This is a reread from 1986. The framework for asking questions - historical context, relationships, and the 'so-what', remain valid to another generation. Neustadt and May encourage a thought process to achieve objectives. A practice which appears absent at present.
October 29, 2025
My book for discussion (yay!)… I liked how they applied the strategies to past historical events. Also liked how as a reader we got to see the process administrations go through to come up with decisions.
July 21, 2018
meh - reads exactly like a Kennedy School prof trying to explain his reasoning for working through case studies. Extremely try and, for this historian, not so instructive.
August 17, 2018
“One is the recognition that the future has no place to from but the past “
November 12, 2018
I appreciated this book more than my "like" of the book. 3 stars because it was mostly a slog to get through. It is, after all, designed as a companion of sorts to an advanced college course.
Read
January 13, 2021Interesting and practical guide for analyzing historical episodes to illuminate decision making.
December 13, 2021
Enlightening on calculating possibilities and forecasting - even more useful than today popular Superforecasting concepts for me.
May 7, 2023
Want to get smart fast…read this book…and really read it…
March 27, 2024
Had potential. Didn’t reach it.
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