This book is based on six lectures that Santayana, himself a philosopher-poet, gave on three towering figures, Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe. These three epitomize, for Santayana, the supreme expression, in turn, of Naturalism, Supernaturalism, and Romanticism. Yet in what makes them great, he says, they are compatible. Taken together, they sum up all of European philosophy.
Why are poets the exemplars and not philosophers? Santayana explains that, while the reasonings and investigations of philosophy are arduous, the vision of philosophy is sublime, imaginative. So it’s not only possible for a poet to be a great exponent of philosophy, but it is advantageous. What Santayana calls the impotence of the arts in his day lies in their assumption that theory can’t be poetic. “The life of theory is not less human or less emotional than the life of sense; it is more typically human and more keenly emotional.”
What follows is less a review than a summary of some of Santayana’s main points.
The nature of the genius of Lucretius is its power to lose itself in its object. “We seem to be reading not the poetry of a poet about things, but the poetry of the things themselves.” He is also the poet of constant elements in flux. He takes over the pair of forces, love and strife, to which Empedocles ascribed this process of gathering and disruption but substituted Venus and Mars for these two terms. For Lucretius, “they are not moral forces,” but the mechanism itself. Arm in arm, “they rule the universe together.”
Life is not matter; it is an event. As a living being, the poet is pictured arriving on the scene at the top of a wave and can only observe and describe its fall. “His philosophy must be a prophecy of death.”
Santayana reminds us that for Lucretius, “nature” was not scenic landscapes (something he was little interested in describing), but “the principle of birth or genesis, the universal mother, the great cause, or system of causes, that brings phenomena to light.” I found this helpful to keep in mind when reading Lucretius and reading one who learned from him, Spinoza.
When he turns to Dante, Santayana presents Dante’s supernaturalism as the full development of a revolution foreseen by Plato: the sole principle of understanding must be the question of the better or worse. Dante, he says further, incorporates two strands of thought: the Hebraic, which saw the great themes of creation, fall, and salvation as historical events (therefore occurring once), and the Greek view. The result, via the four-fold sense of scripture in which Dante was schooled, fires his imagination. “Sacred history acquired for Dante a new importance. . . . Every episode became the symbol for some moral state or some moral principle.”
Santayana lauds Dante’s greatness as a poet yet also points out some of his weaknesses. Dante often wrote “with a passion not clarified into judgment.” His love, on the other hand, is too restrained, expressed too much in fancy. Dante also talks too much about himself, and the “personality thrust forward so obtrusively is not in every respect worthy of contemplation.” It is very proud and very bitter, yet curiously timid.
Goethe, according to Santayana, was simultaneously a naturalist and pantheist in the tradition of Spinoza and an exponent of the transcendental idealism current in Germany (the view of the world as the expression of a spiritual endeavor). Moreover, Santayana detects a second way Goethe combines two strains: northern European romanticism and the new paganism coming from Greece via Italy.
While not a philosophical poem, Faust offers a solution to the moral problem of existence as truly as do the poems of Lucretius and Dante. “The vital straining towards an ideal, definite but latent, when it dominates a whole life, may express that ideal more fully than the best chosen words.” Further, unlike Dante, Goethe never depicts the object his hero is pursuing; “he is satisfied with depicting the pursuit.” To “have an ideal to strive for, and, like Faust, never to be satisfied, is itself the salvation of man.”
Santayana concludes with a comparison of the three. Goethe presents experience in its immediacy, without ground, while Lucretius is the poet of substance. Experience appears to be not as each man comes upon it in his own person but as the scientific observer views it from without. Dante also shows us experience in its totality, but the external point of reference is moral, not physical. What interests him is “what experience is best, what processes lead to a supreme, self-justifying, indestructible sort of existence.” Lucretius is the poet of nature, Dante, of salvation. “Goethe gives us what is most fundamental, — the turbid flux of sense, the cry of the heart. . . .”
A “truly philosophical or comprehensive poet” would unite the insights and gifts of all three; Santayana asserts such a union would not be impossible. He distinguishes two directions for rational art: it may buttress a particular form of life (as does science and any other discipline that informs us about our conditions and equips us for life). Or it may come to express life, that is, the ideal “towards which we would move” under improved conditions. Santayana calls for a poet of “double insight,” one who would “reconstitute the shattered picture of the world.”
The lectures are closely-reasoned, peppered with apposite quotations from the texts. They are also marked by felicity of expression; I highlighted many more passages than I’ve quoted here. Someone who has not read any of the poems Santayana treats might not get much out of it. These are not so much introductions to the works as appreciations and analyses. I’ve read two of them, but only once each; they would repay repeated reading. I’m also eager to tackle the poem I haven’t yet read, The Nature of Things, by Lucretius.