As America fought to defend democratic ideals in Europe and Asia during World War II, our own democratic politics at home paradoxically created a far less than efficient war effort on both civilian and military fronts. While America's glorious triumphs in World War II are well known, the story of our country's failure to swiftly and effectively mobilize and energize our war machine is yet to be fully told. Now, in a broad-ranged domestic, military, and diplomatic history, William O'Neill tells the story of America's strengths and its weaknesses in fighting the Good War. The United States won its victory in World War II not, as legend has it, because of superior numbers and material predominance. Reluctant even to enter the war, the American government proceeded by costly half-measures even after committing to fight. Official reticence and bureaucratic bungling led to inferior and defective weapons, too few infantrymen, the squandering of GI's lives in strategically useless attacks, and other tragic mistakes. The Sherman tank was a deathtrap and the torpedoes of American submarines routinely malfunctioned. Afraid to alarm voters, Congress failed to act on many issues, such as the decision to increase military spending before the war, which could have brought the conflict to a faster end, with less bloodshed. O'Neill traces much of the official bungling to domestic politics and paradoxically to the democratic process itself, which limited Roosevelt's flexibility in wartime. Yet, despite these obstacles, the blood and valor of the men who fought and the strength and struggles of those who remained at home made up for an overly cautious and ambivalent democratic leadership. William O'Neillbrings this war generation to life to tell the story of the country which had long seemed willing to ignore the world but ultimately roused itself to defend it.
William L. O'Neill was an historian specializing in 20th century America. He earned his undergraduate degree at the University of Michigan and his doctorate at the University of California, Berkeley. He taught at the universities of Pittsburgh, Colorado and Wisconsin before accepting a position at Rutgers University in 1971, where he taught until his retirement in 2006.
A Democracy at War is a self-described history of the “people’s war,” exploring how and why the United States won World War II despite numerous strategic failures. William O’Neill, the late professor of history at Rutgers University, covers both the home front and the military campaigns in Europe and the Pacific, arguing that the war was a transformational period for American democracy, industry, and culture. He focuses particularly on how domestic politics, media coverage, and popular sentiment both shaped and responded to the urgency of the moment—often imperfectly.
O’Neill’s criticisms are far-reaching and spare virtually no one. He underscores how America’s democratic system frequently fell short of meeting wartime demands, resulting in delays and missteps that hindered the war effort. He laments Congress’s reluctance to act decisively, noting its refusal to “take more than minimal chances” in preparing for war. He rebukes the public for its poorly informed demands on lawmakers and its clamoring for conflict in the Eastern theater. He also censures political and military leaders for a range of failings: a “shamefully bad” Far Eastern policy; the “misconceived” and “poorly designed” Italian campaign; heavy bombing missions he deems strategically worthless; “inferior” weaponry and “obsolete” assault tactics; the “poor planning and general incompetence” behind aircraft production; and the “poorly conducted campaigns” of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, among others.
O’Neill is equally unsparing in addressing America’s social failings. He criticizes the government’s and public’s “callousness” toward Jewish refugees, the “fear, greed, and racism” behind the internment of Japanese Americans, and the persistent discrimination against African Americans. A central theme throughout is how leaders failed to fully harness civilian potential—particularly by not enabling working women to make broader contributions to the war effort—and were bound for too long by the prevailing pre-war isolationist sentiment.
A Democracy at War is, therefore, a passionate but overly contentious examination of a nation mobilized for total war. While it offers insightful commentary on how wartime mobilization reshaped American life and how leaders grappled with unprecedented challenges, O’Neill’s narrative is often excessively opinionated and petulant. The book also suffers from factual inaccuracies—for example, its claim that Allied bombing campaigns had “no strategic value” overlooks their role in crippling German industry, diverting enemy resources from the Eastern Front, and lowering enemy morale. Likewise, the dismissal of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa invasions ignores their importance in supporting air operations and reducing Allied aircrew casualties.
In sum, while many of O’Neill’s criticisms are valid, the book frequently reads as a litany of grievances against every wartime action that fell short of perfection. Its tone, coupled with a lackluster narrative and overreliance on inferior secondary sources, ultimately renders this a flawed and largely unpalatable account of the war.