Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-up to the Russo-Japanese War

by Nicholas Papastratigakis

From 1904-1905, Russia and Japan were locked in conflict arising from rival imperial ambitions in the Far East. Nicholas Papastratigakis offers an integrated analysis of Russian naval strategy in the decade before this Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russians suffered catastrophic defeat. He seeks to determine the extent to which their defeat can be attributed to flawed Tsarist naval strategy in the region. Rooted in rich primary resources from Russian, French, and British archives, the book sheds new light on Russia's conduct in international affairs in the pre-World War I era. Papastratigakis places Russian naval strategy in the broader context of Russian military strategy at the turn of the century, and of imperialism and "navalism" in general. This book will be of enormous interest to scholars and students of naval, military, imperial, and Russian history.

352 pages, Hardcover

First published April 5, 2011

Reviews

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

Russian Imperialism and Naval Power is a detailed journey through the formulation of strategic Russian naval policy from 1884-1904, with the focus on the second decade. It is superbly researched and written very well (I found it very readable, which is by far from always the case with these kind of discussions, although it is written in an academic style, so don’t go into it expecting Hornfischer-like prose – but it’s an excellent execution of the academic style, which done badly can be quite hard to read indeed).

As it is a discussion of strategy, there are no illustrations, but there are four maps which provide the necessary (and very important) geographic context for the discussion, and they’re handily located all at the back. The language is accessible, and the first chapter provides a broad overview of technological development in the 19th century to set the context for the discussions on ship quality.

One of the very few downsides is that the book references a significant number of Russian personnel, naval and otherwise, and doesn’t help remind the reader of their role when at times it would be helpful. For example, the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, A I Nelidov, is first mentioned on page 81, but are then next mentioned on page 139 with no reference to their role – this is helped by a good index, but it would have made for easier reading when “returning characters” were re-introduced with some reminder of their role. Similarly, given the book contains multiple references during similar times to both Vice Admiral S P Tyrtov and Vice Admiral P P Tyrtov (brothers), the references in the text to “Tyrtov” require the reader to guess as to which one is being referred to – in most (but not all) cases at least probably successfully, given their different roles.

As it’s an academic-style read, it’s not a “recommend for everyone” kind of book, but for people seriously interested in the Russo-Japanese War, or Tsarist Russia’s naval strategy, I would expect it to contain much of interest, and it’s also likely to be of interest for people interested in late 19th/early 20th century naval strategy more broadly, as long as they don’t mind dryer/more academic-style works.