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Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century
In contemporary philosophical debates in the United States "redefining pragmatism" has become the conventional way to flag significant philosophical contests and to launch large conceptual and programmatic changes. This book analyzes the contributions of such developments in light of the classic formulations of Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey and the interaction between pragmatism and analytic philosophy. American pragmatism was revived quite unexpectedly in the 1970s by Richard Rorty's philosophical heterodoxy and his running dispute with Hilary Putnam, who, like Rorty, is a professed Deweyan. Reinventing Pragmatism examines the force of the new pragmatisms, from the emergence of Rorty's and Putnam's basic disagreements of the 1970s until the turn of the century. Joseph Margolis considers the revival of a movement generally thought to have ended by the 1950s as both a surprise and a turn of great importance. The quarrel between Rorty and Putnam obliged American philosophers, and eventually Eurocentric philosophy as a whole, to reconsider the direction of American and European philosophy, for instance in terms of competing accounts of realism and naturalism.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 2002
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June 11, 2025
Joseph Margolis, RIP, June 8, 2021
Pragmatism's Second Wave
The early years of the Twentieth Century resulted in a flourishing of the American philosophy of pragmatism in the works of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In the late years of the Twentieth Century, American philosophy again took a widely-hearalded pragmatic turn, especially in the work and debate of two thinkers of note: Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Both Rorty and Putnam have tried to assume the philosophical mantle of John Dewey. Yet they disagree sharply between themselves about the meaning and future of a revised version of philosophical pragmatism.
The nature of current American pragmatism and its relationship to the founders of the movement is discussed in Joseph Margolis's recent book, "Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century" (2002). Margolis is Laura Carnell Professor of Philosophy at Temple University, and he is written prolifically on philosophy on interpretation, philosophy of culture and philosophy of art.
"Reinventing Pragmatism" is a collection of five provocative and polemical essays that tend to move from the present to the past in comparing the work of contemporary American pragmatists to their predecessors. The genesis of the original pragmatic movement, for Margolis, was the desire to escape from Cartesianism while still finding an important way to practice philosophy. But, Margolis argues, Rorty's philosophical project has little to do with that of Dewey's. Margolis argues that Rorty conflates pragmatism with the naturalism that still is the dominant trend in American analytic philosophy. Margolis further argues that Rorty disagrees with Dewey and the other pragmatists in finding no explanatory role for philosophy. More provocatively Margolis claims that with his realism Rorty remains a Cartesian in spite of himself.
Margolis argues that Hilary Putnam in works such as "Reason, Truth, and History" and later books has tried unsuccessfully to develop a pragmatism that avoids Rorty's strictures against philosophy as well as avoiding charges of relativism. Putnam, in his repeated changes of position, has, Margolis claims, failed to develop a coherent position that saves him from the charge either of Cartesianism or relativism. In addition to discussing Rorty and Putnam and their dispute about pragmatism and the role of philosophy, Margolis compares their work with that of their more analytically-oriented colleagues, especially Quine and Davidson.
Among the earlier pragmatists, Margolis devotes most of his attention to John Dewey and his study "Experience and Nature." He pays substantial attention to the antecedents of pragmatism in Hegelian idealism and in Darwin's evolutionary theory. Margolis does not read Dewey as one intent upon eliminating the philosophical enterprise but instead sees Dewey as trying to redirect it from a concern with concepts and abstractions to a concern with the biologically-based flux in nature and in human beings and the need to work through from concrete problems to increasingly plausible solutions. This attempt, for Margolis, involves a degree of historical thinking, which Dewey himself only insufficiently realized.
Margolis argues that at the end of the Twentieth Century, American philosophy had not fully recovered pragmatism but remained, in its realism,in an analytic and even Cartesian mode. His solution to the problem is, I find, stated less than clearly. Margolis believes that relativism, which is usually associated with the doctrine of Protagoras, has received an unfair treatment at the hands of philosophers beginning with Plato and can be developed in a manner that is not self-refuting. He views this as a matter of the study of culture, but I don't think his ideas are fully developed in this book. More broadly, he believes that for pragmatism to revive, it must weaken its current attachment to philosophical naturalism (or, as some call it, 'scientism"). I tend to share this position. It is worth remembering that Dewey was a Hegelian in his youth and that Peirce and James came close to flirting, at least, with idealism in much of their work. These two thinkers, at least, (as well as their idealist colleague, Josiah Royce) saw their pragmatism as a means of reconciling the claims of science with those or religion, rather than as providing a basis for philosophical naturalism.
Margolis has written a challenging book that will be of interest to those with a good background and interest in contemporary American philosophy and in pragmatism.
Robin Friedman
Pragmatism's Second Wave
The early years of the Twentieth Century resulted in a flourishing of the American philosophy of pragmatism in the works of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. In the late years of the Twentieth Century, American philosophy again took a widely-hearalded pragmatic turn, especially in the work and debate of two thinkers of note: Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Both Rorty and Putnam have tried to assume the philosophical mantle of John Dewey. Yet they disagree sharply between themselves about the meaning and future of a revised version of philosophical pragmatism.
The nature of current American pragmatism and its relationship to the founders of the movement is discussed in Joseph Margolis's recent book, "Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century" (2002). Margolis is Laura Carnell Professor of Philosophy at Temple University, and he is written prolifically on philosophy on interpretation, philosophy of culture and philosophy of art.
"Reinventing Pragmatism" is a collection of five provocative and polemical essays that tend to move from the present to the past in comparing the work of contemporary American pragmatists to their predecessors. The genesis of the original pragmatic movement, for Margolis, was the desire to escape from Cartesianism while still finding an important way to practice philosophy. But, Margolis argues, Rorty's philosophical project has little to do with that of Dewey's. Margolis argues that Rorty conflates pragmatism with the naturalism that still is the dominant trend in American analytic philosophy. Margolis further argues that Rorty disagrees with Dewey and the other pragmatists in finding no explanatory role for philosophy. More provocatively Margolis claims that with his realism Rorty remains a Cartesian in spite of himself.
Margolis argues that Hilary Putnam in works such as "Reason, Truth, and History" and later books has tried unsuccessfully to develop a pragmatism that avoids Rorty's strictures against philosophy as well as avoiding charges of relativism. Putnam, in his repeated changes of position, has, Margolis claims, failed to develop a coherent position that saves him from the charge either of Cartesianism or relativism. In addition to discussing Rorty and Putnam and their dispute about pragmatism and the role of philosophy, Margolis compares their work with that of their more analytically-oriented colleagues, especially Quine and Davidson.
Among the earlier pragmatists, Margolis devotes most of his attention to John Dewey and his study "Experience and Nature." He pays substantial attention to the antecedents of pragmatism in Hegelian idealism and in Darwin's evolutionary theory. Margolis does not read Dewey as one intent upon eliminating the philosophical enterprise but instead sees Dewey as trying to redirect it from a concern with concepts and abstractions to a concern with the biologically-based flux in nature and in human beings and the need to work through from concrete problems to increasingly plausible solutions. This attempt, for Margolis, involves a degree of historical thinking, which Dewey himself only insufficiently realized.
Margolis argues that at the end of the Twentieth Century, American philosophy had not fully recovered pragmatism but remained, in its realism,in an analytic and even Cartesian mode. His solution to the problem is, I find, stated less than clearly. Margolis believes that relativism, which is usually associated with the doctrine of Protagoras, has received an unfair treatment at the hands of philosophers beginning with Plato and can be developed in a manner that is not self-refuting. He views this as a matter of the study of culture, but I don't think his ideas are fully developed in this book. More broadly, he believes that for pragmatism to revive, it must weaken its current attachment to philosophical naturalism (or, as some call it, 'scientism"). I tend to share this position. It is worth remembering that Dewey was a Hegelian in his youth and that Peirce and James came close to flirting, at least, with idealism in much of their work. These two thinkers, at least, (as well as their idealist colleague, Josiah Royce) saw their pragmatism as a means of reconciling the claims of science with those or religion, rather than as providing a basis for philosophical naturalism.
Margolis has written a challenging book that will be of interest to those with a good background and interest in contemporary American philosophy and in pragmatism.
Robin Friedman
Displaying 1 of 1 review