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The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability
Why should we avoid doing moral wrong? The inability of philosophy to answer this question in a compelling manner—along with the moral skepticism and ethical confusion that ensue—result, Stephen Darwall argues, from our failure to appreciate the essentially interpersonal character of moral obligation. After showing how attempts to vindicate morality have tended to change the subject—falling back on nonmoral values or practical, first-person considerations—Darwall elaborates the interpersonal nature of moral their inherent link to our responsibilities to one another as members of the moral community. As Darwall defines it, the concept of moral obligation has an irreducibly second-person aspect; it presupposes our authority to make claims and demands on one another. And so too do many other central notions, including those of rights, the dignity of and respect for persons, and the very concept of person itself. The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority—an account that Darwall carries from the realm of theory to the practical world of second-person attitudes, emotions, and actions.
- GenresPhilosophy
362 pages, Hardcover
First published November 6, 9
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
February 12, 2018
In many respects, Darwall's The Second-Person Standpoint is a conventional piece of analytic philosophy. Normally, I am fairly neutral about that, but Darwall leans really hard into the conventions of reference to philosophy of language and metaphysics in ways that are obscure and often only lead back into the point after a roundabout journey. The result is that the book can often be difficult to read, especially to those who have to spend a lot of time reading into his interpretation of Kant, Fichte, Pufendorf, inter alia. If I were editing the book, this would've been my major suggestion for adjusting it.
The real challenge, and the reason that I found the reliance on classical methods frustrating, is that Darwall's actual analysis if fascinating and useful. The moments where he connects to ideas on authority or contracts or moral motivations are insightful and engaging, and demonstrate the widespread (and previously unconscious) reference to the second-person standpoint that he is making immediate. The theses included in the book are really valuable to those who are working on moral reasons, especially with considerations to a contractualist or constructivist approach, and I would probably recommend at least some of the chapters to those engaged in that sort of research.
I am not sure that he quite argues all of the claims to completion, and that is a little frustrating in lieu of the historical claims. There are lots of things in the historical literature that take circuitous courses around major points in the arguments when it could be argued much more directly, and the result is that some of the arguments aren't really that compelling when they probably could've been if he approached them differently. With that said, many of chapters include succinct, provocative, and engaging arguments that are accessible to folks of all different philosophical backgrounds, and that show the motivation for discussing and exploring the second-person standpoint.
The real challenge, and the reason that I found the reliance on classical methods frustrating, is that Darwall's actual analysis if fascinating and useful. The moments where he connects to ideas on authority or contracts or moral motivations are insightful and engaging, and demonstrate the widespread (and previously unconscious) reference to the second-person standpoint that he is making immediate. The theses included in the book are really valuable to those who are working on moral reasons, especially with considerations to a contractualist or constructivist approach, and I would probably recommend at least some of the chapters to those engaged in that sort of research.
I am not sure that he quite argues all of the claims to completion, and that is a little frustrating in lieu of the historical claims. There are lots of things in the historical literature that take circuitous courses around major points in the arguments when it could be argued much more directly, and the result is that some of the arguments aren't really that compelling when they probably could've been if he approached them differently. With that said, many of chapters include succinct, provocative, and engaging arguments that are accessible to folks of all different philosophical backgrounds, and that show the motivation for discussing and exploring the second-person standpoint.
January 12, 2022
Onödigt svår och krånglig. Upprepande. Förutsätter att läsaren är välbekant med bland annat Kant, Strawson, Korsgaard och liknande. För en som inte är särskilt bekant med tex Kant var det svårt att hänga med i vissa stycken. Vet inte om jag lärde mig så mycket nytt.
Räcker att läsa första och andra delen. Kanske sista kapitlet också.
Gillade hans diskussion om känslor i andra delen.
Räcker att läsa första och andra delen. Kanske sista kapitlet också.
Gillade hans diskussion om känslor i andra delen.
November 12, 2021
A lot of repetitive contents make autor's argument imcomprehensive. The autor likes to write very long sentence and always uses "it" or "that" to refer the key concepts, but these references are totally vague, so the reader almost absolutely cannot understand, what is the autor's idea.
The autor's idea is very important for the current ethics, but his writing technique is really too bad. The author likes to create unnecessary terms and use those unnecessary complex concepts to make the article appear advanced, but the content is very simple in nature (the simpleness does not mean there is no value). It can be said that the content of this book can be completed in one paper, but the author has expanded it into a three-hundred-page book with various bad writing techniques.
The autor's idea is very important for the current ethics, but his writing technique is really too bad. The author likes to create unnecessary terms and use those unnecessary complex concepts to make the article appear advanced, but the content is very simple in nature (the simpleness does not mean there is no value). It can be said that the content of this book can be completed in one paper, but the author has expanded it into a three-hundred-page book with various bad writing techniques.
December 23, 2024
Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint is an amazingly thorough and professional work of academic scholarship. I found it quite persuasive in most of its argument, and I’m really glad I gave it a careful reading. I read it on Kindle, which I found I liked because I found it easy to highlight parts of the argument, and of course the text is searchable.
Any book on the metaethical foundations of ethics is bound to be what another reviewer called "hardcore". It will help if you have read Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals." But I found it pretty approachable if you have some background in ethics. The way to handle this is to read 10 pages or so and then to give it a rest. The mind needs time to absorb ideas at this level of abstraction.
In most places I found it much better written than his earlier Impartial Reason, which I wrote my dissertation on. That earlier work got lost in the mechanics over the Desire-Based-Reasons (DBR) thesis and the Internally Self-Identified Subject of the Rational Normative System (ISIS).
The Second-Person Standpoint provides an incredibly thorough tour of the contemporary ethics literature from the 20th century on, as well as excellent explanatory analysis of Hume, especially Kant, and other historical figures. There are 368 separate references, by my actual count, in the Works Cited appendix. 98% of these are philosophical references, and the rest cultural references.
The concluding two paragraphs of the work are:
This is, of course, deeply Kantian, and earlier in the final chapter he argues that Kantian constructivism is a natural outcome of this argument.
At first, one might feel that this is not much of a conclusion, because the substantive claims rely on presupposition. On further reflection, however, this is a substantial claim. Who among us thinks that we can rationally justify morality with an unreflective selfish person, or still less with a sociopath? A determined egoist of whatever sort is locked in a first-person view, considering only what seems right, desirable, or good for himself.
What one could wish for, however, is a clearer argument that those operating from a second-person viewpoint are justified in holding to moral norms those who decline to enter that second-person viewpoint at all.
We have here the one big substantive claim, that what is moral is what is required or acceptable to the community of free and rational autonomous agents. But we need to specify that by drawing much more specific moral principles and procedures from it. It seems to me that should be done by applying the notion of primary goods. Of course many have advanced variations of that, John Rawls perhaps being the most notable among them.
I agree with another reviewer that if you are going to work in modern theoretical ethics, you'll have to become familiar with Darwall's work. But with a little patience and a moderate pace, you can.
Any book on the metaethical foundations of ethics is bound to be what another reviewer called "hardcore". It will help if you have read Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals." But I found it pretty approachable if you have some background in ethics. The way to handle this is to read 10 pages or so and then to give it a rest. The mind needs time to absorb ideas at this level of abstraction.
In most places I found it much better written than his earlier Impartial Reason, which I wrote my dissertation on. That earlier work got lost in the mechanics over the Desire-Based-Reasons (DBR) thesis and the Internally Self-Identified Subject of the Rational Normative System (ISIS).
The Second-Person Standpoint provides an incredibly thorough tour of the contemporary ethics literature from the 20th century on, as well as excellent explanatory analysis of Hume, especially Kant, and other historical figures. There are 368 separate references, by my actual count, in the Works Cited appendix. 98% of these are philosophical references, and the rest cultural references.
The concluding two paragraphs of the work are:
In the reciprocal recognition of the second-person standpoint, addresser and addressee are committed alike to their mutual accountability as equal free and rational persons, and this commits them to the demand for justification to one another, at least within the scope of their mutual accountability. Their reciprocal address commits them both also to a constraint of reasonableness of any demands they address; they must be able to expect their addressees to accept, or not reasonably to reject, their demands as free and rational persons, in light of their interest as independent, mutually accountable (second-personally competent) agents. It commits them both to imposing no demands on others that they would not also be prepared to impose upon themselves from a common standpoint they share as free and rational.
The second-person standpoint thus vindicates the reasonable and so grounds contractualist moral theory. By presupposing the equal dignity of persons, it commits us to contractualism’s deepest idea: a community of mutually accountable free and rational persons. And in so doing, it gives us a reason of the right kind to comply with principles that mediate respect between mutually accountable equals.
This is, of course, deeply Kantian, and earlier in the final chapter he argues that Kantian constructivism is a natural outcome of this argument.
At first, one might feel that this is not much of a conclusion, because the substantive claims rely on presupposition. On further reflection, however, this is a substantial claim. Who among us thinks that we can rationally justify morality with an unreflective selfish person, or still less with a sociopath? A determined egoist of whatever sort is locked in a first-person view, considering only what seems right, desirable, or good for himself.
What one could wish for, however, is a clearer argument that those operating from a second-person viewpoint are justified in holding to moral norms those who decline to enter that second-person viewpoint at all.
We have here the one big substantive claim, that what is moral is what is required or acceptable to the community of free and rational autonomous agents. But we need to specify that by drawing much more specific moral principles and procedures from it. It seems to me that should be done by applying the notion of primary goods. Of course many have advanced variations of that, John Rawls perhaps being the most notable among them.
I agree with another reviewer that if you are going to work in modern theoretical ethics, you'll have to become familiar with Darwall's work. But with a little patience and a moderate pace, you can.
May 22, 2025
The second-person standpoint is defined as the perspective taken when making and acknowledging claims on one another's conduct and will, with valid demands being grounded in authority relations between agents.
Darwall argues that moral obligation is essentially second-personal, involving demands from the moral community that are "in force" from the moral point of view, and that commitment to morality as equal accountability is a condition of occupying the second-person standpoint.
Darwall criticizes the Kantian project, arguing that it fails to derive the moral law from the concept of rational agency, and instead proposes the concept of a "naïve practical reasoner" who is not autonomous in Kant's sense.
Darwall attempts to vindicate moral norms through the concept of second-personal address, arguing that making and acknowledging demands on one another presupposes equal accountability and authority.
Second-personal reasons are compatible with existing theories of reasons for action, but it is unclear if this concept can be justified and whether a non-second-personal reasoner would be making a mistake by not occupying the second-person standpoint, looking at philosophers like Rousseau and Sartre.
Can a second-person relation apply to an individual's relationship with themselves, as well as to a moral community?
Darwall's idea of a moral community as a "we" that makes demands and holds members accountable raises concerns about whether this community is a genuine subject of action or just a personification of moral norms.
There is the distinction between genuine moral activity and a simulation of moral judgment, where Darwall's conception of morality relies on a genuine second-person standpoint that may not be fully established.
Darwall argues that moral obligation is essentially second-personal, involving demands from the moral community that are "in force" from the moral point of view, and that commitment to morality as equal accountability is a condition of occupying the second-person standpoint.
Darwall criticizes the Kantian project, arguing that it fails to derive the moral law from the concept of rational agency, and instead proposes the concept of a "naïve practical reasoner" who is not autonomous in Kant's sense.
Darwall attempts to vindicate moral norms through the concept of second-personal address, arguing that making and acknowledging demands on one another presupposes equal accountability and authority.
Second-personal reasons are compatible with existing theories of reasons for action, but it is unclear if this concept can be justified and whether a non-second-personal reasoner would be making a mistake by not occupying the second-person standpoint, looking at philosophers like Rousseau and Sartre.
Can a second-person relation apply to an individual's relationship with themselves, as well as to a moral community?
Darwall's idea of a moral community as a "we" that makes demands and holds members accountable raises concerns about whether this community is a genuine subject of action or just a personification of moral norms.
There is the distinction between genuine moral activity and a simulation of moral judgment, where Darwall's conception of morality relies on a genuine second-person standpoint that may not be fully established.
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March 19, 2017
Very repetitious and a bit haphazard in its approach, but this book does put forward a substantial contribution to contemporary contractualist theory.
March 2, 2013
This book makes Rawls' "Theory of Justice" feel like an easy read.
I'm not even going to try to summarize the book, but here are some features to help you decide whether or not to read it:
It's a tough read. Make no mistake, this was a massive pain (for me) to read
It's an ethics book. And it is hardcore. What do I mean by the possibly creepy 'It is hardcore'? I mean that some ethics books are almost entirely accessible to an interested lay audience, usually because most of the content deals with topics that are easily "relatable". Take Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation", for instance. Easy for anyone to follow, so long as that person has an interest in the topic. Others are a little more abstract. And still others are "foundational" (this isn't a real term, so don't use it) - they deal to a large extent with questions such as "What do certain types of ethical utterances presuppose in terms of the nature of 'will', 'desire', etc.?" These foundational texts thus have a deep connection with other branches of philosophy, such as theory of mind stuff, phenomenology, etc.
This is a foundational book.
It's extremely important. This book was very well received. If you're serious about modern ethical theory, you'll likely have to familiarize yourself with it at some point
Darwall is a deontologist. So if you're interested in deontology, the book probably jumps from "extremely important" to "crucial". If you don't know what deontology is, you should do background reading on the topic (at least the Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry) before reading this book
The more you know of Kant and Fichte, the easier it will be. Darwall discusses a number of authors but is usually clear enough to make reading those authors not especially required to understand his point. The two exceptions, in my opinion, are Kant and Fichte. I suspect that the ease of getting through the text will be proportional to your knowledge of those two authors' ideas specifically. If you have no knowledge of them whatsoever, I think (but am not certain) that the text could be largely incomprehensible
A lot more can be said here, but not by me. I'm happy the book was suggested to me, I'm even happier that I read it, and I'm still happier that I can move on to other things.
I'm not even going to try to summarize the book, but here are some features to help you decide whether or not to read it:
It's a tough read. Make no mistake, this was a massive pain (for me) to read
It's an ethics book. And it is hardcore. What do I mean by the possibly creepy 'It is hardcore'? I mean that some ethics books are almost entirely accessible to an interested lay audience, usually because most of the content deals with topics that are easily "relatable". Take Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation", for instance. Easy for anyone to follow, so long as that person has an interest in the topic. Others are a little more abstract. And still others are "foundational" (this isn't a real term, so don't use it) - they deal to a large extent with questions such as "What do certain types of ethical utterances presuppose in terms of the nature of 'will', 'desire', etc.?" These foundational texts thus have a deep connection with other branches of philosophy, such as theory of mind stuff, phenomenology, etc.
This is a foundational book.
It's extremely important. This book was very well received. If you're serious about modern ethical theory, you'll likely have to familiarize yourself with it at some point
Darwall is a deontologist. So if you're interested in deontology, the book probably jumps from "extremely important" to "crucial". If you don't know what deontology is, you should do background reading on the topic (at least the Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry) before reading this book
The more you know of Kant and Fichte, the easier it will be. Darwall discusses a number of authors but is usually clear enough to make reading those authors not especially required to understand his point. The two exceptions, in my opinion, are Kant and Fichte. I suspect that the ease of getting through the text will be proportional to your knowledge of those two authors' ideas specifically. If you have no knowledge of them whatsoever, I think (but am not certain) that the text could be largely incomprehensible
A lot more can be said here, but not by me. I'm happy the book was suggested to me, I'm even happier that I read it, and I'm still happier that I can move on to other things.
June 10, 2010
A bit repetitive, but the book is an important contribution to ethical theory. Also, Darwall cites the Blues Brothers.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews