This is an extremely discomforting, almost disturbing book. As someone who had a family member serve in Afghanistan, I found myself becoming increasingly outraged, and at several points, couldn’t believe what I was reading. Whether it was the ill-thought out and ill-executed platoon house strategy, the obsolete and inadequate equipment, the woeful shortage of infantry for the task at hand, or the lack of a coherent plan for reconstruction and political settlement, it is clear that far too much was asked of the British armed forces in Helmand in 2006. In one sense, this book is already dated as all Western forces have pulled out of Afghanistan since Fergusson wrote it, and the Taliban are back in power. In fact, that only brings his analysis into sharper focus as the problems he highlighted in 2008 have reached their natural conclusion: with no plausible Afghan political alternative, all the Taliban had to do was survive and wait until the coalition partners' resolve ran out
Fergusson highlights a number of areas of muddled and incoherent thinking. The first is what British forces in Helmand were actually trying to achieve; was it a hearts and minds-focused counter-insurgency, or a search-and-destroy mission to neutralise the Taliban? As he comments, “Operation Herrick 4, as the Helmand deployment was called, was supposed to secure economic development and reconstruction in the region. It was, in the terminology of the planners, a ‘hearts and minds’ operation, not a search-and-destroy one. The intention was to spread the Karzai government’s remit into the recalcitrant south of Afghanistan, the Pashtun heartlands and one-time spiritual home of the Taliban - a force that, barring a handful of hardliners, was confidently assessed to have been defeated in 2001…Afghanistan would be won or lost on ‘what the little villager thinks’, and equally certain that the high expectations of Western promises were still not being met. ‘We’re spending money but we’re doing it doctrinally, through DfID, and we haven’t got time for that. People want their lives changed. And so they have been, but so far only by bombing.’”
Another such area is the failure to consider what the British Armed Forces, and in particular the Army, were structured for and capable of: “‘The Army is structured for short-duration, war-fighting operations. We compensate for the historical shortage of troops with firepower, air power in particular, but you just can’t do that in counter-insurgency. You actually want to minimize the use of firepower and maximize the number of boots on the ground, to almost freeze opposition movement. In that state you can do lots of reconstruction. But we couldn’t do that during Herrick 4 because we didn’t have enough troops.’ Britain’s Armed Forces, he went on, had failed to adapt fast or far enough to the long-term nature of modern operations. And in trying to perform a job for which they were neither structured, nor trained, equipped or numerous enough to do - first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan - they had become dangerously ‘knackered’. What was needed in future was ‘many more boots in the Army and, if necessary, a few less fighter jets and large ships’.”
These are fundamental issues of planning and reflect a failure to either understand or appreciate the importance of the operational level to prosecuting war successfully. None of this should be read as an attempt to throw shade on the courage and tenacity of the men and women who served in Afghanistan, but it simply will not do for politicians and senior officers to rely so heavily on the self-confidence, determination and can-do attitude of those they deployed.
As well as all the above, there is one further aspect of this book that is both fascinating and disturbing. Fergusson travelled to Afghanistan and met with some Taliban fighters, an experience that he recounts in the book’s closing chapter and which offers a rare insight to ‘the other side of the hill’. While he is most certainly not an apologist for the Taliban, Fergusson writes with a deliberate balance and nuance that holds out the tantalising possibility that events could have played out differently in Helmand. In an extremely discomforting passage, Fergusson reflects on watching the Taliban fighters turn to prayer at the end of their time together: “There was spirituality here, a transcendental sense of peace and purpose and closeness to death and God seldom experienced in the modern West. This, for me, was Islam at its most appealing. It was marvellous how these people were able to plug instantly into such rapturous oblivion, five times a day, and for a brief moment I frankly envied their serenity. And yet, for all its strength and purity, I was not seduced but saddened by the Taliban’s belief, and the destructive, uncompromising way in which it displaced everything else in the world.” Would it have been possible to negotiate with these men, and avoid fighting in Helmand altogether? We will never know, but it is certainly helpful to be confronted with three-dimensional human beings rather than the stereotype of mindless fanaticism that is so common when we talk about the Taliban in the West. We ought to be disgusted by many of the things the Taliban do, while not losing sight of the fact that they are flesh-and-blood human beings like us.
In the end, this is quite a sad and poignant book, but one that offers valuable insights into why the Western intervention in Afghanistan was ultimately unsuccessful.