Neste livro, Marwan Bishara, israelo-árabe e um dos principais analistas palestinos dos conflitos na região, explica as causas profundas e os riscos da 'segunda Intifada'. Retornando aos acordos de Oslo de 1993, o autor mostra como a assimetria entre palestinos (os ocupados) e israelenses (os ocupantes) foi ignorada pelos que apoiaram essas negociações, principalmente os Estados Unidos. E também como esse processo de transição mal elaborado contribuiu para a instituição do atual sistema de apartheid e de ocupação. Contrariamente à opinião corrente e ao otimismo superficial que caracterizaram a atitude ocidental em face do processo de paz, o autor demonstra que ele já estava condenado ao fracasso em sua origem. Apesar de tudo, Marwan Bishara não propõe ao leitor que se aflija com o fracasso do processo, mas convida-o a olhar para frente. Neste livro, traduzido de uma 2' edição ampliada e atualizada, publicada na França, o autor propõe um balanço lúcido dos dois anos que se seguiram à explosão da segunda Intifada. Ao examinar lucidamente os riscos no campo demográfico, político e da segurança, ele explora os caminhos que poderão levar a uma solução justa e durável do conflito Israel-Palestina.
Marwan Bishara (b. Nazareth) is a Palestinian journalist. A former professor of International Relations at the American University in Paris and Research Fellow at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales; currently, he works for Al Jazeera, as the senior political analyst. Marwan is a brother of Azmi Bishara (an Arab Christian politician; former member of the Israeli Knesset representing the Balad party). Bishara is an author who writes extensively on global politics, he is widely regarded as a leading authority on the Middle East and international affairs. [1] "Growing up in Nazareth, an Arab in a Jewish state, a secular Christian in a traditional Muslim society, a leftist in a Baptist school, I learned firsthand how managing ideological, religious and national differences helps us evolve peacefully. Succumbing to them generates fundamentalism and antagonism. Applying brute force to overcome them-as Israel, my country, has done to my people, the Palestinian Arabs-fails utterly." [2]
While i do value this book as a review of the conflicts history from roughly 2000 onward, as a historical account this doesn’t add much value. Bishara acts as if he is trying to discover if Israel is an apartheid state, but starts with such preposition, and never defends it. he also very rarely is giving dates, documents, quotes, or figures that can be externally validated. mostly just a grand narrative, adding erroneous details to try and normatively load the facts to make israel seem more malicious. For example: “Allowing the military to use M-24s and other new weapons instead of the M-16, insuring maximum casualties.” This is phrased in a way to place an insidious thought process on the Israeli leadership, that they are intentionally trying to kill as many civilians as possible. In reality, if you are in a war, do you expect a fighting force to intentionally use worse weapons than they have access to in order to be less sure of their sides victory? and “insuring maximum casualties” as a moral flaw is ridiculous, the point of a gun, in a war, is to kill people. war is sad, death is sad, but a military using a gun in war is not an attempt to increase “maximum casualties” for the sake of killing.
actors during Oslo and Camp David (II) negotiations but sorely lacking alternative perspectives. This book seeks to call to account the international community for complicity and inaction during peace processes and on that subject it is thought provoking, though the utility of such an accusatory approach is questionable.