Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security

by Thomas Fingar

The US government spends billions of dollars every year to reduce to monitor and forecast everything from the weather to the spread of disease. In other words, we spend a lot of money to anticipate problems, identify opportunities, and avoid mistakes. A substantial portion of what we spend—over $50 billion a year—goes to the US Intelligence Community. Reducing Uncertainty describes what Intelligence Community analysts do, how they do it, and how they are affected by the political context that shapes, uses, and sometimes abuses their output. In particular, it looks at why IC analysts pay more attention to threats than to opportunities, and why they appear to focus more on warning about the possibility of "bad things" happening than on providing the input necessary for increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes. The book is intended to increase public understanding of what IC analysts do, to elicit more relevant and constructive suggestions for improvement from outside the Intelligence Community, to stimulate innovation and collaboration among analysts at all grade levels in all agencies, and to provide a core resource for students of intelligence. The most valuable aspect of this book is the in-depth discussion of National Intelligence Estimates—what they are, what it means to say that they represent the "most authoritative judgments of the Intelligence Community," why and how they are important, and why they have such high political salience and symbolic importance. The final chapter lays out, from an insider's perspective, the story of the flawed Iraq WMD NIE and its impact on the subsequent Iran nuclear NIE—paying particular attention to the heightened political scrutiny the latter received in Congress following the Iraq NIE debacle.

Genres: Politics

176 pages, Paperback

First published July 20, 2011

Reviews

[Tom · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, but I think conceptually muddled. I enjoyed the first half the most — a solid personalized definition of intelligence and its relevance and distinction between it and other forms of inquiry. I didn’t enjoy that back end as much, as it felt like a weird combination of a memoir, a lecture, a resume, and a whole lot of very careful hedging. His perspective as basically the guy charged with fixing the causes (to the extent they were analytical) of the Iraq fiasco is interesting, but I wasn’t sure what to take from his analysis besides “I made some changes that were obvious but difficult to do in a secretive, distributed, entrenched bureaucracy”

[David Kritz · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books I read about the Intelligence Community (IC). Fingar bestows excellent examples of using his real-world experience to explain concepts on the role of the IC, the role of analysts, why uncertainty exists, how and why failure occurs, and a few case studies. While I think Fingar's work would appeal to a wide audience of those interested in either the IC or studying uncertainty, the impact may best be felt for students or junior members of the IC. I use this work as an e-textbook for a graduate course.

[Eli Baum · Rating 1 out of 5]

wanted to learn about analysis but this was too defensive and politicky for my taste. felt a bit like a reputation/pride book too

[Sera Vera · Rating 5 out of 5]

really loved studying this for my class

[Peter Timperman · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had a hard time understanding what this book was about. It side tracks and digresses frequently.

[ShamSham · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fingar does an excellent job of outlining the work and mission of intelligence analysts. It also gives the reader a much better understanding of the flawed intelligence assessments that facilitated the launch of the U.S.-led Iraq War in 2003.

That being said, I do quite strongly disagree with Fingar’s assertion that the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s Nuclear Program “got it right,” especially when compared to the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD program. While I do believe that the tradecraft from the 2002 to the 2007 NIE significantly improved, I still believe that the intelligence authors of the 2007 NIE were similarly vulnerable and perhaps impaired by the same pressures of the political “atmosphere” and sensitivity to past intelligence failures that plagued the 2002 NIE. Fingar completely fails to address these issues, but it seems apparent to me that these same vulnerabilities existed both in 2002 and 2007, but from essentially diametrically opposed directions.

[Aaron · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic description of the difficult working conditions of intelligence analysts. Very revealing, insightful, and deeply personal, drawing heavily on the author's personal experiences as a career analyst. Some very new and interesting perspectives on the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and intelligence reform in general.