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Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan
Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as—at best—disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published July 15, 2011
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October 21, 2012
The British Army was driven out of Basra and totally screwed up its deployment in Helmand, Afghanistan. The British public is generally ignorant of this, and attempts to tell them the truth is met by indignant denial. This of course is a large part of the problem. If the British had an education system, or a health service, or public transport which performed as abysmally as their army in recent years (and God knows the performances of these services have been pretty piss-poor by most First World standards) there would be hell to pay. But the army is different. No politician can refer to it without saying “we have the best army in the world” – how the rest of the world laughs. It is different because its members routinely die or suffer dismemberment in the course of their work. They are, in short, ‘heroes’.
One argument used in defence of these military failures is that the fault was political. It was the inability of the British to dislodge themselves politically from the American arse that put their army in these places in the first place. Another is lack of suitable equipment for which politicians and administrators are entirely blamed. This is overwhelmingly popular with the soldiers and with the public. The British have the fourth largest defence budget in the world: if the army doesn’t have the kit it needs then it is the army’s fault for not knowing what it needs.
In March 2003 the British walked into Basra in berets, not helmets. They would gain hearts and minds. They were the best counter-insurgency army in the world. They had the experience of Malaya and Northern Ireland. The British army walked into Basra with no trouble. Unfortunately it had no plans at all about what to do next.
The cracks appeared quickly. In June 2003 British paratroopers, not noted for their skill in dealing with civilians, conducted weapons searches. Patrick Cockburn said “If the British had really learned any lessons in Northern Ireland about not provoking local communities, they had largely been forgotten between Belfast and Basra”. In accordance with regimental tradition, the paras caused their trouble and, under fire, buggered off. Six Military Policemen were left behind and killed by the irate locals.
Basra had no government apart from the British army. To the north the US Army had been inefficient and murderous in the early days of the occupation. But the Americans learned very quickly. As the conditions in Baghdad improved, Basra deteriorated.
The British, perceiving a non-existent threat, pursued Saddam loyalists. A battle group of 600 men arrested a group of Basrawi car dealers on the information that they were plotting to shoot down aircraft. This information had been laid by a rival group of car dealers. While the British were thus engaged the Shia militias were consolidating their position ‘The previously tolerant society of Basra, a cosmopolitan port city, had no attractions for these men … alcohol sellers, women who did not wear the veil or who had spoken to foreigners, academics and Christians were all potential targets for kidnap and torture’.
Instead of protecting citizens from these Militias, the British did a deal with them. A police force was formed; but the police force and the militias were effectively the same thing. As Basra descended into lawlessness the British army began to suffer a breakdown of discipline. Added to the risk for Basrawis of being kidnapped and tortured by Shia militias was the possibility of being kidnapped (sorry, arrested) and tortured by the British. A hotel receptionist, Baha Mousa, was detained and beaten to death by soldiers of 1st Battalion of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment. Typically of occupying armies, only one soldier was punished for this, although the official report stated that a large number were involved.
Among the militia ‘police teams’ which the British formed, trained, provided uniforms for and thus legitimised was the aptly named ‘Serious Crimes Unit’ - SCU. In September 2005 the SCU kidnapped two British SAS soldiers who were badly beaten before they could be rescued by their comrades. By September 2006 Basra was effectively controlled by the Shiite Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. By now the pretence that the British were doing anything but protect themselves was becoming difficult to maintain.
Another deal was negotiated. In return for the release of prisoners held by the British, JAM would stop attacking them. “Prove your good faith”, the British said to the JAM commander “Order a three-day ceasefire”. He did so; British patrols went out unmolested. This demonstrated the strength of JAM and the weakness of the army. The British had now ceded control of Iraq’s second city to groups who owed no allegiance to, and had no intention of obeying, the newly formed Iraqi government in Baghdad.
In a breathtakingly contemptible statement, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup said “My advice was that the best way of changing this [the political dynamic in Basra] would be to withdraw UK forces from the inside of Basra and force the Iraqis to deal with the problem themselves or accept the fact that they could not control their second largest city”. But the problems of Basra had been created while the city was garrisoned by the British army.
Not that there was much choice about withdrawal - the problem in reality was getting the garrison out of central Basra and retreating to the airport. Again, there had to be a deal, well, really a surrender. The newsreel shows the convoy with flags flying. It does not show the JAM units guarding the route and ensuring the orderly withdrawal. The Militias had defeated the British army and everyone (apart from the British public) knew it.
While the British were still in Basra airport, units of the newly-formed Iraqi regular army, with the highly visible support of US Marines, took control of Basra from the Shiite militias. The humiliation of the British was complete.
But there was another war, which had started before Iraq. This was of course in Afghanistan. If much of the blame for Basra, or at least the origins of the problem, can be laid at the feet of politicians, this is not true of Afghanistan.
The reputation which British army had laboriously rebuilt since the Singapore debacle over half a century earlier was entirely destroyed in Southern Iraq. ‘Afghanistan was to be the ‘good war’ that was to make up for the perceived defeat in Basra – especially in American eyes.’ The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt said “our national and military reputation and credibility have been called into question in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign. Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal – and Afghanistan will provide this opportunity.” Dannatt knew that if he didn’t use in Afghanistan the units starting to come free from Iraq, he would lose them in a future defence review. “It’s use them or lose them”.’ The army was placing its own interest above that of the state it was meant to be serving. It was the army’s war now.
When the SAS had originally recced Helmand their report was accurate, informed and sensitive. The SAS, by and large, is good at this sort of thing. The regiment’s history recounts a tradition of understanding the locals among whom it operates, learning languages, understanding cultures, co-operating with irregular tribal fighters.
What happened next was that the army deployed the paras who immediately began to make a mess of it. Over extending his forces, Brigadier Butler did exactly what the SAS had warned against. The view of the British in Afghanistan remained stubbornly wedded to lethal force. More enemy dead meant success. Air strikes were called in and civilians were killed. If there ever had been a clear mission, there was no consideration of how this was being achieved. Hearts and minds were certainly not being won.
In June 2009 US Marines took over the Nawa in Helmand from the British. The British had been unable to move more than a kilometre from their base without being attacked: Nawa was a ghost town. Five months later the town was bustling and IED attacks were down by 90%. What was the difference? Primarily, Ledwidge points out, the Americans had a mission beyond just creating trouble. The talked to the locals, they knew what the problems were.
There are, Ledwidge acknowledges, some signs that change is possible. Lieutenant Colonel Paul James of 40 Commando who refused to call down an air strike against fifteen locals digging in an IED. “I chose not to strike them because that would have fifteen fathers of fifteen sons who would almost certainly have been driven into the insurgents’ arms.” His restraint acknowledges that most of these men were probably curious onlookers rather than committed insurgents. If you have twenty and kill five you may have fifteen left. You may have none left if the survivors just go home. But you may well have sixty-five if ten from each family join in for revenge. Put harshly “If the only way to save soldiers’ lives is to kill civilians then the men in uniform may just have to get killed”. This policy of ‘heroic constraint’ is not, you probably know, universally popular
Ledwidge is generally not very critical of the lower ranks of the British army, but some conclusions are inescapable. The squaddies like trouble. Their cultural conditioning in their largely working class communities, their military training and their mutual reinforcing of prejudices and attitudes all encourage aggression. The concept of heroic restraint is generally alien to them (although it had been stoically demonstrated in Bosnia). So the behaviour of the squaddies themselves causes much of the trouble - it is often the attitudes of western soldiers which alienates many of the Afghan police and soldier who then turn their guns on them in the numerous ‘green on blue’ incidents.
And the British public’s support their squaddies, sorry ‘heroes’, is beginning to militarise British society itself. The recent case where Royal Marines have been accused of murder has led to a social media campaign in support of the accused. The ‘Support the seven royal marines accused of murder’ is vehement that these men should never have been arrested. There are now sections of the public who apparently think that killing a wounded prisoner is perfectly acceptable. It does not matter that the British are the invaders and the Afghans are the resistance.
Since the publication of ‘Losing Small Wars’ of course, the state has visited upon the army a condign punishment for its Afghan hubris and subsequent failure as, as Dannatt predicted, the government has slashed the number of troops in the regular army and soldiers are faced with redundancy.
This book should be read widely. It won’t be. Criticism of the army is not tolerated in early 21st century Britain. Like the rest of ISAF, the British troops will withdraw, defeated. It will not be called a defeat of course. The British will continue to believe in their mythology and consequently there will continue to be a risk of another tragedy. We can either hope that financial constraints limit the ability of the British to commit further military folly or that far-reaching reform will enable their army to operate in a way which actually achieves anything rather than simply kill and get killed to no purpose whatsoever. Ledwidge’s book is devastating and it is worth quoting what Max Hastings said of it “the author deserves applause for bluntly expressing the truths about our recent military failures that too many of those involved find it convenient to obscure”.
One argument used in defence of these military failures is that the fault was political. It was the inability of the British to dislodge themselves politically from the American arse that put their army in these places in the first place. Another is lack of suitable equipment for which politicians and administrators are entirely blamed. This is overwhelmingly popular with the soldiers and with the public. The British have the fourth largest defence budget in the world: if the army doesn’t have the kit it needs then it is the army’s fault for not knowing what it needs.
In March 2003 the British walked into Basra in berets, not helmets. They would gain hearts and minds. They were the best counter-insurgency army in the world. They had the experience of Malaya and Northern Ireland. The British army walked into Basra with no trouble. Unfortunately it had no plans at all about what to do next.
The cracks appeared quickly. In June 2003 British paratroopers, not noted for their skill in dealing with civilians, conducted weapons searches. Patrick Cockburn said “If the British had really learned any lessons in Northern Ireland about not provoking local communities, they had largely been forgotten between Belfast and Basra”. In accordance with regimental tradition, the paras caused their trouble and, under fire, buggered off. Six Military Policemen were left behind and killed by the irate locals.
Basra had no government apart from the British army. To the north the US Army had been inefficient and murderous in the early days of the occupation. But the Americans learned very quickly. As the conditions in Baghdad improved, Basra deteriorated.
The British, perceiving a non-existent threat, pursued Saddam loyalists. A battle group of 600 men arrested a group of Basrawi car dealers on the information that they were plotting to shoot down aircraft. This information had been laid by a rival group of car dealers. While the British were thus engaged the Shia militias were consolidating their position ‘The previously tolerant society of Basra, a cosmopolitan port city, had no attractions for these men … alcohol sellers, women who did not wear the veil or who had spoken to foreigners, academics and Christians were all potential targets for kidnap and torture’.
Instead of protecting citizens from these Militias, the British did a deal with them. A police force was formed; but the police force and the militias were effectively the same thing. As Basra descended into lawlessness the British army began to suffer a breakdown of discipline. Added to the risk for Basrawis of being kidnapped and tortured by Shia militias was the possibility of being kidnapped (sorry, arrested) and tortured by the British. A hotel receptionist, Baha Mousa, was detained and beaten to death by soldiers of 1st Battalion of the Queen's Lancashire Regiment. Typically of occupying armies, only one soldier was punished for this, although the official report stated that a large number were involved.
Among the militia ‘police teams’ which the British formed, trained, provided uniforms for and thus legitimised was the aptly named ‘Serious Crimes Unit’ - SCU. In September 2005 the SCU kidnapped two British SAS soldiers who were badly beaten before they could be rescued by their comrades. By September 2006 Basra was effectively controlled by the Shiite Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. By now the pretence that the British were doing anything but protect themselves was becoming difficult to maintain.
Another deal was negotiated. In return for the release of prisoners held by the British, JAM would stop attacking them. “Prove your good faith”, the British said to the JAM commander “Order a three-day ceasefire”. He did so; British patrols went out unmolested. This demonstrated the strength of JAM and the weakness of the army. The British had now ceded control of Iraq’s second city to groups who owed no allegiance to, and had no intention of obeying, the newly formed Iraqi government in Baghdad.
In a breathtakingly contemptible statement, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup said “My advice was that the best way of changing this [the political dynamic in Basra] would be to withdraw UK forces from the inside of Basra and force the Iraqis to deal with the problem themselves or accept the fact that they could not control their second largest city”. But the problems of Basra had been created while the city was garrisoned by the British army.
Not that there was much choice about withdrawal - the problem in reality was getting the garrison out of central Basra and retreating to the airport. Again, there had to be a deal, well, really a surrender. The newsreel shows the convoy with flags flying. It does not show the JAM units guarding the route and ensuring the orderly withdrawal. The Militias had defeated the British army and everyone (apart from the British public) knew it.
While the British were still in Basra airport, units of the newly-formed Iraqi regular army, with the highly visible support of US Marines, took control of Basra from the Shiite militias. The humiliation of the British was complete.
But there was another war, which had started before Iraq. This was of course in Afghanistan. If much of the blame for Basra, or at least the origins of the problem, can be laid at the feet of politicians, this is not true of Afghanistan.
The reputation which British army had laboriously rebuilt since the Singapore debacle over half a century earlier was entirely destroyed in Southern Iraq. ‘Afghanistan was to be the ‘good war’ that was to make up for the perceived defeat in Basra – especially in American eyes.’ The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt said “our national and military reputation and credibility have been called into question in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign. Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal – and Afghanistan will provide this opportunity.” Dannatt knew that if he didn’t use in Afghanistan the units starting to come free from Iraq, he would lose them in a future defence review. “It’s use them or lose them”.’ The army was placing its own interest above that of the state it was meant to be serving. It was the army’s war now.
When the SAS had originally recced Helmand their report was accurate, informed and sensitive. The SAS, by and large, is good at this sort of thing. The regiment’s history recounts a tradition of understanding the locals among whom it operates, learning languages, understanding cultures, co-operating with irregular tribal fighters.
What happened next was that the army deployed the paras who immediately began to make a mess of it. Over extending his forces, Brigadier Butler did exactly what the SAS had warned against. The view of the British in Afghanistan remained stubbornly wedded to lethal force. More enemy dead meant success. Air strikes were called in and civilians were killed. If there ever had been a clear mission, there was no consideration of how this was being achieved. Hearts and minds were certainly not being won.
In June 2009 US Marines took over the Nawa in Helmand from the British. The British had been unable to move more than a kilometre from their base without being attacked: Nawa was a ghost town. Five months later the town was bustling and IED attacks were down by 90%. What was the difference? Primarily, Ledwidge points out, the Americans had a mission beyond just creating trouble. The talked to the locals, they knew what the problems were.
There are, Ledwidge acknowledges, some signs that change is possible. Lieutenant Colonel Paul James of 40 Commando who refused to call down an air strike against fifteen locals digging in an IED. “I chose not to strike them because that would have fifteen fathers of fifteen sons who would almost certainly have been driven into the insurgents’ arms.” His restraint acknowledges that most of these men were probably curious onlookers rather than committed insurgents. If you have twenty and kill five you may have fifteen left. You may have none left if the survivors just go home. But you may well have sixty-five if ten from each family join in for revenge. Put harshly “If the only way to save soldiers’ lives is to kill civilians then the men in uniform may just have to get killed”. This policy of ‘heroic constraint’ is not, you probably know, universally popular
Ledwidge is generally not very critical of the lower ranks of the British army, but some conclusions are inescapable. The squaddies like trouble. Their cultural conditioning in their largely working class communities, their military training and their mutual reinforcing of prejudices and attitudes all encourage aggression. The concept of heroic restraint is generally alien to them (although it had been stoically demonstrated in Bosnia). So the behaviour of the squaddies themselves causes much of the trouble - it is often the attitudes of western soldiers which alienates many of the Afghan police and soldier who then turn their guns on them in the numerous ‘green on blue’ incidents.
And the British public’s support their squaddies, sorry ‘heroes’, is beginning to militarise British society itself. The recent case where Royal Marines have been accused of murder has led to a social media campaign in support of the accused. The ‘Support the seven royal marines accused of murder’ is vehement that these men should never have been arrested. There are now sections of the public who apparently think that killing a wounded prisoner is perfectly acceptable. It does not matter that the British are the invaders and the Afghans are the resistance.
Since the publication of ‘Losing Small Wars’ of course, the state has visited upon the army a condign punishment for its Afghan hubris and subsequent failure as, as Dannatt predicted, the government has slashed the number of troops in the regular army and soldiers are faced with redundancy.
This book should be read widely. It won’t be. Criticism of the army is not tolerated in early 21st century Britain. Like the rest of ISAF, the British troops will withdraw, defeated. It will not be called a defeat of course. The British will continue to believe in their mythology and consequently there will continue to be a risk of another tragedy. We can either hope that financial constraints limit the ability of the British to commit further military folly or that far-reaching reform will enable their army to operate in a way which actually achieves anything rather than simply kill and get killed to no purpose whatsoever. Ledwidge’s book is devastating and it is worth quoting what Max Hastings said of it “the author deserves applause for bluntly expressing the truths about our recent military failures that too many of those involved find it convenient to obscure”.
April 25, 2014
No doubt this is a very well researched book, written by someone with an intimate knowledge of the British armed forces. He does a very thorough job of detailing the specific areas of failure in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. My key complaint with the book is how he glosses over or simply ignores the failings of the U.S. government and armed forces in conceiving and executing these invasions in the first place. The British army may indeed have failed in their objectives, but it must be discussed in the context of two "wars" initiated by the U.S. without clear strategies or desired end states.
In the end, I agree this book is a clear and thorough assessment of the British army's capabilities and weaknesses in the face of modern conflicts, but I feel the assessments of the British army's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan must include more of a consideration of how and why they were there in the first place.
In the end, I agree this book is a clear and thorough assessment of the British army's capabilities and weaknesses in the face of modern conflicts, but I feel the assessments of the British army's performance in Iraq and Afghanistan must include more of a consideration of how and why they were there in the first place.
February 18, 2025
Given two failed wars, a failed and failing system which is top heavy, badly run and aimed in the wrong direction and for which there appears to be great inertia to change.....
Err.............. We're f****d.
Rather than aiming recruitment at the jobless and tradeless, perhaps recruitment needs to be focussed towards specialists. More gung-ho, 'can-do' squaddies are not what is needed. An Exhibitionist, violent, macho culture with little thought of aims needs to change.
Err.............. We're f****d.
Rather than aiming recruitment at the jobless and tradeless, perhaps recruitment needs to be focussed towards specialists. More gung-ho, 'can-do' squaddies are not what is needed. An Exhibitionist, violent, macho culture with little thought of aims needs to change.
June 22, 2022
A book of two halves. First, an absolutely fascinating description of the failure of the British military in Basra and Helmand, fought to a standstill by a peasant home guard. Second, an analysis of the systemic causes of this failure, and how these could be corrected; for which, see ''chances, fat''.
A somewhat peripheral throwaway: the Taiwanese army knows exactly what its mission is; the British don't. This isn't its fault; the Govt doesn't know whether it has an army to stop the Russians as now, or to fight little wars, or to help in civil emergencies. How, then, can the army equip and train to do its job? That is even before the many self-inflicted problems.
A somewhat peripheral throwaway: the Taiwanese army knows exactly what its mission is; the British don't. This isn't its fault; the Govt doesn't know whether it has an army to stop the Russians as now, or to fight little wars, or to help in civil emergencies. How, then, can the army equip and train to do its job? That is even before the many self-inflicted problems.
September 11, 2023
It's not often that a well-written, extensively researched, authoritative and devastatingly honest non-fiction work appears, even less so when it proves to be so deeply upsetting, depressing and hard to finish. I had to push myself to read on. It's a brilliant, devastating expose of the strategic and operational failures of what passes for British political and military strategy (for that, read non-existent strategy) that led to the abject and shameful military defeats in Basra in Iraq and Helmand in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the courage and battle skills of the infantrymen involved at the tactical level.
The author has ample experience of active service, and is someone who has thought deeply about his calling as an intelligence officer. He's no armchair warrior, but a loyal and diligent servant of the Crown who's been there himself. He displays a rare intellectual capacity for original thought, something that British Army officers, mostly themselves graduates and not lacking in intelligence, sorely lack for fear of being labelled, all too often, as 'defeatist' or 'radical'.
Ledwidge has plenty of sensible and necessary suggestions for reform, particularly of an Army labouring under the twin burdens of self-imposed mythology and British exceptionalism, which combine to form a degree of self-delusion that's mind blowing in its inability to grasp reality.
I don't know if his recommendations have been wholly or partly taken on board. They should be, urgently, and until the are, the British Army is clearly in no state to carry out operations abroad, nor should it be permitted to do so. It's simply not fit for purpose, something Britain's U.S allies know only too well.
The author has ample experience of active service, and is someone who has thought deeply about his calling as an intelligence officer. He's no armchair warrior, but a loyal and diligent servant of the Crown who's been there himself. He displays a rare intellectual capacity for original thought, something that British Army officers, mostly themselves graduates and not lacking in intelligence, sorely lack for fear of being labelled, all too often, as 'defeatist' or 'radical'.
Ledwidge has plenty of sensible and necessary suggestions for reform, particularly of an Army labouring under the twin burdens of self-imposed mythology and British exceptionalism, which combine to form a degree of self-delusion that's mind blowing in its inability to grasp reality.
I don't know if his recommendations have been wholly or partly taken on board. They should be, urgently, and until the are, the British Army is clearly in no state to carry out operations abroad, nor should it be permitted to do so. It's simply not fit for purpose, something Britain's U.S allies know only too well.
May 13, 2020
Razor sharp, intellectually robust, and at times deeply tragic.
This might just be the most valuable book I've read in a long long time. What I love about it is that anyone can read it, without huge levels of prerequisite knowledge required. Ledwige writes concisely and simply, yet without losing any of the accuracy or "dumbing it down" for the civilian reader such as myself.
Such a talent, to explain complex topics simply but without losing accuracy or poignancy is rare found. So a huge "well done" on that.
I also love the suggestions for change, and clearly well thought out solutions to the problems he identifies. Identifying problems is easier than drilling deeper into WHY it's a problem and even deeper, what to do about it, hence so many publications that simply bash UK strategic failure with little to no lucidity.
This book is comprehensive and valuable.
I'd highly recommend this to anyone with the remotest interest in military affairs.
This might just be the most valuable book I've read in a long long time. What I love about it is that anyone can read it, without huge levels of prerequisite knowledge required. Ledwige writes concisely and simply, yet without losing any of the accuracy or "dumbing it down" for the civilian reader such as myself.
Such a talent, to explain complex topics simply but without losing accuracy or poignancy is rare found. So a huge "well done" on that.
I also love the suggestions for change, and clearly well thought out solutions to the problems he identifies. Identifying problems is easier than drilling deeper into WHY it's a problem and even deeper, what to do about it, hence so many publications that simply bash UK strategic failure with little to no lucidity.
This book is comprehensive and valuable.
I'd highly recommend this to anyone with the remotest interest in military affairs.
May 4, 2022
Thought provoking
Some eye-opening stuff here, challenging orthodoxies and demanding wholesale changes in the British armed forces. A standout fact was that the US Marine Corps is about the size of the combined UK army, navy and air force yet the British forces have eight times the number of general grade officers.
Some eye-opening stuff here, challenging orthodoxies and demanding wholesale changes in the British armed forces. A standout fact was that the US Marine Corps is about the size of the combined UK army, navy and air force yet the British forces have eight times the number of general grade officers.
April 2, 2021
I wish this was wrong.
October 17, 2011
The most disturbing book I have read on the current state of the British armed forces.
Watching on TV the British handover in Basra at the end of March '09, I felt the humiliation that Maj Gen Andy Salmon must have felt as he relinquished command to Maj Gen Oates and his US 10th Mountain Division. I wrote of this feeling on My.Telegraph.co.uk blog site and expressed the view that this was no withdrawal but a serious defeat (I later heard it described as the worst defeat of British arms since the fall of Singapore). I was attacked at length for my blog and gained the impression that most people (in the UK) thought we had done pretty well and believed the blather of the mutual congratulations that day.
Singapore. That bad? The worst defeat in our history? - Such a damning statement had to be checked and search as I could, I found nothing since then that comes close in terms of loss of pride and reputation. At least at Dunkirk we left fighting. And made up for it three years later. The Basra retreat cost us far fewer casualties than Singapore but the damage to our prestige was no less fatal. Because that was the moment the Americans first began to regard us as not necessarily their first choice of ally.
And the way our commanders would lecture the Americans on how to fight small wars! It made my toes curl with embarrassment. It got so bad that British officers were forbidden to mention Malaya or Belfast at meetings! AAaagh! - can you imagine that?
And that opinion is being reinforced by our performance in Afghanistan. Again we suffered the humiliation of being replaced in the south, an American general remarking that 'the Brits aren't up to it.' Hardly surprising when, to take one example, the single battle group led by 3 Para could only put 168 combat troops to conduct operations from the entire brigade! Mind you, those troops certainly made a difference. Before their arrival the Afghans regarded the Brits with simple, historically understandable, hostility. By the time they left, the civilians had come to hate us.
This book is an essential read for anyone concerned with the current state of Britain, because if our armed forces can't do what is demanded of them then who the hell is going to take any notice of us? We are in danger of being regarded (by the Americans at least) as just another European soft power, all talk at the UN but not much use where it really counts.
However, let me stress that neither the author nor anyone else expresses any criticism whatsoever of the bravery and commitment of the British fighting troops (SAS contributions are eye-openers).
It is yet another example of lions led by donkeys, and, nearly a hundred years after those words were spoken, I'm thinking it's time we seriously examined what is rotten (with sadly few honourable exceptions) at the top of our command structure.
p.s. - I just thought. The attitude of many senior British officers (British Greeks to Yankee Romans) in Iraq and Afghanistan, reminded me of Keith Douglas' description of the officer class in his 'Alamein to Zem Zem.' Now there's a good read.
Watching on TV the British handover in Basra at the end of March '09, I felt the humiliation that Maj Gen Andy Salmon must have felt as he relinquished command to Maj Gen Oates and his US 10th Mountain Division. I wrote of this feeling on My.Telegraph.co.uk blog site and expressed the view that this was no withdrawal but a serious defeat (I later heard it described as the worst defeat of British arms since the fall of Singapore). I was attacked at length for my blog and gained the impression that most people (in the UK) thought we had done pretty well and believed the blather of the mutual congratulations that day.
Singapore. That bad? The worst defeat in our history? - Such a damning statement had to be checked and search as I could, I found nothing since then that comes close in terms of loss of pride and reputation. At least at Dunkirk we left fighting. And made up for it three years later. The Basra retreat cost us far fewer casualties than Singapore but the damage to our prestige was no less fatal. Because that was the moment the Americans first began to regard us as not necessarily their first choice of ally.
And the way our commanders would lecture the Americans on how to fight small wars! It made my toes curl with embarrassment. It got so bad that British officers were forbidden to mention Malaya or Belfast at meetings! AAaagh! - can you imagine that?
And that opinion is being reinforced by our performance in Afghanistan. Again we suffered the humiliation of being replaced in the south, an American general remarking that 'the Brits aren't up to it.' Hardly surprising when, to take one example, the single battle group led by 3 Para could only put 168 combat troops to conduct operations from the entire brigade! Mind you, those troops certainly made a difference. Before their arrival the Afghans regarded the Brits with simple, historically understandable, hostility. By the time they left, the civilians had come to hate us.
This book is an essential read for anyone concerned with the current state of Britain, because if our armed forces can't do what is demanded of them then who the hell is going to take any notice of us? We are in danger of being regarded (by the Americans at least) as just another European soft power, all talk at the UN but not much use where it really counts.
However, let me stress that neither the author nor anyone else expresses any criticism whatsoever of the bravery and commitment of the British fighting troops (SAS contributions are eye-openers).
It is yet another example of lions led by donkeys, and, nearly a hundred years after those words were spoken, I'm thinking it's time we seriously examined what is rotten (with sadly few honourable exceptions) at the top of our command structure.
p.s. - I just thought. The attitude of many senior British officers (British Greeks to Yankee Romans) in Iraq and Afghanistan, reminded me of Keith Douglas' description of the officer class in his 'Alamein to Zem Zem.' Now there's a good read.
February 7, 2012
In high school (1989), I wrote a paper for my AP US History class comparing the Malayan Emergency to the American experience in Vietnam. My optimistic thesis was, that if only the United States could have learned something from Malaya, our war in Vietnam could've ended in victory. Little did I know that I was ahead of the curve, and that a succession of academics would make that same case into a cottage industry during our most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (I should've gone for that PhD...) As a full-fledged believer in the British "way", I was eager to read this book- who better to critique our current conflicts than a Brit?
I got much more than I bargained for. Frank Ledwidge, a former British Army intelligence officer (with service in Iraq and Afhganistan) and lawyer, lays out an impassioned critique of the British art of counterinsurgency in theory, history and practice. Page by page, he stripped away my illusions about the British military's adeptness at small wars, and deconstructed some cherished illusions I had about counterinsurgency in general. This book provides a very valuable addition to the ever-growing body of modern COIN literature.
I got much more than I bargained for. Frank Ledwidge, a former British Army intelligence officer (with service in Iraq and Afhganistan) and lawyer, lays out an impassioned critique of the British art of counterinsurgency in theory, history and practice. Page by page, he stripped away my illusions about the British military's adeptness at small wars, and deconstructed some cherished illusions I had about counterinsurgency in general. This book provides a very valuable addition to the ever-growing body of modern COIN literature.
August 17, 2013
The remit of the the book is looking at the strategic loose ends that orientated the British army to disaster in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the later part of the book deals extensively with counterinsurgency theory and the sort of structure and approach it requires to accommodate. I thought it was a good addition to the 'Our War' series you find on YouTube, albeit one that tells you why structurally MOD made the decisions the way it did, with it's bloated archaic structure and exacerbated the body count on both sides, and leaving the army in no-win situation.
The extensive bibliography garners more than a few other critical leads.
The extensive bibliography garners more than a few other critical leads.
December 19, 2019
Ecxellent review of the UK's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. One can clearly see the author has considered the issue long and hard, giving his words the air of authority. My criticisms are the lack of coverage on the decision making process between the military and civilian leadership in Britain and sometimes the author seems to suffer from "the grass being greener on the other side" syndrome as relates to the US military. Nevertheless, a strong work, richly researched that gives voice to something not often heard from until decades after the fact - actual professional critique of the British Army's performance in the field.
January 19, 2015
If you like me had no idea why the we got involved in Afghanistan this is for you. At the time I cynically just thought that we were only doing it because the Americans wanted to kick someone after 9/11 and they wanted some one else involved to legitimize it and we always do what they want. Seems it was just about the only reason we did other than politicians, armys and guns sellers like to have wars. Cost a lot of money, killed a lot of people and by all accounts no one but the people who sell guns came out any better.
September 2, 2015
En av de mest kompromissløse evalueringene av, i dette tilfellet den britiske, deltakelsen i OIF/ Irak og ISAF som jeg har lest. Ledwidge har utvilsomt en agenda med det han skriver, og ikke alt er like godt drøftet, men at han er mange relevante poenger er utvilsomt.
Les boken med en sunn skepsis og et kritisk blikk, se om det kan være paralleller til f.eks norsk Afghanistan- eller Faryab-strategi
Les boken med en sunn skepsis og et kritisk blikk, se om det kan være paralleller til f.eks norsk Afghanistan- eller Faryab-strategi
March 31, 2013
This is a well researched and well written account of a painful truth in the British military. It needs to be read and needs to be heeded. Sadly given the stifling of thought and the necessity to not rock the boat that leads to the promotion to the general staff it will be lauded and ignored. Mistakes will be repeated and there will be many needless casualties.
May 8, 2017
The British Army's defeat in Basra and Helmand is a national disgrace. Ledwidge is one of the few military professionals to explain exactly how these disasters happened and what needs to be done now. To be honest, he could have let rip even more.
June 23, 2019
Excellent look at the failings of the British Armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the reasons behind them. Interesting not only for those interested in military history but for those interested in evaluating the performance of any large organisation.
June 20, 2012
I found the style very readable, and the author's points are logically made. All this without the bitter aroma I'd been expecting.
February 11, 2013
Excellent read - very eye opening for those who didn't serve in Telic. Worrying that it appears we will go the same way with Afghanistan.
May 4, 2016
The British Army isn't as good as it thinks it is. Why did we get involved in that war in the first place. Who gains? Everyone loses.
March 27, 2017
Frank Ledwidge strávil väčšinu svojej kariéry v britskej armáde. Bol v Bosne, Iraku aj Afganistane - zo služby odchádzal ako šéf spravodajskej zložky námorníctva.
O svojich skúsenostiach z posledných dvoch misií napísal kritickú knihu. Tradične sa tento žáner točí okolo (bezpochyby zásadných) chýb politikov, ktorí vojakov poslali kam nemali. Tu sa ide ďalej a veľmi otvorene sa píše o generáloch; čo neniesli zodpovednosť za žiadne zlyhanie; o neexistencií stratégie a nevhodnej kultúre pre strabilizačné misie; o nedostatku vhodných kádrov či spravodajstve. Kniha vyvolala v konzervatívnom a uzavretom prostredí armády vlny.
Samozrejme, nie všetko je prenositeľné do nášho prostredia. Ale niečo veľmi podobne otvorené potrebujeme počuť aj o naších ozborjených silách. V poslednej Bielej knihe vydanej MOSR (https://goo.gl/YFpJoJ) sme sa dočítali veci, ktoré by si zaslúžili mnoho vysvetlovania. Niektorí politici tu majú plné reči štátnosti a národa. Pre začiatok by sa tejto téme mohli naozaj aj venovať, nie len keď sa to hodí vo volebnej kampani.
O svojich skúsenostiach z posledných dvoch misií napísal kritickú knihu. Tradične sa tento žáner točí okolo (bezpochyby zásadných) chýb politikov, ktorí vojakov poslali kam nemali. Tu sa ide ďalej a veľmi otvorene sa píše o generáloch; čo neniesli zodpovednosť za žiadne zlyhanie; o neexistencií stratégie a nevhodnej kultúre pre strabilizačné misie; o nedostatku vhodných kádrov či spravodajstve. Kniha vyvolala v konzervatívnom a uzavretom prostredí armády vlny.
Samozrejme, nie všetko je prenositeľné do nášho prostredia. Ale niečo veľmi podobne otvorené potrebujeme počuť aj o naších ozborjených silách. V poslednej Bielej knihe vydanej MOSR (https://goo.gl/YFpJoJ) sme sa dočítali veci, ktoré by si zaslúžili mnoho vysvetlovania. Niektorí politici tu majú plné reči štátnosti a národa. Pre začiatok by sa tejto téme mohli naozaj aj venovať, nie len keď sa to hodí vo volebnej kampani.
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