Rationality and the Reflective Mind

by Keith E. Stanovich

In Rationality and the Reflective Mind , Keith Stanovich attempts to resolve the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science--the debate about how much irrationality to ascribe to human cognition. He shows how the insights of dual-process theory and evolutionary psychology can be combined to explain why humans are sometimes irrational even though they possess remarkably adaptive cognitive machinery. Stanovich argues that to fully characterize differences in rational thinking, we need to replace dual-process theories with tripartite models of cognition. Using a unique individual differences approach, he shows that the traditional second system (System 2) of dual-process theory must be further divided into the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. Distinguishing them will allow us to better appreciate the significant differences in their key The key function of the reflective mind is to detect the need to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation
activities, whereas that of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of decoupled secondary representations in cognitive simulation.
Stanovich then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. He presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using his tripartite model of cognition, Stanovich shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. He then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been.

Genres: Psychology, Philosophy, Nonfiction, Science, Self Help, Education, Humanities

344 pages, Hardcover

First published December 31, 2010

About the author

Keith E. Stanovich is Emeritus Professor of Applied Psychology and Human Development at the University of Toronto and former Canada Research Chair of Applied Cognitive Science. He is the author of over 200 scientific articles and seven books. He received his BA degree in psychology from Ohio State University in 1973 and his PhD in psychology from the University of Michigan in 1977.

Reviews

[Nat]

This is absolutely fascinating work. Stanovich argues for making a division within type 2 processing, between the "reflective" and "algorithmic" mind, bringing his view into the pantheon of tripartite theories of mind (cf. Plato, Freud). But Stanovich's view is backed up with copious empirical studies from roughly the past 40 years, the sheer volume of which is communicated in a series of footnotes that eventually started to crack me up:

"This debate has generated a very substantial literature of often heated arguments [followed by 21 citations]" (p.9)

"There has been much research on each of the different kinds of Type 1 processing... [18 citations]. Likewise there is a large literature on the concepts of modularity and automaticity in cognitive science [12 citations]" (p.20)

"There is voluminous evidence that exclusive reliance on the heuristic processing tendencies of Type 1 sometimes results in suboptimal responding [14 citations] and that such thinking errors are not limited to the laboratory [27 citations]" (pp.32-3)

"This evidence is substantial and growing [16 citations]" (p.35)

"There is a large and growing literature on cognitive simulation [19 citations]" (p.47)

"There is a large literature on the theory and on the processing correlates of Gf [fluid intelligence] and Gc [crystallized intelligence] [11 citations]" (pp.52-3)

"The literature on the various different proposals is large [22 citations]" (p.63)

"The convergence can be seen in a literature that grows daily [8 citations]" (p.75)

"This literature is growing [17 citations]" (pp.88-9).

"The literature on aspects of the social intelligence hypothesis is huge [18 citations]" (p.91)

"There is a large literature on alternative interpretations of responses on the Linda task [10 citations]" (p.101)

"The literature on framing effects is vast [8 citations]" (pp.107-108)

[RustyShack · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fine for what it is, but its single-discipline, empirical approach seems remarkably insular. Really, every claim needs to have the disclaimer "...assuming that evaluations of the performance of college students to test questions under test circumstances reliably illustrate how people of all ages, cultures and aptitudes make decisions under all other circumstances."

[Max]

Very rich book sketching out Keith Stanovich's understanding of the human mind. It was a bit of a trot to read and here and there I'm still a little confused. His main proposal is to subdivide "higher cognition", into

1) the algorithmic mind, measured by IQ and responsible for the effortful processing of information that I know from solving math homework, or a devilish Sudoku, and

2) the reflective mind, which hosts epistemic standards like requiring evidence and questioning one's beliefs, our ability to avoid biases like being biased by one's politics, but also how we identify and approach problems before letting our algorithmic mind go to work.

He discusses the distinction in relation to thinking errors, for example not being able to detach from your initial tunnel-vision train of thought (he calls it "Serial associative cognition with a focal bias") during problem solving, or possessing contaminated "mindware", e.g. in the form of not questioning oneself or one's ingroup. Also lacking the relevant mindware to do the relevant processing steps can be a problem, for example not having learned basic tools of handling uncertain information.

I really like the term mindware, but don't have a very clear grasp of the concept yet. "[K]nowledge, rules, procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved and used to transform decoupled representations have been referred to as mindware". Decoupled representations are decoupled from perception, i.e. they are separated from our current model of our environment and can be independently transformed (by the mindware). An example would be hypothetical reasoning when planning your next action, which might include your intuitive physics module, or some explicit calculations when deciding between two small or one large pizza. The concept seems to encompass many types of our information processing, but my System 1 just decided to stop this thread. *cognitive miserliness intensifies*

The decoupling of representations from our model of the environment is important for Stanovich, because it's a way to prevent "representational abuse", the issue that a mind might confuse its representation of the environment with a (decoupled) representation that is for example used for thinking about hypothetical developments. This seems kind of costly to me, to have a completely separate representation of the world to plan my movements before climbing a tree. From the inside, it feels more like my plan merges into my "main representation", while being able to let go of the planning part and switch back to only representing the environment at any moment.

A big part of the book revolves around the goal of introducing rationality into psychology. As a teaser, I thought this graphic gave a really nice overview on the topics that you can check out for further interest.


Okay. One last quote of a quote that I liked:

Hull (2001) has said that “the rule that human beings seem to follow is to engage the brain only when all else fails—and usually not even then”

With that, I let my brain off the hook. I hope it knows I appreciate the hard work!

[Teo · Rating 5 out of 5]

2014.07.26–2014.08.21

Contents

Stanovich KE (2011) Rationality and the Reflective Mind

Preface

01. Dual-Process Theory and the Great Rationality Debate
• The Great Rationality Debate
• Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate
• Dual-Process Theory: The Current State of Play
• • Table 1.1. Some Alternative Terms for Type 1 and Type 2 Processing Used by Various Theorists
• Properties of Type I and Type 2 Processing
• Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals: Implications for the Rationality Debate
• The Rest of This Book: Complications in the Dual-Process Theory and Their Implications for the Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence

02. Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind
• Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using Individual Differences
• • Figure 2.1. The Tripartite Structure and the Locus of Individual Differences
• Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind
• Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind
• Thinking Dispositions as Independent Predictors of Rational Thought

03. The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality
• Figure 3.1. Cognitive Decoupling (Based on Leslie, 1987)
• So-Called "Executive Functioning" Measures Tap the Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective Mind

04. The Tri-Process Model and Serial Associative Cognition
• Figure 4.1. A More Complete Model of the Tripartite Structure
• The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias
• Converging Evidence in the Dual-Process Literature

05. The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind
• Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences
• What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration?
• The Master Rationality Motive as a Psychological Construct
• • Table 5.1. Items on the Master Rationality Motive Scale
• Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive and Type 2 Processing

06. A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems (Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West)
• Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures
• • Figure 6.1. Knowledge Structures in the Tripartite Framework
• The Preliminary Taxonomy
• • Figure 6.2. A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Error Types
• Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy
• • Table 6.1. Classification of Several Tasks, Effects, and Processing Styles in Terms of a Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Errors
• Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought
• Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind
• • An Expanded Taxonomy of Thinking Error Types

07. Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks (Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West)
• Figure 7.1. The Tripartite Structure and the Locus of Individual Differences
• Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects
• • Table 7.1. ANOVA (Form x SAT) and Mean Scores as a Function of Form (A vs. B) and SAT; Results From a Parallel Regression Analysis are Also Indicated
• Belief Bias and Myside Bias
• Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate with Cognitive Ability
• • Table 7.2. Thinking Heuristics, Biases, and Effects Classified in Terms of Their Associations with Cognitive Ability
• • Figure 7.2. A Framework for Conceptualizing Individual Differences on Heuristics and Biases Tasks
• Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and Override Detection in Heuristics and Biases Tasks

08. Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate
• Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms of the Taxonomy
• • Figure 8.1. An Expanded Taxonomy of Thinking Errors
• Summary of the Relationships
• Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, and the Great Rationality Debate
• Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities

09. The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality
• Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence
• Intelligence Imperialism
• Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and the Deification of Intelligence
• Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size
• Society's Selection Mechanisms

10. The Assessment of Rational Thought (Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie E. Toplak)
• A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking
• • • Figure 10.1. A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking
• Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought
• • Table 10.1. Measurement Paradigms for the Major Dimensions of Rational Thought
• • Table 10.2. Association Between Aspects of Rational Thought and Real-World Outcomes
• • Table 10.3. Training, Education, and Knowledge Effects on the Components of Rational Thought
• The Future of Research on Individual Differences in Rational Thought

References
Author Index
Subject Index

[Tuukka · Rating 5 out of 5]

Clearly articulated book. A priori not the most interesting subject for me. But very well written and that made it interesting

[van gone. · Rating 3 out of 5]

cognitive science research articles compilation it is

[Rhiemann Yahoo · Rating 3 out of 5]

An insightful though challenging read at some points. Stanovich excels in theory, less so in writing. I suspect I will return to this book to reread the best passages.