FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the Epic Battle Over the New Deal

by James F. Simon

By the author of acclaimed books on the bitter clashes between Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall on the shaping of the nation’s constitutional future, and between Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney over slavery, secession, and the presidential war powers. Roosevelt and Chief Justice Hughes's fight over the New Deal was the most critical struggle between an American president and a chief justice in the twentieth century.

The confrontation threatened the New Deal in the middle of the nation’s worst depression. The activist president bombarded the Democratic Congress with a fusillade of legislative remedies that shut down insolvent banks, regulated stocks, imposed industrial codes, rationed agricultural production, and employed a quarter million young men in the Civilian Conservation Corps. But the legislation faced constitutional challenges by a conservative bloc on the Court determined to undercut the president. Chief Justice Hughes often joined the Court’s conservatives to strike down major New Deal legislation.

Frustrated, FDR proposed a Court-packing plan. His true purpose was to undermine the ability of the life-tenured Justices to thwart his popular mandate. Hughes proved more than a match for Roosevelt in the ensuing battle. In grudging admiration for Hughes, FDR said that the Chief Justice was the best politician in the country. Despite the defeat of his plan, Roosevelt never lost his confidence and, like Hughes, never ceded leadership. He outmaneuvered isolationist senators, many of whom had opposed his Court-packing plan, to expedite aid to Great Britain as the Allies hovered on the brink of defeat. He then led his country through World War II.

Genres: History, Biography, Politics, American History, Nonfiction, Us Presidents, Law

480 pages, Hardcover

First published February 1, 2012

About the author

James F. Simon is the Martin Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus at New York Law School. He is the author of seven previous books on American history, law, and politics. His books have won the American Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award and twice been named New York Times Notable Books. He lives with his wife in West Nyack, New York.

Reviews

[Jean · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was impressed with James F. Simons’ books about Thomas Jefferson against John Marshall and Lincoln against Roger Taney. I just had to read this one with Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945) against Charles Evans Hughes (1862-1948).

The book is well written and researched. Simon provides side by side biographies of these two men and how their divergent positions effected the Great Depression. FDR passed sweeping legislation restructuring America only to have Chief Justice Hughes’ Supreme Court declare the legislation unconstitutional essentially putting a stranglehold on FDR’s economic initiatives.

Professor Simon goes into depth about FDR’s attempt at court-packing. Simon exams carefully all changes in the Court direction with the threat of reform. He also examines Hughes’ own sense of consternation and later decisions in protection of Civil Rights (e.g. Gaines v Canada). Hughes was sympathetic to FDR’s cause but tried his best to maintain consensus on the Court. He followed the letter of the law and thereby forced FDR to rewrite his legislation to conform with the law or have the legislators write new laws. Charles Evans Hughes is considered the second-best Chief Justice after John Marshall.

I read this as an e-book downloaded to my Kindle app on my iPad from Amazon. The book was 482 pages and was published in 2012.

[Aaron Million · Rating 3 out of 5]

Charles Evans Hughes is one of those figures that today has been more or less lost to history, yet really deserves a better fate. The man was extremely accomplished: Governor of New York, twice nominated and confirmed to the U.S. Supreme Court - with the second time being as Chief Justice, 1916 Republican presidential nominee - barely losing to Woodrow Wilson, and Secretary of State. Any of those titles would be noteworthy. To have all of them is quite an accomplishment. Yet there is not a lot written about Hughes, which is the main reason I had chosen to read this book. Unfortunately, it left me unsatisfied.

James Simon presents a book about both Hughes and President Franklin Roosevelt. Both were New Yorkers, both were Governor, and Hughes was Chief Justice for the vast majority of Roosevelt's long tenure in office. Simon throughout the book alternates the story between the two men, staying fairly even in coverage. Despite the two sharing a common state of origin, they were never really in the same circle, although they seemed to sideswipe each other a lot. This is primarily due to Hughes being twenty years older, and the men belonging to different political parties.

The first half of the book is biographical in nature, with Simon showing the rise of each man. Given that this is not a straight biography of either man, some things are obviously left out or covered quickly. While I understand that from Roosevelt's side, simple due to the vast amount of literature out there on him, I was hoping for a much fuller review of Hughes's story. Not that Simon minimizes anything that Hughes did. It is more that I was wanting those things (like the 1916 presidential campaign) to be covered in more detail. And sometimes there were abrupt changes, such as him writing that Hughes had no interest in running for political office, and then in the next paragraph he agrees to run for Governor.

It is well past the halfway mark before the story gets to the point when both are in Washington at the same time. To the extent that the two men had interacted up to that time, they were cordial and friendly, although by no means friends. At this point, the book shifts in tone from that of a biography to one of history. The New Deal is covered at length, and this is really where the conflict comes from: FDR's New Deal consisted of multiple acts of Congress that created many agencies. As lawsuits came in and slowly made their way to the Supreme Court, Roosevelt worried that the conservative majority Supreme Court would severely damage the New Deal. And that is indeed what happened - to an extent. Hughes was never hard-right nor extremely conservative, although he was definitely a conservative overall. If I had to peg his political identity, I would say he was a liberal Republican, fiscally conservative but socially open (Hughes repeatedly used the Court to attempt to further rights for minorities). But the Court overall was much more conservative than he was, and he frequently sided with the Court's conservatives in helping to declare parts of the New Deal unconstitutional.

All of the setbacks angered FDR, who embarked on one of his biggest failures as President: his ill-conceived Court packing plan. It was a major bust and blew up in his face. And Hughes helped to light the fuse by outsmarting him politically, writing several letters to Congress that successfully destroyed some of FDR's biggest criticisms of the Court. Roosevelt wanted the ability to appoint more Justices based on the age of the ones staying - in effect penalizing any who stayed beyond age 70, and ultimately giving himself a majority on the Court. This had no way of passing, especially after FDR played coy with the Democratic Congressional leaders that he would need to help get the legislation through Congress.

Yet, just like that, things changed. The Court, led by Hughes, unexpectedly upheld some key New Deal laws. And some of the Conservative Justices retired, giving Roosevelt the appointments that he had been craving. Things never got too nasty between Hughes and Roosevelt. In fact they both maintained at least surface cordiality during this period. Hughes retired in June 1941, shortly before American involvement in WWII.

The ending of the book seemed rushed. Simon does not really go into what Hughes died of, nor what he thought when Roosevelt died in office (Hughes lived a few years after that). There was no discussion of either man's legacy, no comparison of the two men. Also, the book had many typos in it, a few more than I would have expected. This is not a bad book; it's just that I feel like it could have been so much more. And while I have a better idea about who Hughes was, I still do not think I have an adequate understanding of him.

Grade: C+

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Professor Simon has written a fascinating look at probably one the greatest crises in the history of the Supreme Court – the battle over the New Deal.

The author begins the book with biographical sketches of both FDR and the Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes that take up the first half of the book. He traces there life from boyhood to their ultimate confrontation in the mid 30’s over the constitutionality of many of the pillars of the New Deal. Personally I found Justice Hughes a much more honorable person than FDR. Hughes is presented as brilliant lawyer, judge and teacher, a highly honorable man as well and a very skilled politician. Pres. Roosevelt comes off as a scheming, Machiavellian person not above stretching the truth, if not outright lying if he though it was necessary, though with the highest of goals - saving the United States and its citizens from economic collapse.

Like today the court in the mid 1930’s was sharply divided on ideological grounds with a strong conservative wing of four Justices and strong liberal wing of 3 Justices and Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts being the swing votes. Starting in 1935/1936 the court struck down several New Deal programs. To say FDR and the court did not see eye to eye on the reach of Federal Power is an understatement. With the losses in the Supreme Court, FDR began to look for a way to restructure the court to get more favorable rulings. Since many of the Justices were elderly the plan he came up with was to add a justice to help each justice over 70, who happened to be the conservative wing of the court, deal with the workload of the court. Hughes fought back and was able to hand FDR the first major legislative defeat of his presidency in spite of FDR have 75% majorities in both houses of congress. Professor Simon’s thesis is that it wasn’t so much the “Switch in Time Saves Nine” scenario, but Hughes political skills that saved the 9 member court.

I found this a well written history/biography of a critical era in US history

[H. P. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme and the “switch in time that saved nine” have been immortalized in American history. They mark a turning point in the New Deal and American constitutional law. The account of law professor James Simon stands out in its focus on Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the extensive survey of the major cases leading up to the “switch in time,” and its focus on the role of the Supreme Court in thwarting the court-packing scheme.

Simon starts with sketch biographies of Hughes and FDR and begins interweaving their stories as they both enter public life. He then turns his attention to the big battles between the Court and the president, with particular focus on each man.

Hughes reentered as chief justice a Court embroiled in an increasingly contentious philosophical battle. The conservative wing of the Court—justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter—believed that Congress could only legitimately exercise the powers enumerated in the Constitution and that both Congress and state legislatures were restrained from abrogating individual (including economic) rights by the 5th and 14th Amendments. The progressive wing of the Court—justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo—believed in great deference to legislatures and did not believe the 5th and 14th Amendments protected economic rights. Hughes and Justice Roberts became the swing justices.

Things really heat up 3/5ths of the way through as challenges to New Deal legislation passed during FDR’s famous first 100 days in office begin to trickle up to the Supreme Court. But Simon starts with discussion of a case—Blaisdell—challenging a state statute providing foreclosure relief. Hughes wrote for a 5-4 majority upholding the law. The Court then upheld a NY law fixing the price of milk, notable both because it came only 2 years after the Court struck down a Oklahoma permitting scheme for the ice industry and because it was written by Roberts. Roberts eviscerated the earlier decision by redefining the phrase “affected with a public interest” to “an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for a public good.” The Court again addressed federal regulation in a challenge to the NIRA petroleum code. The virtually untrammeled power the bill gave the president over an industry made it an easy case, and the justices voted 8-1 to strike down the provision as an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power.

In Perry, a challenge to a congressional statute invalidating public and private contracts requiring payment of debts in gold presented a more vexing question. On one hand, overturning the law threatened to bankrupt the US. On the other, the federal government was both meddling in people’s private dealings and attempting to renege on its own obligations. The Court—again with Hughes speaking for a 5-member majority—declared that Congress had the constitutional authority to nullify private contracts but not to alter the explicit terms of public contracts. But Hughes decided that to actually enforce the contract would provide “unjust enrichment.” FDR was exultant, but it was not to last.

In another 5-4 decision, with Roberts writing for the majority, the Court struck down the Railroad Retirement Act. Roberts evidently saw the Act as the sort of health and welfare regulation reserved to the states rather than a valid exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause. In dissent, Hughes accused Roberts of putting his personal policy preferences above good constitutional law. FDR was more annoyed than irate, but the Court released three more rebukes on the same day scolding the president for exceeding his authority in firing FTC commissioner, declaring a change to the bankruptcy code unconstitutional, and gutting the NIRA (Schechter Poultry). All three were unanimous.

The NIRA likely represented the high water mark in American central economic planning, and the Schechters’ attorney suggested that upholding the law would open the door to Congress taking “charge of all human activity.” By the government’s own admission, the NIRA absurdly defined “unfair competition” implicitly as “what the industry considers unfair.” Here was a perfect storm: a terribly designed act from a policy perspective that was also a massive aggrandizement of power by Congress and the President (even Justice Brandeis, solidly in the progressive bloc, privately chastised members of the administration for overreliance on central planning). Hughes’s opinion found fault with the NIRA both as an unconstitutional delegation of power to the president and as exceeding Congress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause. For the latter, he drew a distinction between direct and indirect effects, reviving a defunct constitutional doctrine. FDR angrily denounced it as a “horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.”

FDR’s Second Hundred Days relied noticeably less on central planning than his first, but next before the Court was another key, early piece of New Deal legislation. The Agriculture Adjustment Act spurred an incredible 1,700+ lawsuits, and well over 2,000 people showed up when the issue came before the Court in US v. Butler. Roberts wrote an opinion for a 6-justice majority focusing on what he saw as limitations to the Taxing and Spending Clause. Justice Stone shot back in dissent that the power to spend went necessarily along with the power to tax as a part of the larger power of the purse. He also accused the majority of passing judgment on the wisdom of the legislation as a matter of policy rather than constitutional law.

Butler perhaps represented a breaking point for a Court under enormous pressure. Stone took obvious umbrage at Roberts’s majority opinion and pulled no punches in his dissent. Roberts took offense, but Hughes refused to intervene. Stone’s emotions visibly flared when he read his dissent in open court. The attorney general passed on false gossip that Hughes had been willing to follow Roberts’s vote to avoid another 5-4 decision overturning a law. Stone intimated to Felix Frankfurter he felt Hughes lacked vision and a willingness to trust his “own intellectual processes.” As farm prices dropped in reaction, the justices were hung in effigy and politicians decried the decision as political. FDR hinted at simply ignoring Supreme Court decisions to a cabinet secretary. A very narrow holding crafted by Hughes upholding the TVA did little to tamp down the heat. Members of the administration and New Deal congressman began discussing imposing age limits on the justices. A journalist argued the same by citing an old suggestion along those lines by Hughes himself. The Court again constricted Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, overturning coal mining regulation under a manufacturing-commerce (as well as direct-indirect) distinction despite 97% of coal being sold across state lines (Hughes wrote a separate opinion agreeing with in part, disagreeing in part, and suggesting the people might want a constitutional amendment to “give Congress the power to regulate industries within the State”). After Hughes wrote a separate opinion in another case, Brandeis observed that Hughes had “no control over the Court.” A decision invalidating a state minimum wage law for women—Morehead v. Tipaldo—was widely condemned.

FDR was easily reelected and the Democrats expanded their majority in Congress. The Court was now under serious threat. Rumors of a court-packing scheme persisted, and a number of proposals to rein in the Court were introduced in Congress. A polemic entitled The Nine Old Men labeled Hughes “the most pathetic figure on the Supreme Court.” Simon suggests Hughes influenced Roberts’s votes in that term with a short visit to his country estate. That may well be the case; it was Roberts’s vote allowed the Court to narrowly uphold NY’s unemployment law. He voted in conference to uphold Washington’s minimum wage law for women in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, despite his earlier contrary vote in Tipaldo. Hughes chose to delay the Court’s formal decision in West Coast Hotel so one of the progressive justices could return and provide an extra vote. While they waited, the Court confirmed the president had broad power over foreign policy, upheld a law banning the sale across state lines of harnesses manufactured by convicts, upheld a bankruptcy code provision subordinating landlords’ claims to those of shareholders, and overturned the conviction of a Communist activist.

Nonetheless, FDR began seriously discussing a court-packing scheme with his attorney general. FDR publicly criticized the Court in his State of the Union address. When FDR announced his court-packing scheme, he referenced an overloaded judiciary and “aged and infirm judges” and quoted Hughes (out of context) in explanation. FDR fully expected the public to support him. They did not. A national poll quickly showed a majority of Americans disapproved of his scheme. FDR marshaled his considerable talents for wholesale politicking in response. Hughes considered testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, but both Brandeis and Justice Van Devanter thought it unbecoming. Instead, Hughes wrote a letter laying out in detail the Court’s efficient disposition of cases. He kept his other feelings on the scheme close to his vest and refused media invitations.

With the West Coast Hotel decision in his back pocket, Hughes timed its announcement to the height of the uproar over the court-packing scheme and assigned the opinion to himself. It all but overruled the Court’s recent decision in Tipaldo. The Court announced three other opinions favorable to the New Deal on the same day. Opponents of the Court were not assuaged. Frankfurter proclaimed to FDR that Roberts changed his vote for purely political reasons. A pundit later labeled it “the switch in time that saved nine.” Two weeks later the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NLRB, and Hughes’s opinion discarded the direct-indirect distinction he had only recently resurrected. The Court would not strike down a single piece of New Deal legislation that term.

FDR kept quiet about the Court publicly. Privately, FDR seemed angrier about what Hughes’s NLRB opinion meant for his court-packing scheme than happy about what it meant for the New Deal. He demanded the scheme be reported out of the Judiciary Committee without recommendation. They refused, and it was reported out unfavorably. While the Committee was voting, FDR was reading a resignation letter from Van Devanter timed to take some of the wind out of the scheme’s sails. FDR was again strangely displeased but countered by giving the Senate Majority Leader full control over the fight for the bill along with an implied promise of Van Devanter’s seat. It proved all for naught. A scathing report from the Judiciary Committee paraphrasing Alexander Hamilton and a deviously timed vacation by FDR’s VP (no friend to the scheme) combined to drive the final nail in its coffin. The scheme was quickly buried back in committee after the sudden death of the Majority Leader.

Simon disputes FDR’s later assertion that he lost the battle but won the war. It was Hughes who won the war, Simon argues, by proving to be the cannier politician. And Hughes certainly did, as Simon shows, play an integral role in stopping the court-packing scheme and preserving the Court as an independent branch of the federal government.

Simon wants Hughes to take his proper place as a giant of a justice. If you ask the average law student to name a justice from that period, they would name Cardozo, Black, and even Roberts before Hughes. Hughes’s legal reasoning was sometimes muddled. He resurrected a defunct doctrine only to cast it away again a few years later. But he held together a deeply divided Court, and for that he deserves greater recognition. He was also a great, early defender of civil liberties.

Simon paints his picture of this time with enough detail for lawyers and broad enough strokes for lay readers. He takes us deep inside the constitutional law of the day, discussing a number of the cases only mentioned in passing or omitted entirely from Akhil Reed Amar’s mammoth 1,856 page Con Law casebook.

[Greg Fanoe · Rating 2 out of 5]

Billed as a book about the Supreme Court fights over the New Deal but that's only like 100 pages of the 400 page book! The rest of the book consists of dual pretty unnecessary, very surface level biographies of Charles Evans Hughes and Franklin Roosevelt, two people who easily merit their own full book length biographies. This was pretty good but it would have benefited from a much tighter focus.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

The writing in the book moves back and forth from a focus on FDR to one on Charles Evans Hughes. The author did outstanding work bringing together political and legal history. There is so much in these pages. The almost parallel lives of the two former NY governors is an interesting part of this story, along with the contrast in the marriages of each. Hughes is on the short list of nearly forgotten great Americans who never occupied the White House but impacted the Nation more than most who have. Henry Clay is on that list. Alexander Hamilton is there, too. Hughes, the son of a Baptist preacher, was a detailed and careful lawyer. His life included distinguished service in the highest levels of law and government. His life is a reminder of the important need for thoughtful consensus builders. He was well matched to spend important years of his life in the arena with the most dominating US president. JIM

[Colby Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bit of a slow start, but the story it provides about the clash between FDR and the Supreme Court is fantastic. The book was clearly written to help inform more people of Hughes's side of the story between the two (which makes sense as he's the less famous one) and I found the story of his political journey to the Chief Justiceship fascinating. The examination into Owen Roberts's famous flip in voting was also quite interesting and really kind of dispelled the whole "switch in time that saved the nine" narrative that people often like to push around. At the end of the day, it was a calculated switch based on the stark unpopularity of the interpretations of Congress's powers (along with some better written laws on Congress's part)

[Lisa · Rating 5 out of 5]

#154 of 160 books pledged to read during 2019

[Allie · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough look at a time, much like today, where SCOTUS impeded the progress of the nation. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

[Barry · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed Dean Simon's book very much. Helpful to have both an historian and an expert on the law writing in this area. I liked the approach of writing an abbreviated biography and taking the reader through the chronology of these successful mens' lives, instead of focusing strictly on the Court-packing controversy. I learned a lot about these two statesmen and enjoyed the many anecdotes that the author included.
My own personal favorite of the Roosevelt Presidents has always been Theodore over Franklin,and that preference / bias continues after my reading here. The author's many anecdotes makes the two men come alive. Roosevelt had a sneer to him that was not productive - his bragging (erroneously) about the switch of the Supreme Court in 1936-1937 from conservative to progressive being due to intimidation from the Court-packing proposal is a good example. Another example is his targeting of loyal Democrats who didn't line up to support those proposals - the attempt to dump Georgia Senator Walter George during the dedication ceremony of a new electric plant, with a smile on his (FDR's) face, was revealing. On the other side, the vision of Roosevelt addressing Congress in March 1945 while sitting in his wheelchair, and apologizing for his informality given the weight of the steel braces he generally wore, is very touching.
I learned a lot about Charles Evans Hughes. I knew that he came very close to winning the Presidency in 1916, and always wondered how things would have been different if he had been elected, but I now have a much better appreciation of how and why the election turned out as it did. I did not appreciate that Teddy Roosevelt's vigorous campaigning for Hughes may have been counterproductive, a negative. I did not know about the intrigue behind the implied offer of the Chief Justice role. Nor did I appreciate the impact President Taft's mentorship had on Hughes, in 1910, 1916 and 1930. In general, I gained a nicely rounded view of Hughes, who was a brilliant, compassionate, driven progressive lawyer and statesman and not the patrician of his reputation (perhaps caused in part by his impeccable beard!).
I would heartily recommend this book!

[Lynn · Rating 4 out of 5]

James Simon's book is meticulously researched and balanced in its conclusions. Simon discusses in depth the careers of President Franklin Roosevelt and Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, and their clash over Supreme Court decisions which declared some of Roosevelt's New Deal programs such as the National Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional.

Roosevelt's attempted solution was his "court packing" scheme that would have allowed him to appoint new, and more liberal, judges without having a vacancy. He failed in doing so through political missteps and Hughes skilful responses. Simon praises Hughes for preserving the Court's independence from the Executive branch of the Federal government.

I appreciated the insight this book provided me about a crucial time in our democracy. My only cavil with the book is that its writing style often is plodding. I set it aside several times before I determine to plough through it.

I learned much from the book, and that it the highest praise I of think for a non-fiction work of scholarship.

[Ian Divertie · Rating 5 out of 5]

An interesting biography of both FDR and Chief Justice Hughes. Good discussion of the court packing scheme FDR devised. The life of Hughes is covered in detail and the various men of the Supreme Court in not quite as much detail but you get a clear notion of who the main players are. Hughes definitely was more cooperative with FDR after the court packing incident than before. He was sympathetic to FDR's cause but tried his best to maintain consensus on the court which considering the characters involved was difficult at best. After 1936 Hughes tried to make the court more responsive to FDR's agenda.

[Calvin]

Brilliantly written. James F. Simon shows why he is, in my mind, the foremost scholar on the history of the Supreme Court. His clear explanation of the court cases along with his simply good writing when talking about personalities ceates always compelling reads. I may have enjoyed this even more than his biography on William Douglas, which is saying a lot. The idea of crafting a book around the relationship between a powerful Chief Executive and the sitting Chief Justice was facinating-to the point I cant wait to read his Lincoln-Taney book.

[Sally · Rating 3 out of 5]

The legal arguments made for some heavy reading, but it was interesting to read about how the infamous court packing debate went down. Some of FDR's statements regarding the branches of government also sound vaguely familiar... as though I've heard them said recently by a current political figure ;)

[Donnie Reeves · Rating 3 out of 5]

So many high level games were played by two of the powers of the day...both thought they were right but one had to be right in orser for the new deal to survive and help get a country back on its feet.

[David Eisenthal · Rating 4 out of 5]

Simon takes an interesting approach by crafting this dual biography of FDR and Charles Evans Hughes. The perspective on both of these important 20th century figures is enhanced by this approach.

[Jim Blessing · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an outstanding book, especially on Charles Evans Hughes, who is not well-known. He was a progressive Republican and had an amazing career. The book contained interesting information about FDR. It's a great read!

[Chris Mora · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good legal history. If you have an interest in the executive branch and the judicial branch, and how they can clash this book is for you. Two great intellectuals with differing views clashed and James Simon wrote an amazing book on it.

[Tom Dillickrath · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, but perhaps too specialized for lay reader and too basic for someone conversant with the fundamentals. Poorly edited at times as well. Just adequate.

[John Mahoney · Rating 1 out of 5]

Too many details of young life, father's early life ...
Stopped after the first chapter