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Modern Wars
Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945
The battles in Russia played the decisive part in Hitler's defeat. Gigantic, prolonged, and bloody, they contrasted with the general nature of the fighting on other fronts. The Russians fought on their own in "their" theater of war and with an independent strategy. Stalinist Russia was a
country radically different from its liberal democratic allies. Hitler and the German high command, for their part, conceived and carried out the Russian campaign as a singular "war of annihilation."
This riveting new book is a penetrating, broad-ranging, yet concise overview of this vast conflict. It investigates the Wehrmacht and the Red Army and the command and production systems that organized and sustained them. It considers a range of further themes concerning this most political of
wars. Benefiting from a post-Communist, post-Cold War perspective, the book takes advantage of a wealth of new studies and source material that have become available over the last decade.
Readers from history buffs to scholars will find something new in this exciting new book.
country radically different from its liberal democratic allies. Hitler and the German high command, for their part, conceived and carried out the Russian campaign as a singular "war of annihilation."
This riveting new book is a penetrating, broad-ranging, yet concise overview of this vast conflict. It investigates the Wehrmacht and the Red Army and the command and production systems that organized and sustained them. It considers a range of further themes concerning this most political of
wars. Benefiting from a post-Communist, post-Cold War perspective, the book takes advantage of a wealth of new studies and source material that have become available over the last decade.
Readers from history buffs to scholars will find something new in this exciting new book.
528 pages, Hardcover
First published August 1, 2005
17 people are currently reading
377 people want to read
About the author
Evan Mawdsley
21 books19 followersEvan Mawdsley is Professor of International History at Glasgow University. He has written numerous books and articles on Russian history and is the co-author of The Soviet Elite from Lenin to Gorbachev. He lives in Glasgow.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
July 22, 2020
Thunder in the East has been touted for quite a few years now as the best single volume history of the Eastern Front in English even by Russian and Ukrainian expats. Mawdsley's work, updated in this second edition from an academic press, genuinely is an astoundingly thorough, highly analytical, still enjoyable to read work.
One reason this book stands head and shoulders above the others is that Mawdsley refuses to repeat old tropes of either the pro-German or pro-Soviet factions within historiography. He spends equal time analyzing and narrating both sides, and his conclusions often clash with both schools of historical thought.
He largely blames the incompetent diplomatic and geostrategic policies of the Soviet Union for the cause of the war to begin with.
Mirroring the disastrous strategic decisions that would entangle Czarist Russia in Western alliances, all the while isolating her from her natural allies and purposefully antagonizing the Empire with the world's best Army, so too would Soviet Russia further isolate herself with her actions, and push potential allies deep into the embrace of the Axis, and give Hitler more than just a flimsy pretext for war. The old trope that the Russians are the masters of strategy are certainly blown to shreds by the events of both World Wars.
One can argue that had Russia actually been successful at Strategy, there never would have been either conflict.
Stalin's naked territory grabs in the Baltic and in Bessarabia, not to mention the disastrous war with Finland, far from creating a safe buffer zone for the USSR, instead ensured that Russia would be utterly isolated strategically. And these actions pushed the States of Finland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and others into the camp of the Axis, giving Hitler political legitimacy, and easing his own strategic options considerably.
Mawdsley's analysis of the pre-war planning of both sides shows both sides to be on the wrong foot. The Soviet's, in forming their buffer zone several hundred kilometers westwards, removed their main formations far from their logistical centers, and their prepared defenses. There simply wasn't the time from 1940 till the invasion to perfect and complete the preparations necessary in order make these areas fully useable.
The Germans, meanwhile, planned out a giant operation, but failed to grasp the broader strategic direction behind it. Despite the tremendous gift given them by Moscow's dunderheaded strategic policies from 1939 onwards, the German General Staff failed to envision war beyond the level of the operational, and would pay the ultimate price for doing so.
In terms of narrating the conflict itself, this is a birds eye view. The conflict is told from the strategic perspective, so it may lack the drama some will be looking for. Instead, this book does a superb job of analyzing all the ins and outs of why the war went the way that it did.
One thing that has made Mawdsley's work controversial in Russia during the Putin era, is his honest appraisal of Lend Lease. In the early stages of the war, from 1941-early 1943, Lend Lease was only a minor component of the Soviet War. However, without those teeming thousands of Ford trucks driving supplies and troops to the front, the Red Army doesn't work as rapidly as they did, and one can argue that the march to Berlin post Kursk, goes far differently than it did. American and British refined materials were used to construct many Soviet tanks and artillery pieces, and it was Western loans that kept the USSR from becoming insolvent.
However, Mawdsley points out that the Allies don't win the War without the Red Army. It's inescapable that the Germans and the Axis were defeated on the Eastern Front. And no, General Winter didn't knock out the Germans or their multiple allies. The Soviets developed several quality commanders during the war (Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, just to name a bare few) and if Stalin was a poor warlord, he had, by 1944, a Red Army that was a truly formidable fighting force, led by men who knew their jobs, and who by then were inured to Stalin's rages and apt to stand up to him for their own professional perogatives.
The fact that said behavior cost some of them post war is besides the point.
Mawdsley delves into everything: the strategic policy and planning pre war, the nature of both sides armed cultures, the war itself, the economic aspects, the leadership, and the coalition aspects of the war.
Dense, but still enjoyable. Very highly recommended.
One reason this book stands head and shoulders above the others is that Mawdsley refuses to repeat old tropes of either the pro-German or pro-Soviet factions within historiography. He spends equal time analyzing and narrating both sides, and his conclusions often clash with both schools of historical thought.
He largely blames the incompetent diplomatic and geostrategic policies of the Soviet Union for the cause of the war to begin with.
Mirroring the disastrous strategic decisions that would entangle Czarist Russia in Western alliances, all the while isolating her from her natural allies and purposefully antagonizing the Empire with the world's best Army, so too would Soviet Russia further isolate herself with her actions, and push potential allies deep into the embrace of the Axis, and give Hitler more than just a flimsy pretext for war. The old trope that the Russians are the masters of strategy are certainly blown to shreds by the events of both World Wars.
One can argue that had Russia actually been successful at Strategy, there never would have been either conflict.
Stalin's naked territory grabs in the Baltic and in Bessarabia, not to mention the disastrous war with Finland, far from creating a safe buffer zone for the USSR, instead ensured that Russia would be utterly isolated strategically. And these actions pushed the States of Finland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and others into the camp of the Axis, giving Hitler political legitimacy, and easing his own strategic options considerably.
Mawdsley's analysis of the pre-war planning of both sides shows both sides to be on the wrong foot. The Soviet's, in forming their buffer zone several hundred kilometers westwards, removed their main formations far from their logistical centers, and their prepared defenses. There simply wasn't the time from 1940 till the invasion to perfect and complete the preparations necessary in order make these areas fully useable.
The Germans, meanwhile, planned out a giant operation, but failed to grasp the broader strategic direction behind it. Despite the tremendous gift given them by Moscow's dunderheaded strategic policies from 1939 onwards, the German General Staff failed to envision war beyond the level of the operational, and would pay the ultimate price for doing so.
In terms of narrating the conflict itself, this is a birds eye view. The conflict is told from the strategic perspective, so it may lack the drama some will be looking for. Instead, this book does a superb job of analyzing all the ins and outs of why the war went the way that it did.
One thing that has made Mawdsley's work controversial in Russia during the Putin era, is his honest appraisal of Lend Lease. In the early stages of the war, from 1941-early 1943, Lend Lease was only a minor component of the Soviet War. However, without those teeming thousands of Ford trucks driving supplies and troops to the front, the Red Army doesn't work as rapidly as they did, and one can argue that the march to Berlin post Kursk, goes far differently than it did. American and British refined materials were used to construct many Soviet tanks and artillery pieces, and it was Western loans that kept the USSR from becoming insolvent.
However, Mawdsley points out that the Allies don't win the War without the Red Army. It's inescapable that the Germans and the Axis were defeated on the Eastern Front. And no, General Winter didn't knock out the Germans or their multiple allies. The Soviets developed several quality commanders during the war (Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, just to name a bare few) and if Stalin was a poor warlord, he had, by 1944, a Red Army that was a truly formidable fighting force, led by men who knew their jobs, and who by then were inured to Stalin's rages and apt to stand up to him for their own professional perogatives.
The fact that said behavior cost some of them post war is besides the point.
Mawdsley delves into everything: the strategic policy and planning pre war, the nature of both sides armed cultures, the war itself, the economic aspects, the leadership, and the coalition aspects of the war.
Dense, but still enjoyable. Very highly recommended.
April 21, 2015
Mawdsley's book is one of the best I've read about the "Eastern" Front. He gives a much more balanced view of the Nazi-Soviet war than say Alan Clark (German-centered) or David Glantz (Russian-centered). The narrative is concise and along the way challenges several assumptions that are commonplace in modern WWII history--Manstein's strategic capabilities, the extent to which Hitler is to blame for Nazi failures, Kursk as a pivotal battle in the war, Russians purposely leaving the Polish resistance in a lurch in Warsaw, and production inequities between Germany and Russia. If you were to only read one book about the Nazi-Soviet war then this should be it. My only complaint is related to its greatest strength--the solid academic nature of this book. Mawdsley is no Robert K. Massie, David McCullough, or Cornelius Ryan. There is little emotion, exploration of commander's personalities, or reflection on the magnitude of atrocities committed. In other words, it can be a dry read if the topic doesn't capture your interest. Still, due to the balanced, concise, informative nature of this relatively short work, it is easily worth the 4 stars I rated it. Pick it up and learn something.
December 24, 2022
Quite dry, but packed with information. This book covers the 1941 war in the Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe from a military and political perspective. I hard a hard time following a lot of the detailed battle information (too many commander and army names), but I found the analysis of competing historical theories/causes of the losses/victories in different battles, as well as the descriptions of the economic, military and political organization of the two sides to be compelling, and well worth it.
This book has reinforced what Ibn Khaldun and other authors this year have suggested about narrative history: you can't trust it. That doesn't mean things like Battle Cry of Freedom, which is narrative history in the sense that involves the development of characters such as Grant and Lincoln. I mean narrative in the sense of an ethnic or ideological history. Things the memoirs of the German High Command, the new "Stalin's War" (which this book proves is a stinking load of crap) or the myth of the Lost Cause. War and politics are complicated, and a one-size fits all just-so story is unlikely to actually be true.
Things I learned from this book:
-Soviet Preoccupation with having a buffer-zone between their heartland and Germany ironically caused their diplomatic isolation. Finland and Romania might not have sided with Germany if it wasn't for Soviet aggression.
- When the Soviet's didn't collapse in 1941, the Germans were never going to win. The battle of Moscow, rather than the battle of Stalingrad was probably the actual turning point of the war.
-Soviet war and pre-war production was extremely impressive. Lend-lease probably only accelerated the Soviet westward advance, rather than determining the course of the war
- Soviets were still taking heavy casualties in 1944/1945. The reasons for this are unclear, but "human wave tactics" are not a real reason.
-German high command was extremely disorganized, mainly because Hitler. However, Hitler was merely a more extreme version of the attitude of most of the other talented German generals.
-Renewed importance of the Western Front in 1944
-This being "Stalin's War" is kind of ridiculous. The human and economics cost for the USSR was extremely high, and the author here argues that the nation never really recovered. Also the situation in Eastern Europe did not necessarily end up the way it did by design. The Soviet's weren't necessarily interested in setting up puppet governments, but that's how the situation played out on the ground.
This book has reinforced what Ibn Khaldun and other authors this year have suggested about narrative history: you can't trust it. That doesn't mean things like Battle Cry of Freedom, which is narrative history in the sense that involves the development of characters such as Grant and Lincoln. I mean narrative in the sense of an ethnic or ideological history. Things the memoirs of the German High Command, the new "Stalin's War" (which this book proves is a stinking load of crap) or the myth of the Lost Cause. War and politics are complicated, and a one-size fits all just-so story is unlikely to actually be true.
Things I learned from this book:
-Soviet Preoccupation with having a buffer-zone between their heartland and Germany ironically caused their diplomatic isolation. Finland and Romania might not have sided with Germany if it wasn't for Soviet aggression.
- When the Soviet's didn't collapse in 1941, the Germans were never going to win. The battle of Moscow, rather than the battle of Stalingrad was probably the actual turning point of the war.
-Soviet war and pre-war production was extremely impressive. Lend-lease probably only accelerated the Soviet westward advance, rather than determining the course of the war
- Soviets were still taking heavy casualties in 1944/1945. The reasons for this are unclear, but "human wave tactics" are not a real reason.
-German high command was extremely disorganized, mainly because Hitler. However, Hitler was merely a more extreme version of the attitude of most of the other talented German generals.
-Renewed importance of the Western Front in 1944
-This being "Stalin's War" is kind of ridiculous. The human and economics cost for the USSR was extremely high, and the author here argues that the nation never really recovered. Also the situation in Eastern Europe did not necessarily end up the way it did by design. The Soviet's weren't necessarily interested in setting up puppet governments, but that's how the situation played out on the ground.
June 30, 2011
A thorough and believable analysis of the Soviet-Nazi war, this is not a book for those who do not know a lot about the campaigns. Nor is it a dramatic popularization of the action. It is an excellent book for understanding the reasons for what happened, and in its cold prose clearly renders the horrors of it all.
April 14, 2020
Hard to follow sometimes with the amount of information presented, but still an excellent overview on the scale of the Eastern Front.
July 20, 2009
BOOORRRRIINNNNGGGGG.. and I'm a history major!
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews