FOOT:VIRTUES & VICES & OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY PAPER: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy

by Philippa Foot

"Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."-- Choice

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Essays

231 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1978

About the author

Philippa Ruth Foot
Obituary

Reviews

[Blake · Rating 4 out of 5]

The breadth of Foot's essays is one of broad span across the normative and metaethical terrain of the moral subjects of her day. The volume collects various papers from 1957 to 1977, some more notable than others: The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, which first introduced the trolley problem into moral philosophy; Euthanasia, wherein Foot calls for an infusion of delicacy into the normative question; and Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, in which she made an infamous rejection of the overriding reasons supposition identified with Kant.

While the papers introduce theses here bold and there inventive, the quality coincides with no particular philosophical issue nor with individual papers. Instead, Foot writes most provocatively and powerfully where she neither accepts nor rejects: her indecisiveness sees her at her most inventive and careful. So, the bolder the proposition therewith the less persuasive is the exposition to follow. While her active voice has its merits, the earlier papers in the volume have more charm for being less polemical.

Foot was one of several philosophers who presided over a rebirth or reinvigoration of virtue ethics, raised up here in the setting of analytic philosophy. This was brought to fruition not only by a presentation of positive views proffered in regards to the suitability of virtue for modern treatment, but also by the sharp criticisms she drew with others of those views that may now properly and broadly fall under the banner of non-cognitivism, and which were then dominant in moral philosophy. Some of Foot's moves remain as bold now as they were when she first made them, even where swathes of contemporary virtue ethicists have rejected these stategies. Nonetheless, she enjoys an influence in philosophers as wonderfully diverse as Rosalind Hursthouse and Robert Merrihew Adams; further, her writings helped with others to set the tone and subject of today's debates in the area of practical reason and virtue ethics.

[Malola · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ah-mazing.
Really good... She takes on dismantling certain assertions of Kantian morality/deontology and she's damned good at it.
Her description of the principle of double effect is good. She dwelt a bit on linguistics (really good presentation of certain problems), however it seems to me she gravitates towards nicomachean/virtue ethics precisely because she doesn't know how to solve the Frege-Geach problem. But I might be wrong. (Though there are some issues in her position which she didn't bring to the table.) She does make a good case to establish that if (conditional) F-G is an issue, hypothetical/categorial imperatives are "arguable"... then, virtue ethics might be a possible answer.

I feel like reading a couple more books from her and probably Anscombe.

The bad, however... it's that it can be very dense. I love metaethics, but at times it was difficult to follow (probably because I still haven't completely dived in in some of the authors she references); therefore it took me a while to finish it. (And also because it's the type of read that has you ruminating and thinking of examples and connotations of the views she presents. So one dense but enlightened paragraph can mean half an hour of thinking "what if...?".)

Disclaimer: NOT FOR THE LAYREADER. This is not an introductory book.

[Raymond Lam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This collection of essays is a result of Foot's initial development of virtue ethics in the 70s at a time when virtue theory was much neglected in analytic moral philosophy. Foot revisited the traditional virtue-based moral theory of Aristotle and Aquinas according to which the moral virtues consist in courage, temperance, and, wisdom that are beneficial dispositions a person who acts morally should possess. Foot suggests that virtues are "corrective" passions that guide a person's action. But she further suggests that a person may possess certain virtues without acting in a way that makes his action virtuous. Examples are temperance may not operate as temperance in a timid and hard to please person, and, courage may not operate as courage in a person who habitually takes risk to do bad things for personal gain. Possession of virtuous passions/dispositions can in itself be neutral in moral worth. This notion makes how virtues operate in a person's actions to be nuanced and complicated.
Contained in this collection of essays are position papers she took against emotivism and prescriptivism. In "Moral Arguments", she argued there is no such evaluative element that could capture the 'whole' meaning of moral terms such as "right" and "wrong". Moral terms have determinate meanings to support moral arguments. But she thinks it is not easy to capture the whole moral code in any particular moral view. Yet it is not anything goes. In "Moral Beliefs" she analysed the relationship between evaluative elements and descriptive elements in moral statements. The logical gaps between factual premises in descriptive elements and evaluative conclusion is small if there is a common understanding of how certain effects follow given facts, though she acknowledged that an evaluation is something going "beyond" acceptance of certain facts. No one needs to accept an apparent conclusion just because one accepts certain facts. Here, it seems she accepts the fact/value distinction.
In "Goodness and Choice", she treated the concept of "good" in terms of functionality of that which to be called "good", such as a good knife's goodness being based on the knife functioning as a knife. This essay provides a good discussion of various considerations of good making properties in an era before the concept of supervenience.

Also featured in this collection of essay is The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect. This essay is one of the seminal essays of the trolley car dilemma. She provided many interesting examples to highlight the difference between 'oblique intention' and 'direct intention' in moral decisions, especially the difference in evaluative assessment with respect to direct action, toleration, and, omission.

[Liedzeit Liedzeit · Rating 3 out of 5]

If there is a field in philosophy that I am not interested in it is Ethics. (Unless it is aesthetics.) But I thought I should read this one. I found her treatment of euthanasia and abortion quite okay. But as it gets more abstract I am at a loss. I cannot understand how one can seriously discuss the question whether it is possible that injustice is a good thing. Even if this is supposedly an ancient problem. A different question would be to take a look of what is considered just at different times or in different societies.
Or consider this statement: The primary criterion of goodness in a knife is its ability to cut well. (p. 135) Hm, really? Of course, it is, I am tempted to say. Isn’t it totally obvious that what defines a good mother is to some degree a universal property and to some degree dependent on society? And rather boring it is as well.
Finally, I do not like to see Nietzsche treated, at least to some extent, apologetically.

[jeremiah]

"This conclusion may, as I said, appear dangerous and subversive of morality. We are apt to panic at the thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop caring about the things we do care about, and we feel that the categorical imperative gives us some control over the situation. But it is interesting that the people of Leningrad were not struck by the thought that only the contingent fact that other citizens shared their loyalty and devotion to the city stood between them and the Germans during the terrible years of the siege. Perhaps we should be less troubled than we are by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps we should even have less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves as volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." ("Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives")

[Vítor Medeiros · Rating 3 out of 5]

Foot's philosophy is crucial to the aretaic turn, even if some of the points she raises are shaky at best. Overall, this books provides some relevant reflections on morality and virtue ethics.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Review to follow.

[Sara G · Rating 3 out of 5]

Philippa FOtt is just not for me I guess.

[Jeff]

Foot's thoughts—at least as expressed in her writings so far—don't map well onto mine. If that was hard for you to comprehend, then you know what i'm going thru here.

Also, i have become overly concerned with her decisions about where to use (or not use) commas.

And that pushed me onto a slippery slope downward into the swampy distinction between that and which.

Her short essay about free will and "determination" (according to the back cover blurb!) failed to reignite the fire initially sparked by the supernaturally fecund throwaway idea of the Trolley Problem.

Thus and so, i give up on this book. At least for now (13 June 2016).