Brinkley takes us back to the 1930’s, when America was in the throes of the worst depression it has ever faced, and shows us the rise and fall of two demagogues, Father Charles Coughlin and Huey Long. America has a long history of populism and demagogues, and Brinkley shows how Coughlin and Long were in some ways inheritors of those demagogues, while at the same time steering things in a different direction. Reflecting on the life and times of these two is especially interesting today, since we have just elected our first demagogue in a while.
Brinkley covers a wide range of topics, and spends much of the book comparing and contrasting them. His most striking points were around the way in which Long and Coughlin took advantage of the communications revolution of the radio, how Long, Coughlin, and other contemporary demagogues had clear, principled visions, and the way in which Long and Coughlin were the direct inheritors of the populist movement in America.
When the radio came out, it was the first innovation other than the newspaper that allowed you to reach many people. Furthermore, it felt much more personal than the newspaper. Other than Coughlin and Long, their main antagonist, FDR also used the radio to great advantage. His “fireside chats” were instrumental in shaping public opinion around the New Deal and later around WWII. Later, Kennedy used television to clobber Nixon, and even later, Reagan took advantage of his acting ability to figure out how he could act enough like the president that people decided he could do it! Donald Trump figured out that people treated the presidency like a reality television show, and was able to play the campaign as if it was one. As a reality TV expert, he dld much better than he had any business doing. He was also able to take advantage of social media in a way that only Obama had also succeeded in.
Long’s famous “Share the Wealth” argument was that there should be a confiscatory wealth tax, and that everyone should be given enough cash to fund the American dream. He thought that there was too much income and wealth inequality, and that we should redistribute it directly. Coughlin worried that banks were illiquid and that there wasn’t enough cash in the system. He wanted to double the price of gold, remonotize silver and dissolve the Fed in exchange for a nationalized central bank that would answer to the people. Unlike Long and Coughlin, Trump doesn’t have a clear, principled policy. His original big issue, immigration, he has walked back significantly from. The only policy he has stuck with for almost the entire election has been protectionism. Was Coughlin and Long’s clear vision irrelevant to their success as demagogues? Or has something changed about the structure of demagoguery in America that we’re more vulnerable to ambiguous messages today?
I don’t know that much about previous populist movements in America, but Brinkley points out that although Coughlin and Long inherited that tradition, their tactics, rhetoric, and specific policies are often quite different. The one shared policy idea that he points out is monetizing silver. Other than that, Coughlin and Long seem to be paving their own way–although they seek to gather power by taking advantage of what the people wanted, they don’t seem to seek to be responsive to the people, but rather to provide a solution and get people excited about it so that they personally accrue power. This reminded me a lot of Trump’s rhetoric of, “Only I can fix this.”
Voices of Protest paints a clear picture of how people felt in the throes of the great depression, and how they became susceptible to these kinds of demagogues. This book is useful for anyone grappling with the recent election, or who is curious about the lives of these influential public figures.