Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power

by John France

This expansive book surveys the history of warfare from ancient Mesopotamia to the Gulf War in search of a deeper understanding of the origins of Western warfare and the reasons for its eminence today. Historian John France explores the experience of war around the globe, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. His bold conclusions cast doubt on well-entrenched attitudes about the development of military strength, the impact of culture on warfare, the future of Western dominance, and much more.Taking into account wars waged by virtually all civilizations since the beginning of recorded history, France finds that despite enormous cultural differences, war was conducted in distinctly similar ways right up to the Military Revolution and the pursuit of technological warfare in the nineteenth century. Since then, European and American culture has shaped warfare, but only because we have achieved a sense of distance from it, France argues. He warns that the present eminence of U.S. power is much more precarious and accidental than commonly believed. The notion that war is a distant phenomenon is only an illusion, and our cultural attitudes must change accordingly.

393 pages of narrative, 438 pages in total

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction

393 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2011

About the author

John France is Professor Emeritus and Director of the Callaghan Centre for Conflict Studies at Swansea University, and a former Visiting Professor at the United States Military Academy, West Point. A specialist on the history of crusading and warfare, he has travelled extensively in the Middle East and is the author of numerous articles and books on the subject.

Reviews

[Христо Блажев · Rating 4 out of 5]

Войната от древността до наши дни: http://knigolandia.info/book-review/v...

Франс започва с встъпителна глава за ролята на войната в човешката култура – и както ясно посочват и Стивън Пинкър в “По-добрите ангели на нашата природа”, и Джаред Даймънд в “Пушки, вируси и стомана”, миналото принадлежи почти изключително на нея, състоянието на война е естественото човешко състояние от началото на организираното общество, и теорията за “добрия дивак” на Русо е просто пожелателно мислене. Човешките същества живеят в конфликтна среда изначално и чак съвремието дава излаз от него – но гарнирайки го с периоди на възможно най-мащабното унищожение досега, две противоречия, които се допълват в историята на миналия и този век. Авторът проследява пространно тактиките на водене на бойни действия, традициите, свързани с воюването, причините, ефективността, жертвите, включително научих и че най-ранното оцеляло мирно споразумение е на глинена плочка и датира от 1258 г. пр.Хр.

Изд. "Сиела"
http://knigolandia.info/book-review/v...

[Chris Mallows]

by Noel Malcolm in the Daily Telegraph

Is there such a thing as a Western way of war? A bestselling book by the American historian and political commentator Victor D Hanson argues that there is, and for many this has become an article of faith. Ever since the ancient Greeks, allegedly, Western societies have triumphed on the battlefield because of their essential values: democracy, individualism, and so on. The battle against non-Western despotism of all kinds was won on the playing fields of Athens.

John France, an Emeritus Professor at Swansea, has a word for this: “nonsense”. Styles of warfare, he says, are dictated by material circumstances, basic social conditions, technology and other such factors; democracy has little to do with it. In ancient Greece the best fighters were formed by Sparta, the least individualistic society. Yes, Athenians bravely defended their city when it was under attack; people are usually more motivated to defend their own homes and land.


But most Greek warfare – overlooked in the feelgood accounts of the glory that was Greece – consisted of predatory raiding.


France does not deny that Western powers developed, in the long run, a military advantage that shaped the course of modern history; his book is subtitled The Rise of Western Military Power. But he has a very different account of how, when and why this happened.


In a work of extraordinary breadth and ambition, ranging from ancient Mesopotamia to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and taking in almost everything in between, he puts forward a new world history of warfare.


One of his basic distinctions is between two kinds of population: people of the steppe, and “agro-urban” societies. For elementary geographical reasons, the former flourished in the plains of central Asia, while the latter developed in both Europe and China. Agro-urban armies were based on infantry, supplemented by cavalry and artillery; steppe armies consisted essentially of mounted archers, with the advantage of rapid mobility and (often) huge numbers.

When steppe peoples took over agro-urban societies, as the Manchus did in China, the Mughals in India and the Ottomans in Asia Minor and Europe, they quickly adopted the military skills and technologies of their new subjects. The expansion of Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries was based not on any essential difference in its “way of war”, but merely on the lucky fluke that Western economic growth coincided with oriental political weakness.

France is good both on the technological advances in weaponry and on the underlying continuities in the ways that those weapons were used. As he points out, warfare in the 18th century still depended, as it had done in the ancient world, on soldiers in close order engaging with their enemies with sharp objects. He is unimpressed, therefore, by some of the “military revolutions” that historians have identified: the development of masonry-busting cannons, which made castles obsolete in the 15th and 16th centuries, or the introduction of drill for infantry formations in the 17th.

For him there was only one military revolution, and it came in the latter part of the 19th century, thanks to cheap high-quality steel and machine-tooling. The new rifles, artillery and machine-guns developed by Gatling, Krupp and others gave armies a firepower that made the old way of fighting in close order simply suicidal. Any kind of offensive warfare – against a similarly equipped army, that is – now came at a huge price. The Americans discovered this in their Civil War, and the British learned it at the Somme.

As France points out, the military lessons of the First World War were complex: the need for smaller units acting with speed and initiative on the one hand, and the large-scale co-ordination of infantry, tanks, artillery and air power on the other.

A dysfunctional British military culture largely failed to absorb those lessons; some senior Russian officers did, but they were eliminated by Stalin. It was left to the Germans to work out how to fight the next war – a war they would have won, if only they had stuck more closely to the principles they had established.

This is a powerful book, opinionated but crisply argued, and packed with information about everything from metallurgy to dynastic history. There are some little slips here and there – incorrect dates for the English Civil Wars, for example – and the near-absence of source references means that one can never be sure how well founded some of the factual claims may be. But it’s hard to think of a more impressive single-volume history of the not-only-Western way of war.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fun and easy read, but not sure if I agree with much of France's conclusions. The author traces the entire history of World warfare, with an emphasis on Western traditions. As a survey book the pace is quick but very enjoyable to whip through- hundreds of years at a time. We go from the invention of killing tools to the Missile age in less than 400 pages, and just about any reader will be satisfied with the flow. I found a few statistical mistakes (Subhas Bhose's Indian National Army attracted 12,000, not 40,000 of the 45,000 Raj Soldiers captured at Singapore in 1942, for instance) and other errors, but the book is a good resource on this topic. My only real reservations came with the conclusions drawn at the end, where I think many readers may disagree with Professor France's ideas. His vision of the future seems bleak and unappealing. While Military Enthusiasts will see the value here, Gamers/Modellers will use this only on deepest background.

[Stefan Mitev · Rating 5 out of 5]

Монументален труд за еволюцията на войната от древността до днешни дни.

В прединдустриалните общества характеристиките на войската се определят най-вече от географията, топографията, климата и земеделските практики. Битките почти навсякъде протичат по сходен начин - с водеща роля на пехотата и поддържаща на кавалерията (ако я има) и стрелците. Победите се печелят в директен бой лице в лице с противника. Крайният изход се определя от дисциплината и мотивацията, която често бива изцяло финансова при наемниците.

Книгата проследява военното развитие на големите световни култури: Средиземноморието и Европа, Китай, Индия, Япония и азиатската степ. Особено внимание е отделено на предпоставките за съвременната доминацията на западния свят в стила на "Пушки, вируси, стомана" на Джаред Даймънд.

Войната коренно е преобразена от две ключови събития - Френската революция с нейните идеи за национализъм и демокрация, и индустриалната революция. Технологичният скок напълно променя вида на сраженията. Нарастващото население на света води до все по-многобройни армии, съответно прогресивно повече жертви. Особено внимание е обърнато на партизанската война, която е заплаха за съвременните армии.

Колко наивно днес звучи изводът на писателя от XIX век Ян Блох. В книгата си "Бъдещата война и нейните икономически последици" той твърди, че войната е вече толкова ужасна, че става немислима. Уви, той жестоко греши.

[Simon Vickery · Rating 2 out of 5]

Survey of warfare from pre-history to present time, in particular drawing out the distinction between 'agro-urban' and steppe armies pre1600. Sadly aside from the need to condense much history to fit in so few pages, leading to spitting out many confused sentences, suffers many of the prejudices of contemporary historians including the cultural cringe at the age of discovery. But the final chapter deserves comment for collapsing in unhinged paranoia. This author hasn't really learned from his source material.

[Endre Fodstad · Rating 4 out of 5]

Four stars not for the narrative and information, which is decent but not amazing, but for the lesson France tries to teach, kicking down foolish notions and comfort blankets our societies have dreamed up about the nature of warfare and culture - from both sides (and the centre) of the political spectrum.