What do you think?
Rate this book
Modern War Studies
The Battle of Kursk
Immense in scope, ferocious in nature, and epic in consequence, the Battle of Kursk witnessed (at Prokhorovka) one of the largest tank engagements in world history and led to staggering losses-including nearly 200,000 Soviet and 50,000 German casualties-within the first ten days of fighting. Going well beyond all previous accounts, David Glantz and Jonathan House now offer the definitive work on arguably the greatest battle of World War II. Drawing on both German and Soviet sources, Glantz and House separate myth from fact to show what really happened at Kursk and how it affected the outcome of the war. Their access to newly released Soviet archival material adds unprecedented detail to what is known about this legendary conflict, enabling them to reconstruct events from both perspectives and describe combat down to the tactical level. The Battle of Kursk takes readers behind Soviet lines for the first time to discover what the Red Army knew about the plans for Hitler's offensive (Operation Citadel), relive tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat, and learn how the tide of battle turned. Its vivid portrayals of fighting in all critical sectors place the famous tank battle in its proper context. Prokhorovka here is not a well-organized set piece but a confused series of engagements and hasty attacks, with each side committing its forces piecemeal. Glantz and House's fresh interpretations demolish many of the myths that suggest Hitler might have triumphed if Operation Citadel had been conducted differently. Their account is the first to provide accurate figures of combat strengths and losses, and it includes 32 maps that clarify troop and tank movements. Shrouded in obscurity and speculation for more than half a century, the Battle of Kursk finally gets its due in this dramatic retelling of the confrontation that marked the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front and brought Hitler's blitzkrieg to a crashing halt.
472 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1999
26 people are currently reading
1750 people want to read
About the author
David M. Glantz
100 books219 followersDavid M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 38 reviews
April 17, 2018
With Kursk, Col Glantz uses both Soviet and German military archives to give a complete picture of the greatest tank battle of World War II. The author uses, at the time the book was written, recent access to the Soviet archival material to show light on the Red Army’s plans and decision making.
Col Glantz sets the stage for the July 1943 battle by looking at the situation on the Russia front in the spring of that year. The Soviet Winter Offensives following Stalingrad had driven the Germans back 100s of kilometers and resulted in a huge bulge in the front and around the city of Kursk. If the Germans could eliminate that bulge, they would shorten their lines significantly and release troops for other duties. This made Kursk a logical target for the coming German offensive.
The author makes a point that the Russians could also read maps. They saw the same bulge and came to the same conclusions. While Stalin wanted an immediate offensive in the spring, his general staff, esp Gen Zhukov, convinced him that if they prepared the Kursk Salient properly and waited until the German attack had failed, they then could go on the offensive with much, much better results. Ergo, the Soviets spent the spring building defensive fortifications 100s of kilometers deep in the salient.
In looking at the German planning for their offensive, Col Glantz looks at the delays that occurred and the reasons for them. The starting date slipped from May to the 5th of July mainly because Hitler wanted the newly designed and built German armor, the Panther and Tiger tanks as well as the Elephant assault gun, to take part. The author also points out as time passed senior German commanders became more and more concerned over Soviet defensive preparations in the attack areas. At the time of the attack Col Glantz states the Soviets outnumbered the attacking Germans in both available armored vehicles and sheer man power. The author states that both Guderian and Von Manstein urged Hitler to cancel the operation.
When the assault kicks off, Col Glantz does a good job of telling just what the Soviet defenses did to the German assaults. To put in bluntly, on the north shoulder of the Kursk Bulge, they were stopped cold. Only in the south was there some modicum of success. The author tells the story the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which were the best equipped in Von Manstein’s army, advancing some 20 kms, the deepest penetration of any German units and ending up fighting the Battle of Prokhorovka. Contrary to what most historians think, Col Glantz opines that this was classic meeting engagement and units were fed into the maelstrom piecemeal. The result being that the German advance was halted, in spite of Soviet casualties exceeding German by as much as 4 to 1. Also at this time the Western Allies invaded Sicily and Hitler needed the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to reinforce Italy. So he stopped the battle and transferred the 2nd SS.
While the focus of the narrative in not first person accounts, the author does provided a few. One of the most amusing is when the Germans used a captured T-34 to lead their advancing column during a night march. They ran into a Soviet column moving the opposite way. The Soviets seeing the T-34 took no notice of the German armor following it, allowing the Germans to get into position for the next day’s attacks.
In addition to detailing the combat operations, the author looks at the performance of the equipment used by both sides. The new German armor was found wanting in many details. For instance, while the Panther was an equal if not better tank than the Soviet T-34 if it was in action. It had so many teething problems that they were often unavailable due to mechanical break downs. The Elephant assault/tank destroyers also had mechanical problems, were extremely heavy causing mobility problems, but more importantly had to be accompanied by infantry due to poor point defense capability. The Tiger was probably the best performer of the three, but there were not enough of them.
As with all of Col Glantz’ books on World War II on the Eastern Front this is extremely well researched. He provides plenty of maps (even though some can be hard to read). The photos are also well chosen to illustrate both the equipment and leaders of both armies. It also a fairly succinct and readable narrative, esp compared with some of his other works. This is a solid 4 star read for me.
Col Glantz sets the stage for the July 1943 battle by looking at the situation on the Russia front in the spring of that year. The Soviet Winter Offensives following Stalingrad had driven the Germans back 100s of kilometers and resulted in a huge bulge in the front and around the city of Kursk. If the Germans could eliminate that bulge, they would shorten their lines significantly and release troops for other duties. This made Kursk a logical target for the coming German offensive.
The author makes a point that the Russians could also read maps. They saw the same bulge and came to the same conclusions. While Stalin wanted an immediate offensive in the spring, his general staff, esp Gen Zhukov, convinced him that if they prepared the Kursk Salient properly and waited until the German attack had failed, they then could go on the offensive with much, much better results. Ergo, the Soviets spent the spring building defensive fortifications 100s of kilometers deep in the salient.
In looking at the German planning for their offensive, Col Glantz looks at the delays that occurred and the reasons for them. The starting date slipped from May to the 5th of July mainly because Hitler wanted the newly designed and built German armor, the Panther and Tiger tanks as well as the Elephant assault gun, to take part. The author also points out as time passed senior German commanders became more and more concerned over Soviet defensive preparations in the attack areas. At the time of the attack Col Glantz states the Soviets outnumbered the attacking Germans in both available armored vehicles and sheer man power. The author states that both Guderian and Von Manstein urged Hitler to cancel the operation.
When the assault kicks off, Col Glantz does a good job of telling just what the Soviet defenses did to the German assaults. To put in bluntly, on the north shoulder of the Kursk Bulge, they were stopped cold. Only in the south was there some modicum of success. The author tells the story the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which were the best equipped in Von Manstein’s army, advancing some 20 kms, the deepest penetration of any German units and ending up fighting the Battle of Prokhorovka. Contrary to what most historians think, Col Glantz opines that this was classic meeting engagement and units were fed into the maelstrom piecemeal. The result being that the German advance was halted, in spite of Soviet casualties exceeding German by as much as 4 to 1. Also at this time the Western Allies invaded Sicily and Hitler needed the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to reinforce Italy. So he stopped the battle and transferred the 2nd SS.
While the focus of the narrative in not first person accounts, the author does provided a few. One of the most amusing is when the Germans used a captured T-34 to lead their advancing column during a night march. They ran into a Soviet column moving the opposite way. The Soviets seeing the T-34 took no notice of the German armor following it, allowing the Germans to get into position for the next day’s attacks.
In addition to detailing the combat operations, the author looks at the performance of the equipment used by both sides. The new German armor was found wanting in many details. For instance, while the Panther was an equal if not better tank than the Soviet T-34 if it was in action. It had so many teething problems that they were often unavailable due to mechanical break downs. The Elephant assault/tank destroyers also had mechanical problems, were extremely heavy causing mobility problems, but more importantly had to be accompanied by infantry due to poor point defense capability. The Tiger was probably the best performer of the three, but there were not enough of them.
As with all of Col Glantz’ books on World War II on the Eastern Front this is extremely well researched. He provides plenty of maps (even though some can be hard to read). The photos are also well chosen to illustrate both the equipment and leaders of both armies. It also a fairly succinct and readable narrative, esp compared with some of his other works. This is a solid 4 star read for me.
November 29, 2009
There is no denying that this account of Kursk by David Glantz and Jonathan House is extremely well researched. The amount of detail is awe inspiring with 165 pages in the appendixes dedicated to OB's, strengths & losses, comparative armour strengths and key German & Soviet documents.
The maps, some 32 in all, are very detailed however I must admit that at time they were still hard to read due to the amount of detail. The book itself was well presented and the photos were excellent. The only fault that I could find with the book was that at times it dragged. With the amount of detail being presented you need to catch your breath and close the book. It was not the type of book that had a free flowing narrative that kept you glued to the story, well not for me at least.
Beside that however this would rank as the definitive account of this major Eastern Front battle and well worth the effort to read. No decent WW2 library would be complete without this book.
October 30, 2020
This book is a collection of materials related to the battle for the Kursk bridgehead, one of the greatest battles of the Great Patriotic War. In July 1943 forces of the Voronezh and the Central Front, led by the Red Army's Supreme High Command, won a brilliant victory at the Battle for Kursk, and the Nazi high command's final attempt to achieve a large-scale strategic success on the Eastern Front failed. While I disagree with the editor's statement that Kursk was the pivotal point of Hitler's war in the east – in fact, it occurred as early as Summer 1941, when Operation Barbarossa failed to reach its ultimate goal – the strategic results of the Battle for Kursk undeniably significantly influenced all subsequent Red Army offensive operations.
To better orient the reader, the chief editor of the collection, Major-General P.P. Vechnyi, points out one main feature of the battle: the Soviet defenses in the Kursk bridgehead "had the aim of exhausting and bleeding dry the enemy's enormous advancing forces so as to shift subsequently to a decisive offensive by introducing fresh reserves." Indeed, as the collected materials show, this principle defined the overall structure of defense, the operational formation of forces, the quantity of equipment, the maneuver of reserves, as well as the methods of conducting the defensive operation in each of the fronts.
Another thing Vechnyi underscores, however, is that the main aim of this collection is to acquaint generals and officer cadres with "this most important and highly instructive operation." Mind my words: his is not an empty warning. While the collected materials value is indisputable – they do offer a incredibly comprehensive picture of the Soviet logistics, operations (air and land), engineering support, telephone communications, and maneuvers with remarkable downrightness and without any propagandistic glossing-over – the book's style is very dry and the amount of tables with statistics is overwhelming. Furthermore, I, being a layman, found the complex maps extremely confusing; they all lack much needed explanations.
In summary, the collection is a valuable addition to any WWII buff's library because it sheds light on the Red Army's side of the Battle of Kursk, but it is not for the faint of heart. Prepare yourself not for reading, but for ploughing through it.
3.5 stars
To better orient the reader, the chief editor of the collection, Major-General P.P. Vechnyi, points out one main feature of the battle: the Soviet defenses in the Kursk bridgehead "had the aim of exhausting and bleeding dry the enemy's enormous advancing forces so as to shift subsequently to a decisive offensive by introducing fresh reserves." Indeed, as the collected materials show, this principle defined the overall structure of defense, the operational formation of forces, the quantity of equipment, the maneuver of reserves, as well as the methods of conducting the defensive operation in each of the fronts.
Another thing Vechnyi underscores, however, is that the main aim of this collection is to acquaint generals and officer cadres with "this most important and highly instructive operation." Mind my words: his is not an empty warning. While the collected materials value is indisputable – they do offer a incredibly comprehensive picture of the Soviet logistics, operations (air and land), engineering support, telephone communications, and maneuvers with remarkable downrightness and without any propagandistic glossing-over – the book's style is very dry and the amount of tables with statistics is overwhelming. Furthermore, I, being a layman, found the complex maps extremely confusing; they all lack much needed explanations.
In summary, the collection is a valuable addition to any WWII buff's library because it sheds light on the Red Army's side of the Battle of Kursk, but it is not for the faint of heart. Prepare yourself not for reading, but for ploughing through it.
3.5 stars
January 31, 2022
David Glantz is my favorite author when it comes to the Eastern Front, and I think he is the foremost authority when it comes to the history of this conflict. I was told that his writings are relatively “dry” and for some, they just can’t get into his works; I however love his writings, and reading his works, I was filled with fascination. You’re not just getting the same old story; you’re getting the details. It is not like you’re reading a book written incomprehensively, you’re reading a detailed history of the battle of Kursk. The numbers, the units, the commanders, the locales, and the reasonings are all presented and all fascinate me.
I give this book a Five-star rating because it has all the ingredients of a book that I truly love, and would read again. I think this is the foremost history book on this battle, and I recommend anyone who is to read this book.
I grew up watching the history channel, and a lot of different World War Two documentaries; these all presented the same facts, with not much focus on detail. After spending time reading David Glantz’s work, I feel like I was robbed in my childhood of the true facts about the Eastern Front. Ever since I started reading books on the Second World War, I’ve discovered a more fascinating story; one that wasn’t told to me the right way.
There’s something about the eastern front that has attracted my attention, and kept me interested since I first got into history, but I can’t really put my finger on it. It could be the relative bleakness of it all; how millions of soldiers engaged each other in a struggle that endured for 4 years. While the western, and pacific theatres fascinate me, I will always find the Eastern front to be my area of keen interest. I think it is because of the fact that so much is emphasized on the Western and Pacific theatre, while the Eastern front has been relatively “left out in the cold”.
Lastly, if the reviews on this book dissuade you from trying to read this book, I think you should re-consider. I was sort off reluctant to read this because I thought it might be difficult to read, but once I opened the book and began to read it, all my worries went away. You can truly read anything if you put your mind to it, and I encourage everyone to read this book, and David Glantz.
I give this book a Five-star rating because it has all the ingredients of a book that I truly love, and would read again. I think this is the foremost history book on this battle, and I recommend anyone who is to read this book.
I grew up watching the history channel, and a lot of different World War Two documentaries; these all presented the same facts, with not much focus on detail. After spending time reading David Glantz’s work, I feel like I was robbed in my childhood of the true facts about the Eastern Front. Ever since I started reading books on the Second World War, I’ve discovered a more fascinating story; one that wasn’t told to me the right way.
There’s something about the eastern front that has attracted my attention, and kept me interested since I first got into history, but I can’t really put my finger on it. It could be the relative bleakness of it all; how millions of soldiers engaged each other in a struggle that endured for 4 years. While the western, and pacific theatres fascinate me, I will always find the Eastern front to be my area of keen interest. I think it is because of the fact that so much is emphasized on the Western and Pacific theatre, while the Eastern front has been relatively “left out in the cold”.
Lastly, if the reviews on this book dissuade you from trying to read this book, I think you should re-consider. I was sort off reluctant to read this because I thought it might be difficult to read, but once I opened the book and began to read it, all my worries went away. You can truly read anything if you put your mind to it, and I encourage everyone to read this book, and David Glantz.
November 2, 2011
The Battle of Kursk was a decisive Nazi-Soviet tank battle at Prokhorovka, which went on for days, wreaked massive destruction on both sides, and turned the tides of the war — from then on the Nazi army was in retreat, with the Soviets hot on their heels. This was one of those books that fascinate you and make you want to tear out all your hair at the same time. This is because the maneuvers are described in excruciating detail. Like this:
Although the 170th Tank Brigade lost its commander and as many as thirty of its sixty tanks in the fighting near Oktiabr'skii, by early afternoon it pushed southward, grappling with Leibstandarte's armored reconnaissance battalion, which struggled to defend the SS division's left flank and rear. This battle intensified in the afternoon, when Bakharov's second echelon 36th Guards Tank Regiment arrived to support the 170th. By this time the 170th Tank Brigade, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Kazakov, had joined its neighboring 181st Brigade in an assault on Totenkopf positions east of Andreevka.
Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Puzyrev's 181st Tank Brigade, attacking along the southern banks of the Psel River, drove Totenkopf Panzer grenadiers, which had themselves just begun an attack eastward, back toward the west. By 1800 hours, assisted by the t70th Brigade, Puzyrev's tankers penetrated into the village of Vasil'evka, thereby threatening to sever Totenkopf's communications with Leibstandarte. However, within an hour Totenkopf dispatched a relief column consisting of a Tiger tank company from Hill 226.2, and, with deadly artillery support from Gresnoe, these tanks forced both the 181st and 170th Brigades to withdraw to Andreevka. Although Bakharov's tank corps had made spectacular progress, it could advance no further until the 29th Tank Corps closed up on its left flank. In the meantime, Bakharov brought his second echelon 110th Tank Brigade and 36th Guards Tank Regiment forward and placed them in defensive positions to the rear, where they could either defend or exploit on 13 July. During the day's fighting, Bakharov's 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade was drawn into heavy combat north of the Psel, where the planned assault by Tofenkopf's Panzer Regiment had made striking gains.
Now imagine trying to read hundreds of pages like this, with almost no relief except for bursts of gruesome accounts of slaughter. Although the authors don't actually say this, the Russian strategy at heart was to just keep sending in poorly equipped soldiers and inferior tanks until the outnumbered if superiorly trained and equipped Germans were just plain ground down. The Tigers would roll in and devastate a hundred Soviet tanks and maybe lose four or five tanks (sometimes because Soviet soldiers managed to run up and place explosives on them, sometimes because the engines broke down, sometimes because they got stuck in swampy ground). But then the Soviets would send in another 100 tanks, and another hundred, and another hundred. It is gruesome, incredibly depressing, and yet I persevered. I picked it up because I had just finished David Robbins's novel Last Citadel (see my review), which is about this battle and I wanted to learn more what happened. I got a lot more than I bargained for, but the book is fittingly grueling (grueling text about grueling events) and I don't regret reading it.
Although the 170th Tank Brigade lost its commander and as many as thirty of its sixty tanks in the fighting near Oktiabr'skii, by early afternoon it pushed southward, grappling with Leibstandarte's armored reconnaissance battalion, which struggled to defend the SS division's left flank and rear. This battle intensified in the afternoon, when Bakharov's second echelon 36th Guards Tank Regiment arrived to support the 170th. By this time the 170th Tank Brigade, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Kazakov, had joined its neighboring 181st Brigade in an assault on Totenkopf positions east of Andreevka.
Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Puzyrev's 181st Tank Brigade, attacking along the southern banks of the Psel River, drove Totenkopf Panzer grenadiers, which had themselves just begun an attack eastward, back toward the west. By 1800 hours, assisted by the t70th Brigade, Puzyrev's tankers penetrated into the village of Vasil'evka, thereby threatening to sever Totenkopf's communications with Leibstandarte. However, within an hour Totenkopf dispatched a relief column consisting of a Tiger tank company from Hill 226.2, and, with deadly artillery support from Gresnoe, these tanks forced both the 181st and 170th Brigades to withdraw to Andreevka. Although Bakharov's tank corps had made spectacular progress, it could advance no further until the 29th Tank Corps closed up on its left flank. In the meantime, Bakharov brought his second echelon 110th Tank Brigade and 36th Guards Tank Regiment forward and placed them in defensive positions to the rear, where they could either defend or exploit on 13 July. During the day's fighting, Bakharov's 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade was drawn into heavy combat north of the Psel, where the planned assault by Tofenkopf's Panzer Regiment had made striking gains.
Now imagine trying to read hundreds of pages like this, with almost no relief except for bursts of gruesome accounts of slaughter. Although the authors don't actually say this, the Russian strategy at heart was to just keep sending in poorly equipped soldiers and inferior tanks until the outnumbered if superiorly trained and equipped Germans were just plain ground down. The Tigers would roll in and devastate a hundred Soviet tanks and maybe lose four or five tanks (sometimes because Soviet soldiers managed to run up and place explosives on them, sometimes because the engines broke down, sometimes because they got stuck in swampy ground). But then the Soviets would send in another 100 tanks, and another hundred, and another hundred. It is gruesome, incredibly depressing, and yet I persevered. I picked it up because I had just finished David Robbins's novel Last Citadel (see my review), which is about this battle and I wanted to learn more what happened. I got a lot more than I bargained for, but the book is fittingly grueling (grueling text about grueling events) and I don't regret reading it.
March 26, 2012
This is a typical Glantz book - very heavy on details, to the point where it becomes difficult to follow, which is why he loses a star. I think Glantz is one, along with Jonathan House, of the leading historians of the Soviet Army during World War II. The Battle of Kursk is not his best effort, however, it is still very good.
The book goes into the massive deception effort the Soviets conducted in order to lure the Germans into a massive and extremely well defended salient. The Soviets had used numerous layers of mines, tank ditches, barbed wire and trenches in order to slow the German advance. Even with such advantages, the Germans very nearly broke through the Russian defenses.
Well worth the read, reader beware the intense attention to detail which makes reading this book difficult at times.
The book goes into the massive deception effort the Soviets conducted in order to lure the Germans into a massive and extremely well defended salient. The Soviets had used numerous layers of mines, tank ditches, barbed wire and trenches in order to slow the German advance. Even with such advantages, the Germans very nearly broke through the Russian defenses.
Well worth the read, reader beware the intense attention to detail which makes reading this book difficult at times.
March 11, 2011
The battle at Kursk was a horrific and bloody battle on the eastern front in the Second World War. Huge armies engaged here--almost 1 and a half million Soviet troops against many hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. The German leadership hoped to snuff out the Soviet salient at Kursk and buy time against the Soviet hordes. It was also a colossal armored battle. Much bloodletting. The end result was that the Germans were badly bloodied and the Soviet forces began to take greater initiative.
This book takes advantage of available information from the Soviet side. Many earlier considerations of this struggle depended on German documentation.
Any way you put it, a fine work if one is interested in this major battle.
This book takes advantage of available information from the Soviet side. Many earlier considerations of this struggle depended on German documentation.
Any way you put it, a fine work if one is interested in this major battle.
August 4, 2020
David M. Glantz's The Battle of Kursk gives the details of a critical Soviet win over the Nazis shortly after their victory at Stalingrad. It is described as the largest tank battle ever fought. Like Ulysses Grant's battles from the Wilderness to Appomattox, the Russian losses in men and materiel were greater than the Germans; but the Russians won because they had the men and materiel to expend.
Glantz's book concentrates on which Russian and German forces were used at every stage of the battle. Unfortunately, it makes the books maps virtually unusable, as the names of key military objectives were in light type that is overprinted with the units stationed there.
Kursk and its follow-up Operations Kutuzov and Rumiantsev turned the tide against the Germans: Never again would they be able to employ their blitzkrieg strategy on the Eastern Front.
The book has detailed appendices on the units involved, casualties, and key military documents for both sides.
Glantz's book concentrates on which Russian and German forces were used at every stage of the battle. Unfortunately, it makes the books maps virtually unusable, as the names of key military objectives were in light type that is overprinted with the units stationed there.
Kursk and its follow-up Operations Kutuzov and Rumiantsev turned the tide against the Germans: Never again would they be able to employ their blitzkrieg strategy on the Eastern Front.
The book has detailed appendices on the units involved, casualties, and key military documents for both sides.
May 12, 2019
This is a typical Glanz work. It is loaded down with intricate details of the units that fought. While I admire his dedication to the subject matter, he continually falls short in covering the battle.
For instance, there are 472 pages in the book of which only 281 cover the battle. The rest are the charts of the Order of Battle and Notes. The later is almost as long s the book itself but does not add to read since many of the details were covered through the portion that was readable.
The section of the book, Conclusions was anything but insightful. It is not necessary for the author to attempt to influence the reader with their perspective of the battle.
Anyone who has cursorily studied the battle can easily come up with their own ideas and insights.
And again, the maps add nothing to the story. They are so cluttered up with the divisions that took part in the battles you cannot see the names of the villages that are being discussed. A reader should not be burdened with a magnifying glass trying to figure out what is going on.
This is a good, not great collection to any World Wart Two library.
Three and-a-half stars.
For instance, there are 472 pages in the book of which only 281 cover the battle. The rest are the charts of the Order of Battle and Notes. The later is almost as long s the book itself but does not add to read since many of the details were covered through the portion that was readable.
The section of the book, Conclusions was anything but insightful. It is not necessary for the author to attempt to influence the reader with their perspective of the battle.
Anyone who has cursorily studied the battle can easily come up with their own ideas and insights.
And again, the maps add nothing to the story. They are so cluttered up with the divisions that took part in the battles you cannot see the names of the villages that are being discussed. A reader should not be burdened with a magnifying glass trying to figure out what is going on.
This is a good, not great collection to any World Wart Two library.
Three and-a-half stars.
November 29, 2018
This is a book that should be on the shelf of every student of World War 2. Well written, well researched it is to me a definitive account of the events that transpired in and around the Kursk salient in July and August 1943. The maps were good with the respective protagonists' positions well laid out. The only real criticism I have is that the grey writing on a grey background was difficult and at times impossible to read. I would have preferred something like a larger pull-out map with all the various positions marked in coloured inks to show different days so as to be able to follow the battle without having continually flick back to the latest map. That aside, a magnificent tome with good solid explanations of what transpired, when, and the reasons for the various decisions arrived at.
August 13, 2024
Great study on one of the largest battles in history, exciting to read and packed with detail. Gives a great operational view of the battle and the different command staffs. A must read for any serious Eastern Front enthusiast.
January 4, 2024
I wish the rating system permitted half-stars. I'd give this book 4-1/2, which it deserves. The battle maps were particularly useful to follow the ebb and flow of the fronts for both armies.
The deep dive into daily battle reports from the Red Army perspective lends new insights into this important battle and decisive victory in the summer of 1943. It marked the beginning of the end of Germany's efforts to establish a deep & lasting presence in Russia.
The Red Army victory in the Kursk salient is best summed up in post-battle analysis by General Vasilesvsky: " .... I have frequently noticed their [Western writers] inclination to play down the Red Army victory in the summer of 1943.... At the height of the Kursk Battle our Allies landed in Sicily and, on 17 August, crossed over into Italy. Could they have possibly done so with even half the forces against them that we had to contend with in the summer of 1943? I think not." Well said.
The deep dive into daily battle reports from the Red Army perspective lends new insights into this important battle and decisive victory in the summer of 1943. It marked the beginning of the end of Germany's efforts to establish a deep & lasting presence in Russia.
The Red Army victory in the Kursk salient is best summed up in post-battle analysis by General Vasilesvsky: " .... I have frequently noticed their [Western writers] inclination to play down the Red Army victory in the summer of 1943.... At the height of the Kursk Battle our Allies landed in Sicily and, on 17 August, crossed over into Italy. Could they have possibly done so with even half the forces against them that we had to contend with in the summer of 1943? I think not." Well said.
July 23, 2021
A strong history of Kursk that dispels many Cold War era SS and Wehrmacht apologia that downplayed the ingenuity and dedication of the Red Army. While the book lacks the storytelling you’ll find in history bestsellers, it offers critical insights into the common pitfalls of World War II historiography using the war’s climactic battle as its example.
June 10, 2022
Col. Glantz has published an incredibly detailed account of the largest armor battle in the history of warfare. Two million six hundred thousand men, eight thousand tanks, and five thousand six hundred aircraft. This is the finest one-volume history of the battle of Kursk.
December 29, 2024
Well written and researched operational account of Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and Kharkov. The narrative is detailed but moves along at a good pace and doesn't get too bogged down in individual actions or unit movements. The maps were mostly adequate.
July 1, 2017
The single best researched, deeply engrossing tome on the battle of Kursk, an excellent source for understanding all levels (Strategic, Operational, Tactical) of that titanic battle. A bit dry.
Read
September 7, 2020...
March 20, 2022
This is the way operational histories should be written.
September 5, 2023
A pretty exhausting account. Had to read the Prokhorovka chapter twice. However, the conclusion chapter tied everything up nicely.
May 24, 2024
Hard read. For a professional army writing, it's very repetitive.
July 22, 2016
It is always good to remember that the German war aims on the Eastern front going back into WWI, let alone WWII, were to control Eastern Europe and the Ukraine and push the Russians back into Asia. As the tide of war on the Eastern front turned after the failures at Moscow and Stalingrad, the German war aims retooled into their core essentials: control of the Ukraine as a breadbasket and stabilizing the Russian front in preparation of a two front war with both Russia and the Western alliance. It was these restructured war aims that the battle of Kursk was supposed to serve and ultimately achieve. Gone however were the days when the Germans could mount offensive action across all sectors of the front (North, Center and South) as in Operation Barbarossa in 1941, or even one sector (South) as in Case Blue in 1942. Kursk was the third yearly German East summer offensive of the war reduced to one salient along one sector of the front. Still, it was the fulcrum point of the entire war. It saw the amassing by the Germans of their best troops and armored formations, led by the elite of the army generals. Contrary to common wisdom, This was a battle run by the German General Staff, with Hitler following the cues of his generals. Its failure confirmed his worst paranoia of his generals, leading to crises amongst the German leadership as the war progressed into 1944 (and ultimately the 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler's life). That it failed was in retrospect preordained. The Russian army of 1943 was a different beast from its 1941 predecessor (something that David Glantz has written extensively about in his Colossus Reborn). The Russians outnumbered the Germans (though the latter had the superior armored formations), but importantly they out-generaled them as well. When the German offensive was brought into a halt, the Russian counteroffensive rolled out with an unstoppable momentum. The war was truly lost.
And this is where Glantz narrative comes to the fore. He was amongst the first Western military historians to appreciate the changing nature of the Russian army structure and leadership as the war progressed and its role in the eventual victory. This is especially true in his narrative of Kursk, dry and protracted but filled with insights. Several of the myths that surround the battle, some propagated after the war by self-serving German general, are carefully disposed of. This was no lost victory, as the German ace general Erich Von Manstein would claim, but a veritable German defeat. For those who are interested in the military history of the war, and of the Eastern front in particular, this narrative of one of the most important battles of WWII is an essential reading.
And this is where Glantz narrative comes to the fore. He was amongst the first Western military historians to appreciate the changing nature of the Russian army structure and leadership as the war progressed and its role in the eventual victory. This is especially true in his narrative of Kursk, dry and protracted but filled with insights. Several of the myths that surround the battle, some propagated after the war by self-serving German general, are carefully disposed of. This was no lost victory, as the German ace general Erich Von Manstein would claim, but a veritable German defeat. For those who are interested in the military history of the war, and of the Eastern front in particular, this narrative of one of the most important battles of WWII is an essential reading.
September 13, 2016
Deep Kursk battle research for those who interested in numbers of division/corps/army and their relative positions on day by day basis.
August 27, 2008
There used to be a title called The Tigers are Burning by a raffish old author named Martin Caiden, more famous for his co-authoring Samurai with Saburo Sakai,the Japanese Zero ace. This more modern study has detailed all the mistakes attributable to Hitler alone in the delays in Unternamen Zitadelle that allowed the Red Army the time to prepare elaborate defensive rings around the Kursk Salient.
Barbarossa,the Battle for Moscow, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, the Battle for the Baku oilfields and this, the mightiest and biggest tank vs.tank battle of all time-Kursk-plus the Siege of Leningrad are tales not often retold these days.
All these are worth revisiting just to see how men and women on both sides, fighting with tenacity for the most odious totalitarian regimes ever foisted on humanity, demonstrated their ability to lift themselves out of truly inhuman conditions to prevail or fail, survive or succumb.
This while commissars or the Gestapo were at the rear of both armies with machine guns to mow down retreating soldiers.
Walker
Barbarossa,the Battle for Moscow, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, the Battle for the Baku oilfields and this, the mightiest and biggest tank vs.tank battle of all time-Kursk-plus the Siege of Leningrad are tales not often retold these days.
All these are worth revisiting just to see how men and women on both sides, fighting with tenacity for the most odious totalitarian regimes ever foisted on humanity, demonstrated their ability to lift themselves out of truly inhuman conditions to prevail or fail, survive or succumb.
This while commissars or the Gestapo were at the rear of both armies with machine guns to mow down retreating soldiers.
Walker
January 28, 2015
Knowing little about Kursk, I found this a fabulous read. The German attack plan was titled 'Citadel'. The volumn is based entirely on German records and the Soviet records only released since the demise of USSR. They have 20 nice pictures of the equipment used. One of the events that I found of German thought out-side-of-the-box was when they captured a Soviet T-34 tank. They turned it around and it led the Germany tanks miles thru of Soviet armor. Of course it was dark that July 12, 1943 night. So dark that Soviet tanks passed them on the same road going the other way. They captured the objective. The cost of 'Citadel' in lives, wounded, and equipment was huge. And the Soviet & Germany records are somewhat believable as they often are compliant with each other. Over 177 thousand Soviet casualties and German losses were near 50 thousand. There were more losses on the 2 Soviet counter moves after the Germany defeat. The German tanks and guns were of heavier and better quality accounting for a loss ratio of circa 5 to 1. Much of the direct military records are to be enjoyed.
August 19, 2011
IMO this book is not a general interest book, but a book for those that have read a book or two on the Eastern front during WWII. If you are looking into a more narrative war book or a general history of Kursk, this might not be the first book I would grab. That said, if you are interested in Kursk and are looking for more detail, this is the book for you. This book contains an impressive amount of detail and research. If you are interested in the Russian and/or Axis OOB's, detailed numbers and stats this *is* the book for you. Hands down if you are interested in the Eastern Front...Glantz is your man, a truly unchallenged historian of this Front.
April 7, 2008
Now this on the other hand is more like your typical classroom textbook; full of endless point-by-point information. However, as dull a read as it can be at times, it does convey the sheer volume of men and machines that went into this most decisive of battles for the Nazis on their Eastern Front and the most epic of armored battles in the history of the world. When you realise that in places the Russians had defenses which literally extended over seven miles you begin to graps the enormity of this battle
April 2, 2013
Glantz proves himself (again and still) the master of operational history of the Great Patriotic War (aka the Eastern Front of World War II). Not just an outstanding battle history, but a careful analysis of this key point where the Red Army learned how to stop a blitzkrieg attack, albiet at tremendous cost, and began the series of counterattacks, again at terrible cost, that would only end in Berlin.
July 18, 2012
Incredible amount of detail in this book on the described conflict. Accomplishes what it sets out to do, namely, be the authoritative volume on the Battle of Kursk. However, the amount of detail and material makes it difficult to read and take in. But if you're looking for a detailed account of the lead up to and fighting in the largest tank battle in human history, this is the book for you.
January 16, 2013
The definitive work on the pivotal battle of the eastern front in WWII, Glantz and House use Soviet records made available for the first time in the west. The result is a microscopically detail oriented account that is readable yet scholarly. Must read for anyone studying the War in the East or interested in the Second World War.
March 14, 2016
Comprehensive. I had a hard time keeping all the Russian and Nazi armies, fronts, divisions, brigades, and their commanders, straight in my mind and this book has the worst maps I've ever seen. I would give it a fourth star if it was better written and had better maps but it sure did cover Operation Citadel and especially the monumental battle outside Prokhorovka, in exquisite detail.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 38 reviews