Gilles Deleuze is not a philosopher that can be digested in a breeze not only because his philosophy touches upon miscellaneous fields, but also because his approach is a striking harvest of the philosophies which are the milestones of their epoch. Todd May’s Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction should be read as a different insight towards Deleuze which constitutes its framework around the question “how might one live?” and the study, no doubt, presents a productive discussion in order to answer this question.
It is always difficult to write a review for a book written on a certain philosopher or a certain tradition, as the main part of the book is reserved for the ideas of the philosopher/tradition and in many respects the author remains passive. For this reason, I will also strive to explain, as much as I know and can, Deleuze’s own arguments through May’s reading. The book contains several interesting detections concerning Deleuze such as ontology as a matter of creation instead of discovery which yields one with the opportunity to excess the limits of what is, which has not been identified yet. To put it another way, it provides one to consider not identity, but difference. As Deleuze puts it “difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing.” (19) The most cardinal point here is, in my view, to understand creation within an immanentist ontology from which any sort of transcendental value is excluded. In effect, Deleuze’s endeavor, as Todd May underlines, is not to designate an ontology that seeks beyond what is. Ontology “speaks of what there is. But what there is cannot be identified.” (21) For Deleuze, the unidentification of what there is entirely stems from the assumption that what there is is nothing more than a difference. In this way, Deleuze does not concentrate on the question of absolute truth whose function is nothing but creating an insight about what there is, but rather focuses on the concepts of difference that motivates us to answer the question “how one might live.” (22) May argues that in such an ontology “we can discover our possibilities (...) by probing difference, seeing what new foldings, unfoldings, and refoldings it is capable of.” (25)
This introduction automatically entails a perscrutation to the philosophical background of Deleuze which finds itself, according to May, in three important figures: Spinoza, Bergson and Nietzsche and three concepts accordingly: immanence, duration and affirmation. (26) I think that the most powerful part of the book is May’s systematic reading of Deleuze in this context in which he traces the links between these figures and Deleuze. It is not possible to give here a detailed picture of May’s analysis. To put it all in simple terms, “immanence is the first requirement of an ontology of difference,” for what immanence is the very ground that vitalize Deleuze’s ontology. On the contrary, transcendence is what “freezes living, makes it coagulate and lose its flow.” (27) In other words, one might say that transcendence is what totalizes, completes and in the end what produces an identity. That is why “univocity of Being” is a necessary condition for an ontology, otherwise “transcendence will inevitably return to haunt the construction of any ontology.” (35) Deleuze himself stresses the importance of Spinozism, which “asserts immanence as a principle and frees expression from any subordination to emanative or exemplary causality... And such a result can be obtained only within a perspective of univocity.” (35) In brief, the ultimate conclusion is “there is no transcendence, only immanence.” (38) Properly speaking, after reading May’s analysis I discerned that Spinoza is not only the fundamental thinker that constitutes the very philosophical and political ground of Deluze, but Spinoza’s immanentism is like substratum of the very close links between him and Nietzsche.
Spinozist immanence is followed by Bergson’s duration. I have to admit that I could not comprehend this part very well most likely because my lack of knowledge pertaining to Bergson’s philosophy. Yet as far as I understood, May analyzes two different conceptualizations of time; one is linear, and the other one is existential. In linear time, objects occupy space, but never overlap. In other words, two objects cannot be in the same space and time. It is like Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. In addition, in linear view, time is a container in which things happen. That is to say, time is always in the condition of subsuming the things that happen which validates the thesis that time is “transcendent to what happens.” (42) The second one, existential view, does not recognize time as a container, but rather grasps it as something which is lived that is followed by a linear form. On the one hand, linear time privileges the present, because time as a container involves things happening in the present in a non-contradictory way. On the other hand, according to existential stance, the present is meaningless without past and future, because what defines the present is the past and the future themselves. (43) May argues that these approaches are not convenient for Deleuze which puts Bergson’s duration onto the stage. Instead of accentuating only the Now, Deluze simply offers the coexistence of past and present from which the concept of virtuality is presented. “It is not an instant, or a thing. But it is there, in a different way from the way the present is there.” (48) May simply says that virtuality can be defined “as something that exists but not in actuality.” (48) In other words, the past through which virtuality manifests itself in the present as non-actual “exists within me, and appears at each moment I am engaged with the world.” (51) Considered in this respect, “the temporal character of Spinoza’s substance is beginning to come into view. Substance is duration, the virtual that is always there in all of its modes. Actualization is the ‘modalizing’ of the virtual, the folding, unfolding, and refolding of the virtual into modes. This actualization, this ‘modalization,’ is not making of one thing into another. It is not a creation or an emanation. It is a process in which substance expresses itself in the course of folding, unfolding, and refolding.” (52) According to Deleuze, the significance of duration underlies this reversal of the relationship between past and present: “We do not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception.” (55)
Nietzsche is the last thinker that May scrutinizes on so as to complete his investigation. I personally think that the concept of affirmation is the most remarkable concept of the 20th century, specifically in terms of the political sphere. In my opinion, politics, radical politics in particular, has reshaped itself through affirmation by dislocating the idea of negation. We can observe a significant impact of the concept of affirmation in the philosophies of Deleuze, Foucault, Badiou or even Latour. May particularly focuses on the concept of eternal return, which is “the being of becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming.” (59) As one might notice in the concept of difference, Deleuze is the thinker of becoming, not being. The univocity of Being always extends and renews itself; it is composed of multiplicities which “are the affirmation of unity.” (60) It is unity, because there is no place for a transcendent being in Deleuze’s philosophy that may interrupt the order of that unity. “There is no constant identity outside our world –no God, no laws of history, no goal- that dictates its character.” (60) In this context, eternal return always signifies the return of difference itself, not identity. If a unity is in question, it is the unity of difference, multiplicity. What should be affirmed is this difference which constitutes the very ground of immanent thinking. It is a simple yes to difference, to multiplicity, to the productive side of becoming rather than stability of being. There is no Nietzscheian resentment at stake. “To affirm is not to take responsibility for, to take on the burden of what is, but to release, to set free what lives. To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values, but to create new values which are those of life, which make life light and active.” (65) To affirm is always to experiment. When you say yes, you find yourself in a bet that permanently maintains itself as an experiment.
Without doubt, May brilliantly explains Deleuze’s philosophy through a deep analysis of Spinoza, Bergson and Nietzsche which brings us to “The Politics of Difference”, the title of the fourth chapter. “The question for Deleuze, the political question, is whether we can think otherwise” May states. What one can clearly discern is that Deleuze’s concern is not macro, but micro; not molar, but molecular; not anthropocentric, but object-based. That May underscores quantum flows as striving to explain Deleuzian politics is quite interesting, as what I can see in the 20th century is a parallel development in philosophy, physics and mathematics. That is to say, it would not be wrong to assert that philosophical formulations are influenced by the developments in natural science at a great degree. Quantum flows, May argues, are “fluid identities that arise from a chaotic and often unpredictable folding, unfolding and refolding of matter. Micropolitics is not an issue of the small; it is an issue of quantum flows.” (127) Deleuze’s attention is not directed towards stable entities such as state or society, but rather he would like to deal with things remaining out of the boundaries of these static beings. The ultimate answer to the first question “how might one live?” is given at the end of this chapter by May: “Our task in politics is not to follow the program. It is not to draft the revolution or to proclaim that it has already happened. It is neither appease the individual nor to create the classless society. And it does not lie in the slogan “To the molecular, to the lines of flight.” Our task is to ask and answer afresh, always once more because it is never concluded, the question of how one might live. It is a question we ask and answer not solely with our words or our thoughts but with our individual and collective lives, in an experimentation that is neither guaranteed nor doomed but always in the process of becoming.” (153)
This is a brilliant introductory book for those who want to learn something about Deleuze’s philosophy and May presents not a sum of superficial arguments with respect to Deleuze, but a deep analysis, which does not choke within the complexity, but helps the reader to get into the depths of a Deleuzian life.