Low Intensity Operations: Subversion Insurgency & Peacekeeping

by Frank Kitson

Born in 1926, General Sir Frank Kitson was commissioned into the army soon after the end of World War II and retired 40 years later in 1985. This book tells his story. In the course of his service he spent many years with aromoured formations in Germany, culminating in the command of an armoured division. He also took part in counter-insurgency and peace-keeping activities in Kenya, Malaya, Oman, Cyprus and Northern Ireland and held staff appointments in the Ministry of Defence. He spent the final three years of his service as Commander in Chief of the United Kingdom Land Forces.

Genres: Military History, Nonfiction, History, War, Military Fiction, Ireland, British Literature

219 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1971

About the author

General Sir Frank Edward Kitson GBE, KCB, MC and Bar, DL is a retired British Army officer and writer on military subjects, notably low intensity operations. He rose to be Commander-in-Chief UK Land Forces from 1982 to 1985 and was Aide-de-Camp General to Queen Elizabeth II from 1983 to 1985.

Reviews

[Ian McQuaid · Rating 4 out of 5]

An incredible work of cynicism and paranoia that has set the tone for British foreign policy since the 70s. Kitson sees every conflict as a potential hot bed of communism, and there's no tactic he won't advocate in the quest to maintain British power and interests.
Refreshingly candid, this is essential reading for anyone with an interest in the techniques used for subverting any challenges to capitalist orthodoxy.

[Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A decent look at how to approach insurgencies from very low levels on up from the viewpoint of a military commander. Kitson does a good job laying out the mistakes that are generally made, covering the broad ideas (population control vs killing insurgents, etc) while providing specific examples that help clarify his points. The book is slightly dated (his reference to a central computer to allow access to compiled information being out of reach due to expense for one) and geared mostly towards Great Britain, however it is one of the few books on the subject that addresses things from the perspective of defeating insurgencies in something of an optimistic manner.

[Rizwaan Sabir · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book to understand how Kitson’s highly undemocratic and violent policies exercised in the colonies as well as Northern Ireland came to be embedded into the UK’s domestic arena; blurring the line between counterterrorism, policing, and military warfare.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 3 out of 5]

t is not difficult to see the impact that Frank Kitson's writing has had on US Counterinsurgency doctrine. Many of the organizational recommendations he gives are moot considering they have long been adopted but his prioritization of intelligence collection and conceptual reframing of the battlefield in the minds of commanders are still just as relevant today. Even after over a decade of counterinsurgency operations, it is not difficult to find officers "longing for the good old days" when men stood against men and pummeled each other on the field of battle. If those days were gone in the 1970s, they are surely gone now.
Many of the specific techniques for which Kitson is criticized, such as mass-incarceration, resettlement, and summary executions, are only tangentially mentioned in the book and usually qualified with a discussion on the establishment of politically-acceptable limits on the use of force at each stage of a conflict. The book was clearly written as a theoretical basis for these types of operations and with the understanding that every individual conflict is different. That being said, pragmatism is an overarching theme and Kitson clearly leaves room to justify types of activities well outside the bounds of what the US Army currently considered morally-acceptable behavior. Kitson leaves much of the translation from theoretical concept to execution in the minds of the reader for this purpose. In short, if you are looking for a less prescriptive and philosophical approach to COIN, this is a good book.

[Ciarán MacAirt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential reading for any student of British military history and strategy, especially regarding the north of Ireland. It is difficult to rate it at all as a book without judging the success/failure of Britain's deployment of gangs and counter-gangs, and her low intensity operations on our streets.
Nevertheless, I have given it 5 stars as it is a must-read regardless of how you rate it yourself after reading it. Whether you think Kitson was correct or successful is another book in itself - although I can recommend Roger Faligot's Britain's Military Strategy In Ireland: The Kitson Experiment which was written well ahead of its time.
I also discuss the impact of this book and the historical importance of Kitson in my own book, The McGurks Bar Bombing. I will also be releasing historic documents written by Kitson in the coming days so keep an eye on my Goodreads blog.

[Mr. Reader Eric Mesa · Rating 5 out of 5]

After reading Say Nothing, I wanted to deepen my knowledge about insurgent warfare. I was very pleased by this book, which tells a lot about the more strategic and tactical aspects of counterinsurgency.

It’s a bit of a dry read, and the narrative can be difficult to follow from time to time, but that is because Frank Kitson distills his thoughts so cleanly into 200-proof text. The author also discusses little-known conflicts to help support his observations, and unwittingly illustrates the social dynamics of the world at the time in a way that both explains the past and even gives shading to the shape of things to come- both then and now. He also gives good information on the state of the UK armed forces.

I want to write a novel about insurgency warfare, and I’ll be reading it again for the treasure trove of operational knowledge it has. But this is an important book for anyone to read, because it gives excellent insight on history in the 20th century.

[Mogg Morgan]

The other side of "Beneath the city streets". How the secret state was preparing for insurrection in 1970s. My own university was criticized for having too many cobble stones available for rioters to rip up and use as weapons!

[Mirza Sultan-Galiev · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a counter insurgency classic.

[Christopher · Rating 3 out of 5]

Practical work on counterinsurgency from a British perspective. Essential reading for those interested in counterinsurgency.