Buss states that the dominant “modern synthesis” perspective provides an incomplete picture of evolutionary processes. In that view, as articulated best by Dawkins, the unit of heredity (DNA) is the same as the unit of selection.
Buss separates the unit of selection from DNA and argues that selection has occurred at each of the major transitions in life’s development, from sub-cellular (self-replicating molecules, etc.), to cells, and then to multi-cellular bodies such as ours. There is a synergistic effect at each stage between the older and newer units of selection. The new unit is a vehicle for the older and directly interacts with the environment to take advantage of new environmental niches. Yet, Buss states that the older unit of selection, while once on the front line of interaction with the environment but now removed from direct contact with the outside world, exerts a conservative force as the new unit must meet the internal test of what the older unit requires. That older unit, in effect, “says” that whatever the new unit does, it cannot jeopardize the older unit’s viability. But, in a reverse way, variation (through mutations) within the lower unit cannot jeopardize the new unit’s viability in interacting with the environment. In this way, a life form adapts to the external world by blending the old and new units of selection. Each acts on the other and makes a life form viable in the face of both internal change (mutation) and external requirements (natural selection). The end result is that our DNA is encased (and protected) in a series of “vehicles,” arranged hierarchically, that combine conservative protection of gene structure yet allow new vehicles to serve that structure by effectively dealing with the external environment.
A good part of Buss’s book is more on the technical side, but his last chapter provides a general, non-technical overview of his argument that I’ve summarized. If this summary is within the ballpark of general accuracy, then it might have elements of the following as implications for how we see ourselves: (a) The selfish interest of the gene is protected throughout this evolutionary selection process. It starts with the self-replicating molecules at our core and such self interest is extended outward in a series of “vehicles,” ending with the self interest of the human body (and ourselves). As a question, are we a “layered” self encased, in Buss’s words, in “an ever-increasing wardrobe of ‘vehicles’”? (b) The selfish interest at our core is counter-balanced by synergistic effects between higher and lower units that function together in a cooperative, utilitarian sort of way. This is also an interesting version of whole-part interaction because there’s a two-way governing and directing causality involved as the part (lower unit) limits the whole (higher unit) but the whole also limits the part. (c) As genetic variation is inherent at each unit of selection, might this have a bearing on the question of inborn character differences? The title of Buss’s book refers to the levels of evolutionary development that end up with the individual, as today’s widely understood unit of selection, but does Buss’s account also form the basis for our individuality as biological beings?