I enjoy reading CGR books, especially when they're about topics I'm interested in professionally. They're generally concise and focused. The book was at its best providing me with background and context. It became a bit derivitave as a petty airing of grievances. I don't feel it will drive policy discourse forward.
This was an interesting read because it is an interesting topic to me. I have been a pension fund trustee for the last half-decade, so would consider myself somewhat well-versed in these issues. Further, I would consider myself generally politically predisposed to agree with reformist arguments.
The index fund criticism felt unorganized. I was expecting an exploration of the theory of "universal owners" undermining the efficient management of individual companies, or perhaps a look at the "Big 4" oligopoly. Instead, I walked away feeling grateful for my index fund overlords doing the work which Congress cannot.
Maybe I'm "PE-pilled" in my professional role, but many of the criticisms of that industry didn't land for me either. PE, as I understand the industry, is frequently about control, not necessarily avoiding regulation. The latter is a nice ancillary benefit. Control of these companies was barely mentioned as a motive for LBO's and the industry writ large.
As the author notes, "private equity" has been around for a while. The phrase is used more frequently now because LBO's as an industrial complex adopted the branding. "PE" as a general concept is probably the most critical component of business formation that exists. Not every company has to be public.
Author spends plenty of time discussing how "PE isn't really private", because it's investors are frequently public institutions which represent many millions of people and contributions within. Those public contributions do have consent of delegation, and the structures of defined benefit plans create a "lock up". And yet, the parallel concept for index funds goes unexamined: portable, segregated defined contribution funds, managed ostensibly on behalf of individual investors, have their economic voting power co-opted by the big index fund governance teams. Without much input from those individuals investors, because it is rational for individual investors to not vote their proxies!
I feel less grateful for my Private Equity overlords after having read this book, but I never felt much appreciation for them to begin with. They're the Masters of Our Universe, and we can only hope to contain them with piddly disclosure regulations. A call to arms!
Edit: I talked to my wife about my thoughts on this book and after hearing me discuss it, she demanded I drop my rating from 3-stars to 2-stars.