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The First Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1795-1805
This book is a volume in the Penn Press Anniversary Collection. To mark its 125th anniversary in 2015, the University of Pennsylvania Press rereleased more than 1,100 titles from Penn Press's distinguished backlist from 1899-1999 that had fallen out of print. Spanning an entire century, the Anniversary Collection offers peer-reviewed scholarship in a wide range of subject areas.
257 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1955
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About the author
Bradford Perkins
9 books2 followersBradford Perkins was an American historian known for his influential work on American diplomatic and foreign relations history. The son of historian Dexter Perkins, he taught at UCLA before joining the University of Michigan, where he spent most of his career and later became Professor Emeritus. A Guggenheim Fellow and Bancroft Prize recipient, he also served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and lectured internationally.
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September 30, 2012
Complementing the timeframe of Felix Gilbert’s To the Farewell Address and Samuel Flagg Bemis’ The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, the first of the Bradford Perkins trilogy, The First Rapprochement, concerns American and British diplomatic history from what Perkins recognizes as the prologue to 10 peaceful years, the Jay Treaty. Perkins asserts that the 10 years are “neglected” in history and attempts to fill the void with his book. In The First Rapprochement, Perkins attributes several factors contributing to the peaceful period including a common ancestry and culture, mutually beneficial commerce, a disdain Napoleonic France, and adroit ambassadors.
That the British and Americans maintained a strong connection so soon after the Revolutionary War might be surprising. Perkins begins his book by illustrating how culturally intertwined the two nations were. Many Americans had not been rooted in their own country long and identified with the British. Likewise, the British largely respected the Americans despite having recently been at war with them. Not only did the countries share a common language, but Americans often trained in Britain, bringing their skills back to the States. British artistic talent contributed to American culture in its early days. This common culture made many potentially serious disputes such as debates over frontier lines and settling debts more possible as a certain level of respect came naturally between the two former combatants.
Just as important to the thawed relationship as common culture was a joint commercial interest. The First Rapprochement illustrates how deeply entwined the two nations were over commerce in the Atlantic and how British finance depended on the Americans to pay their debts. American maritime commerce boomed in these years. Britain warred with France a good portion of the time period and the United States had proven their ability to import goods and then re-export them at a fraction of the price that other countries could. Britain so depended on America’s goodwill that the 1st Pitt and Addington governments even loosened the Navigation Acts to permit some American shipping in the British monopolized West Indies. This would be later repealed as Britain hardened towards Americans in 1804. In these initial years of American independence, British finance simply could not afford for America to fail. Perkins claims that 10 million dollars worth of British capital in the United States ensured that diplomacy headed in the right direction.
France always loomed in the not so distant horizon as a contributing factor to Anglo-American diplomacy. When American affinity for the British is high, it is low for the French. Perkins skillfully plays out American dispositions for the French throughout the book and their lessening tolerance for French impressments and seizures at sea. The chapter on the Louisiana Purchase illustrates that the Republicans had evolved from their previous Francophile stance when Jefferson and Madison toyed with using the threat of a British alliance to strong arm Louisiana away from the France’s new claim to the territory. Such a stance flew in the face of Revolutionary alliances so few years ago.
Perkins puts a good amount of credit for The First Rapprochement on good diplomacy. He states that ambassadors such as American ambassador to Britain Rufus King and British ambassador to America Robert Liston settled divisive boundary disputes, relieved Americans of prolonged British military presence on the frontier, and helped settle debts. However the matter of impressments continued to be an issue. Never the less, he showers both ambassadors with praise and bemoans their retirements. Perkins argues that their departures and their replacements led to a dramatic decline in relationship. The First Rapprochement culminates with a less pliable Pitt government leading Britain, after which the glues which held the cooperation between the two nations rapidly disintegrated.
The First Rapprochement addresses a period with, in the 1950s, an identified lack of scholarship. Because of this, Perkins utilizes firsthand accounts of diplomacy through the written works of those who involved and through dispatches between those correspondents. While largely concentrated on the affairs of the state, the book examines political factors as a cause of some of the decisions made. He pays equal attention to outside pressures that influence foreign policy, such as public sentiment and commercial interests. Despite irresolvable issues like impressments, Perkins makes the reader feel like diplomatic efforts of 1795-1805 were largely successful and for this reason, scholars should deem the period worthy of historical inquiry.
That the British and Americans maintained a strong connection so soon after the Revolutionary War might be surprising. Perkins begins his book by illustrating how culturally intertwined the two nations were. Many Americans had not been rooted in their own country long and identified with the British. Likewise, the British largely respected the Americans despite having recently been at war with them. Not only did the countries share a common language, but Americans often trained in Britain, bringing their skills back to the States. British artistic talent contributed to American culture in its early days. This common culture made many potentially serious disputes such as debates over frontier lines and settling debts more possible as a certain level of respect came naturally between the two former combatants.
Just as important to the thawed relationship as common culture was a joint commercial interest. The First Rapprochement illustrates how deeply entwined the two nations were over commerce in the Atlantic and how British finance depended on the Americans to pay their debts. American maritime commerce boomed in these years. Britain warred with France a good portion of the time period and the United States had proven their ability to import goods and then re-export them at a fraction of the price that other countries could. Britain so depended on America’s goodwill that the 1st Pitt and Addington governments even loosened the Navigation Acts to permit some American shipping in the British monopolized West Indies. This would be later repealed as Britain hardened towards Americans in 1804. In these initial years of American independence, British finance simply could not afford for America to fail. Perkins claims that 10 million dollars worth of British capital in the United States ensured that diplomacy headed in the right direction.
France always loomed in the not so distant horizon as a contributing factor to Anglo-American diplomacy. When American affinity for the British is high, it is low for the French. Perkins skillfully plays out American dispositions for the French throughout the book and their lessening tolerance for French impressments and seizures at sea. The chapter on the Louisiana Purchase illustrates that the Republicans had evolved from their previous Francophile stance when Jefferson and Madison toyed with using the threat of a British alliance to strong arm Louisiana away from the France’s new claim to the territory. Such a stance flew in the face of Revolutionary alliances so few years ago.
Perkins puts a good amount of credit for The First Rapprochement on good diplomacy. He states that ambassadors such as American ambassador to Britain Rufus King and British ambassador to America Robert Liston settled divisive boundary disputes, relieved Americans of prolonged British military presence on the frontier, and helped settle debts. However the matter of impressments continued to be an issue. Never the less, he showers both ambassadors with praise and bemoans their retirements. Perkins argues that their departures and their replacements led to a dramatic decline in relationship. The First Rapprochement culminates with a less pliable Pitt government leading Britain, after which the glues which held the cooperation between the two nations rapidly disintegrated.
The First Rapprochement addresses a period with, in the 1950s, an identified lack of scholarship. Because of this, Perkins utilizes firsthand accounts of diplomacy through the written works of those who involved and through dispatches between those correspondents. While largely concentrated on the affairs of the state, the book examines political factors as a cause of some of the decisions made. He pays equal attention to outside pressures that influence foreign policy, such as public sentiment and commercial interests. Despite irresolvable issues like impressments, Perkins makes the reader feel like diplomatic efforts of 1795-1805 were largely successful and for this reason, scholars should deem the period worthy of historical inquiry.
April 30, 2008
In The First Rapprochement, Bradford Perkins describes the relationship between the United States and Great Britain from 1795-1805. He argued that during this decade, relations remained cordial and friendly as both governments worked to ameliorate the pressing problems from the American Revolution. These problems included impressment, war debts, the boundary dispute between the United States and Canada, and trade. Perkins noted that both the John Adams and William Pitt governments understood the value of good relations especially when Great Britain was involved in a war with France during part of the ten-year period. The breakdown of relations between Britain and the United States increased after 1805 as some of the same issues, such as impressment, could not be resolved amicably due to renewed warfare between Britain and France. These new disagreements occurred in an atmosphere of increased nationalism, and less capable leadership in both countries. Perkins, nonetheless, highlighted this period as part of unique relationship between Britain and the United States that encompassed economic, cultural, and personal ties that survive into the present day.
This work began with the conclusion of the Jay Treaty in 1795. American public opinion supported the treaty and it passed in Congress. However, the conclusion of the treaty with Britain nearly led to war with France (42-43). Perkins attributed the improvement of relations over the following decade to effective diplomacy on the part of British and American leaders. The author discussed many leaders, but examined in greater detail two diplomats: Rufus King, the British minister to the United States, and Robert Liston, the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. Both men emerged as respected and able statesmen who were able to settle many outstanding disputes between the two nations. For example, the smooth transfer of forts between the United States and Britain and the beginning of the debt commission served as two areas in which both countries worked together to solve their differences. The Adams administration and the Pitt government in Britain both favored better relations and worked to secure an amicable peace.
In addition, both countries believed that trade benefited their respective economies. Perkins noted that strong economic ties kept tensions between Britain and America low (70). The Pitt government looked favorably on allowing American ships to trade with India and the British West Indies. However, during this time, occasional tensions arose to strain relations. Britain’s renewed war with France caused an increase in ship seizures and the United States’ peace with France after the Quasi War created problems in 1800. Nevertheless, the United States and Great Britain, through the diplomatic efforts on both sides, worked through its issues in a constructive manner.
After the election of 1800, British leaders feared that the Jefferson administration would be hostile towards them in favor of better relations with France. The Pitt government fell in 1801 and Henry Addington became Prime Minister. Instead of harsher relations, Perkins explained that cordiality increased between both nations. Jefferson left Rufus King at his post and assured the British government that his administration did not intend to alter the previous administration’s diplomatic measures (129). The haste of the U.S government to conclude the Louisiana Purchase revealed that Jefferson and his Republican allies distrusted Napoleon’s France. Jefferson was willing to ally with the British to ensure that France would not acquire territory in the Northern hemisphere. Britain supported this goal as well (149). After 1803, relations between Britain and the United States began to sour. Perkins explained, “Inept pilotage, less expected after the generally able helmsmanship since 1794, was largely to blame.” Second, renewed war in Europe exacerbated previous tensions. The new leaders had to deal with a rise in nationalism that argued against relinquishing any ground in squabbles concerning neutral shipping and British seizures of American ships. Despite the initial smooth transfer of power in both countries, ineffective leadership hurt the relationship that had progressed in a positive direction over the previous decade.
Bradford Perkins placed this work in the context of the 1950s Cold War atmosphere. This work reflected his biases in favor of the British-American relationship. His argument suggested that amicable Anglo-American relations were a natural and positive development. He stressed the cultural and economic ties that not only bound both nations together, but allowed them to prosper as well. For instance, when the United States was involved in the Quasi war with France, Great Britain supplied weapons and intelligence to America. The gift of cannons, referred to as the “first ‘lend lease’” program solidified this relationship between two former adversaries (95). This example highlighted the American lend-lease efforts to Britain during World War II. This work implied that the continuation of this commercial and military relationship remains vital to both nations. One contemporary reviewer of this book wrote, “Students of lend-lease and of the machinery of Allied collaboration in World War II will find evidence of Anglo-American co-operation during America’s undeclared war with France, much of it previously overlooked by historians, of particular value.” No doubt, such an assessment reflected the conditions in the world during the 1950s when a strong relationship with Britain was vital to U.S. strategic thinking.
Perkins’s top-down diplomatic history made this work a bland and, at times, a disappointing work. The focus involved a select few diplomats who shared many of the same sentiments concerning American-British commerce and a hostility towards a revolutionary France that went too far in its zeal to recreate its society. Some contentious contemporary debates received no mention. Perkins did not discuss issues of the slave trade and slavery in the United States and the British West Indies. This work placed the events in question in positive ways that, at times, minimized the serious issues of the time. Perkins noted that ship seizures and impressment occurred throughout this period, particularly during times of war. Such acts, however, embarrassed the United States and required years of court proceedings and diplomatic wrangling to solve the issue. The seizure board satisfactorily ended its tenure in 1804, but these same problems arose a few years later as causes of the War of 1812. It seems inconsistent to argue that issues vital to a country’s national security were solved in an amicable fashion when they eventually led to war. Perkins made a stronger argument that politicians in power at the time in both countries found conditions favorable to reduce tensions. No doubt both nations worked through some critical issues. However, despite its treaty obligations, Great Britain flaunted its naval supremacy whenever necessary despite the diplomatic niceties that existed at the time. Again, this work serves as a source of creating a Cold War consensus and not a very critical analysis of Anglo-American relations.
Contemporary reviewers at the time had favorable outlooks towards the work. One reviewer noted that Perkins’s work “gives new significance to relatively neglected period of Anglo-American relations.” A second review questioned the years involved in this study. The reviewer correctly noted that most of the book was heavily weighted towards the first five years after the Jay Treaty. As a result, “the reader is left with the feeling that the author has gone either too far or not far enough” in this account. One hopes that more recent historiography has emerged to challenge Perkins’s rather simplistic ideas concerning the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. While containing good research from both countries and a clear writing style, the author’s biases make this work more of a Cold War narrative and less a critical historical analysis.
This work began with the conclusion of the Jay Treaty in 1795. American public opinion supported the treaty and it passed in Congress. However, the conclusion of the treaty with Britain nearly led to war with France (42-43). Perkins attributed the improvement of relations over the following decade to effective diplomacy on the part of British and American leaders. The author discussed many leaders, but examined in greater detail two diplomats: Rufus King, the British minister to the United States, and Robert Liston, the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain. Both men emerged as respected and able statesmen who were able to settle many outstanding disputes between the two nations. For example, the smooth transfer of forts between the United States and Britain and the beginning of the debt commission served as two areas in which both countries worked together to solve their differences. The Adams administration and the Pitt government in Britain both favored better relations and worked to secure an amicable peace.
In addition, both countries believed that trade benefited their respective economies. Perkins noted that strong economic ties kept tensions between Britain and America low (70). The Pitt government looked favorably on allowing American ships to trade with India and the British West Indies. However, during this time, occasional tensions arose to strain relations. Britain’s renewed war with France caused an increase in ship seizures and the United States’ peace with France after the Quasi War created problems in 1800. Nevertheless, the United States and Great Britain, through the diplomatic efforts on both sides, worked through its issues in a constructive manner.
After the election of 1800, British leaders feared that the Jefferson administration would be hostile towards them in favor of better relations with France. The Pitt government fell in 1801 and Henry Addington became Prime Minister. Instead of harsher relations, Perkins explained that cordiality increased between both nations. Jefferson left Rufus King at his post and assured the British government that his administration did not intend to alter the previous administration’s diplomatic measures (129). The haste of the U.S government to conclude the Louisiana Purchase revealed that Jefferson and his Republican allies distrusted Napoleon’s France. Jefferson was willing to ally with the British to ensure that France would not acquire territory in the Northern hemisphere. Britain supported this goal as well (149). After 1803, relations between Britain and the United States began to sour. Perkins explained, “Inept pilotage, less expected after the generally able helmsmanship since 1794, was largely to blame.” Second, renewed war in Europe exacerbated previous tensions. The new leaders had to deal with a rise in nationalism that argued against relinquishing any ground in squabbles concerning neutral shipping and British seizures of American ships. Despite the initial smooth transfer of power in both countries, ineffective leadership hurt the relationship that had progressed in a positive direction over the previous decade.
Bradford Perkins placed this work in the context of the 1950s Cold War atmosphere. This work reflected his biases in favor of the British-American relationship. His argument suggested that amicable Anglo-American relations were a natural and positive development. He stressed the cultural and economic ties that not only bound both nations together, but allowed them to prosper as well. For instance, when the United States was involved in the Quasi war with France, Great Britain supplied weapons and intelligence to America. The gift of cannons, referred to as the “first ‘lend lease’” program solidified this relationship between two former adversaries (95). This example highlighted the American lend-lease efforts to Britain during World War II. This work implied that the continuation of this commercial and military relationship remains vital to both nations. One contemporary reviewer of this book wrote, “Students of lend-lease and of the machinery of Allied collaboration in World War II will find evidence of Anglo-American co-operation during America’s undeclared war with France, much of it previously overlooked by historians, of particular value.” No doubt, such an assessment reflected the conditions in the world during the 1950s when a strong relationship with Britain was vital to U.S. strategic thinking.
Perkins’s top-down diplomatic history made this work a bland and, at times, a disappointing work. The focus involved a select few diplomats who shared many of the same sentiments concerning American-British commerce and a hostility towards a revolutionary France that went too far in its zeal to recreate its society. Some contentious contemporary debates received no mention. Perkins did not discuss issues of the slave trade and slavery in the United States and the British West Indies. This work placed the events in question in positive ways that, at times, minimized the serious issues of the time. Perkins noted that ship seizures and impressment occurred throughout this period, particularly during times of war. Such acts, however, embarrassed the United States and required years of court proceedings and diplomatic wrangling to solve the issue. The seizure board satisfactorily ended its tenure in 1804, but these same problems arose a few years later as causes of the War of 1812. It seems inconsistent to argue that issues vital to a country’s national security were solved in an amicable fashion when they eventually led to war. Perkins made a stronger argument that politicians in power at the time in both countries found conditions favorable to reduce tensions. No doubt both nations worked through some critical issues. However, despite its treaty obligations, Great Britain flaunted its naval supremacy whenever necessary despite the diplomatic niceties that existed at the time. Again, this work serves as a source of creating a Cold War consensus and not a very critical analysis of Anglo-American relations.
Contemporary reviewers at the time had favorable outlooks towards the work. One reviewer noted that Perkins’s work “gives new significance to relatively neglected period of Anglo-American relations.” A second review questioned the years involved in this study. The reviewer correctly noted that most of the book was heavily weighted towards the first five years after the Jay Treaty. As a result, “the reader is left with the feeling that the author has gone either too far or not far enough” in this account. One hopes that more recent historiography has emerged to challenge Perkins’s rather simplistic ideas concerning the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. While containing good research from both countries and a clear writing style, the author’s biases make this work more of a Cold War narrative and less a critical historical analysis.
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