An interesting book, with some good and relatively novel analytical takes or framings, but somewhat weak on the side of its recommendations. Its main argument is that the modern economy is somewhere halfway on a transition from a ‘tangible’ to ‘intangible’ economy, in terms of core value creation shifting from machines and physical objects to knowledge, (digital, but not just) services, or marketing (following the argument from Westlake and Haskill’s first book, Capitalism without Capital).
Stian Westlake is a relatively well-known figure on the centre-right of the British policy spectrum, who wrote a cool article about the limits of economic thinking within the Conservative party at the beginning of the May premiership. This book should therefore be seen in this context, as a somewhat politically astute yet still nerdy contribution to the debate within the British political centre, which tries to define the main problems of the current state of the economy and propose some solutions.
The main problem identified in the book is the ‘inadequate institutions’ - institutions that helped the economy to get to a certain level (from tangible to intangible) are no longer sufficient for growth. There is a misalignment of incentives, like patent trolls, scientific publications that do not have any value but only satisfy the funding requirements or over-reliance of the VC model’s returns on things like B2B SaaS. This part is not that novel, but definitely argued better than standard academic institutional political economics does.
They define 5 symptoms of this problem:
- Stagnation - real GDP growth on average fell from more than 2% to below 1% since 2000ish.
- Inequality - of status, esteem (reminds me of Rawlsian and Crosland’s thinking about the psychological dimensions of inequality), rootedness.
- Dysfunctional competition - business dynamism is collapsing, and there are either big winners or big losers
- Fragility- limited policy space for interventions, like inability of central banks to push the economy when the interest rates his the zero bound problem.
- Inauthenticity - a sense that there is ‘fakeness’ in the success in the economy (think arguments from Ross Douhat’s Decadent Society or your average MLM or dropshipping scheme).
To explain this, there are currently 2 primary narratives about the current economy: ‘The Lost Golden Age’ (growth and everything was great in the 1950s and 60s, exemplified by Robert Gordon or Tyler Cowen) or ‘the Great Divide’ (the rich are snatching up all the benefits, returns to capital increase etc, as argued by the likes of Thomas Piketty, David Harvey or Will Hutton). They argue that both of these are to some extent true, but they do not explain the full picture. That is, for them, a slowdown of the growth of investments into intangible assets over the past couple of decades
What are intangible assets? Not just knowledge or patents, but also relationships, ways of working and so on. Intangible does not mean post-industrial, and quite the opposite, it can be the intangible value of physical production. Intangibles have a number of specifics: higher returns to political power, large spillovers, but also investments in them are often sunk costs.
Westlake and Haskill draw on institutional theory to explain that institutions that help with commitment are key to long-term prosperity. But the current structure of institutions is outdated for growth at this stage of economic development - ‘What got you here won’t get you there’ problem. For instance, there are tensions between spillovers and synergies in producing new intangibles (public funding for higher education, science and innovation, for patents). Old stale finance and capital accumulation (like value investing, debt financing, etc) is not keeping up with the requirements of the intangible economy.
Intangible economy suffers from the ‘tyranny of collateral’ in debt financing. Most of the debt financing for digital companies (which are on average leveraged only around 10%, in contrast to ‘tangible’ businesses, which are around 90%) is already income covenants (paying up debt from income automatically). This means that the effects of monetary policy are limited (their fragility point from above).
Although they make some good political observations and points for the accumulation and deployment of political capital, like repeatedly stressing the importance of striking good deals and bargains to make things happen, not just relying on technocracy, their policy recommendations range from ineffectual to obvious to absurd and unworkable.
For instance, they argue for putting R&D spending as a part of something like the ESGs, making fiscal policy more automatic through boosting automatic stabilisers - both of which are sensible, but politically very dangerous territories.
In a chapter on cities, they put some quite standard recommendations about transport and so on, but what is really absurd is that they call for hyperlocal planning approvals on street level - this is strange and we have enough evidence by now that it does not work in the USA, where writers like Jerusalem Demsas call for the push to a state level.
In competition policy, they call for sandboxes which have had, to put it mildly, quite limited effects outside the UK financial sector. They argue for balancing national vs local competition and activity-based rather than sectoral regulation in competition policy, which is definitely a good idea.
They end up with the necessity for the development of greater state capacity. This is absolutely true and spot on, but is mentioned rather briefly and to a limited extent at the end.
Overall, an interesting argument, but better as an analysis than a toolkit for change.