We are all immersed in a sea of social norms, but they are sometimes tricky to observe with any clarity. They are often invisible to us and emerge only when they are not observed. Social norms are important to understand because they are both limiting of our freedom, such as gendered and racialized norms, and at the same time the very conditions of our agency.
Social Goodness presents an original, externalist answer to the question of the source or origin of social role normativity. Rather than grounding social normativity in the attitudes of persons, the book argues for an externalism that roots social role normativity in the social world in its positions, institutions, and larger architecture. The core insight of externalism is that the function or structural feature of an enterprise or activity can bring with it normative demands quite independently of the attitudes of those who engage with it. According to the artisanal model, just as a carpenter, ceramicist, or chef is responsive to and evaluable under a set of artisanal norms or techniques, so too is a mother and or an academic or a President. The source of normativity is this technique or expertise, independent of the preferences, endorsements, or recognitive attitudes of individuals.
The artisanal model for social role normativity has resources to explain both the “stickiness” or persistence of social norms and our ability to criticize existing norms and to engage in normative self-creation--to create new normative selves. The artisanal model also has resources to capture and express the social situatedness, locality, and materiality of social roles. The relational ontology of social roles, implicit in the artisanal model, provides a useful frame to consider both hierarchical and oppressive social relations.
Social Goodness: The Ontology of Social Norms offers a thoughtful and ambitious examination of one of the most pervasive yet difficult-to-see features of social life: the norms that shape who we are, what we are expected to do, and how our social roles influence our freedom and agency.
Charlotte Witt's externalist approach provides an especially interesting perspective. Rather than locating the source of social normativity primarily in individual attitudes or preferences, the book examines how social positions, institutions, practices, and broader structures generate normative expectations. The comparison with artisanal expertise creates an illuminating framework for thinking about roles such as motherhood, academia, and political leadership.
What makes the argument particularly valuable is its ability to address both the persistence of social norms and our capacity to challenge and transform them. The book recognizes that norms can constrain people through gendered and racialized expectations while also providing the social conditions through which agency becomes possible.
Concise but conceptually substantial, Social Goodness should appeal to readers interested in social ontology, feminist philosophy, social philosophy, sociology, and the relationship between institutions, identity, agency, and normativity. It is a strong contribution to contemporary discussions about how social roles are created, maintained, evaluated, and potentially remade.