Finally got around to finishing this.
Really fantastic treatment of the subject and an interesting time capsule to the early post-war understanding of information and strategic communication.
First of all, this was excellently written - unsurprising because Linebarger's fiction (under Cordwainer Smith) is superb. It is very approachable, very funny, and with lots of fun quotes, little asides, and flexes of classified+personal knowledge. LInebarger was intimately involved with psychological operations in WWII but wrote this as an academic in SAIS - I only wish I could have taken a class with him lol.
One complaint as a modern reader is that there is a lot of very dense description of the WWII organizational setup of the USG and military psychological operations orgs that didn't ultimately seem relevant as well as a lot of focus on the particular methods of analysis and dissemination of propaganda (especially how to collect and analyze radio manually) that just isn't relevant today. I can't, however, fault him for that since these absolutely would be relevant for the target audience (post-war students and practitioners).
What I enjoyed: Incredibly complete accounting of the historical and practical development of American (and foreign) propaganda analysis and production up to WWII and in the early small wars after. It literally defined the formulation of the field as a discipline. The final chapters were fascinating as a window into the mid 50s. The second edition was published in 1954 and his perspective on the state of the Cold War was truly fascinating. In some ways it was deeply incorrect (lots of disproven ideas about Soviet strength eg, that can't really be faulted at the time). However, his thinking about US opportunities was almost prophetic (I think) and often explicitly Fukuyaman. He pointed out the illogical of holding on to southeast asian imperialism to stop communism specifically because (although he didn't use this terminology) the thymotic advantage of the novel, revolutionary (and seemingly recognition-granting) communist ideology. He points out that (if we wanted to) the US could easily take the thymotic high ground over communism by offering real and enduring recognition to those peoples through (although again he doesn't explicitly say this) liberal democratic ideals and principles.
Finally, I think his most important takeaway (that is soooo relevant today) is that people are complex and societies even more so - nor are either stupid. Psychological warfare (or propaganda, disinformation, whatever you want to call it) cannot (certainly in the long run) convince people of falsehoods in conflict with their material reality. He makes the distinction of limited psychological warfare (using tools of psychology for warfare) and 'war psychologically waged' (integration of planning and strategy along with communication to change the minds of the enemy). The later is clearly more powerful, but ultimately just means well executed war (see, for example, clausewitz). However, his argument in the final chapter (persuasively argued) is that psychological 'warfare' is best not conceptualized as necessarily connected with combat per-se, but in conflict more generally.