(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Два раза пытался прочитать эту книгу, но, в конце концов, пришёл к пониманию, что лично для меня смысла в этом не было. На что я рассчитывал? Получить внутренний инсайд чего-то, что доселе я не знал о российско-украинском конфликте? Не думаю, что у автора имелись такие возможности. Всё же такие книги хорошо смотрятся много лет позже, когда огонь войны потушен, т.е. когда чуть схлынут эмоции и можно будет более-менее объективно дать оценку всем участникам этой драмы (если кто к тому моменту выживет, конечно). Сегодня же позиция «посередине», раздражает как одних, так и других.
Я потерял интерес к книге, когда автор начал утверждать (намекать) что Зеленский делал всё возможное, чтобы война не случилась. Ну, как вам сказать, на самом деле это не совсем так.
One might have concluded from this introduction that Zelensky had taken the side of the revolutionary leaders. But his next appeal was aimed at them. Among their first decisions had to do with the language he was speaking. After taking power the previous week, they decided to repeal the law Yanukovych had enacted to make Russian an official language in eastern Ukraine. That decision, Zelensky said, would only stoke divisions in the country at a time when it needed to stay united. “In the east, in Crimea, if people want to speak in Russian, lay off of them,” he told the leaders of the uprising. “Leave them alone. Give them the legal right to speak in Russian. Language will never divide our homeland. I have Jewish blood, I speak in Russian, and I’m a citizen of Ukraine. I love this country, and I don’t want to be part of another country.”
With the annexation of Crimea, Putin had used questions of language and ethnicity as pretexts for the use of military force. Zelensky saw the hollowness of that excuse for violence, because he knew there were no threats to his rights as a Russian-speaker in Ukraine, certainly none that might require any intervention from the Kremlin. In the third part of his speech, Zelensky pleaded with Putin to stop. “Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, do not allow yourself even to hint at a military conflict. Russia and Ukraine, we really are brotherly nations,” he said. “We are one color. We have the same blood. We all understand each other, regardless of language.” Then he stuttered and hesitated for a moment before setting aside his pride. “If you need it, I can beg you on my knees,” he said to Putin. “But please, don’t put our people on their knees.”
<…>
But Zelensky never abandoned the belief that his fame as an actor could help him as a peacemaker. Having learned to make Russians laugh, he thought he could also make them listen.
Не знаю, чем руководствовался Зеленский или чем руководствовались украинские политики (возможно, думали, что Путин не решится на полномасштабное вторжение), но есть факты, которые противоречат данному взгляду автора.
Вот первый момент, который я взял из книги «Putin and the Return of History How the Kremlin Rekindled the Cold War»:
The initial period of friendly contact between Putin and Zelensky ended in December 2019, when the two presidents met with French and German leaders in Paris to review the implementation of the Minsk agreements. If the Kremlin had taken Zelensky for a pliant ingenu, it was to be disappointed. He demanded the reinstatement of Ukraine’s full control of the state border before any elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and pressed for the 1.5 million Ukrainians displaced from their homes by the fighting to be given the right to vote. At the concluding press conference, Zelensky shook his head as Putin rejected his demands, smiling ruefully and even appearing to giggle as Putin called for the ‘democratic rights’ of ‘the Russian‐speaking population’ of Ukraine to be respected. Zelensky’s public show of disrespect, himself a ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainian’ given a mandate by the majority of Ukraine’s ‘Russian-speaking population’, infuriated Putin. The two men have not met again.
Второй момент я взял из книги «Democracy, Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine On the Fringes of the Virtual and the Real»:
Considered alongside the governmental program of mass privatization, which Zelensky said in March 2021 would go on no matter what (Economic Pravda, 2021), his desire to nationalize the property of sanctioned Ukrainian citizens looks to many like political reprisal rather than a righting of past injustice. Among the first to be sanctioned by the NSDC were two parliamentary deputies from the Opposition Platform “For Life” (OPZZh) — Victor Medvedchuk and Taras Kozak, as well as members of their families. Three oppositional television channels controlled by these politicians were shut down (Olearchuk, 2021). Reporters Without Borders considered this “an abuse of the government’s power to impose sanctions that could lead to an increase in partisan tension” and demanded that Ukraine “respect its international obligations” (RSF, 2021);
Victor Medvedchuk и его пророссийские телеканалы были в Украине, конечно, агентами Кремля, но если Зеленский, как хочет показать автор, стремился сделать всё возможное чтобы предотвратить военный конфликт, тогда зачем он сделал ровно противоположное? Наивно думать, что после атаки на главного агента Кремля отношения между двумя странами улучшились бы, не так ли? Дело не в том, правильно ли это было решение со стороны Зеленского или нет, дело в том, что это противоречит тому, что хочет внушить Simon Shuster. Это не значит, что Зеленский хотел войны или что он готовился к ней. Парадокс всей этой истории именно в том, что не был выбран ни мирный путь с подписанием Минских соглашений ни военный, с рытьём окоп, минированием всего и вся и подготовкой целых городов и сёл к полной эвакуации. Был выбран, так сказать, русский вариант, вариант «русский авось».
В общем, я нашёл книгу необъективной, но разве книга могла быть другой? Наверно нет, не могла.
I tried to read this book twice but finally realized that it didn't make sense to me personally. What was I hoping for? To get an insider's view of something I didn't know before about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? I don't think the author had such possibilities. All the same, such books look good many years later, when the fire of war has been extinguished, i.e., when emotions subside, and it will be possible to give a more or less objective assessment of all participants in this drama (if anyone survives by then, of course). Today, the "in the middle" position irritates both some and others.
I lost interest in the book when the author started claiming (hinting) that Zelensky was doing everything he could to keep the war from happening. Well, how can I tell you, it's not really true.
One might have concluded from this introduction that Zelensky had taken the side of the revolutionary leaders. But his next appeal was aimed at them. Among their first decisions had to do with the language he was speaking. After taking power the previous week, they decided to repeal the law Yanukovych had enacted to make Russian an official language in eastern Ukraine. That decision, Zelensky said, would only stoke divisions in the country at a time when it needed to stay united. “In the east, in Crimea, if people want to speak in Russian, lay off of them,” he told the leaders of the uprising. “Leave them alone. Give them the legal right to speak in Russian. Language will never divide our homeland. I have Jewish blood, I speak in Russian, and I’m a citizen of Ukraine. I love this country, and I don’t want to be part of another country.”
With the annexation of Crimea, Putin had used questions of language and ethnicity as pretexts for the use of military force. Zelensky saw the hollowness of that excuse for violence, because he knew there were no threats to his rights as a Russian-speaker in Ukraine, certainly none that might require any intervention from the Kremlin. In the third part of his speech, Zelensky pleaded with Putin to stop. “Dear Vladimir Vladimirovich, do not allow yourself even to hint at a military conflict. Russia and Ukraine, we really are brotherly nations,” he said. “We are one color. We have the same blood. We all understand each other, regardless of language.” Then he stuttered and hesitated for a moment before setting aside his pride. “If you need it, I can beg you on my knees,” he said to Putin. “But please, don’t put our people on their knees.”
<…>
But Zelensky never abandoned the belief that his fame as an actor could help him as a peacemaker. Having learned to make Russians laugh, he thought he could also make them listen.
I don't know what Zelensky was guided by or what Ukrainian politicians were guided by (perhaps they thought Putin would not dare to launch a full-scale invasion), but some facts contradict this author's view.
Here's the first point I took from the book "Putin and the Return of History How the Kremlin Rekindled the Cold War":
The initial period of friendly contact between Putin and Zelensky ended in December 2019, when the two presidents met with French and German leaders in Paris to review the implementation of the Minsk agreements. If the Kremlin had taken Zelensky for a pliant ingenu, it was to be disappointed. He demanded the reinstatement of Ukraine’s full control of the state border before any elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and pressed for the 1.5 million Ukrainians displaced from their homes by the fighting to be given the right to vote. At the concluding press conference, Zelensky shook his head as Putin rejected his demands, smiling ruefully and even appearing to giggle as Putin called for the ‘democratic rights’ of ‘the Russian‐speaking population’ of Ukraine to be respected. Zelensky’s public show of disrespect, himself a ‘Russian-speaking Ukrainian’ given a mandate by the majority of Ukraine’s ‘Russian-speaking population’, infuriated Putin. The two men have not met again.
The second point I took from the book "Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine On the Fringes of the Virtual and the Real":
Considered alongside the governmental program of mass privatization, which Zelensky said in March 2021 would go on no matter what (Economic Pravda, 2021), his desire to nationalize the property of sanctioned Ukrainian citizens looks to many like political reprisal rather than a righting of past injustice. Among the first to be sanctioned by the NSDC were two parliamentary deputies from the Opposition Platform “For Life” (OPZZh) — Victor Medvedchuk and Taras Kozak, as well as members of their families. Three oppositional television channels controlled by these politicians were shut down (Olearchuk, 2021). Reporters Without Borders considered this “an abuse of the government’s power to impose sanctions that could lead to an increase in partisan tension” and demanded that Ukraine “respect its international obligations” (RSF, 2021);
Victor Medvedchuk and his pro-Russian TV channels were certainly agents of the Kremlin in Ukraine, but if Zelensky, as the author wants to show, was trying to do everything possible to prevent a military conflict, then why did he do exactly the opposite? It's naive to think that relations between the two countries would have improved after an attack on the Kremlin's chief agent, isn't it? The point is not whether it was the right decision on Zelensky's part or not; the point is that it contradicts what Simon Shuster wants to indicate. This does not mean that Zelensky wanted war or that he was preparing for it. The paradox of this whole story is precisely that neither the peaceful way with the signing of the Minsk agreements nor the military way, with digging trenches, mining everything and everything, and preparing entire towns and villages for complete evacuation, was chosen. The Russian option was chosen, so to speak, the "Russian avos" option.
Overall, I found the book biased, but could the book have been any different? Probably not, it couldn't.