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The Rise and Fall of the EAST: How Exams, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology Brought China Success, and Why They Might Lead to Its Decline
The long history of China’s relationship between stability, diversity, and prosperity, and how its current leadership threatens this delicate balance
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2023
Chinese society has been shaped by the interplay of the EAST—exams, autocracy, stability, and technology—from ancient times through the present. Beginning with the Sui dynasty’s introduction of the civil service exam, known as Keju, in 587 CE—and continuing through the personnel management system used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—Chinese autocracies have developed exceptional tools for homogenizing ideas, norms, and practices. But this uniformity came with a huge downside: stifled creativity.
Yasheng Huang shows how China transitioned from dynamism to extreme stagnation after the Keju was instituted. China’s most prosperous periods, such as during the Tang dynasty (618–907) and under the reformist CCP, occurred when its emphasis on scale (the size of bureaucracy) was balanced with scope (diversity of ideas).
Considering China’s remarkable success over the past half-century, Huang sees signs of danger in the political and economic reversals under Xi Jinping. The CCP has again vaulted conformity above new ideas, reverting to the Keju model that eventually led to technological decline. It is a lesson from China’s own history, Huang argues, that Chinese leaders would be wise to take seriously. The long history of China’s relationship between stability, diversity, and prosperity, and how its current leadership threatens this delicate balance
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2023
Chinese society has been shaped by the interplay of the EAST—exams, autocracy, stability, and technology—from ancient times through the present. Beginning with the Sui dynasty’s introduction of the civil service exam, known as Keju, in 587 CE—and continuing through the personnel management system used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—Chinese autocracies have developed exceptional tools for homogenizing ideas, norms, and practices. But this uniformity came with a huge downside: stifled creativity.
Yasheng Huang shows how China transitioned from dynamism to extreme stagnation after the Keju was instituted. China’s most prosperous periods, such as during the Tang dynasty (618–907) and under the reformist CCP, occurred when its emphasis on scale (the size of bureaucracy) was balanced with scope (diversity of ideas).
Considering China’s remarkable success over the past half-century, Huang sees signs of danger in the political and economic reversals under Xi Jinping. The CCP has again vaulted conformity above new ideas, reverting to the Keju model that eventually led to technological decline. It is a lesson from China’s own history, Huang argues, that Chinese leaders would be wise to take seriously.
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2023
Chinese society has been shaped by the interplay of the EAST—exams, autocracy, stability, and technology—from ancient times through the present. Beginning with the Sui dynasty’s introduction of the civil service exam, known as Keju, in 587 CE—and continuing through the personnel management system used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—Chinese autocracies have developed exceptional tools for homogenizing ideas, norms, and practices. But this uniformity came with a huge downside: stifled creativity.
Yasheng Huang shows how China transitioned from dynamism to extreme stagnation after the Keju was instituted. China’s most prosperous periods, such as during the Tang dynasty (618–907) and under the reformist CCP, occurred when its emphasis on scale (the size of bureaucracy) was balanced with scope (diversity of ideas).
Considering China’s remarkable success over the past half-century, Huang sees signs of danger in the political and economic reversals under Xi Jinping. The CCP has again vaulted conformity above new ideas, reverting to the Keju model that eventually led to technological decline. It is a lesson from China’s own history, Huang argues, that Chinese leaders would be wise to take seriously. The long history of China’s relationship between stability, diversity, and prosperity, and how its current leadership threatens this delicate balance
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2023
Chinese society has been shaped by the interplay of the EAST—exams, autocracy, stability, and technology—from ancient times through the present. Beginning with the Sui dynasty’s introduction of the civil service exam, known as Keju, in 587 CE—and continuing through the personnel management system used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—Chinese autocracies have developed exceptional tools for homogenizing ideas, norms, and practices. But this uniformity came with a huge downside: stifled creativity.
Yasheng Huang shows how China transitioned from dynamism to extreme stagnation after the Keju was instituted. China’s most prosperous periods, such as during the Tang dynasty (618–907) and under the reformist CCP, occurred when its emphasis on scale (the size of bureaucracy) was balanced with scope (diversity of ideas).
Considering China’s remarkable success over the past half-century, Huang sees signs of danger in the political and economic reversals under Xi Jinping. The CCP has again vaulted conformity above new ideas, reverting to the Keju model that eventually led to technological decline. It is a lesson from China’s own history, Huang argues, that Chinese leaders would be wise to take seriously.
440 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2023
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews
September 17, 2024
中国的前世、今生、未来，尽在本书中。如果你只想读一本关于中国历史和政治的讨论，那么就是这本。
February 22, 2025
EAST is my most comprehensive read on China and Chinese history so far, so I'm still trying to grasp its thesis. Yasheng Huang being an MIT Professor of Global Economics and Management gives us a very academic book almost like a graduate textbook on Chinese political economics and history. He examines each of the four pillars in his EAST (Exam, Autocracy, Stability, Technology) framework with volumes of data and thorough analysis from Qin Dynasty to current CCP and President Xi Jinping. Huang puts all that into context showing how each tenet influenced the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties and the CCP leaders with fluctuations in scale (homogeneity) vs scope (heterogeneity). The Exam, Keju (precursor of GaoKao) is the overarching theme with its impact in growth of Chinese state in large scales and also losing its scope almost ending in a state without society. Health of a state is based on the equilibrium of scale and scope, so despite all the evidence and predictions why China and CCP haven't collapsed? Huang's answer explains the continuing economic growth (scale) in spite of the decline in scope (Xi eliminating various elements) with Hong Kong where most private companies are founded versus the State-Owned Enterprise. EAST identifies all Chinese leaders (not just Xi, but both recent and historic ones) as unabashed autocrats though in varying degrees. Huang uses Tullock's curse (succession issue in autocracies) to explain the ups and downs of economic and political stability, that is also why he concludes that Reform Era (1978-2018) ended when Xi abolished the presidential term limits as he is moving towards a more extreme autocracy. There is more comparative analysis across Europe, Russia, or the US where Huang points out how economic growth and heterogeneity (freedom of ideas and private enterprise) resulted in democracies but not the other way around, that is, the stability and technology usually favor autocracies. There is too much to summarize here and as I said beginning, I'm still digesting the specific analysis. All in all, this was a very difficult but also very edifying read for me.
August 24, 2025
Found the exam/keju history a very useful frame for explaining China’s particular form of meritocracy: how it achieved high literacy without democracy and competition without heterodoxy. You can tell Huang is a b-school prof in the way he views the Chinese state via the lens of organizational theory and talent selection, but the approach is fresh and backed empirically. Lots of other threads in here too, not all tied together—but still very thought-provoking.
November 16, 2023
Need to cool it with the Big Histories before I get sick of them but this weaved together so much. Hungry for more.
November 12, 2023
China’s meteoric development has been complicated by a host of challenges: economic stagnation and malinvestment, political corruption and repression, chilled private sector dynamism, and geopolitical animosity. These headwinds are partially self-inflicted, the product of increasingly personalistic and hubristic rule that represents a deviation from China’s historically rules-based order, writes Yasheng Huang in The Rise and Fall of the EAST. Huang, Professor of Global Economics and Management at MIT, argues that certain values and customs have been written into the constitution of the Chinese state over time, which Huang condenses into his self-described “EAST” framework.
Huang argues that the staying power of the Chinese political system has historically been defined across four interlocking dimensions: examination, autocracy, stability, and technology. Examination represents the legacy of China’s imperial civil service examination (keju), which systematized intellectual labor, homogenized human capital, and instilled a hierarchical social order centered around an all-powerful ruler. Such systemization promoted statism, which in imperial China was achieved through top-down mandates, autocratic experimentation, and preemption of collective action by Chinese society. It also allowed for long durations of stability, political symbiosis among ruling elites, social obedience and passivity, and authoritarian resilience. Imperial persistence and social organization also allowed creative energies to be channeled through the state, which led to state-directed scientific and technological development that nourished and sustained its survival.
According to Huang, these uniquely Chinese patterns have not only amplified the centrality of the Chinese state, but also emasculated its civil society, defused political opposition, and bred a culture of convergence and conformity. While this system has provided the stability the Chinese state relied on for centuries to survive, Huang argues that this order is in jeopardy of being disrupted under the destabilizing rule of Xi Jinping. By violating term limits, Xi has done away with the rules-based succession framework that had defined political transitions since Deng Xiaoping. Xi has also weakened the EAST model by undermining the autonomy of provincial figures, waging a relentless campaign to weaken political opponents under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign, blurring the lines between private investment and state control, and adopting a personalistic ruling style. Huang compares the Chinese economy to that of South Korea, but its political system to that of North Korea but on less stable grounds. He argues that Xi’s monopolization of power has created the conditions that “favor sycophants and license doublespeak, strategic gaming, and calculating signaling.” China under Xi will be more prone to drama, chaos, noise, and randomness than it has experienced in its recent history.
Huang’s innovative approach is ambitious, almost too ambitious. He surveys nearly the whole course of China’s dynastic lineage, flitting between ancient imperial regimes and contemporary politics. The narrative often comes across as desultory and in need of more incisive editing. Huang’s corpus of sources is eclectic, comprised mostly of sociological works rather than historical archival resources, and the book comes across as a presentation of his personal research with a bit of window dressing. Huang’s arguments could have been more convincing if he scrapped the clunky EAST framework and framed the book as a history of the legacy of the Chinese civil service examination, which seems to be the focus of his research. By sacrificing cogency for breadth, Huang undermines the persuasiveness of his case.
Huang argues that the staying power of the Chinese political system has historically been defined across four interlocking dimensions: examination, autocracy, stability, and technology. Examination represents the legacy of China’s imperial civil service examination (keju), which systematized intellectual labor, homogenized human capital, and instilled a hierarchical social order centered around an all-powerful ruler. Such systemization promoted statism, which in imperial China was achieved through top-down mandates, autocratic experimentation, and preemption of collective action by Chinese society. It also allowed for long durations of stability, political symbiosis among ruling elites, social obedience and passivity, and authoritarian resilience. Imperial persistence and social organization also allowed creative energies to be channeled through the state, which led to state-directed scientific and technological development that nourished and sustained its survival.
According to Huang, these uniquely Chinese patterns have not only amplified the centrality of the Chinese state, but also emasculated its civil society, defused political opposition, and bred a culture of convergence and conformity. While this system has provided the stability the Chinese state relied on for centuries to survive, Huang argues that this order is in jeopardy of being disrupted under the destabilizing rule of Xi Jinping. By violating term limits, Xi has done away with the rules-based succession framework that had defined political transitions since Deng Xiaoping. Xi has also weakened the EAST model by undermining the autonomy of provincial figures, waging a relentless campaign to weaken political opponents under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign, blurring the lines between private investment and state control, and adopting a personalistic ruling style. Huang compares the Chinese economy to that of South Korea, but its political system to that of North Korea but on less stable grounds. He argues that Xi’s monopolization of power has created the conditions that “favor sycophants and license doublespeak, strategic gaming, and calculating signaling.” China under Xi will be more prone to drama, chaos, noise, and randomness than it has experienced in its recent history.
Huang’s innovative approach is ambitious, almost too ambitious. He surveys nearly the whole course of China’s dynastic lineage, flitting between ancient imperial regimes and contemporary politics. The narrative often comes across as desultory and in need of more incisive editing. Huang’s corpus of sources is eclectic, comprised mostly of sociological works rather than historical archival resources, and the book comes across as a presentation of his personal research with a bit of window dressing. Huang’s arguments could have been more convincing if he scrapped the clunky EAST framework and framed the book as a history of the legacy of the Chinese civil service examination, which seems to be the focus of his research. By sacrificing cogency for breadth, Huang undermines the persuasiveness of his case.
April 25, 2025
“(China is a) state without politics, a nation without civil society.”
“Today, China under the CCP is very much a continuation of its imperial former self: tyrannical, unified, and durable against all odds.”
“The sobering reality is that its (China’s) per capita GDP trends toward that of South Korea, its political system is inching closer to that of North Korea.”
Over the last few years, I have read some excellent books about China. All below are recommended. Topics/themes vary including
1. Overseas strategy: “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order”/Rush Doshi
2. The relationship between political power & business: “Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today's China”/Desmond Shum
3. Socio-economic structural challenges: “Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is in Jeopardy”/George Magnus
4. The COVID outbreak: “What Really Happened in Wuhan: A Virus Like No Other, Countless Infections, Millions of Deaths”/Sharri Markson
Adding to this list is MIT Professor Yasheng Huang’s “The Rise and Fall of the EAST” where he analyzes China’s historical and contemporary governance structures utilizing an inter-disciplinary approach. The overriding question the author attempts to answer is what is behind the remarkable longevity and immutability of China’s absolutist political system in contrast to Europe. Huang borrows the conceptual contrast between the ability to “scale” vs the willingness to allow “scope” (or diversity of thought etc) from organizational economics to explain how governance has changed in China over the years, and its impact on society at large. (Well-functioning democracies can scale while maintaining scope, while autocracies achieve scale at the expense of scope.).
The author focuses on four areas: Examinations, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology. In particular, the Keju system introduced in 587 is posited as having played a pivotal role in augmenting state capacity, homogenizing ideas, standardizing human capital, & nationalizing the regional elites. In conclusion, it established the state’s dominance over society, with an absolute insistence on convergence, conformity, and uniformity. A merit-based system, yes, but the state defines what merit is: class struggle during the revolutionary era, GDP during the reform era, and loyalty to the ruler under Xi.
Seen in this light, Xi’s China of today has decimated the myriad heterogeneities of the reform era, thus repeating the mistakes of the prior eras. Reminds one of the pitfalls of excess statism, which is exactly where the world appears to be heading. Informative, insightful, recommended.
“Today, China under the CCP is very much a continuation of its imperial former self: tyrannical, unified, and durable against all odds.”
“The sobering reality is that its (China’s) per capita GDP trends toward that of South Korea, its political system is inching closer to that of North Korea.”
Over the last few years, I have read some excellent books about China. All below are recommended. Topics/themes vary including
1. Overseas strategy: “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order”/Rush Doshi
2. The relationship between political power & business: “Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today's China”/Desmond Shum
3. Socio-economic structural challenges: “Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is in Jeopardy”/George Magnus
4. The COVID outbreak: “What Really Happened in Wuhan: A Virus Like No Other, Countless Infections, Millions of Deaths”/Sharri Markson
Adding to this list is MIT Professor Yasheng Huang’s “The Rise and Fall of the EAST” where he analyzes China’s historical and contemporary governance structures utilizing an inter-disciplinary approach. The overriding question the author attempts to answer is what is behind the remarkable longevity and immutability of China’s absolutist political system in contrast to Europe. Huang borrows the conceptual contrast between the ability to “scale” vs the willingness to allow “scope” (or diversity of thought etc) from organizational economics to explain how governance has changed in China over the years, and its impact on society at large. (Well-functioning democracies can scale while maintaining scope, while autocracies achieve scale at the expense of scope.).
The author focuses on four areas: Examinations, Autocracy, Stability, and Technology. In particular, the Keju system introduced in 587 is posited as having played a pivotal role in augmenting state capacity, homogenizing ideas, standardizing human capital, & nationalizing the regional elites. In conclusion, it established the state’s dominance over society, with an absolute insistence on convergence, conformity, and uniformity. A merit-based system, yes, but the state defines what merit is: class struggle during the revolutionary era, GDP during the reform era, and loyalty to the ruler under Xi.
Seen in this light, Xi’s China of today has decimated the myriad heterogeneities of the reform era, thus repeating the mistakes of the prior eras. Reminds one of the pitfalls of excess statism, which is exactly where the world appears to be heading. Informative, insightful, recommended.
June 20, 2024
Really good and deep thinking about the way China works as a state and civilization up to this day
August 31, 2024
A very scientific analysis of the effect keju (standardized exam on Confucius has on the rise and fall of China. Listener who understand Chinese are for a treat - the audiobook reader is bilingual and pronounced every Chinese word correctly
1. The standardised test existed before SAT. This allows everyone to have a chance. So the poor did have a higher chance to become officials as shown by records. This also provides a new supply of elites when the old ones are politically culled by emperors
2. Though it has many subjects at first, gradually it was changed to involve only rote learning of difficult old Chinese texts, and some spend decades to pass. This drains the elite hopefuls’ energy and brain wash them to conformity. It also crushes creativity so no Industrial Revolution in China.
3. Actually the peak of Chinese creativity (presented in a scientific paper the author wrote) was at the Warring States period, the Three Kingdoms, 5 dynasty 10 countries periods when China was fragmented. Then Sui dynasty happened and institutionalised the standardised exam system. By the Ming dynasty it was way past the peak, and China was technologically backwards in the Qing dynasty. So the foreigners came and invaded.
4. The Chinese Communist Party used to have the GDP growth as a metric for its officials. So China grew. But now Xi Jinping has crushed the private education, construction, technological businesses. Instead, personal allegiance is the new metric. His Wolf warrior stance caused the West to all turn against it. So it’s China’s fault that it is being decoupled from the West.
5. How did China grew so much under a dictatorial regime? Hong Kong and the shell company havens did the trick. The majority of the technological giants were based in Hong Kong. So they have access to the broad China market but can get financing from Hong Kong. Prime example is Lenovo.
6. Under Deng Xiaoping, the transition of leadership is rule and consensus based. However, Xi has crushed his competitors and crown princes. So it’s back to the brutal transition by death for leadership. the author posited that all the purges are politically motivated, because ‘all the officials are corrupt in China’.
7. The author dislikes the China system of governance, because sure you can be the Prince one day, but you are executed or jailed the next. The West is much better, and that’s why all the rich Chinese sent their money and family overseas.
8. The author leaves the best vitriol for Xi. He thinks he is like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, is full of hubris and he is going to drag China down.
1. The standardised test existed before SAT. This allows everyone to have a chance. So the poor did have a higher chance to become officials as shown by records. This also provides a new supply of elites when the old ones are politically culled by emperors
2. Though it has many subjects at first, gradually it was changed to involve only rote learning of difficult old Chinese texts, and some spend decades to pass. This drains the elite hopefuls’ energy and brain wash them to conformity. It also crushes creativity so no Industrial Revolution in China.
3. Actually the peak of Chinese creativity (presented in a scientific paper the author wrote) was at the Warring States period, the Three Kingdoms, 5 dynasty 10 countries periods when China was fragmented. Then Sui dynasty happened and institutionalised the standardised exam system. By the Ming dynasty it was way past the peak, and China was technologically backwards in the Qing dynasty. So the foreigners came and invaded.
4. The Chinese Communist Party used to have the GDP growth as a metric for its officials. So China grew. But now Xi Jinping has crushed the private education, construction, technological businesses. Instead, personal allegiance is the new metric. His Wolf warrior stance caused the West to all turn against it. So it’s China’s fault that it is being decoupled from the West.
5. How did China grew so much under a dictatorial regime? Hong Kong and the shell company havens did the trick. The majority of the technological giants were based in Hong Kong. So they have access to the broad China market but can get financing from Hong Kong. Prime example is Lenovo.
6. Under Deng Xiaoping, the transition of leadership is rule and consensus based. However, Xi has crushed his competitors and crown princes. So it’s back to the brutal transition by death for leadership. the author posited that all the purges are politically motivated, because ‘all the officials are corrupt in China’.
7. The author dislikes the China system of governance, because sure you can be the Prince one day, but you are executed or jailed the next. The West is much better, and that’s why all the rich Chinese sent their money and family overseas.
8. The author leaves the best vitriol for Xi. He thinks he is like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, is full of hubris and he is going to drag China down.
February 21, 2024
This is one of the freshest and most insightful books on China I have read in a while. Huang examines the reigns of three Chinese autocrats - Sui Wendi, Wu Zetian, and Zhu Yuanzhang - and explores how each used the Keju civil exam service system to solidify their grip on power after coming from unconventional backgrounds. He then applies this framework to understanding autocracy, stability, and the role of technology in China, alternating between historical chapters and what Huang calls the 'reform era', or 1978 - 2018. Huang brings many brilliant insights to analysing China from his organisational economic background, from comparing the U-form Soviet economy to the M-form Chinese one, to the promotion of regional leaders over technocratic ones as a form of incentive and monitoring, to the changing role of demand-side and supply-side factors in technological development across Chinese history. The arguments are often backed up by impressive qualitative and quantitative analyses, though it may displease readers who are looking for a traditional work of research situated in the historiographical tradition, as Huang often draws on diverse disciplines like sociology, biology, and economics. In all, while the book may not be definitive, it outlines so many potential new directions of Sinology - and what more could one ask for from a book about China?
August 9, 2025
A big picture book that argues that China's historical success is based on Exams, Autocracy, Stability and Technology.
The more of these kinds of models I come across, the more I think that the best of them are 50% right. If you want to be someone with a somewhat accurate and nuanced intellectual picture of history and politics, you need to be familiar with a lot of such models. But do you really want to be that kind of person?
Anyways, here are my takeaways:
- Westerners thought that technology would drive democracy. They were wrong.
- The exam system is fundamental to Chinese state power, and to Chinese culture. It pulls all the talented people into the state. Their ambitions are drawn towards the success of the state. This also means that they are not building civil society. This concentrates power in the state and supports autocracy.
- It also weakens the power of regional aristocrats.
- The exam system was rife with opportunities for favoritism. Graders could face powerful incentives to give high marks to the children of powerful people. Even something as small as the handwriting of the candidate could be used to signal the identity of the student to the grader. To combat this, all examinations (pages and pages of essays each) were hand copied by a set of 200-300 copyists.
- About half of juren - students receiving top marks on the exam - were the first person in their families to do so.
- The exam system had regional quotas to ensure that at least some people from disadvantaged provinces made it to the final rounds. Affirmative Action is not new.
- The Song dynasty - ~1000-1300 - saw the rise of neo-Confucianism which is much more statist than the original Confucianism.
I had known that Xi Jinping was doing a crackdown on corruption within the CCP, and consolidating his power to some extent. Specifically, he has:
- Purged corrupt party officials. This is good in its own right, and also gets rid of people who could challenge his power
- Less corruption also means more control
- Appointments are becoming more based on "integrity and loyalty" than merit
- He has enforced the rule that all companies must have an active CCP branch
- He has centralized some decision-making power from the state to the CCP
I was also keen to learn some specific potential action areas to for the US to build rapport with Chinese society.
- Demand reciprocal academic cooperation - if Chinse scholars come to the US, US scholars should also come to China. This will help drive more intellectual cooperation, as well as to promote better understanding.
- We can point out that incremental openness and respect for human rights are compatible with Chinese values (while not making unrealistic demands for full democracy).
- Intellectual appeals should be made to Chinese elites whose interest are harmed by the Chinese state.
The more of these kinds of models I come across, the more I think that the best of them are 50% right. If you want to be someone with a somewhat accurate and nuanced intellectual picture of history and politics, you need to be familiar with a lot of such models. But do you really want to be that kind of person?
Anyways, here are my takeaways:
- Westerners thought that technology would drive democracy. They were wrong.
- The exam system is fundamental to Chinese state power, and to Chinese culture. It pulls all the talented people into the state. Their ambitions are drawn towards the success of the state. This also means that they are not building civil society. This concentrates power in the state and supports autocracy.
- It also weakens the power of regional aristocrats.
- The exam system was rife with opportunities for favoritism. Graders could face powerful incentives to give high marks to the children of powerful people. Even something as small as the handwriting of the candidate could be used to signal the identity of the student to the grader. To combat this, all examinations (pages and pages of essays each) were hand copied by a set of 200-300 copyists.
- About half of juren - students receiving top marks on the exam - were the first person in their families to do so.
- The exam system had regional quotas to ensure that at least some people from disadvantaged provinces made it to the final rounds. Affirmative Action is not new.
- The Song dynasty - ~1000-1300 - saw the rise of neo-Confucianism which is much more statist than the original Confucianism.
I had known that Xi Jinping was doing a crackdown on corruption within the CCP, and consolidating his power to some extent. Specifically, he has:
- Purged corrupt party officials. This is good in its own right, and also gets rid of people who could challenge his power
- Less corruption also means more control
- Appointments are becoming more based on "integrity and loyalty" than merit
- He has enforced the rule that all companies must have an active CCP branch
- He has centralized some decision-making power from the state to the CCP
I was also keen to learn some specific potential action areas to for the US to build rapport with Chinese society.
- Demand reciprocal academic cooperation - if Chinse scholars come to the US, US scholars should also come to China. This will help drive more intellectual cooperation, as well as to promote better understanding.
- We can point out that incremental openness and respect for human rights are compatible with Chinese values (while not making unrealistic demands for full democracy).
- Intellectual appeals should be made to Chinese elites whose interest are harmed by the Chinese state.
July 3, 2024
To, że świat Zachodu wybrał inną drogę niż Chiny, to wiemy od zawsze. Inna filozofia, inne pomysły i inne strategie. Pewnie też inne cele, ale nie o tym… Większość publikacji, które do tej pory trafiały w moje ręce, były to książki pisane przez reprezentantów kultury Zachodu. Komentujących sytuacje w ChRL, ale komentujących z zewnątrz, z pozycji obserwatora, a nie uczestnika. Ta optyka wydaje się sporo zmieniać.
Yasheng Huang jest amerykańskim profesorem w MIT, ale urodzonym w Chinach i dorastającym w kulturze chińskiej. Łatwej jest jemu zrozumieć poczynienia Chińczyków. Zna ten paradygmat. Jednocześnie żyje w świecie Zachodu i może na Chiny spojrzeć z bezpiecznego dystansu.
Przybliża Chiny z ich kulturą, gospodarką i nadrzędnymi wartościami. Skupia się na egzaminach państwowych, które pomagają wyłapać elitę intelektualną, na autokratycznych, ale stabilnych rządach oraz na technologii. Pokazuje jak ten kraj zmieniał się na przestrzeni wieków. Omawia ich mocne strony i pokazuje słabości w całej okazałości. Stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak to się stało, że kraj bez społeczeństwa tak sprawnie sobie radzi?
W tekście jest mnóstwo pytań, które otwieraj dyskusję, m.in.: jak bardzo covid zmienił zasady gry i dynamikę w Państwie Środka? Czy nadmierna pewność siebie nie zgubi Chińczyków? Czy Chiny mają wystarczająco charyzmatycznego przywódcę, by ten uporał się z rosnącym niezadowoleniem i spowolnieniem rozwoju gospodarczego? Czy obecne rządy są stabilne? Czy budowanie i umacnianie autorytarnej władzy to dobry kierunek? Czy władza centralna ma się dobrze? Czy nie zapominają o swoich wewnętrznych oponentach? W końcu, czy Chiny poradzą siebie z wyzwaniami, które stawi przed nimi nowoczesność i współczesny świat?
Szalenie ciekawy fragment na temat początków epidemii covid. Pokazuje, jak chiński system nie uporał się z zagrożeniem, jak paraliż decyzyjny wpłynął na rozprzestrzenienie się wirusa. W tym przypadku, do tej pory sprawnie działający system zawiódł. Sytuacja wymagała decyzyjności lokalnych przedstawiciel władz, a ci w obawie przed konsekwencjami, nie stanęli na wysokości zadania. Pytanie, czy mieli jakieś pole manewru.
Ta publikacja wymaga pewnej wiedzy z dziedziny polityki, gospodarki i historii, ale zdecydowanie warto po nią sięgnąć. To kawał porządnej naukowej analizy.
Książka bez wątpienia poszerzyła moja wiedzę w zakresie geopolityki. Pokazała inną perspektywę i wiele zmieniła w moim oglądzie rzeczywistości. Spojrzałam na Chiny innymi oczami. Bez zachodnich filtrów. Z szacunkiem i ciekawością, ale ze świadomości, że ten kolos ma też słabe strony.
Yasheng Huang jest amerykańskim profesorem w MIT, ale urodzonym w Chinach i dorastającym w kulturze chińskiej. Łatwej jest jemu zrozumieć poczynienia Chińczyków. Zna ten paradygmat. Jednocześnie żyje w świecie Zachodu i może na Chiny spojrzeć z bezpiecznego dystansu.
Przybliża Chiny z ich kulturą, gospodarką i nadrzędnymi wartościami. Skupia się na egzaminach państwowych, które pomagają wyłapać elitę intelektualną, na autokratycznych, ale stabilnych rządach oraz na technologii. Pokazuje jak ten kraj zmieniał się na przestrzeni wieków. Omawia ich mocne strony i pokazuje słabości w całej okazałości. Stara się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak to się stało, że kraj bez społeczeństwa tak sprawnie sobie radzi?
W tekście jest mnóstwo pytań, które otwieraj dyskusję, m.in.: jak bardzo covid zmienił zasady gry i dynamikę w Państwie Środka? Czy nadmierna pewność siebie nie zgubi Chińczyków? Czy Chiny mają wystarczająco charyzmatycznego przywódcę, by ten uporał się z rosnącym niezadowoleniem i spowolnieniem rozwoju gospodarczego? Czy obecne rządy są stabilne? Czy budowanie i umacnianie autorytarnej władzy to dobry kierunek? Czy władza centralna ma się dobrze? Czy nie zapominają o swoich wewnętrznych oponentach? W końcu, czy Chiny poradzą siebie z wyzwaniami, które stawi przed nimi nowoczesność i współczesny świat?
Szalenie ciekawy fragment na temat początków epidemii covid. Pokazuje, jak chiński system nie uporał się z zagrożeniem, jak paraliż decyzyjny wpłynął na rozprzestrzenienie się wirusa. W tym przypadku, do tej pory sprawnie działający system zawiódł. Sytuacja wymagała decyzyjności lokalnych przedstawiciel władz, a ci w obawie przed konsekwencjami, nie stanęli na wysokości zadania. Pytanie, czy mieli jakieś pole manewru.
Ta publikacja wymaga pewnej wiedzy z dziedziny polityki, gospodarki i historii, ale zdecydowanie warto po nią sięgnąć. To kawał porządnej naukowej analizy.
Książka bez wątpienia poszerzyła moja wiedzę w zakresie geopolityki. Pokazała inną perspektywę i wiele zmieniła w moim oglądzie rzeczywistości. Spojrzałam na Chiny innymi oczami. Bez zachodnich filtrów. Z szacunkiem i ciekawością, ale ze świadomości, że ten kolos ma też słabe strony.
January 6, 2025
The book presents an interesting perspective on why autocracy survived in China for so long and also speculates about the future of China in the last two chapters. Some key learning points for me:
- the “keju” exams have wide-ranging impacts as they help spread the Chinese ideology while at the same time keeping young Chinese people from pursuing other ideas, ensuring a favourable view of the political elite and displaying a (maybe superficial) sense of meritocracy. The same mechanisms are served today by the “gaokao” high school exams
- the m-economy organization (meaning every province is a “mini state” instead of ministries having sub-departments in each province) aids Chinese unity by providing a path through provincial leadership through to country-level leadership. It also allows - in combination with the GDP target - for a significant degree of autonomy which enables trial/error types of policies while maintaining control over the human resources of the provinces
- the special economic zones (and in particular Hong Kong) were key to Chinese economic growth in the 1980s-2000s as it provided financing outside of the state owned financial institutions
- while keju has the benefits listed above, it does limited the creativity and innovativeness of the Chinese population, both of which are insourced through collaborations, especially with the US
- there was actually some “liberalism” in the 1980s before the tiananmen lockdowns, during which liberal reforms were drafted and partially implemented. However, these went away after the tiananmen protests in 1989. Part of the stability is due to the term limit and the segregation of power imposed during this liberal time
- Xi Jinping does not recognise all of the above and therefore also does not realize that this anti-liberal crackdowns on Hong Kong, international collaborations and inner-party discourse are most likely detrimental to China. The handling of COVID19 shows this.
As you can see from the above, the book makes some very interesting points and also shows perspectives that are typically not considered in main-stream coverage of the “China issue”. The only problem I had with the book is that the “keju” point was maybe dwelled on too much.
- the “keju” exams have wide-ranging impacts as they help spread the Chinese ideology while at the same time keeping young Chinese people from pursuing other ideas, ensuring a favourable view of the political elite and displaying a (maybe superficial) sense of meritocracy. The same mechanisms are served today by the “gaokao” high school exams
- the m-economy organization (meaning every province is a “mini state” instead of ministries having sub-departments in each province) aids Chinese unity by providing a path through provincial leadership through to country-level leadership. It also allows - in combination with the GDP target - for a significant degree of autonomy which enables trial/error types of policies while maintaining control over the human resources of the provinces
- the special economic zones (and in particular Hong Kong) were key to Chinese economic growth in the 1980s-2000s as it provided financing outside of the state owned financial institutions
- while keju has the benefits listed above, it does limited the creativity and innovativeness of the Chinese population, both of which are insourced through collaborations, especially with the US
- there was actually some “liberalism” in the 1980s before the tiananmen lockdowns, during which liberal reforms were drafted and partially implemented. However, these went away after the tiananmen protests in 1989. Part of the stability is due to the term limit and the segregation of power imposed during this liberal time
- Xi Jinping does not recognise all of the above and therefore also does not realize that this anti-liberal crackdowns on Hong Kong, international collaborations and inner-party discourse are most likely detrimental to China. The handling of COVID19 shows this.
As you can see from the above, the book makes some very interesting points and also shows perspectives that are typically not considered in main-stream coverage of the “China issue”. The only problem I had with the book is that the “keju” point was maybe dwelled on too much.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 13, 2024
One of the better books if you want to understand deep cultural trends in China.
If you read anything in the book, it should be the last chapter. Discussing how the country could become less autocratic, he makes a David-Shor-type argument to any Western government that wants to bring about regime change in China. Specifically, he says they should appeal to the self-interest of the median Chinese citizen by showing that capitalist countries are richer and provide protection from government overreach. Similarly, Chinese elites should be reminded of the fact that being purged is not a thing in Western countries. This argument also means that Western govs shouldn't praise democratic activists who seem extreme to the vast majority of Chinese or the Dalai Lama, who most Chinese either don't know or don't like.
I never heard these arguments before, and through that, the book added a lot of value.
Other other take-aways from the book:
- China implemented a multi-stage, highly standardized, more or less fair exam starting with the Sui dynasty in 600 AD (called Keju examination). This exam continued (with some gaps) until the fall of the Qing dynasty. It monopolized talent within the government, starving competing civil society of talent.
- The pre-Tiananmen reform era is described in a lot of detail. The protests are a good argument for history being relatively contingent. Without overthrowing the reformist CCP party secretary Zhao Zyang, China today might be more liberal. Spending the rest of his life under house arrest, Zhao "came to believe that China should adopt a free press, freedom of assembly, an independent judiciary, and a multiparty parliamentary democracy." (Wikipedia)
- Though it's admirable that China was able to lift so many people out of poverty, this is more due to an act of omission by the CCP, who, for once, didn't enact horrible economic policies. And, of course, other Asian countries that are democratic and capitalist are far richer (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan).
If you read anything in the book, it should be the last chapter. Discussing how the country could become less autocratic, he makes a David-Shor-type argument to any Western government that wants to bring about regime change in China. Specifically, he says they should appeal to the self-interest of the median Chinese citizen by showing that capitalist countries are richer and provide protection from government overreach. Similarly, Chinese elites should be reminded of the fact that being purged is not a thing in Western countries. This argument also means that Western govs shouldn't praise democratic activists who seem extreme to the vast majority of Chinese or the Dalai Lama, who most Chinese either don't know or don't like.
I never heard these arguments before, and through that, the book added a lot of value.
Other other take-aways from the book:
- China implemented a multi-stage, highly standardized, more or less fair exam starting with the Sui dynasty in 600 AD (called Keju examination). This exam continued (with some gaps) until the fall of the Qing dynasty. It monopolized talent within the government, starving competing civil society of talent.
- The pre-Tiananmen reform era is described in a lot of detail. The protests are a good argument for history being relatively contingent. Without overthrowing the reformist CCP party secretary Zhao Zyang, China today might be more liberal. Spending the rest of his life under house arrest, Zhao "came to believe that China should adopt a free press, freedom of assembly, an independent judiciary, and a multiparty parliamentary democracy." (Wikipedia)
- Though it's admirable that China was able to lift so many people out of poverty, this is more due to an act of omission by the CCP, who, for once, didn't enact horrible economic policies. And, of course, other Asian countries that are democratic and capitalist are far richer (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan).
March 1, 2024
Yasheng Huang’s The Rise and Fall of the East examines the history of Chinese bureaucracy – EAST in the title is both a geographic reference and a mnemonic for the four topics of Chinese society Huang focuses on: exams, autocracy, stability and technology.
In focusing on the influence of Keju, the civil service exam developed that started during the Sui dynasty administered for the purpose of selecting candidates for the state bureaucracy. Huang discusses both the advantages of the Keju (its extremely meritocratic) and its limitations. Over time, the Chinese state has excelled at promoting group norms and ideas which the population internalized, and achieved great stability for long periods of time. Yet at times it has also been absolutely stifling of its creative class, as exemplified in the CCP’s expulsion of the business elite, intellectuals, artists, and minorities.
China is the oldest civilization on earth, having existed going back to at least a couple thousand years before the birth of Christ. It has achieved marvels: it abolished slavery before the fall of Rome, it invented paper, gunpowder, and the compass. The Chinese state has, at times, consolidated enormous power (though social collapses are quite common as well). However, there have been profound costs to these achievements, and Huang’s gaze is particularly critical when we reach China post WWII and the rise of the CCP. The modern CCP is more brutal than anything most Westerners can imagine but so few Westerners have any idea of how it is run or just how oppressive it is. Huang is highly skeptical of Xi Jingping’s leadership and sees any number of policy failures that could act as tripwires to bring about the collapse of modern China. The next decade will be crucial for determining whether China can withstand the internal pressures of demographic, technological, environmental and political change into the 21st century.
In focusing on the influence of Keju, the civil service exam developed that started during the Sui dynasty administered for the purpose of selecting candidates for the state bureaucracy. Huang discusses both the advantages of the Keju (its extremely meritocratic) and its limitations. Over time, the Chinese state has excelled at promoting group norms and ideas which the population internalized, and achieved great stability for long periods of time. Yet at times it has also been absolutely stifling of its creative class, as exemplified in the CCP’s expulsion of the business elite, intellectuals, artists, and minorities.
China is the oldest civilization on earth, having existed going back to at least a couple thousand years before the birth of Christ. It has achieved marvels: it abolished slavery before the fall of Rome, it invented paper, gunpowder, and the compass. The Chinese state has, at times, consolidated enormous power (though social collapses are quite common as well). However, there have been profound costs to these achievements, and Huang’s gaze is particularly critical when we reach China post WWII and the rise of the CCP. The modern CCP is more brutal than anything most Westerners can imagine but so few Westerners have any idea of how it is run or just how oppressive it is. Huang is highly skeptical of Xi Jingping’s leadership and sees any number of policy failures that could act as tripwires to bring about the collapse of modern China. The next decade will be crucial for determining whether China can withstand the internal pressures of demographic, technological, environmental and political change into the 21st century.
January 4, 2025
Yasheng Huang przedstawia przeszłość i teraźniejszość Chin przez pryzmat czterech filarów: egzaminy, autokracja, stabilność, technika (EAST). Sporo miejsca poświęca historii państwa, wskazując źródła tych filarów, sposób ich kształtowania, by w dalszej kolejności omówić współczesność - sukcesy wynikające z nich, zagrożenia i konsekwencje; kreśli również autorski scenariusz przyszłości.
Koncepcja EAST przyczyniła się do integralności społeczeństwa i państwa, stworzyła spójny system - bez względu na formę sprawowania rządów, wykształciła zdolność do podporządkowania się, niechęć do konformizmu, posłuszeństwo i bierność z drugiej strony wyeliminowała chęć do tworzenia choćby podwalin społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.
Jak Chiny stały się potęgą i czy grozi im upadek? - na pytanie zawarte w podtytule autor udziela ambitnej i wyczerpującej odpowiedzi, sięgając do czasów VI-VII w., omawiając różnice w sprawowaniu władzy, kształtowaniu systemu politycznego, społecznego przez kolejne dynastie aż do współczesności. Czasami ilość tej wiedzy przytłacza.
Najciekawsza część tej książki dotyczy współczesnych Chin, w której autor pokazuje spuściznę czterech filarów, innowacyjność, zachowanie społeczeństwa, represje polityczne. Wszystko to przenika się, jest ze sobą powiązane.
Książka na pewno zainteresuje miłośników kultury, historii Chin. Interesujące informacje znajdzie również ktoś, kto chciałby dowiedzieć się czegoś o współczesnym obrazie Państwa Środka.
Koncepcja EAST przyczyniła się do integralności społeczeństwa i państwa, stworzyła spójny system - bez względu na formę sprawowania rządów, wykształciła zdolność do podporządkowania się, niechęć do konformizmu, posłuszeństwo i bierność z drugiej strony wyeliminowała chęć do tworzenia choćby podwalin społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.
Jak Chiny stały się potęgą i czy grozi im upadek? - na pytanie zawarte w podtytule autor udziela ambitnej i wyczerpującej odpowiedzi, sięgając do czasów VI-VII w., omawiając różnice w sprawowaniu władzy, kształtowaniu systemu politycznego, społecznego przez kolejne dynastie aż do współczesności. Czasami ilość tej wiedzy przytłacza.
Najciekawsza część tej książki dotyczy współczesnych Chin, w której autor pokazuje spuściznę czterech filarów, innowacyjność, zachowanie społeczeństwa, represje polityczne. Wszystko to przenika się, jest ze sobą powiązane.
Książka na pewno zainteresuje miłośników kultury, historii Chin. Interesujące informacje znajdzie również ktoś, kto chciałby dowiedzieć się czegoś o współczesnym obrazie Państwa Środka.
January 30, 2024
I picked up this book just to have an audiobook to listen to while running, and ended up enjoying how analytical and quick moving some of the arguments are (even though it led to replaying many sections). A serious analysis of China from a strong social science lens, this is much more research oriented than a casual nonfiction theory of China. Although it doesn't explicitly discuss how a collectivist mindset may have played a role in addition to the four mentioned factors leading to China's success, it is alluded to indirectly via more formal social science lenses. The two places where I think the structure loses some steam are the transition between explaining the EAST model and talking about the challenges to Xi's regime and the disregard of some of the economic challenges China is currently facing due to it's high rate of growth over the last couple decades (but at least on the latter note it may be due to the strong focus on social rather than economic policy, and I respect how consistent the book is in staying in the social analysis lane).
August 31, 2025
A refreshing view of China starting from an understanding based on data, rooted in Chinese history, and offering a point of view not met by me anywhere else, especially in the Western scholars which currently direct the thinking of the diplomacy.
The book has a short-term aim at the current (and potentially subsequent) investiture of Xi and its implications in the strengthening of the authoritarian regime in the country. The direction is clearly visible, but the book somehow brings a historical mirroring perspective to it.
As it stand today, China, North Korea and Russia-Belarus are spinning in the same direction, with an unfortunate end visible down in some time. Where the writer hopes that this show down will be reversed, some evolution brought to it in the near term, I somehow see that a couple generations will clarify the situation anyway, and the short-termism is not to be truly expected.
This being said, I still think this book it is a very worthy read, and given the time to ponder at its oriental depth.
The book has a short-term aim at the current (and potentially subsequent) investiture of Xi and its implications in the strengthening of the authoritarian regime in the country. The direction is clearly visible, but the book somehow brings a historical mirroring perspective to it.
As it stand today, China, North Korea and Russia-Belarus are spinning in the same direction, with an unfortunate end visible down in some time. Where the writer hopes that this show down will be reversed, some evolution brought to it in the near term, I somehow see that a couple generations will clarify the situation anyway, and the short-termism is not to be truly expected.
This being said, I still think this book it is a very worthy read, and given the time to ponder at its oriental depth.
October 5, 2024
50%
The funny part is, this book was written by a professor, so the author will know exactly what I mean when I say that it's as if he assigned a three-page exam to a student, and the student went and added descriptive phrases and unimportant conjunctions to the words, coupling them together to make them into a long sentence, to make what could have been a very short one-page report into a three-page report. This is not anything new. This whole thing is just talking around the same subject that's very circular, and it comes back to it again and again. There's nothing new added to the discussion. We've talked about this stuff for years. It's just impressive that he made this long of a book going around the same generalized talking points. I didn't learn anything new in this book.
The funny part is, this book was written by a professor, so the author will know exactly what I mean when I say that it's as if he assigned a three-page exam to a student, and the student went and added descriptive phrases and unimportant conjunctions to the words, coupling them together to make them into a long sentence, to make what could have been a very short one-page report into a three-page report. This is not anything new. This whole thing is just talking around the same subject that's very circular, and it comes back to it again and again. There's nothing new added to the discussion. We've talked about this stuff for years. It's just impressive that he made this long of a book going around the same generalized talking points. I didn't learn anything new in this book.
October 6, 2024
This is a long and meandering book, and summarizes the author’s life studies in a very rigorous and systematic way. He goes to deep lengths to sos topics he is not an expert in, and sometimes presents himself a bit defensive. Nevertheless, I think it’s a must read to understand Chinese culture today and how to deal with the insurmountable and uncertain problem of engagement.
My only critique:
In the end one can feel the author’s impotence for the road sino-American relations have been wandering for the last… 40 years? But unfortunately the answers he suggests seem to me incomplete, impractical and largely unrealistic.
My only critique:
In the end one can feel the author’s impotence for the road sino-American relations have been wandering for the last… 40 years? But unfortunately the answers he suggests seem to me incomplete, impractical and largely unrealistic.
April 12, 2025
This was a dense book to read, but it was packed with historical information about China, the legacy of that culture and how that manifest in the communist party today. This felt like one of the best researched and insightful Mation of how the communist party works today and why they have maintained such a strong control over China for those who want a better understand where China comes from and where the path forward might be I would highly recommend reading this book.
December 8, 2024
Even if it's really reaching with its conclusions and tries to explain too much with its model it's still a fascinating book and an enlightening insider view of the Chinese culture of bureaucracy. Even if it's not the deciding factor the author claims it to be I believe it's a major factor. I also like Peter Turchin and this ties in well with his theories about elites.
July 20, 2025
Ciekawa książka, ale brakowało mi wyjaśnienia odmiennej dla nas mentalności, jaka panuje w Chinach. Książka byłaby wtedy dużo głębsza.
Zdecydowanie łatwiej by się czytało, mając większą wiedzę w dziedzinie ekonomii.
Na minus- powtarzanie pewnych stereotypów związanych z historią Kościoła katolickiego.
Zdecydowanie łatwiej by się czytało, mając większą wiedzę w dziedzinie ekonomii.
Na minus- powtarzanie pewnych stereotypów związanych z historią Kościoła katolickiego.
March 9, 2024
I very much appreciated the historical background leading up to the precent. His recommendations in the final two chapters were a bit off, I felt.
US China relations will be difficult both due to history and to ideology. This book brings these facto home again and again.
US China relations will be difficult both due to history and to ideology. This book brings these facto home again and again.
March 25, 2025
Listening on and off during some of my running sessions. I think the book is a bit too lengthy, with some arguments feeling too grandiose without solid support or clear conclusions. Otherwise, it's okay, though I guess some of the takeaways might only hold up for a short time.
April 20, 2025
Huang provides a systematic and thorough thesis backed by data to explain the socio-cultural and political environment that influences how creative and productive a society can be. This book will be worth revisiting.
May 3, 2024
raczej książka dla specjalistów niż dla laików, więcej już wstawię na instagramie!
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October 2, 2024My interview with Yasheng Huang for The Armen Show:
http://www.armenshirvanian.com/podcas...
http://www.armenshirvanian.com/podcas...
December 21, 2024
Exceptional.
March 30, 2025
Hard to take a book seriously when it’s touting US academical freedom and calls Israel a democracy without hierarchies
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