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On Wars
A history of wars through the ages and across the world, and the irrational calculations that so often lie behind them
Benjamin Franklin once said, “There never was a good war or a bad peace.” But what determines whether war or peace is chosen? Award-winning sociologist Michael Mann concludes that it is a handful of political leaders—people with emotions and ideologies, and constrained by inherited culture and institutions—who undertake such decisions, usually irrationally choosing war and seldom achieving their desired results.
Mann examines the history of war through the ages and across the globe—from ancient Rome to Ukraine, from imperial China to the Middle East, from Japan and Europe to Latin and North America. He explores the reasons groups go to war, the different forms of wars, how warfare has changed and how it has stayed the same, and the surprising ways in which seemingly powerful countries lose wars. In masterfully combining ideological, economic, political, and military analysis, Mann offers new insight into the many consequences of choosing war.
Benjamin Franklin once said, “There never was a good war or a bad peace.” But what determines whether war or peace is chosen? Award-winning sociologist Michael Mann concludes that it is a handful of political leaders—people with emotions and ideologies, and constrained by inherited culture and institutions—who undertake such decisions, usually irrationally choosing war and seldom achieving their desired results.
Mann examines the history of war through the ages and across the globe—from ancient Rome to Ukraine, from imperial China to the Middle East, from Japan and Europe to Latin and North America. He explores the reasons groups go to war, the different forms of wars, how warfare has changed and how it has stayed the same, and the surprising ways in which seemingly powerful countries lose wars. In masterfully combining ideological, economic, political, and military analysis, Mann offers new insight into the many consequences of choosing war.
616 pages, Hardcover
Published August 8, 2023
10 people are currently reading
365 people want to read
About the author
Michael Mann
108 books98 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
Michael Mann is a British-born professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Visiting Research Professor at Queen's University Belfast. Mann holds dual British and United States citizenships. He received his B.A. in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 1963 and his D.Phil. in Sociology from the same institution in 1971. Mann is currently visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge.
Mann has been a professor of Sociology at UCLA since 1987; he was reader in Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1977 to 1987. Mann was also a member of the Advisory Editors Council of the Social Evolution & History Journal.
In 1984, Mann published The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results in the European Journal of Sociology. This work is the foundation for the study of the despotic and infrastructural power of the modern state.
Mann's most famous works include the monumental The Sources of Social Power and The Dark Side of Democracy, spanning the entire 20th century. He also published Incoherent Empire, where he attacks the United States' 'War on Terror' as a clumsy experiment of neo-imperialism.
Mann is currently working on The Sources of Social Power: Globalizations, the third volume in the series. [wikipedia]
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name.
Michael Mann is a British-born professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Visiting Research Professor at Queen's University Belfast. Mann holds dual British and United States citizenships. He received his B.A. in Modern History from the University of Oxford in 1963 and his D.Phil. in Sociology from the same institution in 1971. Mann is currently visiting Professor at the University of Cambridge.
Mann has been a professor of Sociology at UCLA since 1987; he was reader in Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1977 to 1987. Mann was also a member of the Advisory Editors Council of the Social Evolution & History Journal.
In 1984, Mann published The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results in the European Journal of Sociology. This work is the foundation for the study of the despotic and infrastructural power of the modern state.
Mann's most famous works include the monumental The Sources of Social Power and The Dark Side of Democracy, spanning the entire 20th century. He also published Incoherent Empire, where he attacks the United States' 'War on Terror' as a clumsy experiment of neo-imperialism.
Mann is currently working on The Sources of Social Power: Globalizations, the third volume in the series. [wikipedia]
Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 28, 2025
On Wars does not start off as the easiest read. It somehow both plods and races through several chapters of history lessons. Despite this, it turns into something interesting, a demonstration of the contestability of evidence and the contestability of opinions based on that evidence.
“Science”
On Wars feels like a demonstration of both the distinctions and commonalities between “soft” and “hard” science, or at least the stereotypes of them.
On Wars is a summary of the evidence of War on both a political and individual basis, along with the causes and the rationale for it (Mann nods towards realism as an ideal, but one with scanty evidence of actual practice). There is a massive amount of ground to cover, even after the case studies presented in the first half, and I focus on specific illustrations of Mann’s approach.
One example is Mann’s review of the existing popular literature on War. Mann takes Steven Pinker’s thesis on the decline in violence at the geo-political level by reranking the most violent wars of all time, breaking down clearly the inadequacies in Pinker’s methodology and applying his own (with citations). In a separate section, Mann takes on the idea that most soldiers freeze up and fail to fire in battle, looking at how the evidence of discarded weapons at American Civil War battlefields was reviewed and applied.
Mann is not doing the testing himself, but he is providing useful commentary on where he considers the evidence now sits. There is genuine value in doing that for sociology, just as there is genuine value for doing the same for physics and similar phenomena. There are ongoing publications about the eventual fate of the universe where the books themselves are not the gathering of new evidence, but are a useful update as to where it is at.
I want to emphasise this: Books such as Better Angels of Our Nature or movies like The Men Who Stare At Goats wend their way into our cultural subconscious, and it is easy to repeat the statements in them like they are unalterable facts. Regular challenges or confirmations to the information they rest upon is healthy, and I am glad Mann does this. Looking into the psychology of soldiers provides a useful corrective, such as the bright and breezy statements that the Wehrmacht was not an ideologically motivated force in Tank Men.
On the “softer” science side, Mann writes often of competing positions (sometimes he implies he’s decided between them but the text does not explicitly make this clear) and often reads as though he is beset by uncertainty on particular points. While there are plenty of examples of this in “hard” science, it feels that Mann’s points rest on a lot of evidence that is determined by how you set the definitions, which themselves do come off as subjective. I accept that you do need thresholds (such as a thousand dead for a major conflict for counting purposes), but generally I feel like On Wars leads the evidence to Mann’s conclusions at times. In addition, he states at least twice that his position has changed from previous publications, which is good in principle, but perhaps reflective of the squishiness of the subject. For example, categories of power and the exercise of it seem flitter in and out of existence with amorphous boundaries.
The Take Machine
I have seen criticism of Mann’s takes on specific issues. There is no question he has them, such as the American Civil War:
Not even a step on the road to the liberty of African Americans was worth such a price in death, given the southern reaction that was soon to undermine emancipation.
…war crimes:
Invasions of Panama and Grenada were easy victories over minnows, while Serbia was a victory for NATO bombing allied to Croat and Bosnian forces on the ground, bringing Serbia to the negotiating table. None of these wars was authorized by the United Nations, and as wars of aggression they could be considered war crimes, though there is no authority that could impose a criminal trial on the United States.
…or US military prowess:
The United States has not achieved its goals in any significant war since 1945, apart from the Cold War, a remarkable series of failures by the world’s superpower.
He even has one on Trump which might just age very badly:
Trump was chronically distrustful of others and regarded business and political relations as battle zones, but he was not a militarist abroad.
How you feel about Mann’s takes might affect your enjoyment of the book. I outright disagree on certain points he makes about the Russo-Ukraine War. However, I like that he has opinions and that they do rest within the framework of evidence he provides. I think we should read and write contestable stuff to challenge our preconceptions. If there are obvious flaws in his methodology or if he was being purposefully deceitful (like Rufo), then I would reconsider. For now, I don’t mind being occasionally annoyed.
“Science”
On Wars feels like a demonstration of both the distinctions and commonalities between “soft” and “hard” science, or at least the stereotypes of them.
On Wars is a summary of the evidence of War on both a political and individual basis, along with the causes and the rationale for it (Mann nods towards realism as an ideal, but one with scanty evidence of actual practice). There is a massive amount of ground to cover, even after the case studies presented in the first half, and I focus on specific illustrations of Mann’s approach.
One example is Mann’s review of the existing popular literature on War. Mann takes Steven Pinker’s thesis on the decline in violence at the geo-political level by reranking the most violent wars of all time, breaking down clearly the inadequacies in Pinker’s methodology and applying his own (with citations). In a separate section, Mann takes on the idea that most soldiers freeze up and fail to fire in battle, looking at how the evidence of discarded weapons at American Civil War battlefields was reviewed and applied.
Mann is not doing the testing himself, but he is providing useful commentary on where he considers the evidence now sits. There is genuine value in doing that for sociology, just as there is genuine value for doing the same for physics and similar phenomena. There are ongoing publications about the eventual fate of the universe where the books themselves are not the gathering of new evidence, but are a useful update as to where it is at.
I want to emphasise this: Books such as Better Angels of Our Nature or movies like The Men Who Stare At Goats wend their way into our cultural subconscious, and it is easy to repeat the statements in them like they are unalterable facts. Regular challenges or confirmations to the information they rest upon is healthy, and I am glad Mann does this. Looking into the psychology of soldiers provides a useful corrective, such as the bright and breezy statements that the Wehrmacht was not an ideologically motivated force in Tank Men.
On the “softer” science side, Mann writes often of competing positions (sometimes he implies he’s decided between them but the text does not explicitly make this clear) and often reads as though he is beset by uncertainty on particular points. While there are plenty of examples of this in “hard” science, it feels that Mann’s points rest on a lot of evidence that is determined by how you set the definitions, which themselves do come off as subjective. I accept that you do need thresholds (such as a thousand dead for a major conflict for counting purposes), but generally I feel like On Wars leads the evidence to Mann’s conclusions at times. In addition, he states at least twice that his position has changed from previous publications, which is good in principle, but perhaps reflective of the squishiness of the subject. For example, categories of power and the exercise of it seem flitter in and out of existence with amorphous boundaries.
The Take Machine
I have seen criticism of Mann’s takes on specific issues. There is no question he has them, such as the American Civil War:
Not even a step on the road to the liberty of African Americans was worth such a price in death, given the southern reaction that was soon to undermine emancipation.
…war crimes:
Invasions of Panama and Grenada were easy victories over minnows, while Serbia was a victory for NATO bombing allied to Croat and Bosnian forces on the ground, bringing Serbia to the negotiating table. None of these wars was authorized by the United Nations, and as wars of aggression they could be considered war crimes, though there is no authority that could impose a criminal trial on the United States.
…or US military prowess:
The United States has not achieved its goals in any significant war since 1945, apart from the Cold War, a remarkable series of failures by the world’s superpower.
He even has one on Trump which might just age very badly:
Trump was chronically distrustful of others and regarded business and political relations as battle zones, but he was not a militarist abroad.
How you feel about Mann’s takes might affect your enjoyment of the book. I outright disagree on certain points he makes about the Russo-Ukraine War. However, I like that he has opinions and that they do rest within the framework of evidence he provides. I think we should read and write contestable stuff to challenge our preconceptions. If there are obvious flaws in his methodology or if he was being purposefully deceitful (like Rufo), then I would reconsider. For now, I don’t mind being occasionally annoyed.
December 29, 2023
Michael Mann's "On Wars" is an ambitious undertaking. Spanning continents and millennia, it attempts to uncover the driving forces behind human warfare, from the Roman Republic to the modern Middle East. This endeavor demands both breadth and depth, and while Mann's erudition is undeniable, "On Wars" suffers from an internal tension between its sweeping scope and nuanced arguments.
The book's strong points lie in its sheer ambition. Mann challenges popular narratives of war as inevitable or primarily driven by material factors. Instead, he emphasizes the role of power--a complex interplay of political organization, ideologies, and emotions--in shaping the decision to wage war. He convincingly argues that leaders often choose war irrationally, driven by miscalculations, hubris, and cultural pressures. By showcasing the unexpected outcomes of numerous historical conflicts, he undermines deterministic claims about war's inevitability.
Mann's comparative lens is another compelling aspect. Examining diverse societies across time and space allows him to identify both overarching patterns and crucial contextual differences. He demonstrates how warfare evolves alongside other social structures, adapting to technological advancements and shifting political landscapes. This comparative approach offers valuable insights into the dynamic nature of war and challenges essentialist arguments about universal causes.
However, the book's ambition also reveals its limitations. The vast scope leads to certain regions and periods receiving cursory treatment, sacrificing depth for breadth. Notably, the treatment of pre-colonial warfare, especially indigenous American conflicts, feels underdeveloped and relies heavily on secondary sources. Moreover, the desire to cover such a wide range of wars can occasionally lead to generalizations that gloss over crucial internal inconsistencies within societies.
Another point of contention is Mann's focus on power elites. While the book acknowledges the agency of soldiers and civilians, it primarily analyzes war as a top-down phenomenon driven by leaders' calculations and ideologies. This focus underplays the role of grassroots movements, economic factors, and cultural factors in shaping the decision to wage war and even influencing its outcomes. By prioritizing the agency of power-wielders, Mann potentially overlooks other significant forces at play.
Furthermore, the book's emphasis on irrationality as a driver of war, while insightful, can sometimes feel overstated. While acknowledging the role of miscalculations and emotions, Mann doesn't adequately analyze the internal rationales that leaders, however flawed, might construct to justify their actions. Additionally, by focusing on irrationality, the book risks underestimating the strategic calculations and tactical considerations that also play a crucial role in warfare.
Despite these limitations, "On Wars" remains a valuable contribution to understanding the complex phenomenon of war. Mann's erudite analysis and ambitious comparative approach offer fresh perspectives on the historical tapestry of conflict. The book's supreme strength--in my humble opinion--lies in its emphasis on power dynamics and the often irrational choices that lead to war. Yet, its sweeping scope necessitates deeper dives into specific regions and contexts, and a more nuanced understanding of the diverse forces that shape the decision to wage war and its long-term consequences. Ultimately, "On Wars" invites further inquiry and discussion, making it a significant contribution to the ongoing conversation about one of humanity's most enduring and destructive endeavors, and should be read, studied, and critiqued by all students of war, peace and, diplomacy.
The book's strong points lie in its sheer ambition. Mann challenges popular narratives of war as inevitable or primarily driven by material factors. Instead, he emphasizes the role of power--a complex interplay of political organization, ideologies, and emotions--in shaping the decision to wage war. He convincingly argues that leaders often choose war irrationally, driven by miscalculations, hubris, and cultural pressures. By showcasing the unexpected outcomes of numerous historical conflicts, he undermines deterministic claims about war's inevitability.
Mann's comparative lens is another compelling aspect. Examining diverse societies across time and space allows him to identify both overarching patterns and crucial contextual differences. He demonstrates how warfare evolves alongside other social structures, adapting to technological advancements and shifting political landscapes. This comparative approach offers valuable insights into the dynamic nature of war and challenges essentialist arguments about universal causes.
However, the book's ambition also reveals its limitations. The vast scope leads to certain regions and periods receiving cursory treatment, sacrificing depth for breadth. Notably, the treatment of pre-colonial warfare, especially indigenous American conflicts, feels underdeveloped and relies heavily on secondary sources. Moreover, the desire to cover such a wide range of wars can occasionally lead to generalizations that gloss over crucial internal inconsistencies within societies.
Another point of contention is Mann's focus on power elites. While the book acknowledges the agency of soldiers and civilians, it primarily analyzes war as a top-down phenomenon driven by leaders' calculations and ideologies. This focus underplays the role of grassroots movements, economic factors, and cultural factors in shaping the decision to wage war and even influencing its outcomes. By prioritizing the agency of power-wielders, Mann potentially overlooks other significant forces at play.
Furthermore, the book's emphasis on irrationality as a driver of war, while insightful, can sometimes feel overstated. While acknowledging the role of miscalculations and emotions, Mann doesn't adequately analyze the internal rationales that leaders, however flawed, might construct to justify their actions. Additionally, by focusing on irrationality, the book risks underestimating the strategic calculations and tactical considerations that also play a crucial role in warfare.
Despite these limitations, "On Wars" remains a valuable contribution to understanding the complex phenomenon of war. Mann's erudite analysis and ambitious comparative approach offer fresh perspectives on the historical tapestry of conflict. The book's supreme strength--in my humble opinion--lies in its emphasis on power dynamics and the often irrational choices that lead to war. Yet, its sweeping scope necessitates deeper dives into specific regions and contexts, and a more nuanced understanding of the diverse forces that shape the decision to wage war and its long-term consequences. Ultimately, "On Wars" invites further inquiry and discussion, making it a significant contribution to the ongoing conversation about one of humanity's most enduring and destructive endeavors, and should be read, studied, and critiqued by all students of war, peace and, diplomacy.
November 24, 2023
A disappointing release from such a renowned sociologist, in some of the chapters it shows the risk of trying to write about ongoing wars when you know nothing about them, and this diminishes the value of the book considerably and makes you wonder how reliable he can be on the others, like when he seriously implies that one of the main reasons for the imperialist wars of the 20th and 21st century was because the leaders of those countries wanted to spread democracy, but sadly those private economic interests get in the way of those noble objectives.
You'll notice that in his chapter about the russia/ukraine war and china he barely provides any references, and that is because his statements are not only incorrect but a lot of them are complete fabrications with ample evidence to disprove them like the documented violations to the Minsk agreements which the UN keeps a record of, the leaked Nuland call that shows 2014 was a west coup, the statements from the heads of state and senators admitting they just signed them to buy some time to reinforce the military for a big offensive, etc. It is likely that some of those were made after he wrote the chapter but that just shows why it is not a good idea to try to include them in this type of book if they are developing as you write and you have a very narrow view of it across a mass of propaganda, it feels like his main source for that chapter was what he heard in CNN or other propaganda outlets.
I'm just surprised he didn't say that russia blew up their own nord stream pipeline, but that was probably just because it happened when the book was already being produced.
I still highly recommend his other works about the sources of social power, fascist and the dark side of democracy.
You'll notice that in his chapter about the russia/ukraine war and china he barely provides any references, and that is because his statements are not only incorrect but a lot of them are complete fabrications with ample evidence to disprove them like the documented violations to the Minsk agreements which the UN keeps a record of, the leaked Nuland call that shows 2014 was a west coup, the statements from the heads of state and senators admitting they just signed them to buy some time to reinforce the military for a big offensive, etc. It is likely that some of those were made after he wrote the chapter but that just shows why it is not a good idea to try to include them in this type of book if they are developing as you write and you have a very narrow view of it across a mass of propaganda, it feels like his main source for that chapter was what he heard in CNN or other propaganda outlets.
I'm just surprised he didn't say that russia blew up their own nord stream pipeline, but that was probably just because it happened when the book was already being produced.
I still highly recommend his other works about the sources of social power, fascist and the dark side of democracy.
Read
December 24, 2023DNF. Not good to listen to because pretty dry.
Alternative that gets to the point (war is about the jackasses on top of society playing pointless games that sometimes kill millions of the little people) more entertainingly:
The 33 Strategies of War
Alternative that gets to the point (war is about the jackasses on top of society playing pointless games that sometimes kill millions of the little people) more entertainingly:
The 33 Strategies of War
April 17, 2024
Excellent analysis of wars throughout human history. If you want a brief review of wars and the thought process behind it over a vast amount of time, I highly recommend this.
If you are a Putin bootlicker, you WILL NOT enjoy certain parts where the author calls him out for his warmongering.
If you are a Putin bootlicker, you WILL NOT enjoy certain parts where the author calls him out for his warmongering.
October 27, 2023
An indepth look at wars throughout recorded history. Well worth the read.
March 31, 2025
I am recommending this book for my strategists and planner friends. A little political commentary which I can do without but over all a great book with much to take away.
December 1, 2023
Since humans started agriculture centuries before it looks like wars started I wonder if domestication of animals spurred people to become parasites on neighboring humans. The author doesn't believe humans are hard-wired for war but it seems to arise when a society is unequal enough to have an underclass that will actually go to battle for the elites. That takes a different attitude towards other humans that small societies don't have. - Henry Kissinger has died. Did this book mention him? Yes. One sentence. I consider this a deep failure of scholarship. What excuses do the rulers use to go to war? There are always sycophants who can deliver the right message. I've read enough.
January 29, 2025
So much information and promise, but this book falls short of it's purpose. Listed below are the main points of his book that I had trouble reconciling.
The author suggests that several other leaders in the field of war (S.L.A. Marshall, Steven Pinker, Dave Grossman, and a few others) have faulty methodology and pokes some holes in their assertions, but offers no solid proof or alternate thesis other than, "I've shown mistakes in their process, now believe me without any additional proof". That's too a bridge too far.
Near the end of the book he delves into climate change and it's impact on the global order with little to no rationale. This serves no purpose. I am not a climate change denier, but this portion of the book is unnecessary and isn't part of a greater narrative.
The authors descriptions of war and it's causes from Ancient China throughout Europe to the present era (including Ukraine) are quite good and compelling, but he doesn't include several key conflicts (Soviet Union in Afghanistan, China-Vietnam War of 1979) where a mountain of data exists. The book is also missing a compelling conclusion that summarizes his findings and thoughts for the future.
The author suggests that several other leaders in the field of war (S.L.A. Marshall, Steven Pinker, Dave Grossman, and a few others) have faulty methodology and pokes some holes in their assertions, but offers no solid proof or alternate thesis other than, "I've shown mistakes in their process, now believe me without any additional proof". That's too a bridge too far.
Near the end of the book he delves into climate change and it's impact on the global order with little to no rationale. This serves no purpose. I am not a climate change denier, but this portion of the book is unnecessary and isn't part of a greater narrative.
The authors descriptions of war and it's causes from Ancient China throughout Europe to the present era (including Ukraine) are quite good and compelling, but he doesn't include several key conflicts (Soviet Union in Afghanistan, China-Vietnam War of 1979) where a mountain of data exists. The book is also missing a compelling conclusion that summarizes his findings and thoughts for the future.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews