The Battle for Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital

by Christopher A. Lawrence

On 24 February 2022, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, unleashed an attack on Ukraine that developed into the most significant conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Fought over the same ground that the Germans and the Soviet Union battled on between 1941 and 1944, Russia attempted to advance to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and replace its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with a puppet regime. Facing determined resistance, the Russians failed to reach the city, being compelled to withdraw and redirect their forces to other fronts.

The Battle of Kyiv tells the story of the heroic resilience of the Ukrainians over the military forces of a country which has more than three times its population and an economy almost ten times larger. This book is also an analysis of the enormous support given to Ukraine, both politically and militarily, by NATO and other nations, without which Ukraine’s military might have failed to beat back the invaders.

The author explores the first phase of the war, during which Russian armor, mechanized and air mobile troops drove on Kyiv, surrounded Chernigov, seized Kherson twice, and threatened the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The United States’ intelligence services estimated that the Russians would seize Kyiv within three days. They offered to evacuate President Zelensky back to Lvov. His alleged response to the Americans was: ‘I need ammunition, not a ride.’ He and his government stayed in Kyiv and the battle lines were drawn.

The Russians continued their offensive. As well as bearing down on Kyiv and Kherson, Putin’s troops also threatened Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, Mykolaiv, and the beleaguered port city of Mariupol. This book covers all the fighting for these areas up until Russia’s subsequent withdraw from the region around Kyiv. It addresses the military operations on the ground, the destruction of the buildings and the Ukrainian infrastructure, the suffering of the civilian population and the day-by-day struggles for survival.

Writing as the battle raged on, the author examines the conflict with an unparalleled immediacy and poignancy. This also means that The Battle of Kyiv is an important historical document, reflecting not subsequent outcomes, but depicting the uncertainty and anxiety faced not just by the contesting forces, but by the rest of the world as the result of the war in Ukraine hung in the balance.

256 pages, Hardcover

First published October 30, 2023

About the author

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict.

Reviews

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Автор поступил очень некрасиво, назвав эту книгу The Battle for Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital. Поэтому, прежде всего я должен отметить, что эта книга НЕ является книгой посвящённой конкретно битве за Киев 2022 года. На самом деле эта книга является очень кратким обзором всего военного конфликта между Россией и Украиной, начиная с 2014 года. Но и это не будет полной характеристикой этой книги. Автор начинает свою книгу, т.е. первую главу с истории появления Украины, с истории древнего Киева. Это у нас какой год? Как пишет автор, 482 год. Возникает вопрос, зачем? Ответ простой: чтобы увеличить объём книги.

По существу книга начинается с событий Майдана в 2014 году, свержением Януковича и начала военных действий на востоке Украины. Тут автор в стиле Википедии просто пересказывает цепь всем известных событий, но делает это очень и очень поверхностно, ибо книга всё же не о военных событиях 2014 года. Где-то ближе к середине, начинается история уже современного военного конфликта между Россией и Украиной. Автор зачем-то процитирует то самое знаменитое выступление Путина от 24 февраля 2022 года, которое я смотрел в прямом эфире в 5 часов утра. Зачем это было сделано автором, так же понятно – для увеличения объёма книги. Автор не анализирует политические события, он просто пересказывает новости. Поэтому не стоит в этой книге искать политический анализ событий, включая политический анализ действия российских властей и Путина лично. Всё что читатель узнает из этой книги, он может легко обнаружить на сайте Википедии или даже в документальных фильмах на данную тему, которые можно найти и посмотреть совершенно бесплатно на сайте YouTube.

Мне могу возразить, сказав, что автор, главным образом, является военным аналитиком, а не политологом. Это действительно так и в книге действительно большой упор делается на рассмотрение военной составляющей. Проблема только в том, что даже в этом вопросе автор использует военные сводки. Те читатели кто смотрел и смотрит сегодня видеоролики с военной сводкой о происходящем непосредственно на фронте, узнают знакомый стиль. Я не являюсь большим любителем просмотра военных сводок, т.е. какая армия и какое село взяло под контроль и какую военную бригаду разбили под тем или иным городом, меня не интересует. Но главным является даже не это, а абсолютно бессмысленное перечисление типов войск и входящих в их состав подразделения. Огромное количество страниц выглядят следующим образом.

This is a total of 18 active brigades deploying at least 892 tanks. This is still an armor moderate force with 5.3 tanks per thousand soldiers.
List of Active Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades
Unit Name Type
1st Tank Brigade Regular
4th Tank Brigade Reserve
17th Tank Brigade Regular
10th Mountain Assault Brigade Regular
14th Mechanized Brigade Regular
24th Mechanized Brigade Regular
28th Mechanized Brigade Regular
30th Mechanized Brigade Regular
<…>
List of Other Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades
3rd Tank Brigade Reserve
5th Tank Brigade Reserve
11th Motorized Infantry Brigade Reserve
15th Mechanized Brigade Reserve
33rd Mechanized Brigade Reserve
60th Mechanized Brigade Reserve
<…>
Tank Brigade was only partly manned and held in the area of Odesa for the first part of the war. The 14th Tank Brigade (reserve) is not listed as it is currently still inactive. Other separate maneuver battalions include:
12th Tank Battalion
54th Reconnaissance Battalion
74th Reconnaissance Battalion
130th Reconnaissance Battalion
131st Reconnaissance Battalion
143rd Reconnaissance Battalion
The Ukrainian Army consists of eleven artillery brigades, with two of them reserve. Most brigades consist of four artillery battalions and an additional anti-tank battalion with 26th, 40th, 45th and 55th Artillery Brigades. The 44th Artillery Brigade had only three artillery battalions and an anti-tank battalion. They are:
15th Artillery Recon Brigade
19th Missile Brigade
26th Artillery Brigade
27th Rocket Artillery Brigade
<…>
Each brigade is between 1,000 to 2,200 people, ideally including 3 infantry battalions, 3 artillery battalions, a tank company and a reconnaissance company. The Air Assault Forces add up to another 16 maneuver battalions to the Ukrainian Army, if the brigades were fully up the strength (which may not have been the case). The Special Operation Forces are 4,000 strong and include 2 units that may add 2 or more battalions to the maneuver forces:
3rd Special Purpose Regiment “Prince Sviatoslav the Brave”
8th Special Purpose Regiment “Iziaslav Mstislavich”

Если кто-то думает, что это лишь две-три страницы, то нет. Автор зачем-то включил в книгу всю возможную статистику по российской и украинской армии, которая выглядит вышеобозначенным способом. Опять же, как и с древней историей Киевской Руси, хочется спросить автора, зачем?

Но если же говорить о том, как выглядит большая часть, то вот вам типичный отрывок из книги:

Ukraine lost at least nine aircraft on the first day (24 February). This included four MiG-29s lost in combat, along with an Su-24 and an Su-27 lost on the ground. Nine civilian aircraft were also recorded as heavily damaged or destroyed at Hostomel airfield this first day. The following day only one Ukrainian aircraft was destroyed, an Su-27 shot down over Kyiv by a Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile. Its pilot died and the plane crashed into a residential complex.

In contrast the Russians lost an Su-25 on the first day, along with three helicopters shot down over the Kyiv reservoir by Ukrainian MANPADSs and anti-tank missiles. They also lost an An-26 on the first or second day of the war (as did the Ukrainians on the first day of the war).

Ukrainian plane losses were still high in the subsequent three days with three Su-25s shot down on the 26th, with two of the pilots being killed near Kherson, ten aircraft lost on 27 February and an Su-27 and Mi-8 helicopter lost on the 28th. Among the ten aircraft lost on the 27th were six MiG-29s caught on the ground as were two Su-24s. Lost in the air was another Su-24 and an Su-25. This is loss of twenty-one modern combat aircraft by Ukraine in the first five days of the war. While this was a favorable exchange by the Russian Air Force, it was not sweeping the Ukrainians from the skies.

Более скучного текста трудно найти. Поэтому-то и не понятно, для кого эта книга написана. Обычную аудиторию подобное перечисление всего и вся лишь вгонит в сон, а военные специалисты и так об этом знают. Поэтому-то мне и кажется, что эта книга, как и многие другие книги на данную тему, написаны в погоне за $. Сегодня российско-украинский военный конфликт продаётся как никогда хорошо и люди, о которых никто ещё вчера ничего не знал, могут не только стать известными в качестве так называемых «экспертов», но и заработать неплохие деньги (на этой теме). Эта книга ничего нового не предлагает, не исползает знания автора в военной сфере, чтобы предложить военный анализ, она просто на просто пересказывает военные сводки, что делались каждый день, начиная с февраля 2022 года.

***

The author did a very ugly thing by calling this book The Battle for Kyiv: The Fight for Ukraine’s Capital. So, first of all, I must point out that this book is NOT a book specifically about the Battle for Kiev 2022. This book is a very brief overview of the entire military conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014. But that would not be a complete characterization of this book either. The author starts his book, i.e. the first chapter, with the history of the emergence of Ukraine, with the history of ancient Kiev. This is what year we have? As the author writes, 482. The question arises, why? The answer is simple: to increase the volume of the book.

In essence, the book begins with the events of Maidan in 2014, the overthrow of Yanukovych, and the beginning of hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Here the author in the style of Wikipedia retells the chain of well-known events, but does it very superficially because the book is still not about the military events of 2014. Somewhere near the middle, the history of the current military conflict between Russia and Ukraine begins. The author for some reason quotes the famous Putin speech of February 24, 2022, which I watched live at 5 am. The author's explanation of why this was done is also clear - to increase the volume of the book. The author does not analyze political events, he retells the news. Therefore, you should not look for a political analysis of events in this book, including a political analysis of the actions of the Russian authorities and Putin personally. Everything that the reader learns from this book, he can easily find on Wikipedia or even in documentaries on the subject, which can be found and watched for free on YouTube.

One could counter me by saying that the author is primarily a military analyst, not a political one. This is indeed true and the book does place a great deal of emphasis on looking at the military component. The only problem is that even in this matter the author uses military reports. Those readers who have watched and are watching today's videos with military reports on what is happening directly at the front will recognize the familiar style. I am not a big fan of looking at military reports, i.e. which army and which village took control and which military brigade was defeated near this or that city does not interest me. But the main thing is not even this, but a meaningless enumeration of types of troops and their constituent units. A huge number of pages look as follows.

This is a total of 18 active brigades deploying at least 892 tanks. This is still an armor moderate force with 5.3 tanks per thousand soldiers.
List of Active Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades
Unit Name Type
1st Tank Brigade Regular
4th Tank Brigade Reserve
17th Tank Brigade Regular
10th Mountain Assault Brigade Regular
14th Mechanized Brigade Regular
24th Mechanized Brigade Regular
28th Mechanized Brigade Regular
30th Mechanized Brigade Regular
<…>
List of Other Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades
3rd Tank Brigade Reserve
5th Tank Brigade Reserve
11th Motorized Infantry Brigade Reserve
15th Mechanized Brigade Reserve
33rd Mechanized Brigade Reserve
60th Mechanized Brigade Reserve
<…>
Tank Brigade was only partly manned and held in the area of Odesa for the first part of the war. The 14th Tank Brigade (reserve) is not listed as it is currently still inactive. Other separate maneuver battalions include:
12th Tank Battalion
54th Reconnaissance Battalion
74th Reconnaissance Battalion
130th Reconnaissance Battalion
131st Reconnaissance Battalion
143rd Reconnaissance Battalion
The Ukrainian Army consists of eleven artillery brigades, with two of them reserve. Most brigades consist of four artillery battalions and an additional anti-tank battalion with 26th, 40th, 45th and 55th Artillery Brigades. The 44th Artillery Brigade had only three artillery battalions and an anti-tank battalion. They are:
15th Artillery Recon Brigade
19th Missile Brigade
26th Artillery Brigade
27th Rocket Artillery Brigade
<…>
Each brigade is between 1,000 to 2,200 people, ideally including 3 infantry battalions, 3 artillery battalions, a tank company and a reconnaissance company. The Air Assault Forces add up to another 16 maneuver battalions to the Ukrainian Army, if the brigades were fully up the strength (which may not have been the case). The Special Operation Forces are 4,000 strong and include 2 units that may add 2 or more battalions to the maneuver forces:
3rd Special Purpose Regiment “Prince Sviatoslav the Brave”
8th Special Purpose Regiment “Iziaslav Mstislavich”

If anyone thinks it's only two or three pages, it's not. The author for some reason included in the book all possible statistics on the Russian and Ukrainian army, which looks the above mentioned way. Again, as with the ancient history of Kievan Rus, one would like to ask the author - why?

But if we talk about how most of it looks, here is a typical excerpt from the book:

Ukraine lost at least nine aircraft on the first day (24 February). This included four MiG-29s lost in combat, along with an Su-24 and an Su-27 lost on the ground. Nine civilian aircraft were also recorded as heavily damaged or destroyed at Hostomel airfield this first day. The following day only one Ukrainian aircraft was destroyed, an Su-27 shot down over Kyiv by a Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile. Its pilot died and the plane crashed into a residential complex.

In contrast the Russians lost an Su-25 on the first day, along with three helicopters shot down over the Kyiv reservoir by Ukrainian MANPADSs and anti-tank missiles. They also lost an An-26 on the first or second day of the war (as did the Ukrainians on the first day of the war).

Ukrainian plane losses were still high in the subsequent three days with three Su-25s shot down on the 26th, with two of the pilots being killed near Kherson, ten aircraft lost on 27 February and an Su-27 and Mi-8 helicopter lost on the 28th. Among the ten aircraft lost on the 27th were six MiG-29s caught on the ground as were two Su-24s. Lost in the air was another Su-24 and an Su-25. This is loss of twenty-one modern combat aircraft by Ukraine in the first five days of the war. While this was a favorable exchange by the Russian Air Force, it was not sweeping the Ukrainians from the skies.

A more boring text is hard to find. That is why it is not clear to whom this book is written. An ordinary audience will be put to sleep by such an enumeration of everything, while military specialists already know about it. That is why it seems to me that this book, as well as many other books on this topic, are written in pursuit of $. Today the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict is selling better than ever, and people about whom nobody knew anything yesterday can not only become known as so-called “experts” but also make good money (on this topic). This book offers nothing new, nor does it utilize the author's military knowledge to offer military analysis, it simply rehashes the military reports that have been done every day since February 2022.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 3 out of 5]

Christopher Lawrence, a military analyst at the Dupuy Insititue (a defense intelligence think tank), and a military historian specializing in Soviet/Russian military history has written what can only be seen as a highly preliminary guesstimation of a highly complex, nuanced, aspect of a broader conflict. Since the war is still underway, and since for now those of us in the West who observe the conflict have no access to Russian documentation, it can only ever be said that at this stage, studies of this nature can only give a partial assessment and analysis.
That said ,Lawrence does a decent job of sifting through both sides obvious propaganda (this is likely the most obnoxiously propagandized conflict in at least my lifetime, and certainly since WW2), and the passion driven, weapons grade, hopium, and copium dispensed by both sides, and their cheerleaders in the West, to come up with a reasonable guesstimate of what occurred, and why, north of the Ukrainian capital in the first two months of the War.
Apparently this is the first of a proposed trilogy, with all three books dealing with the 2022 aspect of the conflict. The author mentioned a separate book on the war in the south, with an especial focus on Mariupol (thus far, the most complete Russian triumph of the war), and another on the main theater which is the Donbas. While these can still only be highly educated guesstimates, as this book was, they'll still serve as a useful tool for future analysis of the analysis once more information comes out, and we can get the Russian side of the story, though likely only years from now.
Lawrence begins with a brief note of his own relation to the story, being married to a Russian, and having already written extensively on the Eastern Front's Kursk campaign of 1943 (ironically, very much near where most of the heaviest fighting is still raging, now).
The author intended to be fair, and I think in the main he succeeded, as he is not afraid to call out Ukraine, or Washington, either for their mistakes, blunders, or obvious propaganda. (Did I mention how ubiquitous the propaganda is in this war?) So if you're thin of skin, and a cheerleader on the far sidelines (leave it to Americans to make a war not involving Americans, or American interests, and find a way to have it revolve entirely around us...maddening), this book will offend you, as he doesn't really pull punches. Though he is professional, and writes diplomatically.
As is pretty standard fare for studies on the conflict that have been coming out in the last year, he spends some time on a brief tour of the civilizational history of the two nations.
Going from the migratory Rus, from Scandinavia, all the way to the quiet death of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of the CIS, and the ever straining relations between Ukraine, and Russia, in a bit less than 50 pages seemed both rushed, and at times unnecessary.
Throughout the discussion on the leadup to the war, Lawrence, who is open about his slight pro-Ukraine bias, both presents as true the Ukrainian version of the reasons for war...as well as the Russian. In truth it's not at all disingenuous as both sides had valid points to make concerning the overall, immediate, causes, but I found the entire discussion a tad tangential to the main focus.
The meat of the book begins with an analytical comparison of the two armies, their doctrine, training, leadership style, and equipment comparisons. The origin point for both the modern Russian, and Ukrainian, armies is the Red Army, and many ways both are still highly influenced by their shared military traditions. That is both a positive, and a negative.
The Red Army did some things quite well, and others bafflingly, and appallingly, bad. On the whole the Russians inherited more of the Red Army than their cousins, while the Ukrainians began to experiment with limited additions of Western doctrine, and methodologies. As yet, with even the recent fall of the Ukrainian fortress town of Avdiivka/Avdeevka, the War is still ongoing, with no signs of a rapid conclusion, so we can't really say whether or not said Ukrainian experentation with Western doctrine availed them of much.
However, we can, and Lawrence does, at length, go into how the Red Army tradition of the Russians, specifically their overly rigid, slow moving, top-down command structure has handicapped their efforts. That said Lawrence goes to lengths to point out that the main Western and Ukrainian narrative of a plucky, brave, heroic Ukrainian Army defending against a brutishly stupid, enormous horde of mindless, amateurish automatons, is simply nonsense.
The Russians have showcased, numerous times, their professionalism, and their ability to adapt, improvise, and make snap decisions in fluid situations. However, it must be pointed out that not all Russian units are equal to each other, and that the VDV, has a clear advantage over the rest of the force, as the VDV is allowed a wider leeway in terms of individual initiative in comparison to the rest of the Army. An Army that is oft held hostage to the whims of Shouigu, and Gerasimov, sometimes hundreds of miles behind the front, with badly outdated information. One can see where such a rigid command structure hampers fluid operations on the ground (the Russians tend to lack a cultural trend within armies such as the Americans, Germans, and French, of men willing to flagrantly violate orders to achieve victory...and be proudly defiant in doing so. Then again, in their system, said officer often loses his job, or possibilities of advancement, while Napoleon, Lee, Grant, or Frederick would have promoted said individual with a laugh).
Even so, the Russians have won some victories in this war, as should be obvious, and are even now making gains exploiting their success at Avdiivka/Avdeevka.
So perhaps their methods aren't entirely flawed. At least they work for that cultural mindset.
Lawrence's narration of the actual course of the early stages of the War is where I have to score the book a tad lower at only three stars. And it isn't his fault. Open source materials are often infected with propaganda (have I mentioned how annoying the propaganda is in this war?), and the information is only partially complete, what with the lack of the opposing viewpoint, operational security concerns, and the sheer fog of war.
Despite the skeletal thin framework upon which Lawrence can build a narrative, he does a fairly good job with what he has.
Lawrence makes it quite clear that the Russians launched the invasion based upon false assumptions fed by very poor intelligence (if, like me, you lost sleep on Telegram observing this conflict, you're going to remember sometime in March when Putin purged his intelligence services...a clear indication that he was not, at all, pleased with their performance up till then). As such they invaded with an overly small force, given far too many, widely scattered objectives, with a shoestring logistical budget to keep them moving, and no clearly apparent central focus to what they hoped to achieve.
It seems clear to me, at least, and Lawrence tends to agree, that the main idea was a decapitation strike on the Ukrainian political leadership with a show of force around the eastern half of the country. Apparently they weren't expecting serious resistance (why else would a company of riot police be enmeshed in the main invasion columns spearhead? Those poor bastards got ambushed, and largely massacred, only days into the war) when they went in, and had to rapidly improvise a new operational plan on the fly when almost nothing went right the first week of the war.
About the only thing that did go well in those first days was the southern offensive.
This established a land-bridge to Crimea, and set the conditions for the Russians to surround Mariupol with concentric operations, and destroy the Ukrainian forces trapped therein.
Beyond that, however, little went correctly, though the perception most of us have of what did occur in this period needs adjusting as Lawrence shows.
First of all, for all the US Intelligence given to the Ukrainians in the leadup to the war, they were caught utterly flat-footed in the main sectors (Kyiv/Kiev, and the Donbas), and had left the south largely undefended. Outside of the grouping of forces which held Mariupol, the south was almost naked of Ukrainian forces.
Secondly, the Russians usage of the BTG system (Battalion Tactical Groups), which Lawrence argues was due to there not being an official declaration war, so only the contractniki could go in, while the conscripts, by Russian law, had to remain behind, was both an aid, and a hindrance. For a force expecting no serious resistance, the BTG's were a perfect, rapid, highly mobile little formations whose diminutive size allowed them to cover ground more rapidly than larger, heavier, formations. However, they lacked infantry, and were top heavy in vehicles, but lacked supporting troops to hold terrain, or clear it. While this did mean heavy vehicle losses once fighting, almost immediately, began, it also meant relatively few Russian human losses. When a vehicle gets hit, it's about a fifty-fifty proposition wether any human casualties will occur within. Most often, the crew bails out, though there might be one crewman injured. Fatalities in vehicles aren't all that common (though when they occur, they're gruesomely spectacular enough that it skews the perception). So while the Russians lost a genuinely quite large array of equipment, their daily human loss rates were also quite low.
That's one advantage, of a sorts, of having few infantry formations.
Thirdly, the majority of the fighting was very small scale, often platoon, or company sized, actions, and much of it was in the Russian rear. Bypassed Ukrainian formations had a field day waylaying Russian logistical columns, while the Russians, by now a tad confused as to what the hell was really going on (as their pre-invasion assumptions proved to be utterly unfounded), had a tough time turning elements of their still advancing columns around to swat aside those pesky Ukrainian Territorial and National Guard units plinking their supply columns.
Even Scott Ritter (a tad of a dubious source, to be honest, as, well, propaganda) admitted that the early stages of the Russian invasion was a case of the Russians controlling the main highways....and nothing else. This made it impossible to setup secure logistical bases, and to supply the spearheads with the fuel, food, ammo, and spare parts needed to keep going.
The little Battle for Hostomel Airport is, in microcosm, a case study of the early invasion. The Russian VDV and Spetsnaz forces managed to take the airport, but Ukrainian counterattacking forces rapidly pushed them out, while the planned reinforcing airlift was canceled as the Russians didn't assume the Ukrainians would resist the initial heliborn landing. So when the fighting catered the runway, the IL-76's couldn't land, and were turned around inside Belarus.
(The Ukrainian claim of shooting down one of these, and killing hundreds of Russian airborne, is nonsense. First of all, the IL-76 lacks the carrying capacity for the numbers claimed, and no wreckage has ever been discovered. Not to mention, such an event would have been broadcast all over Russian Telegram, and other easily accessible social media platforms).
With bridged blown up in their paths, with the Ukrainians forming too many blocking detachments in too many small towns, which considerably slowed the advance, and with fuel, and food, rapidly running out, the Russians called the northern sector off.
Lawrence points out that this Russian defeat was not the catastrophic rout portrayed in the West.
For one, the Ukrainians were in no position to pursue. The few times they did, the Russians clobbered them with air, and artillery. And even had they wanted to, they themselves were still highly disorganized, and still forming reserve, and call up formations. Not to mention they lacked the equipment to allow for rapid pursuits, anyway.
Also the Russians took relatively few human losses (outside of a handful of roughly handled units, like those bad luck riot cops mentioned earlier, and the 28th Guards Tank Division), although they did lose quite a few vehicles. Not having a lot of deployable infantry was both an aid to rapid maneuver, as well as a hindrance to take care of all those bypassed Ukrainian forces early on.
The Russians fairly easily redeployed these forces to the Donbas, and focused their efforts there. And still have.
As mentioned earlier, Lawrence has to couch his narrative in conditional language because we simply don't know what we think we do, and it will take years, after the culmination of the War, before we do. (As someone working on their own book, on a campaign in the War Between the States, I can tell you that the debates are still fierce over a century and a half later). Lawrence tries hard not to overtly take sides, though he is admittedly pro-Ukraine. And if he seems harsh on the Russians, he also pulls no punches with the Ukrainians for their blunders, and tended to take some satisfaction at taking shots at the American Intelligence Community, what with how often he did so.
Overall, I think the book was worth reading, if for nothing else than to lay a framework for future analytical efforts, and hope the author does finish his proposed other books on the Donbas, and the south, and Mariupol.

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

The subject matter of this book was very timely; the conflict is entering its third calendar year with no signs of peace. The only gripe I have with this book is the HUGE number of typos. It's almost like there was no proofreader at all. Other than that, it was a good book. Modern war studies, to me, fall into one of two categories: those of interest and worth reading, and those that are simply a regurgitation of facts and data. This was one of the former. A worthy effort.

[Tyson Wetzel · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some very good ideas information and details on many aspects of the Russian invasion, particularly the Battle for Hostomel Airport, which was critical in the fight for Kyiv. That said, the narrative is severely lacking, it devolves into a listing of units participating and loss rates. The lessons learned chapter at the end was very good though and saved this from a 2-star review.

[Tom Mahan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very in depth reportage of the first few months of the war. Forces used by both sides, and a good rundown of the actual strength of the units involved. Also a good description of the equipment used by both sides, tanks, IFV etc. etc. Hope to see a follow up on the last two years of the war.